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International insolvencies have proliferated in the past decade, but the law
of international insolvency has not kept pace. The United States does not have
a single treaty with another country dealing with cross-border insolvencies' and
many other countries have made relatively little progress in providing for a
comprehensive legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvencies."
Recently, however, significant strides have been taken to fill this void. In 1997,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
adopted a Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law). The Model
Law provides a mechanism to coordinate cross-border insolvencies and is
designed to be adopted by nations; it is not a treaty. The United States National
Bankruptcy Review Commission unanimously recommended the Model Law's
• Ronald J. Silverman is a partner in the law firm of Bingham Dana LLP, resident in the firm's
New York City office. Mr. Silverman gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Matthew A. Schwartz in
preparing this article.
I. Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code does address the issue of international insolvency. Section
304 permits the United States to act in an ancillary role to insolvency proceedings pending in the debtor's
home country. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 304 (1999).
2. The Nordic Convention (Scandinavia) and the Bustamante Convention (South America) are
systems that have been adopted by segments of the international community, but have been of limited
application.
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adoption. The Model Law is now pending before Congress, and if accepted,
would be enacted as a new Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This article summarizes the Model Law and illuminates its most
significant aspects. Section (I) recounts the problems facing international
insolvency and discusses the goals and achievements the Model Law is
designed to accomplish. This section also defines the scope of the Model Law,
an understanding of which is essential to a comfortable grasp of the Model
Law's application. Section (II) describes a main component of the Model Law:
providing access for a foreign representative or foreign creditor to the courts of
an enacting state and providing for equality of treatment for such foreign
creditors with their domestic counterparts. Section (ill) details another major
element of the Model Law, the concept of recognition of a foreign
representative and a foreign proceeding, and discusses the types of relief that
follow recognition. Section (IV) highlights the backbone of the Model Law,
cooperation among all parties to an international insolvency proceeding.
Section (V) addresses the issue of concurrent and multiple proceedings and
discusses the Model Law's treatment of such situations. Finally, Section (VI)
concludes that adoption of the Model Law would provide a useful framework
for addressing many of the problems that currently plague international
insolvencies.
I. THE PURPOSE AND APPROACH OF THE MODEL LAW
A. Goals of the Model Law
International insolvency has been subject to countless problems which are
due, in no small measure, to the absence of a comprehensive cross-border
insolvency framework. Conflicts between legal systems exist, resulting in the
wasting of valuable resources. Considerable legal obstacles exist which
constrain foreign representatives' and creditors' access to domestic courts and
result in disparate treatment being accorded foreign and domestic creditors.
The Model Law seeks to alleviate these recurrent problems by providing a
simple and pragmatic legal framework that guides parties through many of the
issues that arise in the international insolvency context.
The Model Law essentially has two main objectives. The first is to
implement a more coherent and efficient international insolvency legal system.
In pursuing this goal, the Model Law requires cooperation between the courts,
provides for fair and efficient proceedings, and protects the interests of all
parties including foreign and domestic creditors. The second goal of the Model
Law is derivative of the first. Through the creation of a more structured
international insolvency legal framework, the Model Law seeks to further the
interests of the economic community. For example, a reliable international
insolvency legal system will facilitate the maximization of a debtor's estate,
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preserve investment and employment through the resuscitation of financially
distressed companies, and improve upon trade through greater legal certainty.
The Model Law's goals are to be accomplished in three basic ways. First,
the Model Law permits and requires courts and administrators to cooperate with
one another to the maximum extent possible. Second, the Model Law enables
a foreign insolvency administrator or representative to have standing in a local
proceeding and to obtain relief in an efficient manner. Third, the Model Law
requires a base level of equal treatment of foreign and local claims.
Despite the desire to create a cohesive international insolvency legal
framework, it was recognized that the Model Law's force is only as good as its
acceptance. In light of this concern, the drafters created the Model Law to be
flexible and user-friendly, and therefore, encourage acceptance by the states.
To begin with, the Model Law is a succinct, ten page, 32 Article text, that
is procedurally focused. This defining characteristic enables accepting coun-
tries to graft the Model Law to meet the substantive needs of their legal regime.
Furthermore, the Model Law is considerably flexible, in that it is not designed
to pre-empt the entire field of international insolvency. For example, it permits
a court to deviate from the specific provisions of the Model Law if such would
otherwise violate domestic public policy. Further, it recognizes that the assis-
tance provided for in the Model Law is not exclusive, so that other existing
legal forms of cooperation, such as the doctrine of comity, are not displaced.
B. Scope of the Model Law
The Model Law has well-defined parameters and covers situations that to
date have generated conflict and confusion. First, the Model Law applies to
insolvency proceedings where a foreign representative or foreign creditor
requests assistance, or otherwise wishes to commence or participate in a
proceeding, in a local court. Second, the Model Law applies when a local court
requests assistance from a foreign representative or foreign court. Third, the
Model Law governs concurrent, domestic, and foreign insolvency proceedings
pending simultaneously.
The Model Law provides clear definitions for key terms used through its
text. The Model Law defines a foreign proceeding as a collective proceeding
conducted pursuant to the insolvency laws of a foreign state in which the
debtor's assets are under the control of a foreign judicial body for the purposes
of reorganization or liquidation. A foreign representative is defined under the
Model Law as a person or body authorized to administer the foreign proceeding
or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding. This effectively
incorporates the United States concept of a "debtor-in-possession." The Model
Law does not apply to certain types of debtors, such as railroads and certain
regulated financial institutions.
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I1. ACCESS
The provisions of the Model Law are simple and direct. The drafters
wanted to create a model legal framework that was clear and concise so as to
prevent interpretive disputes. Chapter II of the Model Law exemplifies this
point in the context of providing foreign representatives and foreign creditors
access to, and equal treatment under, local insolvency proceedings. The Model
Law permits a foreign representative to apply "directly" to a court within the
enacting State (Article 9). The Model Law also entitles a foreign representative
to initiate a proceeding under the insolvency laws of the State if the conditions
for commencing such an action are otherwise present (Article 11). After
recognition of a foreign proceeding, the Model Law allows a foreign
representative to participate in an insolvency proceeding of the debtor (Article
12). Furthermore, the Model Law mandates that foreign creditors be accorded
the same base level of treatment as domestic general unsecured creditors under
a local insolvency proceeding (Article 13). In other words, under the Model
Law foreign creditors cannot be relegated to worse treatment solely on the basis
of their foreign status.
M. RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN PROCEEDING AND
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE
A. Process of Recognition
Recognition is a prerequisite to cooperation under the Model Law. A
foreign representative or foreign proceeding must first be recognized before
relief can be granted. Traditionally, recognition of foreign insolvency
representatives has been a cumbersome and costly process. By contrast, the
Model Law provides a simple and easy standard for recognition and is designed
to eliminate obstacles that can impede the process.
Under the Model Law, a foreign representative and foreign proceeding can
be recognized in one of three ways (Article 15). First, recognition can be
accomplished by submitting a "certified copy of the decision commencing the
foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative." Second, the
foreign representative can submit a certificate from a foreign court affirming
the validity of the foreign proceeding and that the applicant is a duly approved
foreign representative. Finally, there is. a third alternative that serves as a
"catch-all" method. The court may grant recognition, despite the absence of
proof called for in the first two methods, if it finds acceptable evidence that
establishes the legitimacy of the foreign representative or foreign proceeding.
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Consistent with the Model Law's theme of cooperation and efficiency, the
drafters provided simple mechanisms to avoid disputes regarding the validity
of documents submitted on behalf of a foreign representative or proceeding
during recognition. The Model Law entitles a court to presume the authenticity
of any document submitted in conjunction with the recognition of a foreign
representative or foreign proceeding regardless of the legalization of those
documents (i.e. apostille not required) (Article 16). Furthermore, the Model
Law also mandates that a foreign proceeding shall be recognized once a
showing under Article 15 has been made. The local court is obliged to
determine the recognition application in a prompt fashion (Article 17).
B. Pre-Recognition
Although recognition under the Model Law is designed to be a speedy and
efficient process, the Model Law permits temporary relief pending the
application. It allows the court, at the applicant's request, to provide relief in
order to protect the debtor's assets or the creditor's interests (Article 19). The
Model Law provides a non-exclusive list of the types of temporary relief
available, including "staying execution against the debtor's assets" and
"entrusting the administration or realization of all or a part of the debtor's
assets ... to the foreign representative or another . . ." It should be noted,
however, that the relief created pursuant to this section is only temporary. Once
recognition is achieved, this relief will typically cease, although frequently it
will be superceded by further, post-recognition relief.
C. Effect of Recognition
A foreign proceeding can be recognized as a "foreign main proceeding"
(FMP) or a "foreign non-main proceeding" (FNMP). The classification of the
foreign proceeding determines what type of relief the court may grant.
A FMP is defined by the Model Law as a foreign proceeding that takes
place in the debtor's home country, or the location of the debtor's "centre of its
main interest." The Model Law creates a rebuttable presumption that the
debtor's registered office is the "centre of its main interests" (Article 16(3)).
A FNMP is a foreign proceeding other than a FMP and will only be recognized
if it occurs in a State where the debtor maintains an establishment. An
establishment is a place of operations where the debtor undertakes "non-
transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services." Thus,
an establishment means more than simply an asset within the jurisdiction.
The classification of a foreign proceeding dictates the type of relief a court
shall or may, as the case may be, grant in respect of the foreign proceeding.
Upon the court's determination that a proceeding is a FMP, there is a
mandatory, automatic stay (subject to local exceptions, such as sections 362(b)
2000] 269
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and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code) of all proceedings against the debtor and
transfers of the debtor's assets. Such mandatory relief is accorded in the
context of a FMP. A FNMP is entitled only to permissive relief. Once a court
recognizes a foreign proceeding as a FNMP or FMP, it may grant permissive
relief, but the court must first satisfy itself that all creditors will be protected
under the relief to be granted (Article 22). Permissive relief includes, but is not
limited to, a further stay, an examination of witnesses and taking of evidence,
and the entrustment of the debtor's assets to the foreign representative provided
expressly that local creditors are protected in the event of such entrustment. In
a FNMP, if the court grants permissive relief, the relief must relate to assets
that, under local law, should be subject to the FNMP.
The distinction between a FMP and a FNMP is equally applicable to the
right to commence avoidance actions (Article 23). The Model Law permits a
foreign representative to initiate an avoidance action under the local insolvency
laws of the State. A foreign representative in a FNMP, however, can only bring
an avoidance action if it relates to assets that, under local law, should be subject
to the FNMP.
IV. COOPERATION AMONG THE COURTS
Cooperation among the various parties to an international insolvency
proceeding is indispensable to the Model Law's effectiveness. The goals of the
Model Law can only be achieved so long as the parties communicate and
cooperate with one another to the maximum extent possible. In light of this
paramount concern, the Model Law's provisions addressing cooperation employ
strict, non-precatory language.
The Model Law mandates that the courts and domestic representatives,
"shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign
representatives, either directly or through [an official]." (Articles 25 and 26).
Additionally, in the interests of efficiency, the court or domestic representative
is authorized to communicate directly, or through an official, with the foreign
representative or foreign court. Such requirement and authorization is
particularly important in the civil law context, where a court may find it
difficult to act absent specific statutory direction.
The Model Law provides a non-exclusive list of methods that may be
employed to facilitate cooperation (Article 27). The means of cooperation
include: the appointment of a mediator or other go-between, coordination of
the proceedings, communication of information, or any other measure the court
deems appropriate. The courts are given a wide degree of latitude in deciding
how to implement these measures and how to achieve the goal of cooperation.
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V. CONCURRENT AND MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS
Chapter V of the Model Law addresses the confusing issue of commencing
and coordinating simultaneous local and foreign insolvency proceedings. To
no surprise, the Model Law provides clear definitive guidelines on how to
handle such situations. Chapter V is broken down into five articles, three of
which directly address the problems involved in concurrent and multiple
proceedings.
The first of these articles focuses on the situation where a domestic
insolvency proceeding is sought to be commenced subsequent to a recognized
FMP (Article 28). Such a commencement is permitted only if the debtor has
assets in the State. Further the effect of the local proceeding shall be limited
to the local assets, and to the extent necessary, to cooperate with the FMP in
providing relief that relates to assets that under local law should be
administered in the FMP.
The second article addresses two different cases where concurrent
domestic and foreign proceedings are pending (Article 29). In both situations
the court is required to cooperate with the foreign proceeding to the maximum
extent possible pursuant to Articles 25, 26, and 27. The first situation involves
an application for recognition of a foreign proceeding while a domestic
proceeding is in progress. In such a case, the court can only grant relief to the
foreign proceeding that is consistent with the local proceeding. Furthermore,
if the foreign proceeding is recognized as a FMP, the mandatory stay provision
of Article 20 is inapplicable.
The other situation occurs when a domestic proceeding is commenced
after recognition of the foreign proceeding or after an application has been filed
for recognition (Article 29). In such a case, the court will review and modify,
if necessary, any relief that it had previously granted under Articles 19 or 21.
If the foreign proceeding was recognized as a FMP and therefore, accorded a
mandatory stay, the court is required to modify or terminate the stay if it is
inconsistent with the domestic proceeding. The Model Law also provides that
when continuing any relief granted to a foreign representative of a FNMP, the
court must find that the relief relates to assets that, under local law, should be
administered in the FNMP "or concerns information required in that
proceeding."
The final relevant article under Chapter V addresses the circumstances of
multiple simultaneously pending foreign proceedings (Article 30). When more
than one foreign proceeding regarding the same debtor is pending, the domestic
court is required to seek cooperation and coordination among the proceedings
to the maximum extent possible. Multiple foreign proceedings will generally
fall into one of three categories. In the first, the court will be faced with the
task of formulating relief for the representative of a FNMP after the court has
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already recognized a FMP. In such a case, any relief the court grants to the
.FNMP must be consistent with the FMP. The second situation is the direct
opposite of the first: when a FMP is recognized subsequent to recognition of
a FNMP or the filing of an application for recognition of a FNMP. Under these
circumstances, the court must modify or terminate any relief it had previously
accorded the FNMP if it is inconsistent with the FMP. Finally, where a FNMP
is recognized after recognition of another FNMP, the court shall modify or
terminate the relief granted to the earlier FNMP to facilitate coordination
between the two proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The benefits to be gained by a uniform, coherent framework for the
coordination of international insolvencies cannot be understated. The Model
Law presents a pragmatic solution for achieving this goal. The Model Law
strives to promote cooperation. The Model Law is fair and equitable in that it
generally requires equal treatment of all domestic and foreign creditors. It
provides clear, intelligible guidelines for determining what type of relief can be
expected and granted. It adopts simple and efficient procedures. Of most
significance, the Model Law will help lift the cloud of legal uncertainty that
surrounds international insolvency issues. By enhancing predictability, the
Model Law will promote economic efficiency and, in the end, the entire
international community will benefit.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS - ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT
Charles Curlett*
Good morning ladies and gentlemen, and welcome. We are fortunate to
have with us today a distinguished panel of professors and practitioners who
will be speaking about various aspects of current Alien Tort Claims Act'
(ATCA) litigation. Before I introduce them, I thought we might begin with the
language of the Statute itself. The ATCA states that "[t]he district court shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."2
This language, I think, illustrates the wisdom of our Congress in recognizing
that certain universal principles of law transcend national boundaries, overcome
issues and defenses of sovereignty, and must be enforced whenever possible by
a court competent to hear such claims. Essentially, our courts are competent,
because our Congress says that they are. For certain categories of torts, it does
not matter that the acts were committed outside the borders of the United States,
that the acts were neither committed by a national of the United States, nor
were against a national of the United States. These issues are irrelevant
because international law, the law of nations, is part of our federal common
law. These actions violate international law, and as such violate our laws.
Accordingly, our courts should be permitted to do their part in maintaining,
wherever possible, international peace and stability through the administration
of justice.
These notions of justice and accountability seem right in step with this
post cold-war era in which recognition of the universal nature of human rights
is of paramount importance. It is of such importance, and recognition is
becoming so global, that in just this past year we have seen the arrest of former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, the path for whom is now virtually clear so
that he might be extradited to Spain for crimes committed in Chile under his
direction when Head of State. In this past year, we have also seen the first
international criminal indictment of a sitting Head of State, Slobodan
Milosevic, for crimes against humanity committed within the borders of his
* Panel Chair, Special Assistant in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Speech Given at the 1999 ILA-American Branch Annual Conference in
New York.
1. 29 USCA §1350 (West, 1999).
2. Id.
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own country. So, yes, our Congress seems to be for once right in step with the
most current thinking regarding international enforcement of human rights
norms. However, this is not recent legislation. The language of the ATCA was
drafted 210 years ago as part of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Indeed, this
legislation illustrates a Congress ahead of its time to such extent that the Act
was ignored for 200 years. Enacted originally to address those few norms
which at the time violated the law of nations, such as piracy and the slave trade
- the Act was laid to rest after only a handful of early cases. Then came
Filartiga.4 In 1976 a man and his daughter came to the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights in search of a means to take action against a Paraguayan police
official who had tortured and killed their seventeen year old son and brother.
The officer, Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, fled Paraguay after the Filartigas
charged him with murder. He was living in New York City at the time the
lawsuit was filed. The central holding to emerge from that case was that courts
must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today. I mention briefly that shortly after
Filartiga, Judge Bork in the Tel-Oren5 disagreed with the Filartiga court and
argued just the opposite. Fortunately, his view has been roundly rejected and
the fundamental holding of Filartiga remains, and shall remain, intact.
Today, in an era when the international community is taking great strides
to recognize, and courts around the world are attempting to enforce fundamen-
tal human rights, the ATCA has again become a vital sword for the litigator
who champions the rights of victims from around the world. However, I will
leave you and our panelists with two questions. First, just how sharp is this
sword? In the brief revival of ATCA litigation we have seen fewer than two
dozen lawsuits. Although they have generated two billion dollars in damage
awards, none has been collected. This area of litigation faces the same practical
difficulties of enforcement that plagues much of international law. While we
applaud the indictments of Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko
Mladic, none are in custody. Which brings me to my second question, how can
we sharpen this sword? With that, I turn to our panelists. We are privileged to
have with us today a remarkable and distinguished group of scholars and
litigators. The attorneys who join us this morning are true pioneers and I am
pleased to welcome them.
MICHAEL RATNER
Our first speaker is Mr. Michael Ratner. Mr. Ratner is a human rights
practitioner who has made his legal and political home at the Center for
3. USCA Const.. Art. III § I (West, 1999).
4. Filartigo v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir, 1980).
5. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 469 U.S. 811 (1984).
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Constitutional Rights in New York for over twenty-five years. In the course of
his career, he has sued many of the world's worst killers and torturers. Mr.
Ratner is a former director of the Center for Constitutional Rights and past
president of the National Lawyers Guild. Never content to identify human
rights atrocities committed only by foreign individuals and regimes, he has filed
a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Gulf War. Mr. Ratner co-
authored, with fellow panelist Beth Stephens, the book International Human
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts. Of special interest to human rights litigators
and activists, it addresses lawsuits in the United States under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and related statutes for human
rights abuses committed in other countries. The authors also discuss jurisdic-
tional issues, immunity, choice of law, and sources of international law.
BETH STEPHENS
Beth Stephens is presently an associate professor of law at Rutgers
University. A magna cum laude graduate of Harvard University and the law
school at UC Berkeley, Professor Stephens clerked for Chief Justice Rose Bird
of the California Supreme Court before going on to study the changing legal
system of Nicaragua. Before going to Rutgers, Ms. Stephens was in charge of the
international human rights docket at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New
York. Catharine A. MacKinnon is the Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan School of Law. She holds a B.A. from Smith College, a
J.D. from Yale Law School, and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.
Professor MacKinnon, who practices and consults nationally and internationally,
has also taught at Yale, the Univeristy of Chicago, UCLA, Minnesota, Harvard,
York (Osgoode Hall), and Stanford. Her fields of concentration include
constitutional law and political theory. She is the author of numerous articles and
books. Professor MacKinnon pioneers the legal claim for sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination. In 1983, with Andrea Dworkin, she conceived and
wrote ordinances recognizing pornography as a violation of civil rights. The
United States Supreme Court accepted her theory of sexual harrassment in 1986.
The Supreme Court of Canada adopted, in part, approaches that she created with
the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund with respect to equality,
pornography, and hate speech. Professor MacKinnon is the lead counsel in Kadic
v. Karadzic, filed in 1993 under the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA), in which she represents Bosnian Muslim and Croat
survivors of Serb atrocities seeking international justice for genocide.
BETH VAN SCHAAK
Beth Van Schaak is an associate at the law firm Morrison & Foerster. Ms.
Van Schaak recently spent the second year of a Soros Justice Fellowship at the
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Center for Justice & Acountability (CJA). CJA is an international human rights
legal services organization launched in 1988 with initial support from Amnesty
International, USA and the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of
Torture. CJA aims to close off the United States as a safe haven for torturers
and other violators of human rights. Ms. Van Schaak has filed civil lawsuits in
the courts of the United States under the ATCA and the TVPA against human
rights violators from abroad who reside, visit, or keep assets in the United
States. In May 1999, CJA filed its most recent lawsuit Romagoza et al. v.
Garcia and Vides-Cassanova, involving claims of torture, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment; and crimes against humanity against two
former Ministers of Defense from El Salvador who retired in Florida. A
graduate of Stanford University and Yale Law School, Ms. Van Schaak served
as a law clerk in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. She previously worked for
the Schell Center for International Human Rights and as a teaching assistant for
the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School.
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FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Beth Stephens*
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I. INTRODUCTION
While regularly seeking to apply international human rights norms tojudge
the behavior of other governments, the United States has vehemently rejected
efforts to apply such rules to United States domestic behavior. Variously
described as hypocritical and shortsighted, or pragmatic and morally valid, this
dichotomy is well-ingrained in our legal system. The tensions produced by
United States resistance to domestic application of international law have
heightened in recent years, as the United States seeks to cement its position as
leader of the post-cold war world community and as human rights and
humanitarian law have reached a position of unprecedented importance on the
world stage. Over the course of less than twelve months in 1998 and 1999, the
United States and its European allies fought a war in Kosovo with the avowed
* Beth Stephens is presently an associate professor of law at Rutgers University. A magna cum
laude graduate of Harvard University and the law school at UC Berkeley, Professor Stephens clerked for
Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court, then spent several years studying the changing legal
system of Nicaragua. Before joining the Rutgers faculty, Ms. Stephens was in charge of the international
human fights docket at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York.
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purpose of forcing a sovereign State' to obey international human rights norms
within its own territorial borders. The sitting head of the State of Yugoslavia
faced indictment by an international criminal tribunal for violations of human
rights and humanitarian law. A former head of the State of Chile fought to
avoid prosecution in Spain for international law violations committed in his
home country. The vast majority of the world's nations endorsed a permanent
International Criminal Court over the vehement objections of the United States.
Each of these international confrontations turned upon the relationship between
international and domestic law. Each demanded examination of the extent to
which international law norms govern the internal domestic actions of a
sovereign State.
A variety of doctrines, briefly summarized in the following section, limit
the application of international norms to events within the United States or to
abuses committed by United States officials. Recent litigation under the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), however, has created a small window through which
international human rights law can be applied both to United States-based
private actors and to United States government officials. As this ATCA
window expands, it challenges traditional barriers to domestic enforcement of
international law. In this paper, after a brief review of the interpretive structure
limiting United States domestic incorporation of international law, I trace the
development of the ATCA doctrine and its expansion to a wider range of
possible defendants. I then analyze the current cases in light of what is known
about the original goals of the statute, concluding that the modem application
of the statute is both constitutional and consistent with the apparent intent of its
framers. Finally, I explore the challenge these cases pose to the traditional
reluctance to enforce international norms within the United States, and the
statute's potential for bringing the United States, kicking and screaming, into
the modem age of international law.
II. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
While actively engaged in international efforts to force governments and
officials of other countries to obey international law, the United States
government has sharply restricted the domestic application of those same rules.
Although scholars continue to debate the interrelationship between international
law and the Constitution, statutes and executive decrees,' courts generally agree
1. I use State, with a capital letter, to indicate the government of an independent nation, and state
to indicate one of the fifty United States.
2. Among the extensive literature, see, e.g., Agora: May the President Violate Customary
International Law?, 80 AM. J. lrL L. 913 (1986) (exchange of views); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board
The Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA.
J. IN'rL L. 1 (1984) (concluding that statutes override inconsistent customary international law); Louis
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that both statutes and executive actions override inconsistent customary
international law, thus enabling either of the political branches to render
unenforceable any international obligation deriving from customary law.3
Treaties receive greater respect within the United States domestic law
structure, being viewed as of equal stature as statutes - the last in time governs
over prior inconsistent provisions -but inferior to the Constitution.' The impact
of treaties, however, is sharply restricted by the view that they are enforceable
only where they explicitly provide for a private right of action,' a condition that
the United States has explicitly attached to several recently ratified human
rights treaties.'
Given this restrictive approach to domestic implementation of international
law within the United States, virtually all such enforcement depends upon the
actions of Congress or the executive branch.7 Congress took such action in
1789 with the enactment of the ATCA, and then again over 200 years later with
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). These statutes and the cases
applying them provide one of the few judicial arenas in which issues of this
nature are decided. After exploring how the statutes have been applied over
the past twenty years, I will discuss the implications of this line of cases for the
larger issues of domestic application of human rights norms within the United
States.
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH L.REV. 1555, 1561-69(1984) (arguing that
customary international law is "equal in authority to an act of Congress." id. at 1566, but that in some
circumstances, the President is authorized to disregard such law, id. at 1568-69); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and Izternational Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071,
1130-53 (1985) (fundamental international law norms bind both Congress and the President).
3. Although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the place of customary international
law in the hierarchy, its decisions imply that both statutes and executive actions override inconsistent
customary law, and this has been the holding of all modem court decisions. See The Paquete Habana, The
LoLa., 175 U.S. 677,700 (1899) ("where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ... "); id. at 708 (courts
must apply a rule of international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own
government in relation to the matter."); See Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 397-98 (1997).
4. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190
(1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 584 (1884).
5. Id.; See Lobel, supra note 2, at 1108-10 (criticizing the doctrine of "self-executing" treaties).
6. The United States has attached "reservations, understandings or declarations" to several recently
ratified treaties stating that the treaties create no private right of action, do not effect any changes in United
States law, and do not "federalize" areas otherwise left to the control of the states. See Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 341, 341 (1995)
(discussing the recent attachments to human rights conventions); David P. Stewart, United States Ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1993).
7. One exception is the enforcement of customary international law norms where there has been
no overriding action from the political branches. See Stephens, supra note 3.
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I. THE UNIQUE AND EVOLVING ROLE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Given the barriers preventing direct application of most international
human rights law within the United States, one of the few arenas in which inter-
national norms are regularly applied by United States courts are cases arising
under the 200-year-old ATCA8 and its younger cousin, the TVPA, enacted in
1992.9 The ATCA grants federal courts jurisdiction over a claim by an alien
for "a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations." The statute has
been interpreted to allow noncitizens to bring suit for violations of the evolving
body of customary international law norms. The TVPA authorizes a civil suit
by any individual, citizen and noncitizen alike, for two violations, extrajudicial
execution and torture, when committed "under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation."° The TVPA includes detailed definitions
of the two torts that reflect, but do not duplicate, accepted international
standards. "
These two statutes provide the only consistent means by which interna-
tional law claims are adjudicated within the United States, a result of the
explicit authorization of Congress. The constitutionality of the two statutes has
been upheld by every court that has considered the issue. 12 But as litigants
increasingly seek to apply the statutes to domestic conduct, the statutes are
likely to draw increasing scrutiny.
A. Evolving ATCA Claims
The ATCA affords plaintiffs a broad right to file claims for violations of
the evolving body of customary international law. The proper interpretation of
"the law of nations" was a key issue in the first modem ATCA decision,
Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 3 in which the family of a young man tortured to death
in Paraguay sought damages from the police officer who had tortured him. The
defendant argued that international law did not apply to a government's
treatment of its own citizens, relying on prior Second Circuit decisions. The
Fildrtiga court disagreed, holding that "it is clear that courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (1994).
10. Id., § 2(a).
11. Id. at §§ (a), & (b). See comparison of TVPA definitions with international law norms in BETH
STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 63-68 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 lth Cir. 1996); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493, 501-03 (9th Cir. 1992); FiIrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Fildrtiga v. Pehia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876.
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the nations of the world today." 4 All courts that have decided the issue have
agreed that the statute refers to current norms of international law, 5 and
Congress has indicated its agreement as well. 6
This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's understanding
of the meaning of the law of nations. In one of the few cases to apply
constitutional language authorizing Congress to "define and punish.., offenses
against the law of nations," for example, the Court held that the clause
encompassed violations of the law of nations as it had evolved, regardless of
whether the particular violation existed at the time the Constitution was
drafted. 7 In Arjona, the defendant was charged with violating a federal statute
making it a crime to counterfeit notes issued by a government-owned foreign
bank.'8 Arjona pointed out that such foreign notes were unknown at the time
the Constitution was drafted. The Court nevertheless found the statute to be
within Congress' constitutional power to "define and punish . . . offenses
against the law of nations" because the law of nations, as used in the Constitu-
tion, encompassed this "more recent custom among bankers of dealing in
foreign securities... " even though the framers would not have contemplated
such an act as a violation of the law of nations.' 9 Similarly, the Court held in
1900 that the law of nations encompassed a newly developed rule of interna-
tional law governing the protection of an enemy's fishing vessels, a rule that
had evolved into a binding norm over the course of the 19th century.20
The Courts' conclusion that the ATCA permits suits for violations of
currently existing international law norms has enabled the courts to recognize
a growing list of violations as triggering ATCA jurisdiction. Fildrtiga and its
progeny require that a norm be "universal, obligatory, and definable."'"
Fildrtiga itself held that torture by a government official of a citizen of his own
state violated international law. Subsequent cases have recognized both
14. Id. at 881.
15. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 848; Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
16. See TVPA Legislative Report, H.R. Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, noting that the ATCA permits suits based on "norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law."
17. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
18. Id. at 480-82.
19. Id. at 485-86.
20. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 686,694, the Supreme Court concluded that although the rule
had previously been followed as a matter of comity, it had since ripened into "a settled rule of international
law."
21. This standard, first articulated in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
[hereinafter Forti 1], on reconsideration on other grounds 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988), has since been
widely accepted. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 11, at 51-52; see, e.g.. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,
141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1998); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La.
1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
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additional human rights violations and additional actors as falling within the
reach of the statute. Thus, cases alleging summary execution, disappearance,
arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity have all been found to state claims under
the ATCA.22 Of particular note, one court initially rejected a claim based on
disappearance, but reversed itself based on plaintiff's showing that international
law had recognized such a violation over the preceding decade."
Cases over the past twenty years have also expanded the range of
defendants who can be held accountable under the ATCA. Whereas the
defendant in Fildrtiga was the actual torturer, later suits targeted defendants in
a position of command responsibility: those who planned, ordered, or directed
human rights abuses, or who knew or should have known about the abuses and
failed to prevent their occurrence or punish those responsible.24
B. Private Actors: Individuals and Corporations
In Kadic v. Karadzic,25 the Second Circuit recognized two additional
principles of ATCA jurisprudence as applied to the potential defendants. The
Kadic decision arose out of claims filed against Radovan Karadzic, the leader
of the Bosnian Serbs at the time of the Bosnian war and the head of an
unrecognized de facto state: although based on an illegal seizure of power, his
"government" controlled both territory and population, through a legislature,
executive officers, and a powerful military force. The court first noted that
22. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (slavery); Xuncax, 886
F. Supp. at 185-89 (certain acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment); id. at 173-75 (gender violence
such as rape as a form of torture); Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42 (summary execution, prolonged arbitrary
detention); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) [hereinafter Forti 11] (on
reconsideration) (disappearance). Cases currently pending ask the courts to find gender violence to be an
independent violation of human rights, Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998)
(suit against Islamic fundamentalist group sued for attacks on women and girls), along with egregious
violations of environmental standards, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting issue
but declining to decide whether claim triggered ATCA jurisdiction); Beanal. 969 F. Supp. at 382-84. In
Beanal, the district court held that corporate actions that harm the environment did not violate established
norms of international law. This issue is currently on appeal. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382-84.
23. Cf Ford 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542-43 (rejecting claim based on disappearance), with Forti I1, 694
F. Supp. at 709-11 (accepting disappearance claim as triggering ATCA jurisdiction).
24. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (holding de facto head of state responsible for abuses
committed by his military forces); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding ex-
dictator of the Philippines responsible for abuses committed by his security forces); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. at 171-73, 174-75 (holding Guatemalan general responsible for violations committed by his forces);
Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1537-38 (holding Argentine general responsible for abuses committed by troops under
his command).
25. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
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certain international human rights norms prohibit private conduct as well as
public acts, and it concluded that the ATCA applies to suits alleging such
violations committed by private parties. In particular, violations such as
genocide and certain war crimes trigger ATCAjurisdiction when committed by
private actors because the international law definitions of those offenses
indicate that the prohibition binds private parties as well as public actors.
26
Second, the Kadic court recognized that human rights violations such as
torture and summary execution, as defined by international law, do require state
action, 7 but held that the requisite "official capacity" could be supplied by an
official of an unrecognized de facto state. The opinion notes that underlying
the state action requirement is a regime's ability to exert official power over
those living under its control, not diplomatic recognition:
[Ilt is likely that the state action concept, where applicable for some
violations like "official" torture, requires. merely the semblance of
official authority. The inquiry, after all, is whether a person purport-
ing to wield official power has exceeded internationally recognized
standards of civilized conduct, not whether statehood in all its formal
28aspects exists.
The decision reflects the Court's willingness to examine the underlying purpose
of modem international human rights law, applying the ATCA in a manner
designed to implement that purpose.
The Kadic court also recognized that the state action requirement may
extend accountability to otherwise private actors who act in complicity with
26. Id. at 239-43. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of December 9, 1948 specifically prohibits genocide whether committed by a public or private actor. 78
U.N.T.S. 277, art. 4. Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, applicable to internal conflicts, is
binding on all parties to a conflict, whether or not they constitute state actors. Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T:
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
27. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 10
December 1984, art. 1, for example, prohibits acts of torture "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." G.A. Res. 39/46,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
28. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. In Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 993 F. Supp. at 9. The district court
recognized that, for the purposes of the state action requirement, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria might
constitute a de facto state in the areas under its control, but withheld determination of that factual issue until
later in the litigation.
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public actors.29 As one district court stated, "it would be a strange tort system
that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who conspired with them
to perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power."3 In defining
the state action requirement in ATCA cases, United States courts have applied
the standards developed in litigation under § 1983, the key United States civil
rights statute that also requires state action.3' The Supreme Court has found
otherwise private action to satisfy the United States state action requirement in
many factual settings, including where a private party performs a public
function; where the state commandeers private parties and assigns them public
responsibilities; where the state and private actions are so interrelated as to be
indistinguishable; and where the private and state parties are engaged in "joint
action. '32 As the Doe v. Unocal court noted, a private party's actions will be
considered state action where the private party "willfully participate[s] in joint
action with the state or its agents;" enters into an agreement with a government
actor; "engages in a conspiracy" or "acts in concert" with state agents; or aids
and abets state agents. 33 The court summarized, "where there is 'a substantial
degree of cooperative action' between the state and private actors in effecting
the deprivation of rights, state action is present.
34
These concepts permit suits against non-governmental groups such as
corporations. Under the same principles applicable to individual private
actors, corporations can be held liable for human rights abuses when they are
29. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
30. Eastman Kodak Comp. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 'To the extent a state action requirement is incorporated into the
ATCA, courts look to the standards developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp.
880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997), citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. See also Beanal, 969, 375-80 (E.D. La. 1997)
(appeal pending). Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987); TVPA Legislative
Report, H.R. Rep. No. 367, supra note 16.
32. See summaries of this doctrine in Doe 1, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91; National Coalition of
Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345-49 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal, 969
F. Supp. at 376-80.
33. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890-91.
34. Id. In a related case against Unocal, the same judge found the allegations of state action to be
sufficient where "defendants' challenged actions are allegedly inextricably intertwined with those of the
[Burmese military] government." National Coalition of Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc.,
176 F.R.D. at 349.
35. Similar doctrines permit human rights litigation against unincorporated associations, including
paramilitary groups. For example, the plaintiff in Belance v. Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti,
Civ. No. 94-2619 (E.D.N.Y., filed June 1, 1994), seeks to hold the Front for Advancement and Progress in
Haiti (FRAPH), a terrorist organization, liable for her torture in Haiti. The complaint charges that the
association acted in complicity with the illegal Haitian military regime, and was "present" in New York
because it had opened an office with a representative in New York City. In Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
993 F. Supp. 3 (suit against Islamic fundamentalist group sued for attacks on women and girls), the defendant
association may be held liable as an unincorporated association and/or as a de facto government.
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responsible for violations of international human rights norms that apply to
private actors; or when they act in complicity with government officials to
commit other human rights violations. Thus, a corporation can be held liable
for using slave labor, as alleged in the Doe v. Unocal case,36 or when responsi-
ble for genocide, as alleged in Beanal v. Freeport,3 since both of these
international law prohibitions apply to private actors as well as government
officials. Likewise, corporate actors can be held liable for violations requiring
state action, such as torture and summary execution, when they act in com-
plicity with state actors. As the Beanal court concluded, "a corporation found
to be a state actor can be held responsible for human rights abuses which violate
international customary law. ' 38 Applying the § 1983 civil rights standards,
corporations satisfy the state action requirement when they engage in "joint
action" with a government or government officials, or conspire with or
otherwise act in concert with those officials, or perform a public function, such
as taking responsibility for law enforcement. In a suit against a private
corporation operating a detention facility, for example, a court held that the
defendant corporation and its employees were state actors because they were
"acting under contract" with the United States government and were "perform-
ing governmental services. 39
C. Domestic Applications
Most ATCA cases concern violations occurring abroad, committed by
foreign government officials or foreign citizens, and much of the commentary
on the statute assumes that it is limited to such claims. But the statute in no
way bars claims addressing international law violations within the United-States
or abuses committed by United States citizens or United States government
officials, as long as the defendants are not protected by any applicable
immunities. In the case on behalf of immigrants detained in the United States,
a trial court judge recently upheld the immigrants' right to sue their jailers for
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and other human rights violations.'
The immigration officials had contracted with a private corporation to operate
36. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880.
37. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370-73 (E.D. La. 1997). In Beanal,
however, the district court dismissed plaintiffs third amended complaint, holding that even as amended it
still did not adequately allege genocide, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. March
3, 1998) (unpublished opinion), aff'd on appeal, 197 F.3d 161.
38. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376.
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the facility; the defendants include the corporation, as well as both private
individuals and government officials.
Litigation against the United States government is regulated by the
restrictive Federal Tort Claims Act, which permits such claims for many torts
committed within the United States, but prohibits most claims arising out of
abuses in foreign countries, as well as most of those committed as intentional
acts or in the implementation of discretionary policy decisions.4" It is possible,
however, to sue United States government officials for abuses committed
outside the scope of their authority, or if those acts constitute violations of the
Constitution or specific statutory protections. Thus, United States courts have
refused to dismiss claims against immigration officials for violations of the
rights of detainees4 z and against individual employees of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency accused of responsibility for torture and execution in
Guatemala.43
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE ATCA
The Fildrtiga approach to the ATCA has been remarkably successful on
several fronts. United States courts have followed the precedent in dozens of
cases, producing not a single contradictory holding." Congress has indicated
its agreement with the case and its interpretation of the ATCA, praising the
decision in the legislative reports accompanying the passage of the TVPA.4s
Until very recently, however, almost all of the United States cases have
addressed abuses committed by foreigners in foreign countries. As the targets
of this litigation expand to include United States based corporations as well as
United States government officials, the cases may begin to provoke a more
serious backlash. Thus, it is important to review the constitutional basis for the
statute, and to evaluate whether it will survive increasingly hostile scrutiny, as
41. The Foreign Tort Claims Act and the exceptions to United States government liability are
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2680.
42. Jama, 22 F. Supp.2d at 365.
43. Harbury v. Deutch, Civ. No. 96-00438 (D.D.C. March 9, 2000) (Ordergranting in part/denying.
in part defendants' Motion to Dismiss) (unpublished opinion). In a suit against the City of Los Angeles, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that the ATCA would support a claim against a municipal government for arbitrary
arrest and detention, but found the claim was not supported under the facts. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,
141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1998).
44. Only one judge has written an opinion rejecting Fildrtiga, Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984); neither of the other judges on
the panel joined his opinion (the case produced three-separate opinions, agreeing only in the result), and no
judge since has adopted Judge Bork's reasoning.
45. The House TVPA Report states that the ATCA has important uses and should not be replaced,
and notes that the Fildrtiga decision "has met with general approval." H.R. Rep. No. 367, supra note 16,
at notes 3, 4.
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the inevitable evolution of the law of nations triggers ATCA litigation under
increasingly controversial circumstances.
A. Federal Foreign Affairs Powers
As with many congressional enactments, the ATCA rests on several
alternative constitutional provisions. All derive to some extent from the
framers' expressed intent to centralize foreign affairs powers in the federal
government.
The roots of the ATCA have been traced to a series of crises during the
period between independence and the ratification of the Constitution, a time
when the Continental Congress struggled ineffectively to govern the loose
federation of independent states.' One of the prime areas of concern was the
Confederation's inability to prevent the states from violating international
obligations. After two incidents in which foreign diplomats were assaulted but
the states failed to act to protect their diplomatic status, Congress twice called
on the states to both prosecute crimes in violation of international law and to
permit civil suits for damages by those injured by such violations. Only one
state, Connecticut, is known to have responded.47 The states' refusal to force
repayment of private debts to the British and their allies - as promised in the
treaty ending the war - threatened to precipitate new hostilities.4 8
Leading participants at the Constitutional Convention described federal
control over foreign affairs as a central objective of the new Constitution. In
particular, they emphasized the need for federal supervision of domestic actions
that might have an impact on foreign relations.49 The violent crimes committed
against diplomats, for example, were of concern not because the underlying
crime - assault and battery - had international implications, but because the
target of the assault brought the crime into the realm of foreign affairs.
Similarly, debt repayment, normally a domestic affair, became a national and
international crisis when such payments were governed by international
commitments.
The Constitutional Convention responded by centralizing foreign affairs
powers in the federal government through a series of clauses granting particular
46. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 402-03.
47. Id.; William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 490-04 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
221, 226-30 (1996).
48. See Dodge, supra note 47, at 236, 254; Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. 180.(1804) ("Until the act of
1793, from the obstacles interposed by juries, and the proceedings of some courts of Virginia, a general
opinion prevailed among the inhabitants of the state of Virginia, and among juries, that a British debt could
not be recovered.").
49. Stephens, supra note 3, at 402-07.
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powers to the federal government and prohibiting the states from exercising
others.5 ° In addition, as the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, certain
foreign affairs powers arise out of the very structure of our government. As
summarized in a case addressing federal authority over immigration, "[flor
local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,
embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation,
one power.' In a later case, the Court relied upon the supremacy of federal
authority over "the general field of foreign affairs," a supremacy to which the
Court has "given continuous recognition., 52 "The Federal Government, repre-
senting as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted
with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties." 3
This federal authority over foreign relations provides support for
congressional power to regulate foreign affairs. In upholding the constitution-
ality of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for example, the Supreme Court
found that Congress has the power to define the circumstances under which
foreign governments can be sued in United States courts.
By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign
relations, Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter
50. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,"
"establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," and "repel Invasions," and "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, while the President is to serve as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States," "make Treaties," with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2,
appoint ambasadors subject to Senate approval, and "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Id.
at § 3. The states are prohibited from entering into "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;" or granting
"Letters of Marque and Reprisal;" or, without the consent of Congress, "lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage,
keepting] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONsr. Art. I, § 10.
51. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,606 (1889). See also MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299, 311 (1915), where the court stated, "As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes
of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which
concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."
52. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,62 (1941).
53. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted). This has been the consistent holding of the Supreme Court,
stated most strongly in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), where Justice
Sutherland reasoned, "[Tihe powers of external sovereignty [do] not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution," but rather are "vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality."
Id. at 318, 325-26. The Constitution, Sutherland concluded, was based upon the "irrefutable postulate that
though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were one." Id. at 317.
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of federal law, whether and under what circumstances foreign nations
should be amenable to suit in the United States. Actions against
foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the
foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy of federal
concerns is evident. To promote these federal interests, Congress
exercised its Article I powers by enacting a statute comprehensively
regulating the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United
States. 4
Similarly, Congress has the power to decide "whether and under what
circumstances" claims alleging violations of international law trigger liability
in United States courts. In the TVPA, a modern Congress defined specific
examples of such liability. In the ATCA, the 18th century Congress delegated
to the courts the task of defining the exact contours of such claims.5
Such delegation was unexceptionable tothe framers, who assumed that
customary international law was a part of the common law of both the states
and of the new federal government.5 6 In our modern, post-Erie world, this
unwritten international law is part of the federal common law, a source of both
supreme federal law, binding on the states, and of federal court jurisdiction. 7
Indeed, the Fildrtiga court rested its analysis of the ATCA in part upon the fact
that customary international law is part of the federal common law, and, as
such, cases alleging violations of such international norms "arise under" federal
law for the purposes of Article III of the Constitution. 8
54. Id. at 493 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court explained that the application of federal
law thus triggered federal court jurisdiction:
The statute must be applied by the District Courts in every action against a foreign
sovereign, since subject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the
existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. At the
threshold of every action in a District Court against a foreign state, therefore, the court
must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions applies - and in doing so it must apply the
detailed federal law standards set forth in the Act. Accordingly, an action against a
foreign sovereign arises under federal law, for purposes of Article HI jurisdiction.
Id. at 493-94 (footnote and citation omitted).
55. "[W]e conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may
fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law." Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996).
56. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 408-13. Debate over this issue continues. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1824
(1998).
57. Stephens, supra note 3, at 433-53.
58. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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B. The Offenses Clause
The Constitutional Convention also included an apparently noncontrover-
sial clause empowering Congress to "define and punish.., offenses against the
law of nations."59 The first Congress codified several crimes committed against
diplomats as offenses against the law of nations.6° Further criminal codifica-
tion was unnecessary, given that federal courts prosecuted common law crimes
without codification for the first thirty years of the new nation.6' The civil side,
however, was also codified by the first Congress, by including the ATCA as a
section of the First Judiciary Act.62 The language of the ATCA tracts that of
the Constitution, granting federal courts jurisdiction over torts "in violation of
the law of nations," and it is likely that the offenses clause served as an
important piece of constitutional support in the minds of its framers.63
C. The A TCA and the Evolving Law of Nations
Given this constitutional history, the current interpretation of the ATCA
seems both plausible and consistent with the general intentions of the framers.
This is not to say, of course, that any participant in the drafting and ratification
of the statutes foresaw its application, for example, to a claim of genocide
against the leader of a de facto regime in Europe. Such an action was no more
foreseeable in 1791 than was the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce conducted by means of the Internet. An attack on the
59. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 10. For a comprehensive discussion of the offenses clause and its
relationship to the ATCA, see Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress' Power to Define
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, __ Wm. & Mary L. Rev. __ (forthcoming Dec.
2000).
60. Diplomatic Relations Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 117-18 (declaring certain acts against
diplomats to be crimes against the law of nations).
61. United States v. Hudson, I I U.S. 32 (1812); see Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101
YALE L. J. 919 (1992) (discussing history of common law crimes and the controversy surrounding the
Supreme Court rejection of the concept).
62. The civil side of the offenses clause has been frequently overlooked. The only commentators
to address the clause have assumed without discussion that it applies only to criminal prosecutions. See
Howard S. Fredman, Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress' International Penal Power, 8 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 279 (1969) (reflecting the criminal limitation in its title, without further discussion); Charles
D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power to "Define... Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 866 (1988) (describing the clause as "permitting Congress to
define violations of customary international law as domestic crimes," also without further discussion
(emphasis added)). Congress, however, cited the clause in support of congressional power to impose civil
liability in enacting both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602-11 (1994), and the
TVPA. As explained in Stephens, Congress is clearly correct in relying on the offenses clause for civil as
well as criminal powers, supra note 59.
63. See Stephens, supra note 59.
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Fildrtiga approach based on supposed unforeseeability is meaningless; most of
the core institutions of our current society were unforeseeable at the time the
Constitution -and the foundational statutes passed by the first Congress - were
enacted.
One recent argument posits that the First Congress intended to create a
cause of action only for claims for which the United States would be held
accountable if it failed to provide redress. Thus, the international law crises
during the Confederation were triggered by attacks on foreign diplomats and by
treaty violations. In such situations, the injured parties looked to the United
States government for satisfaction; when it was not forthcoming, the national
government risked reprisals from the victim's government.
But the language of the ATCA was not restricted to violations of
diplomatic privileges. Instead, Congress chose much more expansive language,
creating remedies for all torts in violation of the law of nations. The plain
meaning of this language is exactly that applied by Fildrtiga: torts that violate
currently existing norms of international law. And the background understand-
ings of the framers, to the extent that we can uncover them, support this
meaning. Indeed, when the offenses clause was adopted at the Constitutional
Convention, authorizing Congress to "define and punish... offenses against
the law of nations," the only recorded opposition addressed the incongruence
of a claim that the United States could "define" the law of nations. "To pretend
to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the Civilized
Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance that would make us
ridiculous."' The framers understood that the world community would take
international law along paths that they could not predict; rather than fixing its
content, they chose a standard that would enable the statute to evolve along
with the law of nations.
Moreover, to the extent that the goal of the statute was to avoid interna-
tional disputes, the drafters chose language that accommodated the reality that
they could not predict what issues would be considered to be of international
concern in the future. In their day, diplomatic protection and treaty violations
were of central concern. Today, issues of trade and human rights are just as
likely to provoke international uproars. Well aware both of the changing nature
of the law of nations and the reality that no one nation could control its
evolution, the framers crafted the ATCA broadly enough to encompass
64. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 614-15 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937). The language was accepted only with the explanation that "define" was intended to suggest the need
to provide detail, not to create offenses where none had previously existed: "The word define is proper when
applied to offenses in this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule." Id. at
615.
2000]
292 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:277
changing notions of international obligations. Interpretation of the ATCA is in
this sense quite simple: it means what it says, as several courts have held.65
V. FEDERALISM AND CONGRESS' POWER TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Congress' power to implement international law rests upon several
constitutional provisions, including the federal structural foreign affairs power,
the federal common law status of customary international law, the power to
"define and punish.., offenses against the law of nations," and the interactions
between each of these and the wide-ranging "necessary and proper" clause.'
How far does the power to implement international obligations extend? Can
Congress enact statutes pursuant to this power that would not otherwise fall
within the federal legislative powers? In particular, what constitutional result
if Congress enacts a statute regulating foreign affairs that infringes into an area
otherwise reserved to the states?
Both the logic of the foreign affairs power and Supreme Court decisions
in analogous areas indicate that Congress can take such actions. Each of the
congressional powers constitutes a specific grant to the federal government of
the authority to regulate activities that fall within its reach; only those powers
that are not assigned to the federal government are reserved to the states. In an
analogous area, the Supreme Court held long ago that congressional power to
implement treaties extends into areas over which Congress could not otherwise
legislate.67 Despite recent criticism, this doctrine remains good law.6"
Similarly, the congressional foreign affairs powers - the structural power
and the enumerated powers, including that contained in the offenses clause -
afford Congress the authority to take any and all actions to implement
international law and regulate foreign relations, as long as such actions do not
violate specific constitutional mandates.
Thus, in Boos v. Barry,69 one of the few cases relying on the offenses
clause, the Supreme Court analyzed congressional statutes barring certain
peaceful protests in the vicinity of foreign embassies.70 The Court found one
65. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), holding that the ATCA "confers
federal subject matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues; (2) for
a tort; (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law)."
66. Particular congressional actions, of course, might also rest upon anyone of the specific
congressional powers, see supra note 50.
67. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 423-33 (1920).
68. See Martin Flaherty, Are We to be A Nation? Federal Power vs. States' Right in Foreign
Affairs, 70 UNIV. COLL. REV. 1277, 1297-1316 (1999).
69. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
70. The case addressed the constitutionality of a statute governing protests within the District of
Columbia, but compared the District of Columbia statute to a similar, but less restrictive statute governing
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statute to violate the First Amendment, noting that "it is well established that
'no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on
any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.' '"71 However, the Court accepted without question Congress'
power to legislate in this area, despite the fact that the federal government
would otherwise have had no power to regulate peaceful political protests.
Noting that "[tihe need to protect diplomats is grounded in our Nation's
important interest in international relations," the Court reviewed efforts to
protect foreign diplomats dating back to the pre-constitutional era of the
Confederation. Indeed, the Court noted that, if anything, the pressing national
interest in diplomatic protection is "even more true today given the global
nature of the economy and the extent to which actions in other parts of the
world affect our own national security."72
Boos v. Barry addressed a statute aimed at protecting diplomats, a
centuries-old topic of international law. But the constitutional analysis would
be no different applied to a modem application of international law. As with
the ATCA, nothing in the Constitution freezes foreign affairs to the areas of
concern they occupied at the time the document was drafted and ratified. In
particular, the available evidence as to the intentions and understandings of the
framers, confirmed by early Supreme Court opinions, indicates that the
Constitution incorporates the assumption that the issues governed international
law necessarily evolve over time.
Consider, for example, the international law provisions governing
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. Much of the world considers
such executions to be barred by international law; the United States, however,
through reservations to treaties and other objections has attempted to bar the
international norm from applying to United States conduct." In the absence of
such objections, the norm would be binding on the United States, either through
treaty obligations or as a norm of customary international law.74 In such a
situation, failure to obey the prohibition would place the United States in
such protests around the country. The Court noted that Congress had enacted the District of Columbia statute
pursuant to its authority under Article 1, § 8, cl. 10, of the Constitution to "define and punish... offenses
against the Law of Nations." Id. at 321. The Court also referred to the United States treaty obligation to
protect diplomats, contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. Id. at 322.
71. Id. at 324, cited in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
72. Id. at 322.
73. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders, 42 DEPAULU. L. REV. 1311,1328-34(1993); Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment:
The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 655 (1983).
74. Some commentators have argued that United States objections have been ineffective, and that
the norm is already binding within this country. See Hartman, supra note 73.
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violation of its international law obligations, although repercussions from other
members of the world community would likely be limited to criticism, rather
than concrete reprisals. In the absence of domestic incorporation of the
international rule, United States courts would refuse to enforce it, on behalf, for
example, of a person sentenced to death for a crime committed as a juvenile.
But if Congress chose to adopt the norm as binding on the United States,
it would obtain the force of federal law. Congress could constitutionally enact
legislation implementing the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty relying
on the federal foreign affairs power. Such a statute would no more infringe
upon states' rights than the 1790 classification of assaults upon diplomats as
federal crimes, or the more recent federal prohibition of certain acts in the
vicinity of foreign embassies, upheld in Boos v. Barry. In each of these
examples, Congress has the authority to regulate activities that would otherwise
fall within the control of the states because Congress has determined that such
regulation implicates foreign policy concerns. Although the issues of
international importance have changed, congressional power to determine the
content of such issues remains the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem expansion of human rights law to cover private actors is
firmly founded both in 18th century concepts of the evolving law of nations and
in developments in international law over the past fifty years, developments that
the United States has both guided and accepted during that time period. Indeed,
in a world in which private corporations wield more power than most
governments and are increasingly active in areas formerly reserved for
diplomats, it is inevitable that international law must increasingly address the
behavior of both private individuals and private corporations. The acceptance
of norms governing private actors into international law reflects a new
international consensus that such issues are of international concern, that they
affect international relations.
Similarly, international law recognizes no exceptions either for United
States government officials acting abroad, or for the actions of the United States
government within our borders. It is time for the United States to accept this
reality and to bring the nation into compliance with international obligations.
ATCA litigation has opened a window for litigating such issues in United States
courts; the opening must be strengthened and enlarged if the United States
wishes to be recognized as a law-abiding member of the world community.
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THE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
NORMS IN DOMESTIC COURTS
Beth Van Schaack*
This Article will attempt to make the case for the domestic civil action in
defense of international human rights in the face of a potential threat to such
litigation. It starts with a discussion of the importance of civil redress for
human rights victims and then recounts developments in the area of private
international law that threatens these domestic civil enforcement measures.
Until very recently, impunity for human rights violations and international
crimes has been the general rule in the international community, with few
exceptions. It is clear that only a small proportion of those who commit human
rights offenses are ever brought to justice in a court of law. Some perpetrators
are insulated by blanket amnesties erected in the wake of a transition to
democracy, while others benefit from general government complicity and
inaction. It is axiomatic that this pervasive impunity is probably the most
important factor in the recurrence of such abuses.
Recently, a great deal of attention has focused on efforts at the interna-
tional level to establish institutions to end this culture of impunity and ensure
some measure of accountability for human rights violations. These efforts
include the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the future establishment of the permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), and renewed interest in the establishment of a
hybrid institution to try members of the Khmer Rouge for the international
crimes committed in Cambodia in the 1970s. However, even when these
institutions are fully operational at the international level, domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms will continue to play a vital role in the promotion of
international human rights norms. International institutions, by necessity and
by design, are capable of addressing only a limited number of perpetrators and
conflicts. The jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals, such as those established to
respond to the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is limited
substantively, temporally, and geographically. Likewise, a fundamental pillar
of the ICC statute is the principle of complementarity, which provides that the
future Court will operate only when the domestic court with jurisdiction is
unable or unwilling to go forward with prosecutions. In all fora, prosecutions
at the international level will probably be limited to those individuals
* Attorney, Morrison & Foerster; Consulting Attorney, The Center for Justice and Accountability.
B.A. Stanford University; J.D. Yale Law School.
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commanding and controlling large-scale abuses and to individuals committing
the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. Thus, in order
to address comprehensively this problem of impunity, national systems must be
prepared to take action against human rights abusers within their jurisdictional
reach. National legal systems may respond in a variety of ways to the presence
of human rights abusers within their territories or subject to their jurisdictional
reach. These include criminal prosecutions, often according to the principle of
universal jurisdiction, administrative remedies, and civil redress. No one
mechanism is sufficient, and human rights advocates must strive for the
creation of a coordinated and multifaceted national response to the problem of
impunity.
Europe has witnessed a resurgence in domestic criminal proceedings
initiated against human rights abusers not seen since the close of World War II.
Many of these cases have been brought on the basis of the principle of universal
jurisdiction, as the events in question usually occurred extraterritorially and
involved non-nationals. A leading example is found in the Pinochet proceed-
ings, but prosecutions of individuals accused of committing international crimes
during the conflicts in Latin America, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere have
been commenced in almost every European state, including Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. Additionally, many
countries have enacted domestic statutes specifically authorizing the exercise
of universal jurisdiction over individuals accused of perpetrating grave
international crimes. The typical remedy of a criminal proceeding is the
incarceration of other punishment of the perpetrator. At the same time, civil
reparations for the victim in the form of a money judgment may be available
through the criminal law system in civil law countries that have adopted the
partie civile system.
In contrast to these exciting developments in Europe, criminal proceedings
enforcing international human rights norms in the United States are almost non-
existent despite the legal authorization, and indeed the obligation to criminally
punish human rights abusers within this country. In 1994, the United States
enacted federal legislation providing for the prosecution of torturers found
within its borders pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction espoused
in the Torture Convention. To date, however, the United States has declined
to initiate criminal proceedings under this statute, despite credible and
corroborated evidence of the presence of torturers here.
In addition to criminal prosecutions, states may respond to human rights
abusers with administrative measures. These remedies usually relate to an
accused's right to enter or remain in a particular country and include exclusion,
deportation, denaturalization, or revocation of visa rights. For example, after
staging a few largely unsuccessful prosecutions of World War II defendants,
Canada reevaluated its strategy in 1995, and thereafter adopted a practice of
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deporting non-Nazi perpetrators from the country, rather than criminally
prosecuting them.
Individuals seeking admission into the United States either as refugees,
asylees, or in other capacities must disclose their military service and answer
a series of questions relating to past criminal behavior. Unfortunately, these
filters are not as fine as one would hope. For example, one United States
forum asks candidates if they ever committed a crime of "moral turpitude." The
form fails, however, to proffer specific questions about the candidate's
involvement in the torture or persecution of others. If individuals misrepresent
their past on an immigration form, they may be subject to administrative
remedies, such as deportation, or they may face criminal prosecution for fraud.
Earlier this year, Senator Leahy of Vermont sponsored legislation approved by
the Senate and designed to strengthen administrative remedies by empowering
the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice to investigate
and prosecute modem day war criminals and human rights violators present in
the United States.
Such administrative responses have the benefit of providing victims of
human rights abuses with a genuine safe haven in their country of refuge.
However, these measures may ultimately prove unsatisfactory to victims
because they provide only a limited degree of punishment or accountability.
Further, such proceedings take place in closed hearings that do not afford
victims an opportunity to present their claims in a court of law or see justice in
action. And they do not assign individual liability or provide victims with
reparations.
This brings us to civil suits within domestic courts. This may seem strange
to some observers, but every international crime - such as the crime of genocide
or torture - is also a tort. Human rights abuses manifest this dual character as
both crimes and torts because they harm both human society generally and
individual victims. The commission of a tort can give rise to a civil proceeding
by the victim against the tortfeasor, and the principle remedy is a money
judgment for the victim against the perpetrator.
In the United States, civil cases against human rights abusers have been
pursued with consistency over the last two decades by organizations such as:
the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York and The Center for Justice &
Accountability in San Francisco. Many of these cases manifest a form of civil
universal jurisdiction, in that, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is
obtained wherever he may be found. These civil cases have the benefit of
involving the victim directly in the legal process. The victim chooses to initiate
the proceeding and then plays a central role throughout. This is in contrast to
a criminal trial, at least in the United States and other common law countries,
in which the victim plays a secondary role as witness for the prosecution
against the defendant.
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Those of us who represent victims of human rights violations have found
that this active and direct participation within the legal system is empowering
and often restores a sense of justice for victims of grave human rights abuses
for whom the courts of their countries provided no recourse. Civil cases can
also be commenced where the government is unwilling to act against abusers
within a particular country, as is currently the situation in the United States.
The remedy provided by a civil suit is money damages. The theory behind tort
damages is that they return the plaintiff to the place he or she was prior to the
commission of the tort. In the context of a case seeking to enforce human
rights norms, a money judgment is clearly no equivalent to the harm suffered
by the victims of human rights violations; something fundamental has been
taken from them. However, money damages may begin to compensate the
victim for the pain, emotional distress, and bodily harm suffered, as well as, for
medical expenses, and lost wages, and earning potential. In some common law
systems, punitive or exemplary damages can also be awarded to reflect the
willful or wanton nature of the defendant's conduct and to contribute to the
deterrence of future tortfeasors.
There are some limitations to such suits. First, during the pendency of the
suit, the defendant is not detained in any fashion, which may raise security
concerns for the plaintiffs. Further, in most countries, the defendant can leave
the country despite the filing of a suit against him. Thus, there is no guarantee
that the proceedings will be adversarial in nature, and the plaintiff may end up
with a default judgment in her favor without a detailed articulation of the full
scope of her rights under international law. The most vexing limitation of civil
suits relates to the difficulty of enforcing any resultant judgment. Cases
brought in the United States have been plagued by a lack of enforcement,
because defendants may not hold assets here or they may secrete their assets
abroad during the pendency of the suit. Further, a money judgment may be
difficult to enforce overseas. There is no worldwide enforcement regime in
place. As a result, the enforcement of foreign judgments is largely a matter of
comity and reciprocity.
Several years ago, the United States initiated an effort on the international
level to create a worldwide system aimed at the universal enforcement of
foreign judgments in exchange for the rigid regulation of the exercise of juris-
diction. As will be explained, this system raises large stakes for civil human
rights litigation in domestic courts. Delegates from the international commu-
nity are in the process of drafting a Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters under the auspices of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. The proposed Convention will
govern all "civil and commercial matters" within the national courts of
signatory countries brought against defendants domiciled in another signatory
country. As such, the Convention would apply to civil suits by human rights
victims and civil judgments for reparations obtained through criminal trials.
The Convention seeks to regulate two areas of private international law:
the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments. The
latter aspect of the Convention, dealing with the enforcement of foreign
judgments, holds the potential to greatly benefit civil human rights suits by
providing a mechanism for the automatic enforcement of judgments in the
jurisdictions in which defendants have assets. However, the former aspect of
the Convention -dealing with the exercise ofjurisdiction - may actually hinder,
and under some circumstances eliminate, civil suits seeking to enforce human
rights norms. As the Convention was originally drafted, the default jurisdic-
tional rule was found in draft Article 3, which provided that suits could be
brought in the jurisdiction in which the defendant resides. Draft Article 10 was
a claim specific rule governing cases in tort. According to this rule, a suit
sounding in tort could also be brought in the forum in which the tortious
activity occurred. Article 20 outlined a series of prohibited bases of
jurisdiction and included two important bases of jurisdiction for plaintiffs
seeking to enforce international human rights norms: doing business jurisdic-
tion and transient jurisdiction. The former allows for plaintiffs to bring suit in
a jurisdiction in which the defendant engages in "systematic and continuous"
activities, even if the defendant is not a resident in the jurisdiction. The latter
allows for plaintiffs to bring suit in any forum in which the defendant is present,
so long as the process is properly served while the defendant is in the forum.
Under the original jurisdictional system, victims of human rights abuses
seeking civil redress would have had two options available to them: suing in
the state in which the defendant resides or suing in the state in which the harm
occurred. Thus, these provisions would have entirely foreclosed the application
of universal jurisdiction in the civil context. These original provisions failed
to reflect the fact that many human rights cases before national courts are
brought outside of the state in which the harm occurred or in which the
defendant resides. The vast majority of grave international law violations occur
in states that are experiencing political upheaval or are governed by authorities
who themselves are responsible for the commission of, are complicit in, or are
otherwise indifferent to such violations. Further, perpetrators of human rights
violations may benefit from a blanket amnesty that precludes criminal and civil
trials. As such, domestic courts in these states may be unable or unwilling to
proceed effectively against perpetrators or to provide victims with redress.
In order to ensure their safety, many victims of human rights abuses have
had to flee the state in which the harm occurred, such that it may be impossible
for them to return to that state in order to pursue their rightful claims. They
may even be refugees as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Requiring
the victim to return to their country of persecution in order to seek redress
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clearly convenes the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention and the
international law principle of non-refoulement.
Given these unfortunate realities, in order to seek civil redress, such
victims must be able to access the courts of other nations when a human rights
violator travels abroad. Articles 3, 10, and 20 as originally drafted would have
barred this. Further, the proposed Convention could have prevented the
enforcement of civil judgments arising out of criminal'trials ifjurisdiction were
premised on the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was effectively
prohibited by the proposed Convention.
In this way, the original draft of the proposed Convention could have
extinguished efforts by certain states to enforce international human rights
norms through civil litigation in their national courts and foreclosed efforts to
develop similar avenues for redress elsewhere. This would have significantly
stymied efforts by states to fulfill specific conventional and customary
international law obligations to prevent, punish, or remedy international law
violations. Many international human rights conventions, such as the Torture
Convention and the two International Covenants, oblige states parties to provide
victims of abuses with a meaningful remedy, access to the judiciary, and
monetary reparations. If the Convention were ratified as it was then drafted,
signatories would arguably have been in breach of these conventional
provisions. This is especially alarming given the lack of available international
and regional fora for individual victims of human rights abuses.
Fortunately, attorneys and advocates representing victims of human rights
abuses became aware of the implications of this Convention to cases seeking
to enforce human rights norms in domestic courts and sounded the alarm among
other members of the human rights community. These concerned individuals
formed a "Human Rights Coalition" to participate in the drafting process of the
Convention and lobby delegates to include language excluding human rights
provisions from the more restrictive aspects of the Convention's jurisdictional
regime. Negotiations of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on
the draft Convention were held most recently in October 1999 in preparation
for a final Diplomatic Conference in 2000. Going into the negotiations,
members of the Coalition had secured a bracketed "placeholder" that suggested
an exception for civil suits seeking to enforce human rights norms. However,
this placeholder did not provide any details regarding the scope of the
exception. Fortunately, the negotiation session resulted in considerable
progress, although additional work is necessary.
The debate began with the submission from the Human Rights Coalition
that proposed that the following language be inserted in Article 20:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a party from bringing an action
in a national court seeking relief for a violation of international
Schaack
human rights or international humanitarian law that amounts to
criminal conduct under either international or national law, or for
which a right to reparation is established under either international
law or national law. International law shall be interpreted with
reference to the sources of international law identified in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.'
In drafting this language, members of the Coalition were mindful of two
considerations. On the one hand, we wanted to keep the language as broad as
possible in order to allow for the evolution of norms under international law.
At the same time, however, we were cognizant of the fact that delegates would
balk if the exception swallowed the rule. Thus, we drafted the text so that the
exception would apply only to conduct that rose to the level of a crime under
international law. We also suggested that courts look to international and
domestic law to determine which norms have attained this status.
In the ensuing debate, some delegates were concerned that this proposal
remained overly vague and broad. In response, another proposal was put
forward that enumerated a few crimes that would activate the exception and
required future plaintiffs to demonstrate exposure to a risk of a denial ofjustice,
because proceedings in other states are not possible or could not reasonably be
required. Other delegates insisted that this short list of crimes would prove to
be too limiting over time and disallow normative evolution. A third proposal
was advanced that enumerated three general categories of crime - genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity - in keeping with the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC Statute.
China introduced a fourth proposal that would trigger the exception only
if the state exercising jurisdiction was acting in accordance with an interna-
tional treaty to which it is a party. Other delegates countered that the Conven-
tion' s exception should be triggered by a violation of customary international
law norms, as well as by treaty violations, in order to address the patent
inequalities created by the fact that not every state has enacted the necessary
implementing legislation for the treaties they have signed.
By the end of the session, the Drafting Committee had consolidated these
proposals into the following draft text to be located in Article 20:
4. Nothing in this article shall prevent a court in a Contracting State
from exercising jurisdiction under national law in an action [seeking
relief] [claiming damages] in respect of conduct which constitutes:
[Variant One:
1. Proposal presented at Debate for Human Rights Coalition for Article 20 (1999-2000).
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genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime [as defined
in the statute of the International Criminal Court]; or a serious crime
against a natural person under international law; or
a grave violation against a natural person of non-derogable
fundamental rights under international law, such as torture, slavery,
forced labor and disappeared persons]. [Sub paragraphs [(b) and (c)]
above apply only if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a
denial ofjustice because proceedings in another state are not possible
or cannot reasonably be required.]
[Variant Two:
A serious crime under international law, provided that that state
has established its criminaljurisdiction over that crime in accordance
with an international treaty to which it is a party and that the claim is
for civil compensatory damages for death or serious bodily injury
arising from that crime.]2
The fact that the entire provision is not in brackets is a welcome develop-
ment in that it indicates that a human rights exception will be included within
the final text, although this could theoretically be re-opened at the final
Diplomatic Conference in 2000.
However, this language does include some limitations. First, Variant 2 is
unacceptable for the reasons discussed above, and some version of Variant 1
must be adopted. However, the Convention should not require proof that
proceedings in another state are not possible. This has never been a prerequi-
site to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Further, plaintiffs should not bear
the burden of trying to bring suit in various other jurisdictions when the fcrum
in which the defendant is found can exercise jurisdiction under the universality
principle. Second, the crimes that trigger the exception should not be defined
with reference to the Statute of the ICC. The subject matter jurisdiction of the
future ICC is limited to the most serious international crimes. As such, these
definitions include high thresholds of applicability in order to exclude smaller-
scale and isolated crimes from the ICC's jurisdiction. It is crucial that some
exceptional language along the lines of a modified Variant 1 be included within
the Convention text to protect cases seeking to enforce international human
rights norms from these restrictive jurisdictional provisions. This will ensure
that victims of human rights violations who lack access to the courts of the state
in which the harm occurred are not denied legal redress, and that perpetrators
who are immune from suit in their home countries can be held accountable for
their violations of international law wherever they can be found. These minor
modifications will ensure that the Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments
reflects the fact that human rights litigation is qualitatively different from
2. Drafting Committees consolidation of Section 4 for Article 20 (1999-2000).
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commercial or tort litigation, and that it is inappropriate to subject these vastly
disparate types of cases to a uniform set of jurisdictional rules. Further, the
Convention will actually advance the cause of human rights by providing a
uniform enforcement mechanism that will ensure the enforcement ofjudgments
arising out of civil suits seeking to enforce human rights norms.
International human rights law is composed of a litany of rights that are
fundamental to our sense of fairness and justice. However, if these rights are
to be meaningful, the law must enforce them and provide a meaningful redress
to victims. Civil suits in domestic courts play an important role in this process.
A court judgment denouncing a human rights violation, identifying a responsi-
ble individual, and providing reparations can go a long way toward restoring a
victim's sense of justice. Further, an enforceable damage award can assist the
rehabilitation of victims of human rights abuses who must restart their lives in
their countries of refuge. Unless wrongful conduct is addressed in some official
and public capacity, violations will be repeated with impunity. For these
reasons, it is imperative that the proposed Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters enables, rather than
disables, civil suits seeking redress for grave human rights violations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Human rights law has evolved considerably over the past half-century.
Much of this evolution has occurred at the international level. Evolution can,
of course, consist of growth and expansion, or decline and regression. For the
* Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. E-mail address:
madrumbl@ualr.edu. This Article was presented at the International Law Association International Law
Weekend (November 4-6, 1999), for a panel entitled "Evolving Law: International Human Rights in Flux."
Parts (111) and (IV) of this Article expand upon concerns raised in my essay Waging War Against the World:
The Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122 (1998).
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most part, the recent international evolution of human rights law has tended
towards growth and expansion.
Growth can involve the creation of new mechanisms to enforce basic civil
rights by holding accountable those who violate these rights. In recent years,.
the creation of mechanisms to promote accountability has become a focal point
of activity for international lawyers. This activity has most immediately
culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute)' in July, 1998. The Rome Statute innovates on both the
procedural and substantive fronts. Along with creating an enforcement
mechanism in the form of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Rome
Statute also refines prior customary and conventional rules by providing a
detailed list of what can prospectively be sanctioned as the "most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole."2 In this regard, the
Rome Statute creates important linkages between human rights, international
humanitarian law, and international criminal law. This gives rise to what one
scholar has labeled the "humanization" of international humanitarian law.3
Although there has been considerable parallelism between international
human rights and international humanitarian law, this has, for the most part,
occurred within the nexus of classic human rights such as the right to life, the
right to freedom from persecution, and the right to bodily integrity. The
evolution and growth of social and political rights, and their penetration into the
world of international humanitarian law, has been much slower. A tradition-
ally socio-political right whose exploration shall constitute the focus of this
Article is the right to live in a healthy and productive environment, which some
have called "environmental security."4 For the most part, the linkage between
international humanitarian law and environmental security is weak and may in
fact reflect a somewhat troubling disjunction between international environ-
mental law and humanitarian concerns. Although international humanitarian
law may well be "humanized," it is not showing signs of being "environ-
mentalized."
The gap between international humanitarian law and environmental
security should trouble international lawyers. Just as armed conflict often
creates a context in which the most serious human rights abuses occur, so too,
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [Rome
Statute].
2. Id. at art. 5(1).
3. See comments of Professor Theodor Meron at the Opening Session of the International Law
Association International Law Weekend (November 4-6, 1999) (notes on file with the author).
4. See, e.g., Bernard A. Weintraub, Environmental Security, Environmental Management, and
Environmental Justice, 12 PACE ENVTL. L REv. 533, 546 (1995) ("environmental security... refers to a
community's state of assurance that its stability as a community will not be threatened by a lack of proper
management of the natural resources it deems to be necessary parts of its identity").
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does it create a similar context for the infliction of wanton and extensive
destruction to the environment. This destruction creates profound environ-
mental insecurity. Part (H1) of this Article explores the insecurities caused by
the environmental consequences of armed conflict. Although the international
community has shown considerable concern for the humanitarian consequences
of war,5 it has been significantly more hesitant in accounting for war's
environmental consequences. It is for this reason that a very fruitful
exploration of the progress that has been made and that still needs to be made
in terms of harmonizing international humanitarian law with environmental
protection can emerge from a study of how the international community
monitors the environmental consequences of war. Part (Ell) examines the
successes and failures of the international legal order in controlling these
consequences and directs its focus on the ICC's jurisdiction to prosecute
environmental war crimes. Part (IV) argues that the ICC may not be
particularly well-suited to sanction environmentally destructive behavior. This
raises the more penetrating question whether punitive criminal approaches
pursued in isolation of other policy devices can ever promote environmental
security. Part (V) is proscriptive, sketching ways in which the promotion of
environmental security can be made more effective. Part (V) posits that the
effective promotion of environmental security requires a multifaceted approach,
which combines criminal prosecution, preventative measures, and specially
tailored remedies. An additional element of this multifaceted approach,
inspired by environmental justice litigation in the United States, involves more
proactive use of international anti-discrimination conventions to guard against
the infliction of environmental insecurity on already disempowered groups. In
the end, this encourages environmental security to become more closely
integrated with both the protection of human rights and international
humanitarian law.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
OF ARMED CONFLICT
Modification or desecration of the natural environment has often been
used as a strategic mechanism to safeguard state sovereignty. Over two mil-
5. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 1949 Geneva Convention H for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
August 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 85; 1949 Geneva Convention IlI Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The Security Council's creation of ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also evinces the international
community's concern for the humanitarian consequences of war. See also Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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lennia ago, Roman soldiers salted the soil of Carthage. Much more recently,
Agent Orange was used to defoliate the Vietnamese jungle. In fact, it is
estimated that, from 1962 to 1971, the United States sprayed twelve million
gallons of defoliant over more than ten percent of what was then South
Vietnam.6 United States estimates reveal that fourteen percent of the area's
forests were destroyed.' Other estimates place the figure at nearly one-third.'
Regardless of the exact numbers, "broad stretches of the landscape are still bare
of trees." 9 Civilians and soldiers who had been exposed to defoliants claim to
have passed the ill-effects through their family lines. In fact, there are tens of
thousands of physically or mentally disabled children in Vietnam whose
disabilities can be linked to the spraying of Agent Orange which occurred
before they were born or even conceived.' °
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, vast quantities of oil were dumped into
the Persian Gulf to contaminate Kuwait's water supply." Kuwaiti oil wells
were also deliberately ignited by Iraqi troops. 2 Remedying the losses and
damages suffered as a direct result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait has prompted the creation of the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC) as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. 3 The
UNCC is a unique initiative (part court of law, part arbitral tribunal) which
adopts mass tort litigation approaches to settle claims and pay compensation,
including for damage to the Kuwaiti environment and public health. Iraq,
whose liability is presumed, is to pay reparations out of its frozen international
6. Seth Mydans, Vietnam Sees War's Legacy in Its Young, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 1999), at 12.
Two commentators have argued that the Vietnam War's "environmental damages offered a rallying point for
opponents of the conflict and catalyzed political animus against the war." See Peter J. Richards and Michael
N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON
L. REV. 1047, 1053 (1999).
7. Id.
8. See Oscar Arias, Responsibility of Nations to the Environment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12, 1998).
9. Mydans, supra note 7.
10. There is evidence that dioxin, the poisonous residue of Agent Orange, contributes to the types
of birth defects found in Vietnam. However, much of this evidence is "anecdotal" and is disputed by the
United States, which persists in refusing to take responsibility. Id.
11. Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1055.
12. See Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation of Damages Resulting from Iraqi
Aggression, OIL ANDENViRONMENTALCLAIMS BULLETN (Aug. 1997). Independent of the damage to Kuwait
and to the Persian Gulf waters, it is estimated that the oil well fires set by Iraqi soldiers expelled one to two
million tons of carbon dioxide, which in 1991 represented one percent of total global carbon dioxide
emissions. Id. at 8. One commentator has estimated that over 700 oil wells were ignited. See Weintraub,
supra note 4, at 536.




assets as well as from a portion of its future oil export earnings. Thus far, 2.6
million claims have been filed.'4 The asserted value of claims is still to be
resolved $320 billion. 5 Of those claims which have been resolved, nearly 15
million has been awarded in compensation to aggrieved partners.
Reports of significant ecological destruction are also emerging from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO aerial bombardment of the FRY
under Operation Allied Force has resulted in the destruction of oil refining
installations as well as storage facilities for other industrial products. Much of
this destruction arose from the indiscriminate effects of bombing from very
high altitude levels.' 6 In particular, the destruction of a petrochemical, fertilizer
and refinery complex in Pancevo resulted in the discharge of oil, gasoline, and
dichloride (a powerful carcinogen) into the Danube river.'7 The bombardment
of the Pancevo facility also caused the emission of toxic gases.' 8 The result,
according to one Western observer, is an "ecological disaster," with the
pollution "spread[ing] downstream to Romania and Bulgaria and then into the
Black Sea."' 9 Scientists are also very concerned that extensive flooding may
result from ice which may form on the Danube and then become lodged behind
three bridges in Novi Sad which were bombed during Operation Allied Force.20
The areas most at risk include low-lying portions of Serbia, as well as Croatia
and parts of Hungary. 2
In short, "[f]rom antiquity to the present, examples of environmental
destruction in war abound."22 But it is not only actual war which creates
environmental insecurity. The environment also faces severe threats as nations
prepare to go to war (mobilization) and as nations turn back from the threat of
14. Jay Austin and Carl Bruch, The Greening of Warfare, 15:6 ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 32, 33
(1998). See also, United Nations Compensation, www.UNOQ.ch/uncc/stats.htm (visited on-March 6,2000).
15. Id.
16. One scholar has in fact argued that the patterns of the NATO bombings trigger important
international humanitarian law concerns. See comments of Professor Julie Mertus, "The Imprint of Kosovo
on International Law" Panel, International Law Weekend (November 4-6, 1999) (notes on file with the
author).
17. Tom Walker, Missile Strikes Pollute Danube, GLOBE AND MAIL (April 19, 1999) at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Marlise Simons, Hungary Says Danube's Bombed-OutBridges May Cause Floods, N.Y. TIMES
(October 24, 1999). One hurdle which will have to be overcome in the repair of the bridges is that the FRY
government maintains there are still unexploded missiles and other ordnance in the Danube. Id.
21. Id.
22. Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1051. See also Neil A. F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law,
Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 69 (1995) (providing
examples of deliberate dam-busting by armed forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945,
World War 11, and the Korean War).
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war (decommissioning and disarmament).' On this latter point, Russian
attempts to decommission its nuclear submarines in the Arctic Ocean are being
carried out with insufficient financial and human resources and seriously
threaten that particularly fragile marine environment.24 Testing of weapons -
specifically nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - also has particularly
noxious effects on the environment. These activities collateral to actual armed
conflict therefore require regulation. Nonetheless, for the most part, multi-
lateral legal structures only provide limited supervision and monitoring for the
environmental consequences of such activities.
I. THE ICC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LANGUAGE OF THE
ROME STATUTE
It is only very recently that the international community has made inroads
into contemplating the prosecution of those who engage in unacceptable use of
the environment during wartime. In this regard, the language of the Rome
Statute is important. For the first time, environmental war crimes are
independently sanctioned and an apparatus is provided for the punishment of
those who commit such crimes. Although there was some scattered mention of
environmental war crimes at the Nuremberg Trials,25 over the past five decades
humanitarian abuses have been treated separately from environmental
desecration. This disconnect is revealed in the Statute of the International
23. Mobilization should also include the day-to-day maintenance of military bases. It is reported
that it would take "enormous diversions of money and effort to remediate the numerous hazardous waste sites
that the United States military has created at its many military bases." See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 582.
Should military bases not be run in an environmentally sensitive manner, the threat of environmental
degradation and contamination increases.
24. SYMPOSIUM RATIONALE, ARMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PREVENTING THE PERILS OF
DISARMAMENT, University of Tulsa (Dec. 9B 10, 1999) ("Many of the past and potentially adverse future
global environmental impacts on the Arctic caused by Russian nuclear dumping have obstructed and delayed
the implementation and multiplied the costs of implementing START I [n.b. the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties]. The United States, Norway, and the international community are trying, ex post, to address and
prevent these unforeseen problems, but might have done so more effectively and efficiently ex ante."). See
also, Elizabeth Kirk, The Environmental Implications of Arms Control Agreement (Paper on file with author).
25. See, e.g., German General Rendulic was acquitted of charges that he perpetrated a scorched
earth policy as his forces evacuated Norway. See The Hostage Case (U.S. v. list), 11 T.W.C. 759 (1950).
Rendulic alleged he believed his forces were being chased by Soviet forces. As a result, he maintained that
the environmental destruction was militarily necessary. As it turned out, Rendulic's forces were not being
chased by Soviet forces. However, it was held that Rendulic's belief, although mistaken, was reasonably
held. Id. The Rendulic case is a classic example of the operation of military necessity as a defense to
environmental crimes. See Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification through the
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: " Greening' the International Laws of Armed Conflict to
Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 793, 815 (1996).
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia26 and the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda." Neither Tribunal is directly em-
powered to prosecute those who propagate environmental insecurity through the
commission of environmental war crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has some jurisdiction over war crimes which bear
an incidental relationship to the security of the natural environment. 2' The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda essentially lacks jurisdiction over
even incidental violations of environmental security. 9
26. U.N. SCOR 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), Annex [hereinafter Statute of the
ICTY].
27. U.N. SCOR 955 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., (Nov. 8, 1994), Annex [hereinafter
Statute of the ICTR].
28. The ICTY has jurisdiction over a series of war crimes. See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 27,
art. at 3. Environmental desecration does not figure among the listed crimes. There is, however, jurisdiction
over a series of war crimes which bear an incidental relationship with environmental insecurity. See id. These
include: employment of poisonous weapons (art. 3(a)); wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity (art. 3(b)); attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings (art. 3(c)); and plunder of public property (art. 3(e)). The
ICTY can also prosecute as a war crime the extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (art. 2(d)). However, these crimes do not
involve environmental destruction as a crime per se. Instead they focus on damage to human environments
and property. Without the immediate causal link to human harm there can be no liability. This provides no
jurisdiction to hold individuals accountable for wanton environmental destruction, regardless of the long-term
effects of that destruction on human life or environmental security. The ICTY's jurisdiction over war crimes
is not limited to those enumerated in the Statute of the ICTY. Id. at art. 3. However, so far no one has been
prosecuted for environmental war crimes.' See Preparatory Commission Request, infra note 39, at 29. As
a result, the ICTY has not been called upon to decide whether it has the discretionary jurisdiction to address
such crimes. Id
29. Statute of the ICTR, supra note 28, at art. 4. One crime over which the ICTR has jurisdiction
that bears a remote relationship to the environment is "pillage." Id at art. 4(f). Jurisdiction can also be
exercised over "violence to health of persons" and "acts of terrorism." Id. at arts. 4(a) and 4(d). Both of these
crimes have an even more remote relationship with the protection of the natural environment. However, there
have been no charges involving these war crimes. Given the profound environmental insecurity arising out
of the Rwandan conflict, the lack of jurisdiction over environmental war crimes is disappointing. The
Rwandan conflict has seen two national parks (Pare national des volcans and Parc national de l'Akagdra)
landmined, endangered species (the mountain gorillas) poached, agricultural lands rendered barren in order
to coerce the migration of persecuted peoples, and systemic resettlement exhausting moderate lands
specifically in eastern Congo of their agricultural capacities. See Mark Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid
Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 545 (1998). The domestic war crimes prosecutions which are occurring in Rwanda have also been
completely reticent in the area of environmental crimes.
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Under the language of the Rome Statute, however, intentional infliction
of harm to the environment may constitute a war crime. 0 More specifically,
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) prohibits [emphasis added]:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 1
The negotiation history of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) merits a brief review. The
draft of the Rome Statute which served as the basis for the final negotiations
listed three other options along with the language which was eventually adopted
in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).3" The three rejected options are:
1. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which is not justified by military
necessity; (Or)
2. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the natural environment;
(Or)
3. No paragraph [in other words, no prohibition on intentionally
inflicting widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment].
In the end, the provision which was adopted was a compromise and, from
an environmental perspective, occupies a middle ground. However, it shares
with the first option the important limitation that environmental integrity is
secondary to the military advancement of national security interests. There are
other important limitations. The jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to "war
30. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(c) (vesting the ICC with jurisdiction over war crimes).
Articles 5(l)(d) and 5(2) create jurisdiction over "crimes of aggression." However, the definition of this term
is not provided; in fact, the Rome Statute leaves it to the parties to define this term in the future. Id. Those
concerned with environmental issues may view the open-ended nature of crimes of aggression as a potential
device to expand the ICC's jurisdiction over environmental matters.
31. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv)(emphasis added).
32. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8 (2 April 1998), section B(b) to the "War Crimes" section of Part 2 (visited Feb. 18,
2000) <http://www.un.org/icc> [hereinafter "Draft Rome Statute"]. The Draft Rome Statute is on file with
the author.
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crimes in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes."33 The question consequently arises
whether the "in particular" language will allow isolated incidents to fall within
the purview of the Rome Statute. A more important limitation, however, is the
fact that prohibiting harm to the natural environment is explicitly mentioned
only once in the entire Rome Statute.34 This provision may therefore become
peripheral given the broad array of other crimes to which the ICC's energies
will be directed. As a result, the effect of this provision may well be more
apparent than real. Also, the environmental war crimes provision of the Rome
Statute only applies to inter-state armed conflicts. Environmental desecration
during internecine conflicts is consequently left unaddressed. 5 This is a
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8(1). Another limitation to the effectiveness of the ICC in
the area of warcrimes is the fact that any signatory state can opt out of the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes
alleged to have been committed by that state's nationals or on that state's territory. See id. at art. 124.
34. In other places, the Rome Statute prohibits as a "war crime" conduct which may be collaterally
related to the well-being of the natural environment, or have some other ancillary connection. See, e.g., id.
at art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (sanctions extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly). Article 8(2)(b) prohibits other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international
law, namely: (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects; (iii) Intentionally directing attacks
against.., installations, material... involved in a humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping mission; (v)
Attacking or bombing... dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against... [inter alia] historic monuments; (xiii) Destroying or seizing
the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival. The Rome Statute also criminalizes the use of
certain weapons with destructive effects on both humanity as well as the natural environment. See id. at art.
8(2)(b). Prohibited practices include: (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; (xviii) Employing
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. Many of these
weapons are already prohibited by other international agreements. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 35 U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/CONF 95/15, Oct. 27, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 1523; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800.
35. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 8(2)(c) & (e). These articles list the types of war crimes
punishable within internal armed conflicts. Intentionally inflicting widespread, long-term and severe harm
to the environment is omitted from this list. Basic principles of treaty interpretation provide that this
omission is deliberate and evinces a desire not to punish environmental desecration when committed in an
internal conflict. Further limitations on the application of the entire Rome Statute to internal conflicts are
found in Article 8(2)(f), which provides.
Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is
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troubling gap.36 Also troubling is the fact that the ICC can only capture
environmental crimes committed by military forces actively engaged in
hostilities. There is therefore no jurisdiction to sanction the environmental
insecurity created by armed forces in the testing of weapons or in the
mobilization of forces. Nor is there jurisdiction to supervise any disarmament
process,37 notably the modalities of decommissioning and their environmental
effects.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) also triggers more specific interpretive concerns. By
way of overview, there are three principal components to the language of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv): (1) the actual physical act:- or actus reus - which consists
of launching an attack which causes "widespread, long-term and severe
damage" to the natural environment; (2) a second material element, namely
that the damage must be "clearly excessive" in relation to the "concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated"; and (3) even if both material
elements are found, the mental element - or mens rea - must be demonstrated,
thereby entailing proof that the attack was launched intentionally and in the
knowledge it will cause "widespread, long-term, and severe damage" to the
natural environment.
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups. Id. [emphasis added]. In sum, nations appear less willing to criminaize conduct in internal conflicts
than in international conflicts. This gives rise to concern that the protection of both humanity and the
environment in internal conflicts may be inadequate. However, even the limited jurisdiction obtained over
internal conflicts represents a major step forward. After all, such intrusion into internal affairs is one of the
most jealously guarded elements of state sovereignty.
36. See discussion of the environmental effects of internal conflicts in Rwanda, supra note 30.
There are other examples of intentional environmental degradation occurring during internal conflicts. See
infra note 134, for a discussion of the effects of the El Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and Colombian conflict. In
the Colombian conflict, it is reported that a "guerrilla group... attempted to undermine the authority of the
government by repeatedly blowing up the nation's largest oil pipeline, spilling more than 600,000 gallons of
oil into east Andes wetlands." See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 583, citing James Brooke, Colombia Rebels
Turn to Ecological Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1990). Insurgency and counter-insurgency guerilla civil
wars have a particularly devastating effect on local environments. Insurgents often use tropical forests as
home bases and hiding grounds; counter-insurgency forces often respond by slashing and burning forests,
together with polluting rivers. The Cambodian conflict reflects a different, yet equally destructive, misuse of
the environment during an internal armed conflict. It is reported that "the Khmer Rouge has survived in the
rainforests on the Thai-Cambodian border by decimating the forests there and selling concessions to log the
timber and mine whatever minerals can be found in that region. This abuse of Cambodia's natural resources
can be understood to be a threat not only to Cambodia's environmental security . . . but also to the
environmental security of all those who rely on, or support, the protection of the Cambodian rainforests."
See id. at 602-03.
37. Supra note 25 ("disarming nuclear and chemical weapons and weapon systems does ... create
environmental impacts").
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A. The Physical Act: Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage
A successful prosecution under the Rome Statute will, first and foremost,
have to show that the accused launched an attack3" which caused "widespread,
long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment." Of great importance
is that all three elements must conjunctively be proven. The language of
"widespread, long-term and severe" has woven its way into the handful of
other international humanitarian conventions which address the use of the
environment in times of war, for example the 1977 United Nations Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention),39 and the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (Protocol I).40 However, by
providing that all three elements must be conjunctively shown to exist, the
38. "Attack" has been defined as an act of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
defense." See Protocol I on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol ], art. 49(!). See also
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE INERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY JAPAN,
U.N. Doc. PCNICCt1999/WGEC/DP. 12 (July 22, 1999). The attack cannot be isolated or sporadic, but must
involve the Ause of armed force to carry out a military operation during the course of an armed conflict." See
REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, COSTA RICA, FINLAND, HUNGARY, THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, SOUTH AFRICA ANDTHE PERMANENTOBSERVER MISSION OF SwrIZERLANDTo THE UNITED NATIONS
REGARDING THE TEXT PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMrrTEE OF THE RED CROSS ON ARTICLE 8,
2(B), (I), ( ), (i), (IV), (V), (VI), (VII), (IX), (Xl) AND (XII) OF THE STATURE, UN Doe. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/
INF.2/Add. 1 (July 30, 1999) 29 [hereinafter Preparatory Commission Request].
39. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 (entered into force Oct. 5, 1978)
[ENMOD Convention], which prohibits engagement "in military ... environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other
State Party." The ENMOD Convention focuses on the use of the environment as a weapon - as a result,
wanton destruction of the environment occurring as a byproduct ofa military campaign might not fall within
its parameters. See Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1063 ("Mhe 1977 ENMOD Convention ...
merely limits the use of modification of the environment as a tool or weapon of warfare."). Environmental
damage per se is for the most part not a concern of the ENMOD Convention. See Richards and Schmitt,
supra note 7, at 1063. Some of the activities prohibited by the ENMOD Convention amount to outrageous
behavior not within the military capability of most nations for example: inducing earthquakes and tidal
waves, or activating quiescent volcanoes.
40. Protocol I, supra note 39, at art. 35(3) (prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment"). Id at art. 55 states that:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition on the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or
survival of the population. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. See
also id. at arts. 54, 56 (which provide for the protection of property, which has ancillary benefits for the
environment.) The United States has not yet ratified Protocol I, in part owing to objections over its
environmental provisions. See Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1054.
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language of the Rome Statute regresses from the wording of the ENMOD
Convention which bases fault disjunctively on proof of only one of these three
characteristics.
What exactly do "widespread," "long-term," and "severe" mean? The
Rome Statute is silent on this point. The International Law Commission (ILC)
has concluded that "widespread, long-term and severe" describes the "extent or
intensity of the damage, its persistence in time, and the size of the geographical
area affected by the damage."'" However, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) recognizes that the more specific question "as to what
constitutes 'widespread, long-term, and severe' damage... to the environment
is open to interpretation."42 In this regard, some interpretive guidance can be
provided by the work of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament Understanding (CCD Understanding) regarding the application
of these terms under the ENMOD Convention.43 This additional work was
necessary since the ENMOD Convention does not itself define these terms.
The CCD Understanding provides as follows:
1. "Widespread" encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometers;
2. "Long-term" lasting for a period of months, or approximately a
season;
3. "Severe" involving serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
Regrettably, the interpretive value of the CCD Understanding is curtailed
by the fact that it stipulates that its use is limited to the ENMOD Convention
and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of similar terms if used in
another international agreement." As the ENMOD Convention deals with
"extraordinary manipulations of the natural environment for military purposes,
such as creating floods, it is unclear what weight, if any, it would be given by
the [ICC]."45 As it turns out, greater interpretive guidance may be obtained
from commentaries on Protocol I, especially since its language is, like the Rome
41. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2241, 22 August 1991, pp. 15, 18, cited in Preparatory Commission
Request, supra note 39, at 33.
42. UN Doc. A/48/269, p. 9. See also Doc. A/47/328, 31 July 1992, paras. 20, 63, cited in
Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
43. Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, reprinted in Convention
on the Prohibition of Military orAny Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Hearing
Before Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) [CCD Understanding].
44. Id. (It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively for
this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms of used in
connection with any other international agreement.). See also Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1065.
45. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 38.
Statute's, conjunctive in nature. From an environmental perspective, the
prohibitions in Protocol I are more circumscribed than those of ENMOD. For
example, "long-term" has been interpreted by the ICRC as meaning lasting for
"decades rather than months."
6
The "widespread" and "long-term" principles attempt to ascribe temporal
and geographic limitations to environmental harm which, for the most part,
does not know such boundaries. As the planet constitutes one single ecosystem,
environmental degradation of one part of the earth ultimately affects the entire
planet.4 7 The "severe" requirement could mean that damage to an isolated
section of the global commons whose natural resources have not yet been
valued by global financial markets could escape punishment; and this
notwithstanding its biodiversity or species-importance. The anthropocentric
limitation of "severe" damage to that which affects human life and human
consumption of natural resources underscores a more general shortcoming with
much of the existing framework of environmental protection during wartime -
namely that this protection is not geared to protecting the environment per se,
but, rather, humanity's need to make use of it. More troubling is that state
practice in some of the signatories to the Rome Statute ascribes the
anthropocentric limitation to the totality of the material element of Article
8(2)(b)(iv). For example, the German Military Manual states that:
"'Widespread,' 'long-term,' and 'severe' damage to the natural environment is
a major interference with human life or natural resources. 48
An additional phrase that requires definition is "natural environment." In
its report detailing the work of its 43rd Session, the ILC offered a broad
definition of "natural environment. 4 9 This definition focused both on the
46. UN Doc. A/48/269, p. 9. See also JozefGoldblat, The Mitigation of Environmental Disruption
by War: Legal Approaches, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF WAR: RELEASING DANGEROUS FORCES IN AN
INDUSTRIALZED WORLD 52 (Arthur Westing ed. 1990). The ILC has concluded that Along-term" should be
taken to "mean the long-lasting nature of the effects and not the possibility that the damage would occur a
long time afterwards." See UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2241, 22 August 1991, pp. 15, 18, cited in Preparatory
Commission Request, supra note 39, at 33.
47. Lynn Berat, Defending tile Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geocide in
International Law, I I B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 347 n.102 (1993).
48. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS MANUAL (GERMANY), No. 403, 37 (1992), cited
in Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34. More broadly, the fact that the environmental war
crimes is clustered by the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes with provisions entirely focused on
damage to the human environment gives further credence to the concern that the delegates to the Preparatory
Commission may not see Article 8(2)(b)(iv) operating beyond these anthropocentric limitations. See
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, 26 July to 13 August 1999,
<http://www.un.orglaw/icc/prepcpmni/prepjul.htm> (visited October 18, 1999) [Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court, Second Session].
49. GAOR, 46th session, suppl. No. 10 (U.N. Doc. A/46/10), p. 276, cited in Preparatory
Commission Request, supra note 39, at 33.
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human environment as well as on the natural environment per se.50 Having
such a broad definition is necessary for Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to fully encompass
environmental security as opposed to only covering the protection of human
environments (e.g. cities, dwellings, private property) from destruction. The
ILC definition of the "natural environment" is as follows:
The words "natural environment" should be taken broadly to cover
the environment of the human race and where the human race
develops, as well as areas the preservation of which is of
fundamental importance in protecting the environment. These words
therefore cover the seas, the atmosphere, climate, forests and other
plant cover, fauna, flora and other biological elements."'
It will be important to develop a memorandum of understanding under the
Rome Statute in which the scope of "natural environment," "widespread,"
"long-term," and "severe" is spelled out. The ongoing Preparatory Commis-
sion sessions provide an appropriate forum for such discussions. In fact, the
Preparatory Commission intends to "ensure the formulation of generally
acceptable elements of crimes on Article 8, as part of a complete set of
elements of crimes for all crimes, laid down in the [Rome] Statute."52
Unfortunately, thus far specific discussion of the environmental war crime
provision has been very limited. 3 Nonetheless, it is essential to the viability of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, supra note
49.
53. The Working Group on the Elements of Crimes regularly meets during the Preparatory
Commission sessions. See id. So far, it has considered the elements of some of the war crimes enumerated
in the Rome Statute. It has divided the war crimes provisions into nine clusters based on "the possible
commonality of their elements." Id. Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) is clustered with arts. 8(2)(b)(v) [attacking or
bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which
are not military objectives], (ix) [intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives], and (xxiv) [intentionally directing attacks
against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law]. Id. So far, several discussion papers have been
proposed by the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes. No discussion paper has been prepared for
Article 8(2)(b)(iv). Id. The official website for the Preparatory Commission addresses this gap in the
following manner: "there was not sufficient time for the Coordinator to prepare discussion papers on the
elements of all the provisions of war crimes." Id. Of the 23 national government proposals submitted to the
Working Group on Elements of Crimes, only a handful made mention of Article 8(2)(b)(iv). See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, List of documents issued at the second session of the Preparatory
Commission, <http://www.un.orglaw/icc/prepcomm/ gtdocs2nd.htm> (visited October 19, 1999). Only one
of these proposals gave thorough treatment to Article 8(2)(b)(iv). See Preparatory Commission Request,
supra note 39. There is no indication this trend will change in upcoming Preparatory Commission sessions.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) that the definition of the elements it contains is not pitched
at such a high level so as to strip the provision of any practical effect. This may
well require the threshold of responsibility to be relaxed from the international
community's current understanding of the meaning of "widespread," "long-
term," and "severe" harm.
B. Exculpatory Effects of Military Advantage
Even if there is proof of widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment, liability is only found if this damage is "clearly excessive"
in relation to the "concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."
This second material element permits "military objectives [to be] offered
as a defense against charges of environmental damage, even intentional
damage, as long as that damage is outweighed by the expected military gain."54
The exculpating force of "proof of military advantage" traces its roots to the
doctrine of "military necessity." This doctrine has historically been used to
mitigate or eliminate responsibility often for grievous breaches of humanitarian
standards. In short, "military necessity" is a principle of customary
international law5 "which 'authorizes' military action when such action is
necessary for the overall resolution of a conflict, particularly when the
continued existence of the acting state would otherwise be in jeopardy."56 At
the Nuremberg trials, the doctrine of military necessity was applied to the
destruction of property (the closest the international community has yet come
to an environmental war crimes proceeding) in the following manner:
The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself
is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming
of the enemy forces. 7
"Military advantage" may bear an even lower threshold of proof than
"military necessity." As a result, the prohibition in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may be
narrower than its antecedents at customary international law. In the case of
The fact that little individualized attention is given to the environmental war crimes provision
notwithstanding its fundamentally different nature than the other war crimes may foreshadow the possibility
that the environmental war crime is simply not taken particularly seriously within the spectrum of offenses
contained within the Rome Statute.
54. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 39.
55. See Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 28, nn. 32-33.
56. Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare:
Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479,496 (1993).
57. The Hostage Case, supra note 26, 11 T.W.C. at 1254.
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Article 8(2)(b)(iv), the ambit of "military advantage" is limited by the fact that
only "concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated" can justify the
environmental damage. Nonetheless, "concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated" still seems easier to prove than "military necessity." In
addition, although the "military necessity" defense may in fact form part of
customary international law, it is noteworthy that Protocol I, in its prohibition
of "widespread, long-term and severe" harm, did not permit proof of any
military advantage or necessity to eliminate wrongdoing. 58 As a result, Article
8(2)(b)(iv)'s prohibition is but a diluted version of that in Protocol I.
There are other concerns with "military advantage" in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
First, although a "proportionality test" (i.e. the environmental damage must be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage) is established, no guidelines, definitions or examples of "clearly
excessive" are provided. In fact, "the addition of the word[ ] 'clearly' ... in the
definition of collateral damage is not reflected in any existing legal source."5 9
To this end, memoranda of understanding of the Parties to the Rome Statute or
initial decisions by the ICC will be important in setting the scope for "clearly"
excessive.
Second, the factual element of the proportionality test is also unclear: since
proof of "clearly excessive" is required in order to find someone guilty, and
since the burden of proof rests with the Prosecutor, what type of research and
data will have to be marshaled? In addition, adjectival terms such as "concrete"
and "direct" and "overall" military advantage are somewhat vague and have not
yet been comprehensively defined by international law. Nor does the Rome
Statute provide more particularized definitions of the meaning of these terms.
As for "overall," the ICRC has suggested that it indicates "that a particular
target can have an important military advantage that can be felt over a lengthy
period of time and affect military action in areas other than the vicinity of the
target itself."'6 In the end, the extent to which these adjectives qualify or
extend the exculpating effect of military advantage will bear heavily on the
ability of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to punish environmental crimes.
58. See Protocol 1, supra note 39, at arts. 35, 55. See also Richards and Schmitt, supra note 6, at
1062 ("No other considerations, such as the military advantage offered by the prohibited act, the possibility
that alternative operations will result in greater incidental injury to civilians or collateral damage to civilian
property, or the overall impact of the action in context, can trump the principle of environmental protection").
Protocol I did use the military advantage limitation for other violations (e.g., the safety of civilians). See
Protocol 1, supra note 39, at arts. 51, 52, 57. As a result, interpretive assistance of the meaning of "military
advantage" in the Rome Statute can flow from the use of the term "military advantage" in Protocol 1. Any
such assistance is, of course, limited by the fact that "military advantage" in Protocol I does not figure into
its treatment of the environmental war crime.
59. See Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 29.
60. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/INF/10 (July 13, 1998).
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Finally, the military advantage needs simply to be "anticipated." What
does this term signify? Some clarification as to the meaning of "anticipated"
can emerge from a consideration of state declarations made to the use of
"military advantage" in prior international conventions. It is reported that:
A number of [s]tates expressed their understanding that the military
advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the
advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not
from isolated or particular parts of the attack.6
On a related note, it is unclear by whom and according to what standards
the "anticipation" is to be judged. Does there have to be an objective element
to the anticipation, or can the belief be subjectively held yet unrealistic? If the
notion of military advantage remains subjective in the mind of the military or
political leader under the circumstances in which the tactical decision was
made, then the defense could be too widely available. In order to curtail misuse
of the defense, it will be important to establish some objective standards as to
when the military advantage of an attack may justify widespread, long-term,
and severe damage to the environment.
The difficulties which inhere in giving appropriate meaning to the defense
of military advantage raise more penetrating questions. These questions
militate in favor of reconsidering the interaction between international
environmental law and international humanitarian law. Certain practices - such
as genocide and torture - have been sanctioned as illegal by the international
community to the extent that they can never be undertaken even if essential to
defend national sovereignty. Why should intentional environmental desecration
not be similarly proscribed?
C. The Mental Element: Strict Intentionality
In the case of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), criminal sanction will only fall upon an
individual who knows his or her behavior will cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the environment which is clearly excessive in relation to the
overall military advantage anticipated and, notwithstanding proof of this
knowledge, still commits the act with the full intention of causing the
environmental damage. More concisely, the perpetrator must be found to have
61. Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 30. This is the position taken by the
governments of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom in regard
to Protocol I. Australia and New Zealand have declared that military advantage anticipated refers to the
Abona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of
the military attack involved." Id. Commentators have also linked the military advantage of the specific attack
in question to the purposes of the military operation taken as a whole. id. at 31.
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acted willfully and in the knowledge that the attack will cause the prohibited
environmental damage.62 The Rome Statute therefore "presupposes that the
attack was launched in the knowledge that [the] consequences listed occur. 6 3
The ICRC has interpreted the phrase "in the knowledge" as requiring "the
person committing the act [to know] with certainty that the described results
would ensue, and this would not cover recklessness."' The fact that there is no
liability for negligently or carelessly inflicting widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the environment means that persons who are found to act
negligently will not face any sanction at all. The provision therefore covers
only the most invidious offender. It goes without saying that proving this very
onerous intentionality requirement will not be easy.
As a result, a more proactive approach may be required. Military and
political officials in both developing and developed nations should be educated
on the environmentally harmful effects of certain types of warfare, and be
informed of the technologies to avoid reliance on such strategies in the first
place. In this regard, the work of the ICRC can play a pivotal role. The ICRC
has published a document entitled Guidelines for Military Manuals and
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times ofArmed Conflict
(Guidelines), which are:
Intended as a tool to facilitate the instruction and training of armed
forces in an often neglected area of international humanitarian law:
the protection of the natural environment. The Guidelines['] ... sole
aim is to contribute in a practical and effective way to raising
awareness... [T]hey are an instrument for dissemination purposes.'
The Guidelines state that they are drawn from existing international legal
obligations and, as such, constitute a baseline ofjus commune among nations.66
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 34.
64. Zimmermann, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDMONAL PROTOCOL 1, art. 85, No. 3479, at 996,
cited in Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
65. Follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Guidelines for
Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 311, 230-237 (March 1, 1996); published as an annex to
U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994) <http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/8> [Guidelines]. The United Nations
General Assembly invited all states to widely disseminate these Guidelines and to give due consideration to
the possibility of incorporating them into their military manuals. See GA Res. 49/50 (Dec. 9, 1994), art. 11.
See also SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise
Doswald-Beck, ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a restatement of the law applicable to armed
conflicts at sea. Many of the principles in the San Remo Manual are encapsulated in the general provisions
of the Guidelines.
66. Guidelines, supra note 65, at art. I(1).
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Many detailed rules are provided in Article 111(9) of the Guidelines, which
cover numerous issues ranging from barring incendiary weapons in forested
regions to precluding the use of naval mines. Ultimately, it is hoped that the
Guidelines could constitute the specific level of objective knowledge imputed
to all military and civilian leaders and agents for purposes of culpability under
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute. It is also hoped that they will be taken
into account as new weaponry is developed. In this latter regard, Article 1V(18)
of the Guidelines is particularly important:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, states are under an obligation to
determine whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by applicable rules of international law,
including those providing protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict.67
In conclusion, unless some level of objective knowledge is read into the
intentionality requirement, individuals who choose not to inform themselves
that what they are doing is destructive of the environment might be able to use
their ignorance as a full defense. A failure to incorporate an objective element
into the Rome Statute's environmental war crimes also represents a step
backwards insofar as Protocol I had, as early as 1977, grounded responsibility
not in intentional environmental harm, but simply when there was a reasonable
expectation that environmental damage would occur.6"
IV. IS IT WORTH GREENING THE ICC?
International lawyers need to consider whether the interests of the global
environment are in fact well-served by collapsing environmental crimes within
an overarching multilateral mechanism. If so, then an important subsidiary
question emerges: is the ICC the appropriate mechanism or should a new
environmentally specific entity be created? The most immediate countervail-
ing option to proceeding multilaterally would be to address environmental
crimes within the rubric of independently negotiated regional agreements. In
such cases, domestic courts, regional tribunals, or either domestic or regional
regulatory agencies could serve as enforcement mechanisms.
Efforts at the regional level may prove effective in combating
environmental crimes within and outside the context of armed conflict. By way
67. Id. at art. IV(18).
68. Background Paper, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES
(June 10-12, 1998) 5; See also Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
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of example, in March, 1999, six African countries established an "African
Interpol" to fight wildlife crime. 9 More sweeping is the Council of Europe's
Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law.7 °
The motivation behind the Convention is that signatories should take effective
measures to ensure that the perpetrators of environmental hazards having
serious consequences escape neither prosecution nor punishment.7' This
Convention obliges signatories to criminalize certain intentional or negligent
forms of environmental offenses (although the negligence may be limited by
declaration to acts of gross negligence only).72 Specific examples are provided.
For instance, the intentional discharge of ionizing radiation into the air, soil, or
water which causes a "significant risk" of death or serious injury is to be
prohibited.73 So, too, is the unlawful disposal or transport of hazardous waste
which causes or is likely to cause death, serious injury, or "substantial damage
to the quality of air, soil, water, animals, or plants."74 This latter provision is
important for it goes beyond the anthropocentric approach to assessing
environmental harm which often characterizes current conventions and laws.
However, these successful regional initiatives should not obscure the
importance of multilateral efforts. The two levels can in fact operate
contemporaneously. As for the ICC, in order for it to capture environmental
crimes outside of the context of war, its jurisdiction would have to be
broadened. In this vein, some commentators have suggested making it a crime
recklessly or intentionally to harm the environment." This could permit the
behavior of armed forces not engaged in hostilities to be regulated, together
with corporations and governments who may implement policies which
promote insecurity through environmental modification. This crime has been
named "geocide" or "ecocide." Literally, this constitutes the environmental
counterpart of genocide - a killing of the earth. The logic of ecocide is as
69. IRIN News Update (March 18, 1999). The countries are: Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The headquarters of the African Interpol will be in Nairobi,
Kenya. Negotiators indicated that the arrangement was required owing to the need for international
cooperation to fight wildlife crimes successfully." Id.
70. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
ETS No. 172 (November 4, 1998).
71. Id. at pmbl.
72. Id. at arts. 2, 3.
73. Id. at art. 2.
74. Id.
75. This crime would operate within and outside the context of war. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk,
Environmental Disruption by Military Means and International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A
TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL 33-51 (1984); Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism:
Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 481 (1994); Mark Allan Gray, The
International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215 (1996); Berat, supra note 48; Caggiano, supra
note 57; Yuzon, supra note 26.
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follows: significantly harming the natural environment constitutes a breach of
a duty of care, and this breach consists, in the least, in tortuous or delictual
conduct and, when undertaken with willfulness, recklessness or negligence,
ought to constitute a crime.76
Although some international environmental lawyers may find the
criminalization of ecocide to be intellectually attractive, it seems fair to say that
its chances of being negotiated into the jurisdiction of the ICC are slim at best.
And yet environmental crimes outside armed conflict do occur and, when they
do, certainly inflict "widespread, long-term, and severe" damage to the natural
environment. Examples of such crimes could include reckless misconduct at
nuclear power facilities," testing of biological weapons, or intentional dumping
of oil and chemical wastes from ships (often cruise ships) at sea.7" Trade in
endangered species, hazardous wastes and ozone-depleting substances
constitutes an underground market estimated at $U.S. 20 billion annually.79
Another particularly troubling example of what is arguably an environmental
crime which is essentially unregulated at the international level notwithstanding
its transnational effects is the setting of forest fires in the Amazon basin and in
Indonesia. In both cases, there is compelling evidence that these fires had been
deliberately set by businesses seeking to clear the forests for economic
development.80
76. See Mark A. Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move From War Crimes
to Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122, 142 (1998).
77. A case in point could be the 1986 meltdown at the Chernobyl plant in the former Soviet Union.
See Berat, supra note 48, at 345 (There is substantial evidence that although Soviet scientists and
governmental officials were aware that the Soviet nuclear power plant design was flawed and had the
potential for causing unmitigated disaster, they persisted in maintaining old plants and built new ones without
design modification.).
78. See Douglas Frantz, Sovereign Islands: Gaps in Sea Laws Shield Pollution by Cruise Lines,
N.Y. TIMES, January 3, 1999, at Al. (documenting pollution activities by the Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
proof of which induced United States courts to order a $9 million fine and a promise that the dumping
practices would cease); See Matthew L. Wald, Cruise Line Pleads Guilty to Dumping of Chemicals, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1999, (documenting further pollution activity by Royal Caribbean after the original fine,
which lead to a guilty plea to an additional $18 million fine). Although United States authorities were
ultimately successful in asserting jurisdiction over the cruise ships and subjecting them to United States law,
this was not an easy process. "The ships fly foreign flags and the parent companies are registered in foreign
countries, often putting them outside the reach of the authorities in this country." See Wald, supra note 79.
79. Eight Countries Agree to Fight Environmental Crime, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1998, at A4.
80. John Klotz, 20:12 NATIONAL L.J., (November 17, 1997) at A 18 (col. 3). For the Indonesian
context alone, see Randy Lee Loftis, The Tropics Are on Fire, TORONTO STAR, June 6, 1998, at C6
("evidence shows that settlers were being paid by large corporations to bum forests to convert land into
corporate-owned palm or rice plantations"). "The Indonesian Environmental Forum estimates that at least
two million hectares of forests and other land were burned in 1997." See ORAN R. YOUNC, INSITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: SCIENCE PLAN 31 (1999). The effects on the
environment are clear: immediate destruction, an inability of ecosystem regeneration, as well as contribution
to global warming. In the end, this destruction comes full circle to affect humanity: through death and
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Nonetheless, even if negotiators had the willingness and succeeded in
according the ICC jurisdiction over ecocide as a "most serious crime[ ] of
concern to the international community as a whole,"'" uncertainty would linger
as to the ICC's effectiveness in terms of being able or suited to enforce such a
prohibition. As a result, collapsing environmental crimes within the ICC might
not be the most effective way to sanction such crimes. This Article identifies
five reasons why this might be so: (1) environmental crimes may become lost
amid the hurly-burly of the ICC's activities; (2) ICC personnel may have low
environmental expertise and there may consequently be very high transaction
costs involved in "getting up to speed" on environmental issues; (3) the
sanctions which the ICC can order are not appropriate to correcting
environmental desecration; (4) there is limited scope under the Rome Statute
to integrate preexisting international law in the area of environmental crimes;
and (5) environmental harm may well be best deterred by a negligence standard
which is essentially incompatible with the mandate of a permanent international
court designed to punish the most serious crimes of concern to humanity. This
Article will now consider each of these in turn.
A. Environmental Concerns Lost in the Shuffle
Clearly, one of the major successes of the Rome Statute is that it creates
an institution to actually punish the conduct it prohibits. Nonetheless, from the
environmental point of view, the extent to which "environmental crimes" will
receive the ICC's attention is uncertain given the broad array of other crimes
to which it will have to direct its energies. The environmental war crime
constitutes only one provision out of dozens in Part 2 of the Rome Statute. And
A[t]his provision has largely escaped notice amid the larger debate about the
creation of the court and the scope of its jurisdiction." 2 Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
remains peripheral to the ongoing discussions of the Working Group on the
Elements of Crimes held at the Preparatory Commission sessions.8 3 As a result,
there is no indication that, as work on the establishment of the ICC progresses,
the environmental war crime will be able to attract the attention it requires in
order to be effectively implemented.
disability owing to the effects of asthma and smog-related illnesses, and, in the case of the Indonesian fires,
creating smoke and haze which may have induced a plane crash in Sumatra which took the lives of 234
people. See Loftis, supra note 81.
81. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
82. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 32.
83. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, supra note
49; See also supra note 54.
B. Low Environmental Expertise of the Judges and Prosecutors
Judges and prosecutors on the ICC will likely not have expertise in the
area of environmental law, policy or science. This can heighten the transaction
costs of proceeding judicially,84 as well as produce ineffective jurisprudence.
Were environmental crimes to be litigated in a separate forum or before a
specialized agency, there could be a greater guarantee of some level of
scientific expertise.
C. Inappropriate Sanctions
Part 7 of the Rome Statute offers the most contemporary compilation of
the international community's thinking on how international crimes ought to be
punished. The punishment provisions of the Rome Statute contain two
limitations on the effectiveness of Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
First, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to natural persons. This makes
it impossible to find any institutional or state liability should it be difficult to
prove that the actions of one or some individuals accounted for the
environmental desecration. This is unlike the Council of Europe's Convention
on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, Article 9 of
which establishes jurisdiction over corporate offenders together with natural
persons.8 5
Second, sentencing is limited to imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime. 6 There does not appear to be much room to compel
restitution, remediation of blight, establish civil liability or, simply put, to clean
84. For example, in the recent International Court of Justice's decision in Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymnaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25, 1997, No. 92 General List, <http://www.icj-
cij.org/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgementlihsjudcontent.html>), the judges had to be educated in the environmental
science aspects of the dispute. Although there is much to be gained from educating lay people on
environmental issues, this can involve significant time as well as financial costs. A specialized tribunal could
avoid some of these. Making mention of the International Court of Justice begs the question whether it could
serve as an adjudicator of environmental crimes. In the past, the International Court of Justice has had limited
experience with environmental matters, although it has taken some very important decisions, such as the
•Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 253; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua: (Nicaragua v. United States) 1986 I.C.J. 16; and most recently in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Spain v. Canada) (Dec. 4, 1998). It has also recently created an Environmental Chamber with a view to
playing a more proactive role in resolving environmental disputes. Nonetheless, the impediments to the
effectiveness of the International Court of Justice to adjudicating environmental crimes are significant: (1)
the requirement that both litigants consent to thejurisdiction of the court, which is impractical in any criminal
context where it is inexorable that one litigant will unwillingly be dragged into court; and (2) there is simply
no jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individuals or non-natural legal persons.
85. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
supra note 71.
86. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77.
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up the environmental harm. This is again unlike the Council of Europe's
Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
Article 6 of which provides that sanctions include imprisonment, fines, as well
as reinstatement of the environment.87 This is also unlike the UNCC's ap-
proach to remedying environmental crimes committed during the Gulf War.88
Nor does the ICC have injunctive powers to stop violations from occurring.
Without the ICC being able to order restorative or injunctive remedies, the
curative nature of the punishment for causing "widespread, long-term, and
severe" damage to the natural environment is limited at best. It is true that the
Rome Statute permits fines and assets collected to be transferred to a Trust
Fund for the benefit of victims of the crime.89 Access to this Trust Fund is
provided for in Article 75, which permits the ICC to make an order specifying
reparations to victims for purposes of restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation. However, the Trust Fund does not address a situation where it
is the natural environment directly, and humanity only indirectly, which bears
the burden of the damage. In addition, the magnitude of wartime environmental
harm may be so vast that resources transferred from individual defendants
simply cannot go very far in terms of remedying that harm. By way of ex-
ample, in the Gulf War alone Kuwait's environmental claims filed with the
UNCC total over $15 billion.' Another concern is that "to the extent that
charges of environmental war crimes are ancillary to other serious charges, the
concern for using the trust fund to aid human victims doubtless will take
priority over addressing environmental harms."'" This, once again, returns us
to the problem of pursuing environmental goals in a regime principally
designed to address genocide, persecution, and murder.
As a result, there is cause for concern that environmental crimes will not
only be poorly cognizable under the ICC, but also that the punishment for
wrongdoing will not address the unique nature of these crimes.
87. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
supra note 71.
88. See supra note 14. The UNCC is only beginning to turn to the environmental claims which have
been filed. Nonetheless, initial decisions by the UNCC in other areas may reveal limitations on its
effectiveness to assess compensation for environmental harms. For example, in its decision on contractual
claims issued on July 1, 1998, the UNCC limited many of the asserted losses on the basis that the claimants
had not established a sufficiently direct causal link to Iraqi aggression: more particularly, the UNCC required
"specific proof that the failure to perform was the direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
See Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 32, 35. In the end, the contractual claimants received less than one-
tenth of the damages they had asserted. Id. at 32. Rigorous requirements of causality and directness of
damage may make it difficult for environmental and public health claims to succeed.
89. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 79.
90. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 33.
91. Id. at 39.
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D. Limited Scope of Judicial Interpretation
The list of enumerated war crimes under Article 8(2)(b) appears to be
exhaustive. After all, the use of the term "namely" implies that the ICC is not
to have jurisdiction over serious violations of the laws and customs of war
which are not listed in Article 8(2)(b). There is thus little opportunity for
judicial interpretation to reach beyond the enumerated environmental war
crime. To this end, it might be difficult for the ICC to use Article 2192 to
incorporate in its jurisdiction the very small number of international legal
materials which may provide more proactive sanction of environmental war
crimes than that found in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).93 This constitutes further evi-
92. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 21(1), which states that the Court shall apply: (a) In the first
place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place,
where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict.
93. In addition to the ENMOD Convention and Protocol I, these fragments include the International
Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility (provides that an international crime may result from,
inter alia, a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-guarding and
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or
of the seas). See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILTY, art.
19(3)(d) (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 199 1). This is one of the few international legal documents prior to the Rome
Statute which demonstrated a willingness to criminalize environmental degradation. The International Law
Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind recognizes as "war crimes:"
(i) extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly; (ii) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(iii) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; and (iv)
in the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the
intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely
prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs. See INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINSTTHE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, art. 20, G.A. Res.
97, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 220, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); amended by G.A. Res. 151,
U.N. GAOR, 42d sess., Supp. No. 49, at 292, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987). Some of these crimes were
incorporated into the Rome Statute. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note I, at arts. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xvii),
8(2)(b)(xviii), 8(2)(b)(xx). The 1907 Hague Regulations deem it prohibited to destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. See
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. Although not explicitly
mentioned, the natural environment can be considered to constitute "property;" however, it is unclear whether
the natural environment within the global commons would fall within the notion of "property" since it is
neither privately nor nationally owned. For a review of other internationally negotiated provisions which
might provide ancillary protection to the environment during wartime, see Richards and Schmitt, supra note
7, at 1067-73. There are also some soft law agreements which may inform the content of international
standards. See World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. (1982),
Principle 5 ("Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities."). See
also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5Rev. 1, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992), Principle 24 ("Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
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dence of the limited ability of the ICC to accommodate environmental
protection concerns. After all, without the flexibility to go beyond the words
of the Rome Statute notwithstanding developments in international
environmental law, the ICC may not be able to do justice to any such
developments.
E. No Room for Negligence or Recklessness
The ICC is designed to deter criminal behavior. Unlike direct humanitar-
ian abuses, environmental crimes during warfare may often involve conduct
which tends more to the negligent, reckless, or willfully blind than to the
intentional. Intention is always difficult to prove. So, too, is causation.
Consequently, in order for the ICC to remain within its present mandate it will
have to let go all but the most flagrant incidents of deliberate environmental
desecration.
As a result, some of the recommendations suggested in this Article to
enhance the effectiveness of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may simply not be able to be
accommodated by the present mandate of the ICC. 4 Two commentators have
offered the following well-placed remarks regarding two of these
recommendations:
[I]t is difficult to imagine how the [ICC] could relax both the
threshold of damage and the intent requirement while remaining
within its existing mandate. The countries that acceded to the Rome
Statute simply could not have intended to let their military officers be
prosecuted for any action, committed with any state of mind, that
causes any environmental damage.9"
If only the most egregious form of environmental insecurity has been
caught by the ICC, does this augur well for the future promotion of
environmental security within the structures of international criminal or
humanitarian law? In the end, these structures may only be able to address
environmental insecurity in a very limited fashion. The question thus arises
cooperate in its further development, as necessary."). See also U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 47/37 (November 25, 1992)
(environmental considerations constitute one of the elements to be taken into account in the implementation
of the principles of the law applicable in armed conflict). The International Court of Justice has ruled that
states "must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives." See International Court of Justice, Legality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion (July 8, 1996), at 30.
94. See also Drumbl, supra note 77, at 129-30, 133 (provides a more detailed discussion of these
recommendations).
95. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 39.
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whether encouraging remediation as a "punishment" (instead of individual
imprisonment, fines, and the resultant stigmatization) might bring more nations
on board in terms of sanctioning less egregious (yet, when aggregated, likely
more destructive) forms of environmental destruction during armed conflict.
If so, then an organization supervising a strict liability regime supplemented by
a remediation fund might be a preferable institutional device. Such an
organization could be established on a regional or ad hoc basis (such as the
UNCC). On the other hand, such an institution may be capable of development
as a permanent multilateral entity which could minister to the remediation of
global environmental harm. If the fund were to operate on an "at-fault" basis,
then it could be financed by the international community yet retain subrogation
rights against perpetrators of environmental harm. If the remediation fund were
to operate on a "no-fault" basis, it could be capitalized by international
contributions assessed by the size and nature of a nation's armed forces
(reflecting the capacity of those forces to create environmental harms).'
Capitalization can also be sought from the private sector, namely
manufacturers of weapons. In this latter regard, the International Fund for the
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage can serve as a precedent, as it is in part
capitalized by "fees imposed on oil transported on the high seas, and
supplemented by contributions from tanker owners, oil producers, refiners, and
marketers."97 In the least, such funds can assist immediate mitigation efforts
which will usually reduce the long-term costs of remediation. In this latter
regard, Austin and Bruch recommend the creation of an "emergency response
task force" which would be financed by the fund and could spearhead initial
mitigation efforts."
V. PUNITIVE SANCTION, PROACTIVE PROTECTION, OR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?
A more fundamental question lurks beneath any evaluation of the ICC as
a mechanism to promote environmental security. Essentially, the ICC
represents a punitive, retributive justice paradigm in which certain serious
crimes against the international community are to be redressed through the
prosecution and imprisonment of selected individuals. The foundational
question for international environmental lawyers is whether a punitive
methodology will actually promote environmental security.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Environmental funds in the United States have also been proffered as potential precedents.
These include Superfund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, the
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund, and the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. Id.
98. Id. at 42.
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It is clear that considerable symbolic and precedential value can emerge
from the criminal punishment of invidious perpetrators of intentional
environmental desecration. However, what about the practical effect? Cases of
intentional environmental destruction do not, when aggregated, constitute the
most significant source of harm to the environment. Since the ICC can only
capture the intentional infliction of environmental harm, it leaves undeterred the
activities which cause the greatest amount of environmental harm - negligent
or reckless conduct. As a result, the question arises whether a greater level of
deterrence can be achieved through preventative measures as opposed to the
threat of criminal punishment. This is a question that environmental advocates
at the domestic level have long considered. At the domestic level, there has
been much discussion regarding the limits of punitive ex post punishment as a
device to promote environmentally respectful behavior. Many advocates pre-
fer a focus on including as policy devices incentive-based regulation and
proactive ex ante prevention. Is there any reason why such a methodology
might not prove beneficial at the international level?
Implementing this second approach - proactive protection - will entail
linkages beyond the legal context. Examples include the creation of economic
disincentives to producing environmentally destructive weaponry, technology
transfers to assist developing countries to pursue national security interests in
more of an environmentally friendly manner, and financial assistance
mechanisms, for example for the safe decommissioning of nuclear weapons.
Linkages to trade and investment should be developed so as to create
disincentives to export and sell the more environmentally injurious military
technology. One final linkage which is of considerable importance involves
international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement forces. These could be
mandated to ensure environmental, along with humanitarian, protection.
Allotting these international forces a "green-keeping" mandate could help
integrate international environmental norms into internecine conflict. By way
of example, were United Nations involvement in Somalia to have had a "green-
keeping" mandate, then practices of deforestation and assaults on water purity -
which were commonplace in the conflict - could have been much better
addressed. Ultimately, the prevention of environmental crime cannot be
disaggregated from the fact that environmental scarcity and resource depletion
are often the cause of military conflict.9 As a result, equipping nations
(through technology transfers, transparency of information or financial
99. By way of example, the Rwandan conflict was partly precipitated by demand for arable land.
Over the past three decades, average farm size has declined from two hectares per family to 0.7 hectares. On
the relationship between agricultural land-use and the Rwandan genocide. See Guenthar Baechler, Rwanda:
The Roots of Tragedy, Battle for Elimination on an Ethno-political and Ecological Basis, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS A CAUSE OF WAR, VOLUME II, 461-502 (1996).
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assistance) to engage in proper environmental management and sustainable
development could have the collateral benefit of mitigating military aggression.
A relatively new wave of litigation in the United States reveals a third
approach to attaining environmental security: environmental justice claims
under the United States Constitution" or under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. '' These claims meld environmental protection and civil rights. The nub
of these claims stems from the factual observation that "environmental
degradation often has a distinctly racist aspect."'0 2 More specifically:
[Rieports generally indicate that people with relatively low incomes
and/or people of color are more likely to have hazardous waste
treatment facilities sited in their neighborhoods than are members of
the population in general. [Miembers of politically less powerful
groups are exposed to greater risks from hazardous waste related
problems than the overall population of the United States, and are
thus disproportionately carrying certain environmental burdens of
modem society.'03
In response to this difficult situation, the environmental justice paradigm
attempts to create "equal protection from ecological hazards for all communi-
ties."' 4  Aggrieved parties have argued that the uneven distribution of
environmental burdens on disempowered minority groups infringes the Equal
Protection Clause. 05 Others have submitted that decisions to locate environ-
mental facilities in certain regions of the country evidence discrimination in the
expenditure of federal funds. 6 The argument has also been raised that
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations promulgated to implement
100. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV 1.
101. 42 U.S.C. 2000(d) (1994).
102. Anthony D. Taibi, Comment, Environmental Justice, Structural Theory, and Community
Economic Empowerment, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. 491,492 (1994).
103. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 568-69.
104. Lincoln L. Davies, Working Towards a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields
Redevelopment in Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 287 (1999). "[Llow-
income and minority communities bear the brunt of the industrialized world's environmental contamination
and are often the last groups to receive funding for cleanups." Id. at 288.
105. U.S. CONST. Amends. V, ("[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law;") XIV § I (applies to discriminatory actions taken by the states).
106. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title Vi, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), 601 ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(l), 602 ("Each Federal department and
agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity... is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000(d) of this title.., by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability.").
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Title VI provide an enforceable cause of action should the exercise of the
EPA's authority to manage environmental policy subject individuals to
discrimination. 10
7
Environmental justice litigation has only had limited success. No court
has found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."8 Courts have held that
Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination only. " Intentional discrimination,
as opposed to disparate impact, can be very difficult to prove in environmental
justice cases." 0 As for the claim alleging violation of the EPA regulation, some
courts have expressed doubt as to the existence of a private right of action to
enforce such a claim."' The highest profile environmental justice case thus far,
Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, involved a claim
brought under the EPA regulations."' The challenge was to the issuance of a
permit to construct and operate a waste treatment facility, more specifically a
soil incinerator. The factual underpinnings to this dispute are typical of many
environmental justice claims. Chester is a city of 42,000 inhabitants located in
Delaware County, Pennsylvania."' Although Delaware County's 500,000
residents are overwhelmingly white (91%), Chester's population is two-thirds
African-American." 'The complainants allege that five of Delaware County's
waste treatment facilities are located in Chester; the remaining two facilities are
located in predominantly white areas. 15 The fact that the state permitted the
107. Pursuant to Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d)(l), 602, the EPA adopted
regulations which state: "A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect if subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex."
See 40 C.F.R. 7.35(b). This prohibition would thus prevent intentional as well as disparate impact
discrimination.
108. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Terry
Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523 (1 th Cir. 1986); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n
v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989); R.I.S.E., Inc.
v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). The requirement to prove the defendant acted with
discriminatory intent has been a major stumbling-block for such claims. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental
Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. CoLO. L REV. 387,432 (1999).
109. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); New York City Environmental
Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
110. See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause ofAction Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?
The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L 1. 10-13 (1999).
111. New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, supra note 110; South Bronx
Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
112. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 9925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620,
524 U.S. 974 (1998).
113. Id. at 927.
114. Id.
115. The two permits granted for white areas covered facilities with a combined waste capacity of
1,400 tons per year, whereas the five permits granted in African-American areas were for facilities with a
combined waste capacity of over 2,100,000 tons per year. Id.
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new treatment facility to be located in Chester notwithstanding this pre-existing
disproportionality1 6 prompted residents to sue the state, alleging "environ-
mental racism" in the administrative decisions to allocate permits. The District
Court dismissed the lawsuit." 7 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding the complainants entitled to an implicit private right of action under the
EPA regulations and thus permitting the claim to proceed."' On June 8, 1998,
the United States Supreme Court gave itself its first opportunity to consider
environmental justice by granting certiorari to review this dispute. 9 However,
on August 17, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed its grant of certiorari,
vacated the Chester Residents judgment, and remanded the case back to the
Third Circuit with instructions to dismiss."n The vacatur was based on the fact
the dispute had become moot: on April 30, 1998, before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, the soil incinerator permit expired and was revoked as the
applicant indicated it no longer planned to site a waste treatment facility in
Chester.' 2 ' The vacatur of the Third Circuit decision in Chester Residents
removes an important precedent to support environmental justice claims.
However, this vacatur does not mean that the Third Circuit decision is bad
law.' The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue."n As a result, the
legal future of environmental justice claims in the United States may still carry
promise.2 In fact, notwithstanding the procedural hurdles inherent in having
an environmental justice claim heard by a court, the possibilities of facing an
environmental justice lawsuit have influenced government policy in the United
116. Id. at 415.
117. Id.
118. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 925.
119. Seif, 524 U.S. 915 (1998).
120. Id. at974 (1998).
121. Mank, supra note 111, at 50.. In situations where the underlying controversy is independently
removed, the normal practice of the Supreme Court is to vacate the decision under appeal. Id. at 51-2.
122. Recent decisions have affirmed the existence of a private right of action to challenge
administrative regulations on the grounds of disparate impact. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20092 (3rd Cir. 1999); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11 th Cir. 1999); Sandoval v.
Hagan, 7 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
123. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he Supreme Court seems likely to decide this vital
issue." See Mank, supra note 111, at 6. Nonetheless, "environmental justice plaintiffs may not rely on the
[Chester Residents] decision as precedent in the Third Circuit or even cite it as a'valid judgment in other
circuits." Id. at 51.
124. However, a recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may dampen this promise.
See Goshen Road Environmental Action Team v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1999 WL 187264
(4th Cir. 1999) (siting a wastewater treatment facility in a predominantly African-American neighborhood
did not violate environmental justice policy concerns).
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States. 25 Concerns over lawsuits and fears regarding their perceived effects
have also affected the practice of environmental management.' 26
Might the fertile basis of internationally-negotiated anti-discrimination and
human rights conventions not provide solid ground for environmental justice
claims? Prohibitions against discrimination are found in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, 27 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 and the International Convention on All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion. 29 Important regional agreements prohibiting discrimination are found in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 3' as well as the American Convention on Human Rights.' 3'
125. See Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). The Order provides that "each Federal
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing...
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States." Id. Agencies are
required to conduct programs which "substantially affect human health or the environment" so as not to
"subject[ I persons to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin." Id. However, the Order
states that it is not intended to create a right ofjudicial review against the United States. Id.
126. By way of example, a "broad" civil rights investigation has been launched in response to claims
that the concentration of dozens of garbage transfer stations in the South Bronx discriminates against minority
residents. See Paul Zielbauer, Garbage Transfer Stations Face Civil Rights Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (March 7,
1999) at Al. More specifically, the investigation will "seek to determine whether dozens of garbage transfer
stations, and the hundreds of trucks that feed them, have spawned widespread respiratory and other health
problems that violate the civil rights of South Bronx residents, the vast majority of whom [n.b. 95%] are black
or Hispanic." Id. Similar investigations had previously been initiated in Michigan and Louisiana. Id.
127. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 7 ("All are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.").
128. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966), art.
2 ("Each State Party ... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."), art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
129. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.LM.
352 (1966), at arts. 2, 5 (State Parties guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color,
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law... in the enjoyment of the right to public health).
130. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 312
U.N.T.S. 221, as amended (Nov. 4,1950), art. 14 ("'he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.").
. 131. American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673 (November 22, 1969), art. 24 ("All
persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection
of the law.").
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Notwithstanding the fact these conventions may permit international
environmental justice claims, thus far there has been very little literature
exploring the use of international human rights as a device to propound
environmental security. This is unfortunate since internationalizing environ-
mental justice recognizes that "environmental security may be ... a global idea,
only fully achievable as part of a universalization of environmental responsibil-
ity.' 32 For international lawyers, environmental justice may be attractive in
two types of situations: (1) the equal treatment of individuals within a state; and
(2) the equal treatment of individuals between states.
First, environmental justice can help combat "environmental cleansing"
the deliberate misuse of the natural environment as a tool to promote the
politics of racial, ethnic, or class hegemony within a nation-state.'33 Environ-
mental cleansing can deny individuals, groups and communities the "minimum
quality of environment' ' t34 needed to sustain ways of living or even lives and,
as such, further political goals such as forced relocation, subjugation,
assimilation, or internal colonialism. In this regard, the creation of environmen-
tal insecurity may well "reflect the governing body's discriminatory use of
power."'' 35 When the courts and legislatures of the nation-state in question offer
no recourse, individually enforceable remedies under international conventions
132. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 564.
133. See, e.g., Bill Weinberg, WAR ON THE LAND: ECOLOGY AND POLITICs IN CENTRAL AMERICA
76 (1991) ("[In Nicaragua] the rainforest was destroyed by campesinos who had been pushed from their land
to make way for the ecologically disastrous cotton industry, which relied heavily on pesticides and other
inputs. While all Central American countries became a dumping ground' for dangerous pesticides, which are
either restricted or banned in the countries where they are produced, Nicaragua also became a testing ground
for new experimental pesticides with the Nicaraguan citizenry serving as the guinea-pig" [emphasis in
original]). See also id. at 93; Ricardo A. Navarro, Environmental Impacts of the Civil War in El Salvador,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12,1998); Bernard Q.
Nietschmann, The Effects of War and Peace on Nicaragua's Environments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12, 1998) ("barrels of cyanide from gold mines were
dumped in rivers to kill fish eaten by rebel supporters"); Alvaro Josd Rodriguez, Environmental Impacts of
the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES
(June 10-12, 1998) (discussing fumigation of agricultural lands where coca is allegedly grown, obliging
peasants to move into and clear-cut formerly pristine rainforest in order to cultivate subsistence crops). See
also supra, note 36 (on Colombia).
134. See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 542-53. The notion of environmental cleansing recognizes how
behavior directed against the environment can readily constitute a threat to the security of people,
demonstrating "the increasingly important role that environmental management plays in modern political
relationships." See id. at 536.
135. Id. at 564.
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or political pressure applied internationally may constitute the best available
options to redress the wrongs.
Second, environmental justice can address situations in which developing
countries and people of color disproportionately bear the environmental
externalities of the world's industrialization. One important example is the
export of hazardous waste from the developed world, where it is produced, to
the developing world, where it is to be disposed. 36  Although developing
countries may be paid to receive these wastes (often quite generously), they
often lack the technology to safely and adequately dispose of them upon
receipt; they may also lack the regulatory and scientific infrastructure to
supervise such disposal.' This then creates profound environmental insecurity
in local communities. One commentator has argued that "the shipment of
hazardous waste from developed to developing countries is environmental
racism on an international scale.' 3'  Although certain recently negotiated
conventions 39 provide disincentives to and in some cases even prohibit the
shipment of certain wastes from developed countries to developing countries,
the characterization of these shipments as infringing environmental justice
allows nations not signatories to these agreements to be held to similar
standards. Embedding the prohibition against such shipments in the discourse
136. See, e.g., Rozeia S. Park, An Examination of International Environmental Racism Through
the Lens of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 659 (1998);
Hugh J. Marbury, Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 251 (1995).
137. See Park, supra note 137, at 668-70. As a result, the cost of disposal in these developing
countries for the polluter is much lower than it would be were the disposal to occur in a developed country.
See id. ("In 1989, in Africa, waste disposal costs were about forty dollars per ton. In contrast, the cost was
four to twenty-five times this amount in Europe and in the United States, twelve to thirty-six times greater.").
See also Marbury, supra note 137, at 257-58, 260 ("Given developing nations' inexperience in handling
hazardous waste and the large quantities of such waste generated each year, the possibility of a major
environmental disaster exists.").
138. Park, supra note 137, at 660. See also Marbury, supra note 137, at 291 ("Hazardous waste.
exporting is just environmental racism on a global scale. The main similarity between the two is who
shoulders the burden of living near and with the hazardous waste. Under each regime, the poor are forced
to shoulder a disproportionate amount of national and global burdens.").
139. Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, March 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 657 (1989), amendedby Conference Decision 1112 (March 25, 1994),
adopted by the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, U.N. Environmental
Programme, UNEP/CHW.3/35 (1995); Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, openedforsignature Jan. 29,1991,
30 I.L.M. 773 (1991); The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic Community
Convention of Lomd, opened forsignature March 22,1990,29 I.L.M. 783 (1990). One problem which could
be addressed by characterizing these shipments as a cognizable violation of the right to environmental
security is that the various conventions have "failed to coalesce into a single, dominant solution for the
externalities of hazardous waste exporting, which continue to be a vexing problem." See Marbury, supra note
137, at 262.
of human rights also allows a broader range of exported substances to be
subject to review: for example, the adverse environmental impacts caused by
the export of dangerous or environmentally risky products to the developing
world. Should these products not constitute "hazardous wastes," then they fall
outside the scope of the international conventions. However, the distributional
implications of such exports could well be caught by international anti-
discrimination standards applied to the environmental context.
Elevating environmental justice to the international level will require the
creation of new institutions. What tribunals, courts, or agencies can determine
the existence of environmental injustice? Are domestic courts or existing inter-
national human rights commissions (for example the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights) sufficient? Or will new international human rights
tribunals need to be created? On a related note, elevating environmental justice
to the international level will also require the establishment of new rights. For
example, is there an internationally recognized right to public health or security
of the person?" 3 Such a right must exist in order for there to be a remedy for
its infringement by discriminatory environmental mismanagement or insecurity.
In bridging this particular gap, advocates for environmental justice should be
encouraged by the Stockholm Declaration, which as early as 1972 contemplated
the linkages between justice, equality, and environmental well-being:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future genera-
tions.' 4'
A subsidiary question which arises (and has been particularly pivotal in the
United States jurisprudence) is whether the discrimination must be intentional
or whether proof of discriminatory impact suffices to justify a complaint.
In sum, the opportunities for environmental justice claims as a device to
promote transnational environmental security remain inchoate and unexplored.
It remains, though, that environmental justice claims at the intra-state level may
provide important linkages to the political right of self-determination. Such
claims recognize that maintenance of a "minimum quality of the environment"
is a prerequisite to the existence (and enjoyment) of civil and political rights,
as well as the dignity of the individual. Environmental justice claims can also
promote democratization by encouraging local and citizen group involvement
140. See Popovic, supra note 23, at 68 (discussing the right to live as broader than the traditional
concept of the right to life).
141. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm
Declaration), U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14, 11 LLM. 1416 (1972), Principle 1.
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in the political process.'42 By "permitting individual victims to activate
international enforcement procedures," these claims increase political
participation together with transparency of information. 14' Environmental
justice claims at the macro, inter-state level may help link environmental
protection with socio-economic rights, such as the right to development.
Opportunities for development may be hindered when the developed world
passes the costs of its industrialization onto developing nations. Ultimately, a
macro, transnational conception of environmental justice can constitute a
theoretical justification for the promotion of equality in the sharing the benefits
and burdens of environmental management globally. As for the burdens,
environmental justice may justify distributive equality in terms of shouldering
the responsibilities of dealing with global environmental problems (e.g. climate
change, protecting the ozone layer). True distributive equality in this regard
would require the developed world to bear a considerably larger burden of
assuming these costs and responsibilities. This, in turn, feeds into the discourse
of "common but differentiated responsibilities" between developed and
developing countries which is growing into a principle of international
environmental law.'"
In the end, the question is not really whether punitive sanction or proactive
protection or environmental justice should constitute the dominant approach to
promote environmental security. Instead, a polycentric approach blending all
three paradigms might maximize policy results. Such a multifaceted approach
could promote environmental security by criminally punishing the most
invidious offender, dissuading the negligent offender through incentive-based
schemes, cleaning up blighted communities, according individuals a medium
to air grievances, and encouraging the global community to equally shoulder the
environmental externalities of industrialization.
142. This has been one of the strengths of the environmental justice movement in the United States.
See Taibi, supra note 103, at 491-92. ("IThis movement comprises a number of discrete and mostly
unaffiliated groups whose identity and membership largely center on a particular location or issue. These
groups are led by and draw their ranks not from educated professionals but from the more typically politically
alienated lower middle class."). On the international level, see Council of Europe, Convention on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, supra note 71, at art. II (parties may grant
environmental non-governmental organizations the right to participate in criminal proceedings concerning
offenses under the Convention).
143. Popovic, supra note 23, at 89. See also id. at 88 ("A human rights mechanism would enhance
the prospects for protecting the environment because it would help the international community see the
environmental impact of war from the perspective of the most affected individuals and groups.").
144. See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New




Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute criminalizes the willful infliction
of "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." The
inclusion of this crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC is cause for limited
celebration and some disappointment. The disappointment flows from the fact
that such conduct is already "prohibited" by virtue of Protocol I and the
ENMOD Convention. Nonetheless, the Rome Statute does provide a signifi-
cantly more viable mechanism to sanction this illegal conduct. It will, however,
be very difficult to prove "widespread, long-term, and severe damage;" proof
will be rendered more problematic owing to the conjunctive nature of these
terms. Additionally, the environmental war crime requires a very significant
level of knowledge and intentionality. Criminal behavior is not sanctioned on
an objective basis and, consequently, ignorance of the law might serve as a
defense. This would be less than desirable as environmental education and
transparency of knowledge would then be discouraged. The availability of
military advantage as a defense to the intentional infliction of widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment may further denude the
practical effect of Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
The inclusion of environmental crimes within the Rome Statute should
also give rise to considerable reflection. The principle point of contemplation
is the usefulness of the ICC as a device to promote environmental security.
Ultimately some of the foundational limitations of the ICC as a device to
promote such security flow not only from its structure, but also from the
punitive paradigm it embodies. As a result, this Article suggests that proactive
protection and environmental justice be woven into the international legal
response to environmental crimes. Proceeding with this blended approach
allows environmental security to serve as a lightning-rod uniting disparate
fields such as international criminal law, the law of war, international trade
law, international humanitarian law, and international anti-discrimination law.
Only through such a polycentric approach can environmental security be
promoted outside of the narrow confines of widespread long-term and severe
damage intentionally inflicted during an international armed conflict.
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1. INTRODUCTION
International human rights law has only very recently begun to address
issues of sexual identity. When international human rights law was being
developed after World War II, in the shadow of the horrors of the Nazi regime,
same-sex sexual activity was illegal in most nations.' The status of gay men
and lesbians as criminals and/or as mentally ill2 no doubt meant that rights
associated with sexual identity were not even imagined as part of the corpus of
international human rights law. This was the case despite the fact that lesbians
and gay men were explicitly targeted by the Nazi regime in Germany and
interned in concentration camps. Reform of the criminal law began in Britain
in 1967, 3 and the reform process has spread to most western countries. But
many nations, including seventeen United States states, still criminalize same-
LL.B (Hons) BSc LL.M (University of Melbourne), LLM (Columbia). Senior Lecturer in Law,
University of Melbourne. Adjunct Professor, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Miranda Stewart
and Ali Miller for their inspiration and support of my work on sexuality and international human rights law.
1. In some countries, only male-male sexual activity was specifically criminalized; however, this
did not mean that lesbians were not subjected to the criminal law. Lesbians were often arrested and
prosecuted under more general laws dealing with sexual behavior.
2. Up until the 1970s, "homosexuality" was regarded as a mental illness in the United States, and
it is still considered a mental illness in some nations today.
3. See NICHOLAS BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND
GAY RIGHTS LAW 28-32 (1997).
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sex sexual activity. And gay and lesbian identity remains stigmatized in most
countries, even those where decriminalization has occurred.
Notwithstanding the continued stigmatization and criminalization of same-
sex sexual activity, in the last decade we have seen the emergence of gay,
lesbian, and transsexual rights issues on the international stage. In Part (I), of
this paper, I will provide a brief overview of the development of international
human rights law in the area of sexual identity. In Part (II), I will look at
refugee law as a case study that offers us some insight into the way in which
this development has occurred. In particular, this section will highlight the way
in which international human rights law has focussed very much on sexual
identity, rather than on non-normative sexual behaviors. In Part (I), I will
offer some thoughts on the direction international human rights law might take
from here. I will suggest that it is desirable to move away from the identity
model as the sole focus and towards a model that seeks to deal more generally
with sexuality. One way in which this could be achieved is through the
articulation of a right to sexual self-determination.
II. SEXUAL IDENTITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Europe
The development of international human rights law in the area of gay and
lesbian sexuality began in the 1980s, in Europe, when the European Court of
Human Rights held in two landmark cases that criminalization of consensual
adult sex between men in private violated the right to privacy protected by the
European Convention on Human Rights.4 Over the subsequent years, the
European Court of Human Rights has developed a reasonably extensive
jurisprudence on sexual identity and human rights, not all of it positive. Gay
men and lesbians have been quite successful in invoking the right to privacy
under the European Convention in cases ranging from the discriminatory age
of consent in Britain5 to the ban on lesbians and gay men serving in the armed
forces in Britain.6 Not all the privacy cases have succeeded, however. A
challenge to the criminalization of consensual sado-masochistic (S-M) sexual
practices in Britain by three gay men failed.7
4. Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1988); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser A)(1981).
5. Euan Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 25186/94, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (1997) (visited
Feb. 18, 2000). <http://www.dhcommhr.coe.fr/eng/25186R3 l.E.html>.
6. Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. No. 00031417/96; 00032377/96, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1999); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999 WL 478154 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 1999).
7. Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, 1997 WL 1104639 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Feb. 1997).
Although the criminal law in question (the common law of assault) did not, at least on its face, discriminate
on the basis of sexual preference, the British courts seemed to be influenced by this fact: the judgment in the
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In contrast to the general success of privacy arguments, lesbians and gay
men have been less successful in the areas of equality and respect for family life
under European law. Discriminatory provision of employment benefits to
heterosexual couples has been upheld by the European Court of Justice,' and,
to date, no gay or lesbian family arrangement has been protected under Article
8 of the European Convention, which provides for respect for family life, as gay
and lesbian relationships, even those involving children, are not recognized as
"family" under the Convention.9 However, there are some indications that this
situation may change. The European Court of Human Rights ruled, as I was
writing this paper, that the non-discrimination clause of the European
Convention, Article 14, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 0 In the case in question, the applicant had been denied custody of
his child because he was gay. He claimed interference with his private and
family life under Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention, and the Court
upheld his claim. The fact that the extension of Article 14 to sexual orientation
came in a case concerning family issues suggests that protection for lesbian and
gay families may eventually emerge in the European system.
In contrast to the record of lesbians and gay men, transsexuals have been
on the whole successful in Europe in invoking the right to equality," but
unsuccessful in invoking the right to privacy 2 and respect for family life. 13
House of Lords contains some comments that suggest that the sexual preference of the participants was
relevant to their conviction. See R. V. Brown, 2 All E.R. 75 (1993); and, in a different case concerning sado-
masochistic activity between husband and wife, charges were dismissed, at least in part because they were
married and the state ought not to interfere in the marital relationship. See R v. Wilson, Q.B. 47 (1996).
8. Grant v. Southwest Trains, All E.R. (EC) 193 (1998). For a discussion of Grant see Laurence
Heifer, International Decisions: Grant v. Southwest Trains, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 200 (1999).
9. See Pieter van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European Convention on
Human Rights in KEES WAALDUK AND ANDREW CLAPHAM (EDS), HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY ISSUE 179, 189-92 (1993). Van Dijk observes that the interpretation of "family life" in the
heterosexual context has been broad, in contrast to the narrow and exclusionary interpretation in the context
of same-sex relationships. Although the van Dijk piece is now six years old, there have been no subsequent
cases that reverse the exclusion of lesbian and gay families from the notion of "family" under the European
Convention. Indeed, in 1998 in Grant the European Court of Justice expressly reaffirmed that same-sex
relationships do not constitute "family" under European law. See Grant v. Southwest Trains, All E.R. (EC)
193, IN 33-35 (1998).
10. 33290/96, Salguiero Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
11. P v. S and Cornwall County Council, All E.R. (EC) 397 (1996). (discrimination against a
person who underwent sex reassigment surgery constituted discrimination on the basis of sex).
12. Rees v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56 (1987); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 13 at 622 (1991); Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (1999). Cf B v.
France, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1993). The major concern for transsexuals in these cases was the ability to alter
key documents concerning their life, in particular birth certificates (denied in Rees, Cossey and Sheffield) and
identity cards (permitted in B).
13. X, Y, and Z v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 143 (1997). (a female to male transsexual, his
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B. The United Nations
In the United Nations human rights system, events concerning interna-
tional human rights and sexuality have occurred mostly outside the judicial
arena. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an important role
in achieving visibility for lesbian and gay concerns in the international sphere.
Two gay and lesbian NGOs, the International Lesbian and Gay Association
(ILGA) and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
(IGLHRC), have, for many years, tried to bring lesbian and gay issues into the
international arena with mixed success. In 1993, ILGA was granted consulta-
tive status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. 4 This allowed
ILGA, along with scores of other NGOs, to participate in United Nations
conferences and some United Nations meetings, though not to participate in
United Nations decision-making. This status was short-lived, however, as the
United States led a campaign to oust ILGA from its consultative status based
on the fact that some national member organizations, including the United
States based North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA),
advocated inter-generational sex. Although ILGA eventually expelled
NAMBLA and two other national organizations from its ranks, its accreditation
was nonetheless suspended, as one other national member organization was
alleged to support pedophilia.15 As a result of the controversy, the United
Nations AIDS program has indicated that it will not fund any project linked to
ILGA."6 Currently, no gay and lesbian NGO has consultative status at the
United Nations.
Mainstream NGOs have also begun, in the last 10 years, to play an
important role in the area of sexuality and human rights. In 1991, Amnesty
International included people imprisoned for their homosexual sexual activity
partner and their children did constitute a family for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention. However,
Article 8 imposes no obligation on states to recognize as the father of a child a person who is not the
biological father of that child, hence there was no breach of the Convention).
14. ILGA had been seeking consultative status with ECOSOC since 1991, but its application was
extremely controversial, ultimately requiring the NGO Committee of ECOSOC to depart from its traditional
consensus decision-making model and put ILGA's application to a vote. See Wayne Morgan and Kristen
Walker, Rejecting (In)tolerance: Tolerance and Homosex 20 MEIB. U. L. REv. 202, 213-4 (1995).
15. For a detailed description and analysis of the events surrounding ILGA's removal from
consultative status, see Joshua Gamson, Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements and Symbolic
Boundaries, 11 GENDER AND SOCIETY 178, 183-87 (1997).
16. Douglas Sanders, Kurt Krickler and Rodney Croome, The International Lesbian and Gay
Association: Finding a Place In International Law, (visited Feb. 18, 1999). <http://www.ilga.org/
lnformation/finding_a_placejn_international.htm>.
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or identity in its definition of "political prisoner,"'" and since then, several other
mainstream NGOs have begun to address lesbian and gay issues.'
In terms of the United Nations itself, activity has been more recent still.
In 1993, gay and lesbian rights issues were raised by activists at the Vienna
Conference on Human Rights - this was the first time these issues had been
spoken of at a major United Nations conference. In 1995, lesbian rights were
raised by women's NGOs at Beijing and references to sexual orientation were
included in the draft Platform for Action, although they were bracketed.' 9 All
these references were ultimately removed from the final Platform for Action,
however.2'
In the area of judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, there is but one within
the United Nations system. In 1994, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee handed down its views in the Toonen communication concerning
Australia, where one state, Tasmania, criminalized private consensual sex
between men. The Committee held that the Tasmanian law violated the right
to privacy in the ICCPR.2' This was a significant milestone in the battle for gay
and lesbian rights. There have not yet been further cases in the United Nations
human rights system, but there is a pending case of interest, concerning New
Zealand's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry. 22
17. Laurence Heifer and Alice Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United
States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 90 (1996).
18. For example, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the International Human Rights Law
Group, the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch and the Center for Women's Global
Leadership. See Laurence Heifer and Alice Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United
States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, n. 138 (1996).
19. Dianne Otto, Lesbians? Not in My Country, 20 ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 288, (1995).
"Bracketing" refers to the United Nations practice of placing material not yet agreed upon by states in
brackets in draft documents. Bracketed material is then negotiated by the states.
20. 1d.; See also Dianne Otto, Holding Up Half the Sky, But for Whose Benefit? A Critical
Analysis of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 6 AUSTRALAN FEMpNS L J. 7 (1996).
21. Comm. No 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm'n. 50th Sess, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). For a discussion of the Toonen case, see Wayne Morgan, Identifying Evil
for What It Is: Tasmania, Sexual Perversity and The United Nations, 19 MELB. U. L REV. 740 (1994);
Kristen Walker, International Human Rights Law and Sexuality: Strategiesfor Domestic Utigation, 3 N.Y.
CrrY L. R., 115 (1998).
22. Known as Quilter v. New Zealand. Communication to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights against
the Government of New Zealand (filed Nov. 1998). As of November 1999, the petition had yet to be assigned
a communication number by the UNHRC. See Laurence Heifer, Quilter v. New Zealand: Will the U.N.
Human Rights Committee Recognize Same-Sex Marriages? "in Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenas, eds.,
LEGALRECOGNrfON OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, forthcoming, Hart Publishing, (2000).
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Notably, most of the events described above center on sexual identity
categories, rather than on non-normative sexual activity. This can be problem-
atic, as it redefines existing identity categories and may also reflect culturally
specific understandings of sexuality. It also excludes from human rights
protec-tion those whose sexuality is non-normative or stigmatized, but whom
do not fit into sexual identity categories as traditionally conceived. For a more
detailed illustration, I turn to the example of refugee law.
l. REFUGEE LAW AND SEXUALITY
The Refugee Convention provides that a refugee is a person who,
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.
It is now accepted by the major refugee receiving countries, including the
United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, and the
Netherlands, that gay men and lesbians may constitute a particular social group
for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and thus are entitled to protection
if they are persecuted because of their sexual identity.23 Canada has also
accepted that transsexuals may constitute a particular social group.24
The cases have generally treated homosexuality as something immutable
or, in some cases, either unchangeable or something the individual should not
be required to change. In all jurisdictions, the emphasis has been on the
identity category "homosexual," rather than on the individual's sexual behavior.
This emphasis on sexual identity is underscored by the fact that "mere"
criminalization of same-sex sexual activity is not generally recognized as
persecution.2 5 Rather, there must be some serious detriment to a person because
of his or her identity or status as gay or lesbian, not just because of his or her
sexual activity.
In this regard it is interesting to note that heterosexuals who violate social
norms concerning sex - by engaging in sex outside marriage or sex for money,
23. See Eric Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual Orientation-
Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 1 (1996).
24. Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board Case No T94-07129 (14 August 1995), 5 (copy on
file with the author).
25. See, e.g., F v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 947 F.L.R. (1999) 14.
(visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>. See also Kristen Walker, The Importance ofBeing Out:
Sexuality and Refugee Status, 18 SYDNEY L. REv. 568, 581-85 (1996).
for example - have, to date, received less protection under refugee law than gay
and lesbian claimants. In Australia there have, to date, been no cases where
those engaging in sex work, adultery, or fornication have been accepted as
constituting a "particular social group" for the purposes of the Refugee
Convention, although both adultery and fornication have been the basis for
several claims for refugee status.
A. Adultery
A woman who committed adultery in Iran successfully obtained refugee
status in Australia. The basis was persecution on the basis of membership in
the social group of "women in Iran who have refused to submit to the severity
of the Islamic code as it is enforced by the (Iranian) government. ' 26 In contrast,
a man who engaged in adultery was unsuccessful in claiming refugee status in
Australia. He argued that the Iranian law against adultery constituted
persecution on the basis of religious belief. The Australian Federal Court did
not accept that the application of a generally applicable criminal law concerning
adultery constituted persecution on the basis of religious belief, unless the
application of the law was itself discriminatory.27
B. Fornication
Fornication, that is, consensual sex between unmarried adults, has been the
basis for several claims for refugee status in Australia. However, these claims
have not been based on the argument that "fornicators" constitute a particular
social group and they have been unsuccessful. In one case, the claimant feared
he would be killed by the family of the woman with whom he had sexual
relations. The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal did not accept that this
constituted persecution for a Convention reason.2" In Z v. Minister for Immi-
gration and Multicultural Affairs,29 also concerning Iran, Z had engaged in
fornication and was threatened with prosecution and punishment of stoning, or
perhaps whipping, if he failed to marry the woman concerned. Here the social
group, as argued by the applicant, varied from "single Iranians... required, on
26. Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decision N95 09580,17, 22,23 (1996). (visited Feb. 19,
2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>. In the United Kingdom, women accused of adultery succeeded in their
claim for asylum, on the basis that the claimants were members of the social group of women. See generally,
R v. Immigration Appeals Tribunal; exparte Shah 2 All E.R. 545 (1999).
27. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Darboy 931 F.L.R. (1998). (visited Feb.
19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
28. Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decision V97/06522 (1998) (visited Feb. 19, 2000)
<http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
29. 1578 F.L.R. (1998). (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
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penalty, to marry in consequence of relationship with a member of the opposite
sex" to "single adult male Iranians, inherently possessed of sexual drive." The
Federal Court did not decide on the social group question, however, as it found
that the applicant's fear was of the application of a law of general application,
which did not constitute persecution for a Convention reason.30
C. Sex Work
There have been no Australian cases of which I am aware in which a
claimant argued that "sex workers" constitute a particular social group or where
a person has claimed a fear of persecution based on his or her profession as a
sex worker. However, fear of "forced prostitution" has been argued as
constituting a well-founded fear of persecution. 31 This was rejected by the
Tribunal in each case on the basis that the persecution alleged was not for a
Convention reason.
The failure to consider adulterers, sex workers, and fornicators to be
particular social groups seems to be, at least in part, because adultery,
fornication, and prostitution are seen as behaviors, not identities. Adultery,
fornication, and sex work are not seen as constituting particular kinds of people
in the way that same-sex sexual activity, for example, is seen as constituting a
particular kind of person, namely the "homosexual." The sex of one's sexual
partner is seen as something fundamental to one's identity, something
immutable, difficult to change, or that one should not be required to change.
"Homosexual" is something a person "is." In contrast, adultery, fornication,
and prostitution are viewed simply as "things a person does," and thus, are not
seen as attracting the operation of the Convention in the same way. 32 Although
protection has been given in some cases concerning adultery, this has been
based more on gender than on sexual behavior.
Thus, where sexuality is concerned, refugee law has protected those who
fit themselves within an identity category such as gay or lesbian. But it has not,
to date, protected those whose sexual behavior violates social norms and who
do not fit within a recognizable, essentialized identity category.
30. Z v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1578)F.L.R. (1998) (visited Feb. 19.
2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
31. See, e.g., Australian Refugee Review Tribunal Decisions V97/06838 (1998) and N98/25996
(1999). (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austlii.edu.au>.
32. This distinction between "things one does" and "things one is" has been drawn in a number of
cases. See Morato v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 111 A.LR. 417, 420, 422 (1992); Ram
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 130 A.LR. 314, 319 (1997); Australian Refugee
Review Tribunal Decision, V97/06522 (1998) (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.austii.edu.au>.
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IV. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
To date, most human rights activism and jurisprudence in the area of
sexuality has been concentrated in several disparate locations. First, there is
gay/lesbian/bisexual/transsexual rights activism, which has centered primarily
on the right to privacy in the criminal law context; the right to equality, often
in the area of relationship recognition; and the right of transsexuals to
recognition of their new sex. Second, there is extensive work around women's
sexuality by feminist scholars and activists. Here, the focus has been broader
and has included reproductive rights, rape, sexual trafficking, sexual health, and
female genital mutilation - with some attention to women's right to sexual
autonomy and lesbian sexuality. Third, there has been some activism by sex
workers at an international level. But this has not yet received a great deal of
mainstream human rights attention, in part because sex worker rights are
controversial within the feminist movement, a large segment of which seeks to
end prostitution rather than champion sex workers' rights.
Although there have been some coalitions between these various groups,
there has not, to date, been any sustained action around sexuality more broadly
conceived. Nor has there been, until recently, any attempt to articulate a rights
framework specific to sexuality. Rather, rights work in the area of sexuality has
generally focused on fitting sexuality issues within the existing human rights
framework, particularly the rights of equality and privacy. While this work has
produced some significant advances, it nonetheless has some limitations, as it
often fails to challenge dominant conceptions of sexuality.
As an alternative approach, I suggest that we articulate a right to sexual
self-determination," rather than either privacy or non-discrimination on the
basis of sexual identity. Thus, rather than pursuing an international declaration
or convention on sexual rights that simply adds sexual orientation as a category
of non-discrimination to existing civil and political rights,' we need to imagine
and enumerate new rights claims around the area of sexuality. This does not
mean that we cannot or should not use the language of identity categories -
visibility of particular non-normative sexual activities and preferences is clearly
33. The phrase "sexual self-determination" is potentially controversial. I have discussed this choice
of words elsewhere. See Kristen Walker, Capitalism, Gay Identity and International Human Rights Law,
forthcoming, 10 AUSTRALASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN L. J., 2000. 1 note that others have used the idea of a
"right to sexuality." See Alice Miller, Human Rights and Sexuality: First Steps Towards Articulating a
Rights Framework for Claims to Sexual Rights and Freedoms, forthcoming, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw ANNUAL MEETING, (2000).
34. This is suggested by Eric Heinze. See ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT
289 (1995). For a more detailed discussion of Heinze's approach and the limitations with it, see Walker,
supra note 33.
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important and can challenge the present heterosexism of human rights law.35
However, we must be careful to acknowledge the cultural specificity of such
categories and their narrow focus. Sexual self-determination is not just about
freedom and equality for lesbians and gay men, rather, it is about valuing sexual
diversity.
My notion of sexual self-determination is thicker than a simple assertion
of a right to liberty, although liberty is clearly an aspect of self-determination.
Rather than merely seeking an absence of state regulation of behavior, sexual
self-determination also seeks to achieve the conditions under which individuals
can make choices about their sexuality - albeit choices constrained by local
social and cultural traditions and knowledge. This involves not only the
absence of criminal law regulating consensual sexual activity, but the fostering
of social structures that recognize individual and joint choices about important
relationships and permit the expression of sexuality by individuals, couples, and
groups. This requires the creation of a society in which diversity of sexual
expression is recognized as good and fostered; in which there is education on
diverse sexualities; and in which we are not constrained in our sexual activities
by poverty and sickness. It is, in short, a transformative social project not
limited to simply claiming existing rights. I argue that any international
instrument dealing with sexuality ought to proceed from the premise of sexual
self-determination. It ought to enumerate a right to engage in consensual sex,
including public sex, paid sex work, and a right to freedom of sexual speech
and expression. It should provide for freedom from coercive sex, including
sexual trafficking and freedom from violence because of sexual difference. It
should provide for recognition of important sexual relationships36 and should
recognize reproductive rights, including abortion. It should recognize rights for
those with HIV or AIDS and should provide rights for those who violate
traditional gender norms, including but not confined to transgender folk. It
should also provide for sex education and sexual self-determination for young
people.
35. As Dianne Otto has observed, "recognizing the risks of identity politics does not have to lead
to its rejection. This recognition could also lead towards understanding and practicing identity in a different
way - as always contested, as contingent and dynamic, rather than definitive and static." See Dianne Otto,
Sexualities and Solidarities: Some Thoughts on Coalitional Strategies in the Context of International Law,
8 AUSTRALASIAN GAY AND LESBIAN L. J. 27, 33 (1999).
36. I have argued elsewhere for a model of relationship recognition that, while recognizing
important sexual relationships, reserves state financial support to relationships involving caring for children
or other dependents. See Kristen Walker, U.N. Human Rights Law and Same-Sex Relationships: Where to
From Here? in ROBERT WINTEMUTE AND MADS ANDENAS, eds., LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OFNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,forthcoming, Hart Publishing,
(2000).
Any articulation of sexual rights needs also to acknowledge the links
between economic and social rights and sexuality." For example, we need to
recognize the links between poverty and sexual oppression, particularly for
women. Similarly, rights to sexual health are essential, especially in the context
of HIV and AIDS.
This list is not, and is not intended to be, comprehensive. It is, rather, a
starting point for debate on these issues. It is important, I argue, for those of us
working on sexuality issues from diverse perspectives to try to articulate the
commonalties between us and also to assess our differences. Perhaps it will not
be possible to develop a consistent formulation of a right to sexuality. Perhaps
such a project is simply to broad or too abstract; or perhaps sexuality is too
culturally specific to allow for a universal right to sexual self-determination.
But, even if this is so, a dialogue on these issues can only advance our
understanding of sexuality and the ways in which international human rights
can protect sexual expression.
37. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Questions of Solidarity and Difference: Towards Transforming the
Terms of Lesbian Interventions in International Law, forthcoming, in ViCrORIA BROWNWORTH AND
RUTHANN ROBSON (EDS), SEDUCTIONS OF JUSTICE: LESBIAN LEGALTHEORIES AND PRACTICES. (Manuscript
on file with the author).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1998, a bomb exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am
Flight 103 killing all 259 passengers and crew, as well as eleven residents of the
town of Lockerbie where the wreckage of the Bowing 747 crashed 31,000 feet
below. After years of negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering, Libya recently
surrendered the two Libyan officials accused of the bombing (Abdelbasset Ali
Ahmed AI-Megrahi and Ali Amin Khalifa Fhimah) for trial in the Netherlands
before a panel of Scottish judges. The trial is set to begin on May 3, 2000.
Experts are already calling this "the trial of the century," - though the label
is somewhat misplaced given that the century will only be a few months old
when the trial begins. There is no question, however, that this will be the most
important and unique, as well as the longest and most expensive, trial in
Scottish Legal History. This article, which is an expanded version of a speech
delivered at International Law Weekend '99 at the House of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, describes the events that led to this historic
trial, analyzes the unique aspects of the proceedings, and previews the likely
outcome of the criminal case.'
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law & Policy, New England
School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence (1989-1991) and Attorney-
Adviser for United Nations Affairs (1991-1993), United States Department of State. Professor Scharf is
currently writing a book about the Lockerbie criminal trial.
1. This articledraws from the following public sources: LockerbieTrial Briefing, (visited July 19,
1999) <http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/lockerbie> (includes indictment, the UK-Netherlands Agreement,
correspondence between the United Nations Secretary-General and Libya/the United Kingdom/the United
States, and Security Council Resolutions 731,748, 883, and 1192); How the Deal was Done, The Guardian
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II. FROM LOCKERBIE TO CAMP ZEIST
Pan Am 103 was blown up just five months after the United States Frigate
Vincennes. mistakenly fired a missile at and shot down an Iran Air airliner,
killing all aboard and provoking the Iranian Parliament to publicly call for
revenge against America. Two months before the Pan Am 103 bombing,
German police raided an apartment in Frankfurt, Germany, belonging to
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
Command (PFLP-GC), a terrorist group which operated out of Syria. The raid
disclosed an arsenal of terrorist weapons, including a Toshiba radio cassette
player converted into a bomb, just like the one that was discovered in the
wreckage of Pan Am 103. In light of these events, United States officials
initially stated that they believed either Iran or the PFLP-GC (rather than Libya)
was behind the Pan Am bombing.
It was not until three years after the Lockerbie disaster that the United
States and United Kingdom publicly cast the blame on Libya. In November
1991, the United States and the United Kingdom formally charged Al-Megrahi
and Fhimah with conspiracy, murder, and destruction of Pan Am 103.
According to the charges, the government of Libya ordered the bombing of Pan
Am 103 in revenge for the United States bombing of Tripoli two years earlier.
Al-Megrahi, a Libyan Intelligence Officer, allegedly prepared a suitcase
containing a bomb in a Toshiba radio cassette player. Fhimah, who worked for
Libyan Arab Airlines on Malta, allegedly planted the suitcase on an Air Malta
plane bound for Frankfurt Germany. In Frankfurt, the suitcase was loaded onto
a Pan Am feeder flight to London, and at London's Heathrow Airport, it was
transferred to Pan Am 103.
Though neither country had an extradition treaty with Libya, the United
States and United Kingdom both demanded that Libya immediately surrender Al-
Meghrahi and Fhimah to them for trial. Citing the "lynch mob atmosphere"
prevailing in the United States and United Kingdom concerning this case, as well
as its right to undertake its own prosecution of the accused under the Montreal
Aircraft Sabotage Convention, Libya refused to comply with the United States
and United Kingdom demands.
(London), April 6, 1999, at 8 (available on Lexis, Cumws File); Lockerbie Truth May be Elusive, The
Canberra Times, April 10, 1999, at C4 (available on Lexis, Cumws File); CBS News: 60 Minutes, April 11,
1999 (transcript available on Lexis, Curwns File); Russell Warren Howe, What if they are Innocent, The
Guardian (London), April 17, 1999, at 8 (available on Lexis, Cumws File); Robin Crompton, Lockerbie and
Justice, The Korea Herald, April 23,1999 (available on Lexis, Cumws File); David E. Rovella, Flight 103
Highlights Scots' Law, The National Law Journal, April 26, 1999, at AI and A5; Nick Drainey, Trial Will
Be Fair, Insist Locke rbie Families, Press Association Newsfile, August 24, 1999 (available on Lexis, Curnws
File).
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In 1992, the United Nations Security Council responded to Libya's refusal
by adopting Resolution 748, which imposed sanctions on Libya to impel it to
hand over the two accused for trial, make compensation to the victims' families,
and demonstrate with concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism. As expanded
in 1993 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 883, the sanctions
required the members of the United Nations to freeze Libyan government funds
in their banks, impose an embargo on military and oil production equipment on
Libya, and prohibit flights arriving from or destined for Libya.
Libya responded by offering to extradite Al-Meghrahi and Fhimah to Malta,
where their acts allegedly took place. However, the United States and United
Kingdom rejected the offer on the ground that Malta was so close geographically
to Libya that its judiciary would be susceptible to improper influence. As an
alternative, in 1994, Libya proposed trial before a Scottish court, provided it sat
in a neutral country such as the Netherlands. At first, the United States and
United Kingdom rejected the offer, believing it to be merely a propaganda ploy.
During the next few years, however, it became increasingly clear that, despite
sanctions, the two Libyans would not be surrendered for trial. Meanwhile, a
growing number of countries were expressing their opposition to the sanctions,
and enforcement of the sanctions began to erode. Finally, in August 1998, the
British Government of Tony Blair persuaded the United States to agree to Libya's
plan.
The final deal with Libya contained the following elements: (1) The Security
Council imposed sanctions would be suspended when Libya surrendered Al-
Megrahi and Fhimah to the Netherlands for trial before a Scottish panel of judges
at Camp Zeist, part of the decommissioned United States Soesterberg air base
outside of Utricht; (2) AI-Megrahi and Fhimah would be permitted to fly on a
non-stop flight from Libya to the Netherlands so that they would not be
susceptible to arrest ina third country; (3) While in the Netherlands, AI-Megrahi
and Fhimah would stand trial only for the Pan Am 103 case, and if acquitted,
would be returned directly to Libya; (4) If A1-Megrahi and Fhima are convicted,
United Nations monitors would be permanently stationed inside Barlinnie Prison
in Scotland where the two would serve sentence; and (5) The United Kingdom
would permit Libya to establish a consulate in Edinburgh to watch over Al-
Megrahi and Fhima's interests, despite the absence of diplomatic relations
between the United Kingdom and Libya. In addition to these five conditions,
press reports indicated that the United Kingdom had agreed that no senior Libyan
intelligence officers would be required to testify at the trial and that the
prosecution would not try to trace the orders for the bombing to Khaddafi himself.
Scottish prosecutors have insisted that no such deal has been made.
On April 6, 1999, Al-Megrahi and Fhimah arrived in the Netherlands. Later
that day, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998), the United
Nations sanctions were suspended when Secretary-General Kofi Annan
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communicated formally to the Security Council the successful handover of the
two accused.
Ill. SCOTMISH JUSTICE AT CAMP ZEIST
The Scottish rules of evidence and procedure that will govern the Pan Am
103 trial differ from the United States rules in several notable respects which may
affect the outcome of the trial.
Under the Scottish rules, for example, there is no requirement that probable
cause be confirmed at a preliminary hearing to test the sufficiency of the
Prosecutor's case prior to trial. In contrast, had the case been tried in the United
States, a magistrate would have to independently determine through an open and
adversary hearing that there are substantial grounds upon which a prosecution
may be based. This screening process is said to prevent hasty, improvident, or
improper prosecutions.
It is a peculiarity of the Scottish system that no one may be convicted
without corroboration. This requires that, for every. element of the crime, there
must be credible evidence from more than one source. A single piece of evidence
of guilt, no matter how compelling, cannot support a conviction.2 This corrobora-
tion requirement will make it more difficult to obtain a conviction in the
Lockerbie court than if the case had been tried in the United States.
At the request of the defense, the Lockerbie court will be composed of a
panel of three judges, rather than a fifteen-member Scottish jury. Yet, as with a
Scottish jury, the three-judge panel can rule by a simple majority. This is to be
contrasted with the United States practice of requiring a determination of guilt by
a "substantial majority" (a minimum of nine out of twelve jurors) in a federal
felony case.3 In contervailance to the strict corroboration requirement, this will
make it somewhat easier to obtain a conviction in the Lockerbie court than if the
case were tried in the United States.
Another aspect of Scottish criminal procedure that may enhance the
prospects of conviction as compared to a United States proceeding is the broad
Scottish hearsay exception for unavailable witnesses. An out of court statement
may be introduced not only if the witness is dead or has disappeared (as in the
United States), but also if the witness simply refuses to appear at Camp Zeist to
testify. This is important since the Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands lacks
the power to compel the appearance of witnesses outside of Scotland.
Perhaps the greatest difference between the Lockerbie court and a United
States court concerns the range of verdicts that are possible. Where the United
2. On the other hand, two eyewitnesses accounts would be sufficient; a single eye-witness account
may be corroborated by circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused, and it is even possible
for two pieces of circumstantial evidence to corroborate each other.
3. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
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States only has "guilty" and "not guilty," the Scottish court can issue three
possible verdicts: "proven," "not proven," and "not guilty." "Not proven" in
Scotland usually means that the jury thinks the defendant is guilty, but that the
proof of guilt was not beyond a reasonable doubt. The existence of this third
option may make it easier for the judges to acquit Al-Megrahi and Fhimah,
because they can do so while simultaneously explaining in their written judgment
that they nonetheless thought the defendants were guilty.
If the defendants are convicted, they cannot be subject to the death penalty,
which has been outlawed in the United Kingdom. The sentence for murder is a
mandatory life imprisonment, with no possibility for a reduction of sentence in
light of mitigating factors. There is no prescribed sentence for a conspiracy
conviction, which would be up to the discretion of the judges.
Finally, in contrast to the United States double jeopardy principle, the
Scottish prosecutors can appeal an acquittal on a legal point. The appeal is to the
High Court (a panel of five Scottish judges in Edinburgh), which can order a new
trial if it concludes that the verdict rested on an error of law.
IV. "IF THE CIRCUIT BOARD DOESN'T FIT, You MUST ACQurr' A PREVIEW
OF THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL
A The Prosecutor's Case
From the indictment and the discovery proceedings in the civil case against
Libya, one can glean what the prosecution's key evidence is in this case.
One of the most important pieces of evidence was the discovery in the Pan
Am 103 wreckage of an unaccompanied suitcase bearing tags from Valletta,
Malta. The charred suitcase contained clothing traced to a shop called "Mary's
House" in Malta. The owner of the shop, Tony Gauci, has identified AI-Megrahi
as the person who purchased the items in question. The Prosecutor will argue that
Al-Meghrahi filled the suitcase with this clothing, in addition to the Toshiba
radio-bomb, so that it would not appear suspicious to airport security personnel.
Also important to the Prosecution's case was an intercepted radio message
from Tripoli to a Libyan government office in Berlin on December 22, 1988 that
said, "mission accomplished."
After months of searching through the debris of some 10,000 items spread
over 850 square miles, the Lockerbie investigators found the most important piece
of evidence of all - a small fragment of a circuit board from the electronic timer
that had triggered the bomb. The FBI Lab, headed by Thomas Thurman, matched
the fragment, which was smaller than a thumb nail, to a timer seized earlier from
Libyan agents in West Africa. That timer was traced to an electronics company
in Zurich, Switzerland called Mebo, which admitted that it had sold twenty such
timers to the Libyans in 1985.
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Finally, the Prosecution will present its star witness - a Libyan defector,
presently in the United States witness protection program, who used to work for
Libyan Arab airlines in Malta. He is expected to testify that early on the day of
the Pan Am 103 bombing, he saw Fhimah put the suitcase containing the bomb
aboard the Air Malta Flight to Frankfurt.
B. The Defense's Case
The Defense will suggest that Pan Am 103 was blown up not by Libya, but
by Iran or the PFLP-GC, as the criminal investigators originally suspected. Under
Scottish law, this is the special defense of "incrimination." It is permissible to
blame "persons unknown" in Scottish law. A special defense is special only in
the sense that it must be announced prior to trial. It does not shift the burden of
proof to the defense.
But if Libya was not behind the bombing, why the radio transmission from
Tripoli saying "mission accomplished?" To answer that question, the Defense
is likely to call Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad Secret Service agent and
author of By Way of Deception. In his book, Ostrovsky tells how Israeli
commandos set up a transmitter in Tripoli that generated a false signal about
"success" after the 1986 LaBelle Disco Bombing. Believing Libya was behind
the attack on the German nightclub where United States servicemen were killed
and injured, the United States retaliated by bombing Tripoli a few weeks later.
The Defense will suggest that the Israelis likely accomplished the same feat in
1988, thereby once again incriminating their enemies, the Libyans.
And how will the Defense deal with the circuit board, which had been sold
by Mebo to the Libyan Government? The Defense is likely to call Edwin Bollier,
the director of Mebo, who will testify that the fragment found in the Pan Am 103
wreckage does not in fact match the timers that his company sold the Libyans in
1985. Bollier told CBS "60 Minutes" in April 1999, that investigators had shown
him a photograph of the Lockerbie fragment. In contrast to the circuit boards that
he sold to Libya, which were smoothly printed by machine, that photograph
shows clearly that the Lockerbie fragment was roughly soldered as if made by
hand.
In addition, Bollier has publicly stated that he had previously sold roughly
soldered handmade timers similar to the one used in the Lockerbie bomb to the
Stasi, the East German secret police. And the Stasi was known to have supplied
weapons and explosives to Palestinian terrorist groups including the PFLP-GC,
the original Lockerbie suspects. Boiler has also said that a few months before the
Lockerbie bombing in 1988, he reported a break in at his company in which
photographic blueprints for a circuit board like the one used to blow up Pan Am
103 were stolen. Whoever had the blueprints was in a position to make the
Lockerbie circuit board and timer. Thus, the Defense has ammunition to argue
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that the necessary connection between the Lockerbie circuit board and Libya is
broken. And to bolster its case, the defense will point out that Thomas Thurman,
the FBI forensic expert responsible for the Pan Am 103 investigation, was forced
out of the FBI after a Justice Department inquiry found that he had allowed
examiners in his explosives unit to overstate conclusions in favor of the
prosecution in several cases.
There seems to be little doubt that the clothes in the suitcase containing the
bomb were bought at Mary's House in Malta. But Tony Gauci, the eyewitness
who links Al-Megrahi to the mysterious suitcase, identified Al-Megrahi from a
photo a year after the bombing. Prior to the photo ID, Gauci said the person who
purchased the clothing was fifty years old, six feet tall, and heavily built. Al-
Megrahi was then only thirty-six, just five foot eight, and slight of build. And
after the ID, Gauci later identified the person who purchased the clothing as
Mohammed Abu Talb, a PFLP-GC terrorist who was in Malta at the time in
question and is now serving a life-sentence in jail in Sweden.
Finally, the Defense will try to impeach the Libyan defector by pointing out
that he stands to gain $4,000,000, which is the reward that has been raised by the
United States and Air Pilots Association for evidence which leads to a conviction
of Megrahi and Fhima.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the peculiarities of the Scottish procedures and the problems with the
prosecution's case which are discussed above, it will be very difficult for the
prosecution to obtain a conviction in the Lockerbie case. And no matter the
outcome, the Lockerbie criminal proceedings will play into Colonel Khaddafi's
hands.
If the verdict is "not proven," Colonel Khaddafi can claim he was not behind
the bombing. Even if found guilty, AI-Megrahi and Fhimah are unlikely to
implicate Khadaffi because their families remain in Libya. They will take the fall
and Colonel Khaddafi can claim that the trial never proved that he was involved.
Most importantly, the Security Council has already lifted the sanctions on Libya,
thus putting an end to Colonel Khaddafi's pariah status. International trade with
Libya is booming since the surrender of Al-Megrahi and Fhima, and even the
United States seems poised to remove Libya from its list of terrorist-supporting
states.
Faced with no trial, or this trial, perhaps this was the best possible solution.
The families of the victims of the bombing will finally see some sort of closure
to their ordeal. Yet, they will not necessarily see justice done, nor the full truth
told in the case.
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The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for
the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Treaty provides that, in some
circumstances, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states
that are not parties to the Treaty and have not otherwise consented to jurisdic-
tion. Specifically, Article 12 provides that, in addition to jurisdiction based on
Security Council action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and
jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state of nationality, the ICC
will have jurisdiction to prosecute the nationals of any state when crimes within
the Court's subject matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state
that is a party to the Treaty or that consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.
That territorial basis would empower the Court to exercise jurisdiction even in
cases where the defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the Treaty and
does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
The United States has objected to the ICC Treaty on the ground that, by
purporting to confer upon the Court jurisdiction over the nationals of non-
consenting non-party states, the Treaty would bind non-parties in contravention
of the law of treaties. This objection has given rise to a heated controversy.
The question of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals poses a genuine
dilemma. There are legitimate and very important concerns on each side of this
matter.
Let me tell you what I think is at stake. On the one hand, there is the
pressing need for justice in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. That need is pressing, if for no other reason, because of the interest
of victims in seeing justice done. There is also the important and related fact
that the sense that justice has been served may help to break cycles of violence
in societies in which revenge and retaliation may otherwise take the place of
trial and punishment. Those reasons are enough to qualify the need for justice
as a pressing need. Perhaps prosecutions also would deter future crimes of
mass violence. That, we do not know. Either way, the need for justice is a
* Copyright, Madeline Morris, 1999.
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compelling one, and the ICC may make some important contribution in that
cause.
This brings us to the issue of the ICC's jurisdiction. The crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are often committed with
the collusion of governments. Those governments are unlikely to consent to
ICC jurisdiction over their nationals for crimes that the government supported
or condoned. The Rome Treaty responds to that serious problem by providing
that, in some cases, the Court will have jurisdiction even without the consent
of the defendant's state of nationality and even if that state is not a party to the
Treaty. This sort of jurisdiction makes some sense. It makes sense to give the
Court robust jurisdiction lest a rogue regime should be able to shield its
nationals from justice. And, when viewed from this perspective, it is hard to
see how any state could legitimately object. If the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to established international crimes and the process of the
Court is fair, then no state - party or non-party - should have legitimate
objections to the Court's exercising jurisdiction over its nationals.
This reasoning might cause us to see ICC jurisdiction over non-party
nationals as relatively unproblematic were it not for the fact that the ICC will
inevitably hear two different types of cases. There will be cases involving
strictly a determination of individual culpability, and cases that will focus on
the lawfulness of the official acts of states. There will, in ICC cases, always be
an individual defendant in the dock. But if the conduct forming the .basis for
the indictment was an official act taken pursuant to state policy and under state
authority, then the case will, in effect, be an adjudication of the lawfulness of
the state's acts and policies. In such cases, the state whose conduct is
questioned might acknowledge the conduct and maintain that the conduct was
lawful; or the state might deny that the alleged acts in fact occurred. In either
event, the case will represent an adjudication of the lawfulness of a state's
conduct and, in that sense, will constitute a legal dispute between states.
For individual culpability cases, the ICC will share much in common with
other criminal courts. For official acts cases, the ICC will resemble much more
an international court for interstate dispute adjudication. For the former, robust
jurisdiction is appropriate for the reasons I have touched on. For the latter,
flexibility and consensuality of jurisdiction are important, as reflected in the
jurisdictional regimes of other international courts that adjudicate interstate
disputes, such as the ICJ, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and the WTO dispute
settlement system. The ICC, thus, requires ajurisdictional structure that is both
sufficiently aggressive to make the Court effective in the prosecution of
criminals and also sufficiently consensual to make the Court a suitable
institution for the adjudication of international disputes. It is this need for the
ICC's jurisdictional structure to accommodate these two conflicting require-
ments that creates our dilemma.
Let me focus for a moment on why compulsory jurisdiction to adjudicate
interstate disputes in an international court may raise serious concerns for
states. Particularly where an interstate dispute concerns an area of unsettled
law, litigation may entail more risk than states can be expected to accept. If the
subject matter is important and the law is unsettled, allowing a third party to,
in effect, decide the binding law of the matter is a very perilous course of
action. Relatedly, compulsory jurisdiction may be problematic insofar as
compromise outcomes of various sorts may be desirable in interstate dispute
type cases, but are unlikely to emerge from adjudicated rather than negotiated
resolutions. It is also important to recognize here that the decisions of an
international court will be more authoritative than would those of any
individual state's courts. Thus, an international court would have the power to
create law in a manner disproportionate to that of any state. This may be more
law-making power than some states are comfortable granting to one interna-
tional institution - especially in sensitive areas involving military activities and
international security. Moreover, the law developed by an international court
would not be susceptible to revision or reversal through any legislative process,
as would be the case in municipal justice systems. States may have legitimate
concerns about the compulsory jurisdiction of such a court. Finally, states
would need to be more concerned about the political impact of adjudications
before an international court than before an individual state's courts. An even-
remotely successful international court will have significant prestige and
authoritativeness. The political repercussions of such a court's determining that
a state's acts or policies were unlawful would be very substantial indeed, and
categorically different from the repercussions of the same verdict emerging
from a national court. States may therefore be put to a choice, in some cases,
of either revealing sensitive data as defense evidence or withholding that
evidence and thereby risking severe political costs in case of a guilty verdict.
These are, in very abbreviated form, the legitimate and significant
concerns that may give states pause in accepting ICC jurisdiction. This is not
to say whether states ultimately should or should not accept ICC jurisdiction.
Rather, the point is that the implications of jurisdiction exercised by an
international court are very different from those of jurisdiction exercised by
national courts. The two kinds of jurisdiction therefore raise very different
concerns for states.
Now, you may say, "It is true that there are these political and policy
considerations at stake for states, but those are not legal bars to jurisdiction."
You may say, "The lawfulness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals is
unproblematic, and so states - whatever their policy concerns - are obliged
to accept that jurisdiction." Here is where I believe that an error is made.
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals has been justified as a form of
delegated jurisdiction. The theory is that states parties, in effect, delegate their
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universal or territorial jurisdiction to the ICC. However, there are very
significant differences in the consequences and implications of ICCjurisdiction
as distinct from state jurisdiction, in the ways I have just described. For that
reason, it should not be quickly presumed that the option of delegating a state's
jurisdiction to an international court is necessarily part of the customary law of
universal or territorial jurisdiction. Because different state interests are affected
by state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction, consent to or acquiescence
in state-exercised jurisdiction is not equivalent to consent to or acquiescence in
jurisdiction exercised by an international court.
The international law of jurisdiction (universal, territorial, and so on) is
customary law. It has developed through the consent, acquiescence, and
practice of states. Its legitimacy rests precisely on the fact that, in the course
of the law's development, states have accepted a particular jurisdictional
principle as law and have acted accordingly.
Unsurprisingly, states decide whether to accept the development of
particular principles or rules of law based on the implications of those rules for
states' interests, however they define those interests. If the concept of the
"incremental development of customary law" is to mean anything coherent, it
must mean that a development can be considered incremental only if the
development would not fundamentally change the impact of the law on states'
interests. Customary law, if it is to maintain any claim to legitimacy, cannot
proceed by ambush and surprise. We cannot say to states,
This "development" of customary law was unforeseeable and not part
of what was anticipated as the law developed through state practice
and opinio juris. In fact, this "development" has a significantly
different impact on your interests than the rule that it developedfrom.
But, nevertheless, you are now bound to accept this innovation
because it has been deemed incremental.
That would not be legitimate, and it also would not work.
This is why I believe that the concerns that states may have with ICC
jurisdiction are not "mere policy concerns" but are, in fact, of fundamental
legal significance. It cannot be said that the option of delegating states'
jurisdiction to an international court is already an established feature of the
customary law of universal or territorial jurisdiction. And the fact that the
impact of international jurisdiction on state interests is significantly different
from the impact of state-exercised jurisdiction means that we cannot label the
move to include delegability as an "incremental development."
There is no instance of prior state practice involving the delegation of
states' jurisdiction to an international court without the consent of the
defendant's state of nationality. The International Criminal Tribunals for the
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda base their jurisdiction on Security Council
powers under Chapter VII. The Tokyo Tribunal after WWII based its
jurisdiction on Japan's consent. And the Nuremberg Tribunal based its
jurisdiction on the consent of the Allies, acting as the German sovereign. As
the Nuremberg judgment stated:
[T]he making of the Charter [establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal]
was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the
undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied
territories has been recognized by the civilized world.
Thus, the Nuremberg Tribunal relied on the right of the Allies to exercise
sovereign prerogatives in Germany as the basis for its jurisdiction. There are
excellent arguments for the view that the Nuremberg Tribunal should not have
done so. But that is what it did. Its jurisdiction may have been flawed for that
reason -but that would mean only that its jurisdiction was flawed, not that the
jurisdiction rested on some basis other than the one stated by the court.
The net result is that none of the four modem international tribunals has
exercised the delegated jurisdiction of states in the absence of consent by the
defendant's state of nationality. Therefore, there appears to be no prior instance
of state practice to support the ICC's exercise of universal or territorial
jurisdiction delegated to it by states without the consent of the defendant's state
of nationality.
Now, you may say, "You're quibbling. If each of the states parties to the
ICC Treaty would have the right to prosecute these defendants, then surely
those states can get together and prosecute them in an international court which
they create." You may say, "Even if there are no prior instances of state
practice of such delegated jurisdiction, the innovation is 'incremental' - states
can prosecute in their national courts or in an international court - it's such a
minor change."
But, here is precisely where we see that, from the point of view of states'
interests, the implications of the innovation are very significant and not minor
or incremental at all. States, for the reasons I have briefly elaborated, may be
unwilling to have their interstate disputes adjudicated by an international court,
even while those same states may accept universal and territorial jurisdiction
and, thus, accept the prosecution of their nationals in the courts of other
individual states.
Thus, when we speak of the delegation of states' jurisdiction to an
international court, we are speaking not of an "incremental development" but
of a substantial and significant legal change. Such substantial changes cannot
and should not be accomplished through labeling them as minor or incremental
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developments in customary international law. An attempt to characterize a
major change as a minor change is bound to meet with resistance, just as we
have seen in the ICC context.
Before closing, I would like briefly to address two different arguments,
sometimes raised in this context, that I think we probably need not detain
ourselves with. I will mention them here in passing, though I say much more
about them in my paper.' The first of these arguments is that the Rome Treaty
has itself created new customary law permitting jurisdiction over non-party
nationals. That claim seems to me to be very premature, for reasons that I take
to be self-evident. If I am wrong about that and there is disagreement on the
point, I would be happy to discuss it.
The other argument sometimes made is that the terrorism treaties
demonstrate that states can create otherwise non-existentjurisdiction in treaties
and then apply that jurisdiction to non-parties. The terrorism treaties do,
indeed, provide that states parties will have, in effect, universal jurisdiction
over the crimes covered in the treaties. But, as I discuss at some length in the
paper,2 this does not indicate that states can create jurisdiction that they would
not have individually by signing a treaty, and then impose that jurisdiction on
non-parties. The better interpretation of the significance of the terrorism
treaties is that those treaties, in effect, propose new customary law. Non-party
states can respond to that proposal by acquiescing in or objecting to the
jurisdiction. If they acquiesce, then the jurisdiction defined in the treaties will,
in time, become customary law. If non-parties object, then the bid to create
new custom will likely fail. So far, in the case of the terrorism treaties, we have
seen acquiescence. That has not been true regarding the jurisdictional
provisions of the ICC Treaty - and therein lies the relevant and crucial
distinction. Once again, I would be happy to discuss the terrorism treaties
further but, in truth, I think that they are off point.
What I think is really relevant here, in conclusion, is that there are
meaningful concerns about the compulsory adjudication of interstate disputes
that might cause a state to reject the jurisdictional regime of the Rome Treaty.
These concerns cannot, I believe, be dismissed as being non-legal in character.
Rather, the fact that the ramifications of international jurisdiction and state-
exercised jurisdiction are very different is entirely relevant to and, indeed, calls
sharply into question, the lawfulness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party
nationals.
1. See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: Tile ICC and Non-Party States,
forthcoming 63 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS - (2000).
2. See id.
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For these reasons, I believe that, as I began by saying, what we have is a
genuine dilemma - not excuses or pretexts, but legitimate concerns on each
side. I feel deeply, as we all do, the need for enforcement of the body of law
intended to reduce the human suffering caused by genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. I want for us to make progress on the particular
obstacle to an effective ICC that we are considering today. I believe that we
stand a chance of doing so only if we see realistically the valid concerns on
both sides of this issue and take those concerns seriously into account in
examining whether there may be a workable resolution.
PINNING GUILT ON PINOCHET
Alfred P. Rubin*
Britain's Highest Court has decided that a treaty requires the British to
honor a Spanish request for the extradition of General Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte, Chile's strong man from 1973 until he "retired" with a rank of "Senator
for Life" in Chile. The decision has raised the hopes of many that Pinochet
would finally be made to face the moral evils that many think justify criminal
punishment. Less noticed, it has aroused the apprehension of those concerned
with the structure of international society and the place of "law" in it.
Assuming that Pinochet is in fact responsible for the evils his government has
been accused of, I am reminded of Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons,'
in which St. Thomas More refuses to cut a road through the law to catch a
wicked person:
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
- where would you hide...? This country's planted thick with laws
.. , man's laws, not God's - and if you cut them down... d'you
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's
sake.'
The first rule of law is its distribution of authority; Constitutional Law.
No matter how wicked a person, before he or she can be tried, a court must be
found with jurisdiction over the person and the offense. Since Spanish criminal
law does not apply to events in Chile any more than it applies to events in the
United States, the first question is whether Spain has the necessary jurisdiction
to apply to Pinochet its version of "international criminal law." There are many
reasons why it does not. Spanish judges given authority in a Spanish legal
order do not represent the international legal community; they represent the
Spanish legal community. If under the law of Spain they can apply the Spanish
version of "international criminal law" to the acts of a Chilean, Pinochet, in
Chile, that remains an authority derived from Spanish constitutional law, not
* Distinguished Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts
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from international law. Secondly, under the unwritten constitution of inter-
national society, derived from history, practice, and political necessity, like the
unwritten British Constitution, all states are equal. If Spain can try Pinochet for
violations of the Spanish version of international criminal law, then Iran can try
Salman Rushdie under the Iranian version of international criminal law. Nor
does the oft-mentioned example of piracy stand close inspection; the opinions
of publicists and even dicta in tribunals does not make a convincing precedent,
and the reasons why no country arrests or tries a foreign pirate who has attacked
only third country shipping are clear. Would the United States accept the
authority of Haiti or Cuba to rule the waves in that way? In main-stream
international law texts jurisdiction is divided into segments. Even if a state has
"jurisdiction to prescribe," that is the authority to make illegal by its own
version of international law some acts by foreigners in so-called "universal
jurisdiction" cases, it does not necessarily have "jurisdiction to enforce." It is
the lack of that "jurisdiction to enforce" that makes it necessary for Spain to
request cooperation, extradition, from the United Kingdom. Even if Pinochet
is extradited, thus placing him within Spain's territorial "jurisdiction to
enforce," that does not mean that Spain has "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in a
criminal matter. I know of no case in which a war criminal or other supposed
violator of "international criminal law" from a major power has ever been tried
by a neutral tribunal.
The precedents in law all go the other way and have nothing to do with
"chief of state" immunity. States in general do not interfere in the internal
affairs of their neighbors but, except for spies, allow total personal immunity
for any agent of state acting in a public capacity even if acting abroad. For
example, France recently argued that the French agents involved in sinking the
Greenpeace in New Zealand, because they acted for France, should be relieved
of their liability under New Zealand's criminal law, even though the French
actions were illegal as a matter of international law and their agents acted
criminally under New Zealand's criminal law. Eventually, the convicted French
agents were released to France as the result of the intermediacy of the United
Nations Secretary General.
If there was a rule of international constitutional law under which Pinochet
could be tried in Spain for his official actions, that rule could not apply equally
among the sovereigns of the world who are supposedly equal before the law.
Not only does the Salman Rushdie example indicate the problems, but, even
more obviously, it would be politically disastrous to the cause of peace and
reconciliation for a neutral state to attempt to indict Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon,
various Russian and Chechen leaders, Margaret Thatcher, Gerry Adams,
Milosevic, Izetbegovic, Tudjman - but the list is endless. However desirable
it might seem, without forbidding revolutions by international law and placing
international "guardians" over even democratically elected governments, it is
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currently impossible to put the world into the hands of people who would agree
that various particular atrocities could never be justified in the interest of
stability, order, security of person, and property. When Plato made a similar
suggestion, he noted that those best fit to be the "guardians" of society would
not want the job.
What are the alternatives? For one, instead of a criminal action in Spain
under the Spanish version of international criminal law, what about a normal
civil suit against Pinochet in the United Kingdom (or anywhere else Pinochet
is physically present or has assets) for the damage he has inflicted on anybody?
Such suits are not uncommon. They are resolved by national courts referring
to an applicable system of law, which might be the law of Chile, under which
Pinochet has immunities, but might be international claims law. It depends on
the "choice of law" rule of the tribunal; a thing to be investigated by plaintiffs'
attorneys and argued before a tribunal that has "jurisdiction to enforce" over the
defendant and "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in the particular case. This
difference between civil and criminal causes was illustrated in the United States
most notably in the O.J. Simpson affair; he was acquitted in a criminal trial and
convicted in a civil action. Another possibility is an ordinary international
claim by Spain against Chile for the "denial of justice" to Pinochet's Spanish
victims. Again, the procedures are well-precedented and do not involve the
complexities of proving the rules of a supposed international criminal law., A
third possibility is the "Waldheim" solution: Kurt Waldheim was never tried
by anybody and it is still not known if he committed any war crimes, but he
cannot get a visa to visit any place outside of Austria. Pinochet, like other
persons of dubious moral standing, but undoubted pride and political
significance back "home," can be restricted to his home turf by governments
that agree that his past actions fall below their moral standards. Had the British
taken this view, Pinochet would not have been given a visa, could not have
visited England, and there would have been no extradition request or Pinochet
case in the United Kingdom.
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The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide' protects "national, ethnical, racial and religious" groups from
intentional physical destruction. It imposes a variety of obligations upon States
with respect to individual criminal liability for the crime. "[T]he principles
underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation,"2 said
the International Court of Justice in its celebrated advisory opinion.
The enumeration of the groups protected by the Convention's definition
of genocide is perhaps its most controversial aspect. Critics have argued that
the omission of political, economic, social, gender and other groups is illogical
and incompatible with the Convention's lofty mission.3 Some domestic
legislatures, when enacting implementing legislation, have expanded the list of
groups covered by the term genocide, the most extensive of these being the
recent amendment to the French Code penal which defines genocide as the
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intentional destruction of any group based on arbitrary criteria.4 Indeed, since
the Convention's adoption in 1948, surely far more has been said and written
lamenting the restrictive scope of the groups covered by the definition found in
article HI of the Convention than on its interpretation per se.
The first judicial interpretation of the enumeration of groups protected by
the Genocide Convention dates to September 1998, fifty years after the
Convention's adoption.5 In Prosecutor v. Akeyesu, a Trial Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda wrestled with the application of the
enumeration to the Tutsi victims of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.6 Perplexed
by difficulties in determining how to categorize the Tutsi group, the Trial
Chamber ultimately ruled that article U of the Genocide Convention should be
interpreted to apply to all "stable and permanent" groups, whether or not the
Tutsi could be neatly fit within the scope of the terms "national, ethnical, racial
or religious." Months later, a second Trial Chamber of the same Tribunal, in
Prosecutor v. Kayeshema and Ruzindana, took a very different approach to the
issue, ruling that the Tutsi were an ethnic group not because they met the
definition in any objective sense but because Rwandan laws had defined them
as such.7
This paper examines the conflicting interpretations produced by different
Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda with respect
to the enumeration of groups protected by the prohibition of genocide.
I. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, in his 1944 work Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, invented the term genocide, defining it as a crime directed against "the
national group as an entity."' A close reading of Lemkin's writings shows that
he viewed the prohibition of genocide as an extension of the protection of what
were called "national minorities" in the inter-war treaty regime. It is true that
Lemkin spoke of "political" and "economic" genocide, but here he referred not
to the group protected but rather to the nature of the persecution. Lemkin's
approach to the forms that genocide might take, including destruction of
political, economic and cultural institutions, was far broader than what would
4. Penal Code (France), Journal officiel, July 23, 1992, art. 211-1.
5. The Eichmann case involved interpretation of Israeli legislation modelled on article II of the
Genocide Convention. While the twojudgments construe several important elements of the definition, they
do not give any attention to the enumeration of groups: A.G. Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 I.L.R. 5 (District
Court, Jerusalem); A.G. Israel v. Eichmain, (1968) 36 LLR. 277 (Supreme Court).
6. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Case no. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, Sept. 2, 1998, (1998) 37 I.L.M.
1399.
7. Prosecutor v. Kayeshema and Ruzindana, (Case no. ICTR-95-I-T), Judgment (May 21, 1999).
8. Raphael Lemkin, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS
FOR REDRESS 79 (1944).
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later take shape within the Convention. But as for the nature of the groups
protected, his narrow conception is quite faithfully reflected in article II of the
Convention.9
The term "genocide" was used by the prosecution during the Nuremberg
trial of the major war criminals to describe the destruction of the Jewish
population of Europe.'0 The judges, however, did not adopt the term, and
qualified the persecution of Jews by the Nazi regime as a crime against
humanity. A few months after the Nuremberg judgment of September 30 -
October 1, 1946, genocide was the subject of a General Assembly resolution.
The first draft of General Assembly Resolution 96(1) spoke of "national, racial,
ethnical or religious groups,"" echoing almost exactly the terminology later
enshrined in the 1948 Convention. However, a drafting sub-committee of the
Sixth Committee changed this to "racial, religious, political and other groups."
No recorded debates of the sub-committee exist to explain the addition of
"political and other groups," and the summary records of the plenary Sixth
Committee are silent on the subject. It has subsequently been argued that the
presence of "political and other groups" within the 1946 definition suggests the
existence of a broader concept of genocide than that expressed in the Conven-
tion, one that reflects customary law. But given the meager record of the
debates, the haste with which the resolution was adopted, the novelty of the
term, and the fact that the subsequent Convention excludes "political and other
groups," such a conclusion seems adventuresome at best. That Resolution 96(l)
also omits ethnic and national groups is a further argument against it being
taken as an authoritative list on this issue.
During the subsequent drafting work on the Convention, although debate
raged about the specific groups to be included, particularly political groups,
there is no doubt, that the drafters intended to list the protected groups in an
exhaustive fashion. Inclusion of "national groups" within the enumeration
raised little controversy during the drafting of the Convention. As delegates
explained, the term was well-understood within the context of the "minorities
problems" in Eastern Europe between the two wars. Concern that "national"
might be confused with "political" led Sweden to propose the addition of the
term "ethnical."' 2 The reference to "racial" groups posed the least problem for
the drafters of the Convention. There are no significant references to discussion
9. As a consultant to the Secretariat, he opposed adding political groups to the enumeration in the
draft Convention: U.N. Doc. E/447, 22.
10. France et al. v. Goering et al., (1946) 22 I.M.T.203, 13 I.L.R. 203, 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 45-6
(I.M.T.).
11. U.N. Doc. A/BUR/50, proposed by Cuba, India and Pakistan. The Saudi Arabian draft
convention, submitted at about the same time, spoke of "the destruction of an ethnic group, people or nation,"
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/86.
12. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Petren, Sweden); U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Petren, Sweden).
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of the term "racial" in the travauxprparatoires, suggesting that it is very close
to the core of what the Convention was intended to protect. Although some
questioned the inclusion of religious groups, these were accepted on the
understanding that they were closely analogous to ethnic or national groups, the
result of historical conditions that were in reality as defining of the group in an
immutable sense as racial or ethnic characteristics.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Convention, the International Law
Commission regularly flirted with the idea of modifying the text of article II of
the Convention so as to give the enumeration of protected groups a non-
exhaustive character, but it eventually returned to the original 1948 version.13
When it created the ad hoc Tribunals, the Security Council also retained the
1948 definition. There were isolated attempts to amend the definition of
genocide during the drafting of the Rome Statute,4 but the final version also
repeats the 1948 text without modification.
II. AKAYEsu: "STABLE AND PERMANENT GROUPS"
The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
its September 2, 1998 decision in Akayesu, considered the enumeration of
protected groups in article HI of the Genocide Convention (the model for article
2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwandal"), to be too
restrictive. The categorization of Rwanda's Tutsi population clearly vexed the
Tribunal. For the Tribunal, the word "ethnic" came closest, yet it too was
troublesome because the Tutsi could not be meaningfully distinguished, in
terms of language and culture, from the majority Hutu population.16
The Rwandan Tutsis are, it is widely believed, descendants of Nilotic
herders, whereas the Rwandan Hutus are considered to be of "Bantu" origin
from South and Central Africa. Historically, their economies were different,
the Tutsis raising cattle while the Hutus tilled the soil. There are genomic
differences, a typical Tutsi being tall and slender, with a fine, pointed nose, a
13. Yearbook 1951, Vol. I, 90th meeting, at 66-8; Yearbook 1951, Vol. II, p. 136; "Fourth report
on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special
Rapporteur," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986), art. 12(1); Yearbook 1989, Vol. 1, 2099th meeting, p. 25, 42;
Yearbook.1989, Vol. 1, 2100th meeting, p. 27, 12, p. 30, 31; Yearbook 1989, Vol. 1, 2102nd meeting, at
41, *2; "Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-first session," U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.l (Part 2), at 59,9 160; Yearbook 1991, Vol. 1, 2239th meeting, at 214,1
7-8; Yearbook 1991, Vol. 1, 2251 st meeting, at 292-93, 19-17; "Report of the Commission to the General
Assembly on the work of its forty-third session," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/199 I/Add. I (Part 2), at 102,1
(2).
14. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. A/50/22, at 12-13,9159-72.
15. U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, annex.
16. Akayesu, supra note 6, at 1693.
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typical Hutu being shorter with a flatter nose. These differences are visible in
some, but not in many others. Rwandan Tutsis and Hutus speak the same
language, practice the same religions, and have essentially the same culture.
Mixed marriages are common. Distinguishing between them was so difficult
that the Belgian colonizers established a system of identity cards, and
determined what Rwandan law calls "ethnic origin" based on the number of
cattle owned by a family. 7
Confronted with the prospect that none of the four terms of the definition
might apply, the Tribunal concluded that the Convention could still extend to
certain other groups, although their precise definition was elusive. Pledging
fidelity to the Convention's drafters, the Akayesu judgment declared:
On reading through the travaux prdparatoires of the Genocide
Convention (Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth Commit-
tee of the General Assembly, 21 September - 10 December 1948,
Official Records of the General Assembly), it appears that the crime
of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only 'stable' groups,
constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is
determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more 'mobile' groups
which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as
political and economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the
four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not chal-.
lengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in
a continuous and often irremediable manner.
The Trial Chamber continued:
Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by
the Genocide Convention, echoed In Article 2 of the Statute, should
be limited to only the four groups expressly mentioned and whether
they should not also include any group which is stable and permanent
like the said four groups. In other words, the question that arises is
whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of
a group as such under the Genocide Convention, if the said group,
although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the
definition of any one of the four groups expressly protected by the
Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particu-
larly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide
17. Andrd Guichaoua, LES CRISES POLIIQUES AU RWANDA El AU BURUNDI (1993-1994) (1995);
Jean-Pierre Chretien, LE DRI DE L'ETHNISME; RWANDA Er BURUNDI: 1990-1996 (1997); G. PRUNIER, THm
RWANDA CRISIS, 1959-1994, HISTORY OFA GENocIDE(1995); Filip Reyntjens, L'AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS
EN CRISE (1994).
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Convention, which according to the travaux pr6paratoires, was
patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group. 8
With this approach, the Rwanda Tribunal encompassed the nation's Tutsi
population within the definition of genocide, even if the term "ethnic group"
was deemed insufficient.
The Akayesu analysis is open to criticism on several fronts. In the first
place, it quite brazenly goes beyond the actual terms of the Convention
definition, invoking the intent of the drafters as a justification. The problem is
that the drafters chose the four terms in order to express their intent. If they
meant to protect all "stable and permanent groups," why didn't they simply say
this? The role of the travauxprparatoires is to assist in clarifying ambiguous
or obscure terms, or those that are manifestly absurd or unreasonable, 9 not to
add elements that were left out. As was stated by Sir Percy Spender and Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice of the International Court of Justice: "The principle of
interpretation directed to giving provisions their maximum effect cannot
legitimately be employed in order to introduce what would amount to a revision
of those provisions."20 Reading in terms that are not already present in the text
is also particularly objectionable when the treaty defines a criminal offence,
which should be subject to restrictive interpretation and respect the rule nullum
crimen sine lege.2' If the "stable and permanent" hypothesis is to be sustained,
it must rely on a construction of the actual words that appear in article II.
A general discomfort with the term "racial group" may explain why the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in its September 2, 1998 judgment
in the Akayesu case, was reluctant to classify the Tutsi as a racial group. The
general conception of Tutsi within Rwanda is based on hereditary physical
traits, even though these may be difficult to distinguish in many cases.
According to the Rwanda Tribunal, "[t]he conventional definition of a racial
group is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
factors."22
This definition, adopted by the Tribunal in 1998, is considerably more
restrictive than the recognized meaning of the term "racial" in 1948. An
indication of usage at the time is provided by the Oxford English Dictionary,
which proposes several definitions of race, of which the most appropriate are:
"A group of persons, animals, or plants, connected by common descent or
18. Akayesu, supra note 6, at 1515.
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1979) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 32.
20. South West Africa case, [1950] I.C.J. Reports 128.
21. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., (Case no. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, Nov. 16, 1998, (1999) 38
I.L.M.57, 402, 409-13.
22. Akayesu, supra note 6, at 513.
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origin;" "A group or class of persons, animals, or things, having some common
feature or features."23 This definition can be extended without difficulty to
cover national, ethnic, and even religious minorities, and that is indeed how the
term was understood in 1948, although this no longer corresponds with modern-
day usage.24 For example, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in a
1935 advisory opinion, spoke of the "the preservation of [the] racial peculiari-
ties" of national minorities.25 A special United Nations Declaration of
December 17, 1942 denounced ill-treatment of the "Jewish race" in occupied
Europe.26 The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
noted that judges in Germany were removed from the bench for "racial
reasons," a reference to treatment of Jewish jurists.27 It also condemned Julius
Streicher for crimes against humanity because his incitement to murder and
extermination at a time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most
horrible conditions constituted "persecution on political and racial grounds."
A British war crimes tribunal at the end of the Second World War convicted
Nazis for their "persecution of the Jewish race."28 The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East charged the Japanese government with failing to take
into account the "racial needs" and "racial habits" of prisoners of war.29
Although the term "racial group" may be increasingly obsolete, the
concept persists in popular usage, social science, and international law.
Understandably, progressive jurists search for a meaning that is consistent with
modern values and contemporary social science. This must be the explanation
for the Rwanda Tribunal's insistence upon hereditary traits as the basis of a
definition. Yet it is unquestionable that the meaning of "racial groups" was
much broader at the time of the drafting of the Convention, when it was to a
large extent synonymous with national, ethnic, and religious groups. That
23. IN THE COMPACTEDITION OFTHEOXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2400 (R.W. Burchfield, ed.,
1971).
24. ETHNIC RELATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 195 (David Levinson, ed., 1994).
But in the early 1980s, a court in The Netherlands concluded that Jews were covered by the word "race" in
the country's Penal Code, because "[tihe widely held opinion is that the term 'race' in 1 429(4) cannot be
construed solely in the biological sense but rather... must be viewed as defining 'race' by reference also to
ethnic and cultural minorities." S. Roth, The Netherlands and the 'Are Jews a Race? Issue, 17:4 PATTERNS
OF PREJUDICE 52 (1983).
25. Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, April 6, 1935, P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 64.
26. Quoted in MANFRED LACHS, WAR CRIMES, AN ATrEMpr To DEFINE THE ISSUES 97-98 (1945).
27. France et al. v. Goering et al., supra note 10, at 419 (1.M.T.).
28. United Kingdom v. Kramer et al., ("Belsen Trial"), (1947) 2 L.R.T.W.C. I (British Military
Court), at 106.
29. United States of America et al. v. Araki et al., Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, Nov. 4, 1948, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 49,688 (R. John Pritchard, Sonia
Magbanua Zaide, eds., 1981).
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modem judicial interpretation results in less protection now than fifty years ago
is surely a perverse result.
On closer scrutiny, three of the four categories in the Convention
enumeration, national groups, ethnic groups, and religious groups seem to be
neither stable nor permanent. Only racial groups, when they are defined
genetically, can lay claim to some relatively prolonged stability and perma-
nence. The day after the General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention
it approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims the
fundamental right to change both nationality and religion, thereby recognizing
that they are far from permanent and stable. 3 National groups are modified
dramatically as borders change and as individual and collective conceptions of
identity evolve. Nationality may be changed, sometimes for large groups of
individuals where, for example, two countries have joined or secession has
occurred. Religious groups may come into existence and disappear within a
single lifetime. As for ethnic groups, individual members may also come and
go, although there will often be formal legal rules associated with this,
determining ethnicity as a result of marriage or in the case of children whose
parents belong to different ethnic groups.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear from a reading of the travaux
pr~paratoires of the Convention that the intent of the drafters "was patently to
ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group," as the Rwanda
Tribunal claimed. In fact, reference to groups which are "stable and
permanent" occurred only infrequently during the drafting, and other, complex
justifications for the choices of the General Assembly were also given in the
course of the debates."a What a review of the drafting history reveals is that
political groups - perhaps the best example of a group that is not stable and
permanent - were actually included within the enumeration until an eleventh-
hour compromise eliminated the reference. The debates leave little doubt that
the decision to exclude political groups was mainly an attempt to rally a
minority of Member States, in order to facilitate rapid ratification of the
Convention, and not a principled decision based on some philosophical
distinction between stable and more ephemeral groups.
Nor is there any support for the "stable and permanent" hypothesis in
national legislation introducing the crime of genocide in domestic penal codes.
It is true that several States have departed from the Convention definition, but
none has taken the "stable and permanent" approach.
The Trial Chamber's imaginative interpretation in Akeyesu, designed to
address its discomfort with defining the Tutsi as an ethnic group, is particularly
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (11), U.N..Doc. A/810, arts. 15(1),
18.
31. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/1R.69 (Amado, Brazil).
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puzzling because in the same judgment the Trial Chamber convicted the
accused of crimes against humanity, in that he was responsible for a
"widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population on ethnic
grounds."32 Surely the word "ethnic" means the same thing in article 4 of the
Statute as it does in article 2 of the Statute? Yet the Rwanda Tribunal did not
see any need to enlarge the definition of crimes against humanity!
III. KAYESHEMA: PURE SUBJECTIVITY
Determining the meaning of the groups protected by the Convention seems
to dictate a degree of subjectivity. It is the offender who defines the individual
victim's status as a member of a group protected by the Convention." The
Nazis, for example, had detailed rules establishing, according to objective
criteria, who was Jewish and who was not. It made no difference if the
individual, perhaps a non-observant Jew of mixed parentage, denied belonging
to the group. As Jean-Paul Sartre wrote in Riflexions sur la question juive,
"[le juif est un homme que les autres hommes tiennent pour juif: voilb la vdrit6
simple d'oti il faut partir. En ce sens le ddmocrate a raison contre l'antis6mite:
c'est l'antisdmite qui fait le juif."34 Problems with the four categories in article
II of the Convention have led some writers to argue for a purely subjective
approach." If the offender views the group as being national, racial, ethnic, or
religious, then that should suffice, they contend. In Rwanda, Tutsis were
betrayed by their identity cards, for in many cases, there was no other way to
tell.
In Kayeshema and Ruzindana, another Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda adopted a purely subjective approach, noting
that an ethnic group could be "a group identified as such by others, including
perpetrators of the crimes."36 Indeed, it concluded that the Tutsi were an ethnic
group based on the existence of government - issued official identity cards
describing them as such,37 quite clearly failing to endorse the "stable and
32. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 6, at 1 652.
33. For consideration of this question from the standpoint of minorities law, see, John Packer, On
the Content of Minority Rights, in DO WE NEED MINORITY RIGHTS 124-25 (J. Rilikkd, ed., 1996); John
Packer, Problems in Defining Minorities, MINORrrY AND GROUP RIGHTS TOWARDS THE NEW MI.LENIUM
(B. Bowring, D. Fott'ell, eds., 1999).
34. Jean-Paul Sartre, RFLExIONS SUR LA QUESTION JUIVE 81-84 (1954).
35. Jean-Michel Chaumont, LA CONCURRENCE DES VICTIMES: GINOCIDE, IDENTr,
RECONNAISSANCE 211-12 (1997).
36. Prosecutor v. Kayeshema and Ruzindana, (Case no. ICTR-95-1-T), Judgment, May 21, 1999,
at [98.
37. Id. at. 522-30.
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permanent" analysis of the Akayesu judgment.38 However, it did not explicitly
disagree with the other Trial Chamber's analysis.
This approach is appealing up to a point, especially because the
perpetrator's intent is a decisive element in the crime of genocide. The flaw of
this approach is allowing, at least in theory, genocide to be committed against
a group that does not have any real objective existence. To make an analogy
with ordinary criminal law, many penal codes stigmatize patricide, that is, the
killing of one's parents. But the murderer who kills an individual believing,
erroneously, that he or she is killing a parent, is only a murderer, not a patricide.
The same is true of genocide. Although helpful to an extent, the subjective
approach flounders because law cannot permit the crime to be defined by the
offender alone. It is necessary, therefore, to determine some objective existence
of the four groups.
It is also significant that several references to "group" appear within article
II of the Convention. The term is used both within the chapeau, which
describes the mental element or mens rea of the offence, and the five
paragraphs that follow, which set out the punishable acts of genocide. Had the
concept of groups appeared only in the portion of the text dealing exclusively
with the mental element, namely the chapeau, the subjective argument would
have more force. It would be sufficient to identify a genocidal intent where the
accused believed that the group existed. However, the provision goes further
and requires, in the definition of the actual acts of genocide, that they be
directed against "members of the group."
IV. DEFINING THE GROUPS: AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH
The High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Max van der Stoel, was once quoted
saying that although he could not define the term, "I know a minority when I
see one."39 Put differently, difficulty in constructing a definition does not
render an expression useless, particularly from the legal point of view. The
four terms - national, ethnical, racial, and religious - necessarily involve a
degree of subjectivity because their meaning is determined in a social context.
For example, issue may be taken with the term "racial" because the existence
of races themselves no longer corresponds to usage of progressive social
science.' However, the terms "racial" as well as "race," "racism," and "racial
38. Id. at. 1 94.
39. Max van der Stoel, Prevention of Minority Conflicts, in THE CSCE ANDTHETURBULENTNEW
EUROPE 148 (L.B. Sohn, ed., 1993). His comment was inspired by United States Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart who said the same thing about pornography. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963).
40. According to the Commission of Experts on Rwanda, "to recognize that there exists
discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, it is not necessary to presume or posit the existence of race or
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group" remain widely used and are certainly definable. They are social
constructs, not scientific expressions, and were intended as such by the drafters
of the Convention. To many of the delegates attending the General Assembly
session of 1948, Jews, Gypsies and Armenians might all have been qualified as
"racial groups," language that would be seen as quaint and perhaps even
offensive a half-decade later. Their real intent was to ensure that the
Convention would contemplate crimes of intentional destruction of these and
similar groups. The four terms were chosen in order to convey this message.
International law knows of similar examples of anachronistic language. One
of the earliest multilateral treaties dealing with human rights was aimed at
"white slavery.' Its goal, the eradication of forced prostitution on an
international scale, remains laudatory and relevant, although the terminology
is obviously archaic.
The four terms in the Convention not only overlap,42 they also help to
define each other, operating much as four comer posts that delimit an area
within which a myriad of groups covered by the Convention find protection.
This was certainly the perception of the drafters. For example, they agreed to
add the term "ethnical" so as to ensure that the term "national" would not be
confused with "political." '43 On the other hand, they deleted reference to
"linguistic" groups, "since it is not believed that genocide would be practised
upon them because of their linguistic, as distinguished from their racial,
national or religious, characteristics." The drafters viewed the four groups in
a dynamic and synergistic relationship, each contributing to the construction of
the other.
The 1996 report of the International Law Commission on the Draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopts this approach in
considering "tribal groups" to fall within the scope of the definition of
genocide.45 It is not difficult to understand why tribal groups fit within the four
comers of the domain, whereas political and gender groups do not. Yet in
concluding that tribal groups meet the definition of genocide, it seems
unnecessary to attempt to establish within which of the four enumerated
ethnicity itself as a scientifically objective fact." Final report of the Commission of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1995/1405, annex, 159.
41. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, (1904) 1 L.N.T.S. 83;
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, (1910) 7 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(3d) 252, 211 Consol. T.S. 45.
42. Fourth report on the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Securty of Mankind, by Mr.
Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398, at 56.
43. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.73 (Petren, Sweden); U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.74 (Petren, Sweden).
44. U.N. Doc. A/401.
45. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26
July 1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, at 89.
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categories they should be placed. In the same spirit, the Canadian Criminal
Code's genocide provision includes the term "color" in its list of protected
groups.' We readily understand that groups defined by "color" are also
protected by the Convention without it being important to determine whether
they are in fact subsumed within the adjectives national, racial, ethnical, or
religious.
There is a danger that a search for autonomous meanings for each of the
four terms will weaken the overarching sense of the enumeration as a whole,
forcing the jurist into an untenable Procrustes bed. To a degree, this problem
is manifested in the September 2, 1998 judgment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda in the Akayesu case. It also appears in the definitions
accompanying the genocide legislation adopted by the United States of
America.47 Deconstructing the enumeration risks distorting the sense that
belongs to the four terms, taken as a whole.
Raphael Lemkin conceived of genocide as a crime committed against
"national groups," something made apparent by frequent references in his book
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.48 In his famous study, he associated the
prohibition of genocide with the protection of minorities.49 Lemkin clearly did
not intend the prohibition of genocide to cover all minorities, but rather those
that had been contemplated by the minorities treaties of the inter-war years.
The term "national" had an already well-accepted technical meaning, having
been used to describe minorities in the legal regime established in the aftermath
of the First World War. For Lemkin, genocide was above all meant to describe
the destruction of the Jews, who cannot in a strict sense be termed a national
group at all. Yet the term's usage was clear enough in what it covered and what
it was meant to protect. The historical circumstances and the context of Nazi
persecution further enhanced this perspective. The etymology of the term
"genocide" also confirms this. In ancient Greek, genos means "race" or "tribe."
It does not refer to any group in the abstract, or even to groups defined on the
basis of political view, or economic and social status.
Attacks on groups defined on the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity, and
religion have been elevated, by the Genocide Convention, to the apex of human
rights atrocities, and with good reason. The definition is a narrow one, it is
true, but recent history has disproven the claim that it was too restrictive to be
of any practical application. For society to define a crime so heinous that it will
46. Criminal Code [Canada], R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 318(4), "any section of the public
distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin."
47. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, (The Proxmire Act), S. 185 1, sec. 1093.
48. Supra note 8, at 79, 80-2, 85-7, 90-3. See also, Raphael Lemkin, Le genocide, f 1946] REV.
INT'L DROIT PtNAL 25. (Par 'gnocide' nous voulons dire la destruction d'une nation ou d'un groupe
ethnique.").
49. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, supra note 21, at 90.
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occur only rarely is testimony to the value of such a precise formulation.
Diluting the definition, either by formal amendment of its terms or by
extravagant interpretation of the existing text, risks trivializing the horror of the
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in those days they wanted to kill all the indigenous people. He was
in charge of the country then - that Lucas Garcia, is he in jail yet?
What's happening with that?
2
* Jan Perlin teaches in the International Human Rights Law Clinic, American University,
Washington College of Law. Ms. Perlin began her work as an international human rights lawyer when she
began six years of service with the United Nations. She was a field investigator with the teams that verified
compliance with the peace accords in both El Salvador and Guatemala, and ran projects to build the justice
system in Guatemala. In her last assignment she provided legal counsel to the Guatemalan Historical
Clarification Commission. Prior to her United Nations' service, Ms. Perlin was a public defender with the
New York City Legal Aid Society.
1. Genocide is defined as: "... any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
It should also be noted that under the Convention the attempt to commit genocide or complicity in genocide
are also contemplated as punishable acts. Convention on the Prevention and Punislment of Genocide.
2. "En ese tiempo queran matar a los indfgenas. El manda al pals. -Este Lucas Garcia estar ya
preso? "C6mo va esa cosa?" Collective Testimony-Rabinal, in Guatemala: Memory ofSilence, Vol. II!, Ch.
II, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3362. Author's translation. All cites to the final report of the Historical
Clarification Commission, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, refer to the complete Spanish-language version,
unless otherwise specified. The cites contain Volume, Chapter, Section and paragraph numbers instead of
page numbers because the paragraph numbers correspond to both the print and electronic versions of the
complete report, which can be found online at <http://www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh>. General Lucas Garcia
served as president from 1978 to March 1982, when he was unseated in a coup d'etat and replaced by General
Rios Montt, now Secretary-General of the FRG party and recently elected to a seat in the Guatemalan
National Assembly. Rios Montt was also unseated in a military-sponsored coup in August, 1983.
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Well you know, they wanted to finish off all the villages, but we
were lucky, thank the Lord, because we were able to get away, 'cause
for them to finish the job meant not just frightening people, not just
killing one, or two, or three - it meantfinishing off everyone once and
for all, because like I heard as I was leaving - escaping from under
streams of bullets - I heard a soldier say, "come on men, lets go kill,
kill them all - because now it's time to kill.3
On December 29, 1996 the Guatemalan government and the Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG),4 signed peace accords
bringing an end to thirty-four years of internal armed conflict. As part of the
transition to peace it was agreed that a commission be created to document and
clarify the history of the violence and the causes of the conflict. This
commission would also be called upon to formulate recommendations about
how to "encourage peace and national harmony."'
On the other hand, the Guatemalan truth and national conciliation package
would permit criminal trial and punishment for persons found responsible for
torture, forced disappearance and genocide. This position represented a com-
promise on the hotly debated issue of amnesty. By allowing these crimes,
representing gross violations of human rights, to be exempted from the list of
offenses whose prosecution could be suspended under the 1996 National
Reconciliation Law,6 impunity for those violations would arguably be limited.
On the other hand, the truth-telling function normally associated with criminal
trials would be delegated to the Historical Clarification Commission,7 where
3. "Ellos pues quisieron terminar a las aldeas pero que suerte tenemos a nuestro Sefior porque
logramos escapar, porque ellos que para terminar no es para asustar a la gente, no es para matar a uno, dos
o tres, sino que para terminar de una vez, porque segdn he ofdo cuando salf pues de escapar bajo chorros de
tiros, entonces of que dijo un soldado que maten muclA, maten a todos porque ahora ya es tiempo de matar."
Collective Testimony from Pexla Grande, Nebaj, Quichd, in Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch.
Il, Sec. XXI, Genocide, i 3226. Author's English translation.
4. Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, a coalition of the four opposition guerrilla
organizations, the EGP (Ejdrcito Guerrillero de los Pobres), ORPA (Organizacidn del Pueblo en Armas) FAR
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, formerly Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes), and the PGT (Partido Guatemalteco
de Trabajadores) that came together to form the URNG in 1982. Before that they operated independently
with the PGT operating primarily in the political arena, albeit clandestinely. The other three organizations,
formed at different historical moments had both a political branch and military units throughout the conflict.
5. Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations
and Acts of Violence that Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, Oslo, 23 June 1994, reproduced
in The Guatemala Peace Agreements, United Nations Department of Public Information, (1998.)
6. Decree Law # 145- 96 was proposed on presidential initiative. Negotiated in the context of the
peace talks, the law was a product of an agreement between the parties to the conflict with the aid of the
United Nations moderator.
7. Guatemala Peace Agreements, supra note 5. [hereinafter Oslo Accord].
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judgments about responsibility for human rights violations would take into
account a broad historical context. The duty to discover and speak the truth in
its final report was limited only by the prohibition against "individualizing
responsibility" for the "human rights violations and incidents of violence"8 it
documented.9 The Oslo Accord memorialized the agreement between the
Guatemalan Government and URNG on the creation of the Historical
Clarification Commission, and constituted an essential component of the overall
peace process.'0
While the Commission's role in the peace process did not contemplate
criminal prosecutions, its mandate gave it the power to renderjudgments based
on international human rights law applicable to the Guatemalan conflict. A
legal framework had to be constructed that would underlie the Commission's
judgments and shape its conclusions. A good deal of time was spent focusing
on the scope and methods of information-gathering and on the determination of
which sources of law should be applied and how. The Accord's call for the
clarification of "human rights violations" and "incidents of violence" related to
the conflict, provided the principal guidance on the scope of the inquiry. In
addition, references contained in other agreements, " comprising the final peace
8. ld. 11.
9. Some argue that the Commission was further handicapped by his inability to subpoena witn-
esses and compel the production of documents. It is interesting to note in this regard, that the final report
reproduces the correspondence reflecting the dialogue between the Commissioners and the Government on
the issue of government collaboration in the production of information. Also noted are efforts to gather
information from other governments. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Annex III and Vol. 1, Metho-
dological Considerations.
10. The Oslo Accord also stated that the Commission's work would have "no judicial effect." This
declaration is largely moot, as the Commission points out, because it did not have the power to suspend the
exercise of citizen rights to complain of past abuses or prosecutorial obligations to pursue those complaints
in the nationaljudicial system. Practically speaking, the Report and its conclusions are of limited evidentiary
value without the presence of the underlying witnesses and documentation. The Commission's additional
obligation to maintain confidentiality, ("The Commission's proceedings shall be confidential so as to
guarantee the secrecy of the sources and the safety of witnesses and informants." Oslo Accord), means that
a prosecutor would have to discover the identity of witnesses through independent means. However, it is
entirely possible that the Commission's factual analyses, legal arguments and the references to historical and
social context will inspire a framework for victims and conscientious prosecutors to seek redress for the gross
violations of human rights documented, without in any way violating this limitation on the Clarification
Commission mandate. See the Report's discussion of the Commission's mandate, Vol. I, Mandate and
Procedures, 168. In fact, some prosecutions relating to public officials' criminal responsibility for forced
disappearances have already been filed. For instance, the accusation of Adriana Portillo against Donaldo
Alvarez Rufz, Germin Chupina Barahona, Pedro Garcia Arredondo, and Manuel de Jesds Valiente Tillez all
of whom held positions of authority over security forces, for the disappearance of five family members in
1981. See Acusacidn en MP, Prensa Ubre, 4 agosto de 1999.
11. The Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement called on the United Nations to verify the
observance of human rights with "particular attention to the rights to life, integrity and security of persons,
to individual liberty, to due process, to freedom of expression, to freedom of movement, to freedom of
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accord, gave preference to monitoring breaches of fundamental human rights,
such as the rights to life, liberty, security, expression, association, movement,
and due process. This hierarchy of values was further defined by the United
Nations' ongoing verification of the behavior of both State and opposition
actors. While there would be no criminal sanctions imposed by this body, the
force of the Commission's recommendations' 2 depended on the strength of its
investigations and the solidity of its historical and legal analysis.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework incorporated those international treaties ratified by
Guatemala, among them the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 3 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II. " International customary law,'5 particularlyjus cogens
norms, were also used to frame the legal inquiry, including the concept of
"crimes against humanity,"'.6 which has eluded a uniform codification. 7 While
association, and to political rights." Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement, Part X, International
Verification by the United Nations, § 12, in The Guatemala Peace Agreements, United Nations Department
of Public Information (1998), p. 30.
12. The Commission had as one of its purposes, to "formulate specific recommendations to
encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala. The Commission shall recommend, in particular,
measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of
human rights and to strengthen the democratic process." Oslo Accord, supra note 5, at _ .
13. Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1949 and deposited its ratification in 1950. In
the Guatemalan Criminal Code, genocide is punishable by a sentence of twenty to thirty years in prison. See
Article 376 Criminal Code, Decree 17-73 as amended (1997).
14. Guatemala ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1987, and the Geneva
Conventions themselves in 1952. The Commission determined that Additional Protocols II "reflected the uses
and practices universally accepted as customary international law and/or as juridical principles universally
accepted based on common Article 3. This is reason why these norms should be considered as a valid and
relevant point of reference." Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I1, Ch. II, Sec. Vill Legal Framework,
1685. Author's translation.
15. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. 1I, Sec. VIII, Legal Framework, 1647-48.
16. While the Commission does not settle on a particular definition for crimes against humanity,
the following analysis best reflects its understanding of the unique elements of those crimes: "The Tribunal
in the Justice Case affirmed that crimes against humanity encompassed inhumane acts and persecutions that
were "systematically organized and conducted by or with the approval of government." The implications of
this aspect of its decision were not lost on the Tribunal, which observed "Only when official organs of
sovereignty participated in atrocities and persecutions did those crimes assume international proportions," -
that is, become international crimes. At the same time, those charged with crimes against humanity could
not escape liability by claiming the traditional immunities extended by international law to acts of state and
to individuals whose official positions ordinarily entitled them to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of
other states." Diane Orentlicher, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Early Warning and Prevention,
December 8-10 ,1998, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Genocide and CrimesAgainstHumanity:
The Legal Regime, Citations omitted. On file with author.
17. Crimes against humanity have been codified with varying terms and definitions in the post
world-war two international tribunals, including most recently the ones approved by the Security Council for
Perlin
the Commission makes note of the human rights protections contained in the
Guatemalan Constitutions in force during the conflict, it also points out that
these provisions were systematically violated by successive governments.
Finally, contemporary interpretations of international human rights law were
applied based on the understanding that the nucleus of fundamental rights
framing the analysis of the violence were all derived from the essential
principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
therefore part of binding customary international law or internationally
recognized principles of law,"8 from the time the conflict began in 1962.
II. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSIBILITY
This entire framework was applied to both the State and the guerrilla. 9
However, the acts committed by the guerrilla were referred to as "incidents of
violence" or violations of international humanitarian law, and not human rights
violations, per se. TheCommission was reluctant to find that the guerrilla had
committed human rights violations in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as
the guerrilla did not have the same affirmative obligation to promote and
guarantee human rights as do the States. Therefore, the concept of "incident of
violence" referred to in the Oslo Accord became the relevant term. 2' However,
it was determined that both the military and the guerrilla were obligated to
comply with humanitarian law norms during the entire period of the conflict.2'
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The most recent codification is contained in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 1998. However, even the Rome Statute acknowledges that alternative definitions may be
valid. See Article 10, Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
18. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. Il1, Ch. II, Sec. VIII Legal Framework, 1668.
19. The guerrilla actions werejudged under the framework of International Humanitarian Law that,
according to the Commission, included the fundamental principles underlying international human rights law
generally. Thus, the guerrilla was not said to have committed human rights violations per se, because the
guerrilla was not obligated in the same way as the State to provide certain affirmative guarantees. Rather the
guerrilla was said to have violated international humanitarian law and through those actions offended
fundamental principles of human rights. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 11, Ch. 11, Sec. Vill, Legal
Framework, 1658. In order to achieve parity in the analysis and assure the most equal treatment of both
parties, both sources of law were applied then, in principle, to both parties and regarded, in any event, as
being mutually reinforcing and consistent in their goal of protection of fundamental rights such as life,
security of the person, liberty, and due process. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. II, Sec. Vill,
Legal Framework, 1676.
20. Id. 1662.
21. There is one reservation expressed regarding the application of humanitarian law, in
consideration that the threshold for establishing an internal conflict was not necessarily reached during every
moment of its thirty-four year duration. The obstacles to consistent levels of documentation for a conflict that
endured over such a long period of time is a significant one in an exercise designed to render specific
judgments. However, it is interesting to note that laws embodying the essence of humanitarian law
protections and perhaps implementing legislation for Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II, can
2000]
394 ILSA Journal of international & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:389
Thus, the guerrilla was evaluated on the basis of its compliance with humanitar-
ian law obligations under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to, for
example, treat prisoners in a humane manner, refrain from summary executions,
avoid injury to civilians, refrain from inflicting torture, from destroying private
property,engaging in pillage, etc. Regarding forced disappearances commonly
attributed to the State because of the peculiar requirement that the State have
denied custody of the victim for the purpose of obscuring their fate,22 guerrilla
actions that resulted in the disappearance of persons were said to constitute an
infringement of the right to life, liberty and physical security and a violation
of humanitarian law, but not a human rights violation. In contrast, Guatemalan
State responsibility' was framed in terms of the direct commission of human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.
Due to the nature of its mandate, the Commission's analysis of responsibil-
ity under this broad human rights framework focused on institutional, rather
than individual responsibility for human rights violations.24 In addition to the
acts of its own agents, violations were attributed to the State where individuals
acted with the collaboration, consent, support, tolerance or acquiescence of.
State institutions, agents or public officials,25 or where individual violent acts
related to the armed conflict went uninvestigated and unpunished, even when
there was no indication the State had prior knowledge of those particular acts.26
In this way, the persistent impunity for human rights violations characteristic
of the conflict was attributed to the State's systematic failure to act on behalf
of victims or to investigate or punish violators. Additionally, patterns of
be found in the Guatemalan Penal Code. See, e.g., Penal Code Decree # 17-73 as reformed, 1997, Art. 378.
Crimes against humanitarian obligations: Whomsoever violates or infringes humanitarian obligations, laws
or agreements regarding prisoners or hostages of war, those wounded in battle or whomsoever commits any
inhuman act against the civilian population or against hospitals or places designated for the wounded will
be sentenced from twenty to thirty years in prison. Author's translation. The sentence for this crime is the
same sentence provided for in the case of genocide. Id. at Article 376 (Genocide).
22. Guatemala has the dubious honor of being the site of the first documented mass disappearance
in the Americas. The case of the "28 disappeared" document in the Commission's Report occurred in 1966.
Recently released CIA documents affirm that the then Guatemalan government had the victims in custody
and killed them, vowing to deny they had ever been held by the State. To date, there has been no official
acknowledgement of this incident. See Illustrative Case No. 68 in Annex I, Vol. 1 of the Commission's
Report.
23. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. IL Ch. II, Sec. VIII, Legal Framework, W 1656, 1658,
1659.
24. 1 will only refer to the analysis of State violence, given that only the State was found to have
committed genocide and the State was found responsible for ninety-three percent of the violations registered
by the Commission directly. The guerrilla was found responsible for three percent of the violent incidents
registered.
25. The army, civil defense patrollers, military commissioners and police comprised the great
majority of responsible institutions whose acts were attributed to the State.
26. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I Ch. Vil Legal Framework, 1656.
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deliberate obstruction of justice by State agents are amply documented in the
report.27 Impunity is a phenomenon that the United Nations Human Rights
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), 8 pointed to in 1995 as the
single largest obstacle to progress in the respect for human rights in Guatemala,
and that fact continues to represent a major point of contention in evaluating
advances in the peace process. 2
9
The process of investigation included not only the gathering and analysis
of relevant testimony and documentation, but also involved an examination of
the country's broader political and social history. The result was an under-
standing of the dynamics and modus operandi of the violence. Through the
documentation of reiterated and similar practices over time and geographic
locations, much was learned about the levels of planning and coordination
involved in the perpetration of the human rights violations. Moreover, because
the Commission's goal was historical clarification, that is to say, truth-seeking
from the historical and human rights legal perspectives, the focus on institu-
tional rather than individual actions became the most appropriate vehicle for
substantiating concrete recommendations. By demonstrating how State
institutions had become distorted in the service of undemocratic, destructive
and violent ends in the past, the Commission's recommendations became
directly relevant to the peace process. Thus, the focus became the implementa-
tion of measures designed to guarantee that the past would not repeat itself and
that the promotion of fundamental human rights would be a priority for the
future. The implementation of measures designed to guarantee that the past
would not repeat itself as well as promoting the effective future enjoyment of
fundamental human rights was demonstrated."
The Commission's overall conclusion on State responsibility observed
that:
27. Id., See especially the discussion on "Forced Disappearances" in Vol. I1Ch. II, § X1, specifically
regarding the element of official denial of custody and on impunity in Vol. I1. Ch. XVI on "Denial of
Justice," 1 2634.
28. Verification reports at MINUGUA's website at <http://www.minugua.guate.net> (visited Feb.
18, 2000.)
29. The still unsolved murder of Monseflor Juan Gerardi, head of the church's human rights office,
two days after his presentation of the final report of the Historical Memory Project (Recuperacion de la
Memoria Hist6rica-REHMI) on the conflict, was an important theme in the presentation of the Historical
Clarification Commission Report ten months later. That case continues to highlight the difficulty of
overcoming the intolerance, violence and impunity generated by the conflict. Witnesses, prosecutors and
judges have left Guatemala, often with the aid of the international community, because of death threats related
to their participation in helping carry that investigation and prosecution forward.
30. The recommendations are organized under the following categories: (1) measures for
remembering the victims; (2) reparations; (3) measures for promoting a culture of mutual respect and
observance of human rights; and (4) measures designed to strengthen the democratic process.
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Most of the human rights violations made known to the Commission
and which were perpetrated by State agents or allied para-military
groups came about with the knowledge, or by order of the highest
military authorities .... The results of our investigations demonstrate
that, in general, the excuse that mid-level commanders acted with a
wide margin of autonomy.., is unsubstantiated and totally lacking
any basis whatsoever. 3'
These findings, while attributing direct responsibility to the State for the
overwhelming majority of the violence, pointed out the specific role of the
executive, judicial,32 and legislative branches in committing human rights
violations and, ultimately, in fashioning the counter-insurgency State. The
Report also noted the active participation of various sectors of civil society,
including political parties, economically powerful groups, churches, members
of the university community, etc., in the counter-insurgency effort. On the basis
of an overall historical analysis, the Commission concluded that the conflict had
been more than a war between two armies, with the State on one side and the
guerrilla on the other. Rather, it represented the consequences of employing the
State machinery to carry out a policy of intolerance, exclusion, and racism.
The Oslo Accord, by authorizing the application of a broad human rights
legal framework, gave Guatemala the opportunity to reorder its priorities and
objectives and, in turn, create new expectations about the role of the State and
its institutions in society. This combined focus on institutional action and
historical context, was also the point of departure for the Commission's
exploration of whether genocide had been committed.
31. Speech by Christian Tomuschat upon the occasion of the presentation of Guatemala: Memory
of Silence, Feb. 25, 1998, on file with author. Author's translation. Tomuschat continued:
On the basis of having concluded that genocide was committed, the Commission also
concludes that, without prejudice to the fact that the participants in the crime include
both the material and intellectual authors of the acts of genocide committed in
Guatemala, State responsibility also exists. This responsibility arises from the fact that
the majority of these acts were the product of a policy pre-established by superior
order and communicated to the principal actors. The State also failed to comply with
its obligation to investigate and punish the acts of genocide committed within its
territory.
Id. See also Guatemala: Memory of Silence Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification Conclu-
sions and Recommendations, English Version p. 38-41, or 105-126 (visited Feb. 18, 2000)
<http://www.hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/english/>.
32. The Report contains an entire section on the denial ofjustice, where it describes the complicity
in and direct perpetration of human rights violations by the judicial branch during the conflict. Guatemala:
Memory of Silence, Vol. I, Ch. II, Sec. XVI, Denial of Justice. Later on in Vol. IV on the consequences of
the conflict, there is a sub-heading discussing the phenomenon of impunity in Guatemala.
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III. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF GENOCIDE IN GUATEMALA
The Commission's final report containing its analysis, conclusions and
recommendations, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, was made public on
February 25, 1999. The Commissioners attributed the roots of the conflict to
the profound and historical divisions in Guatemalan society. Those divisions,
at the same time, ideological, social, economic and political fueled the early and
rapid formation of a counter-insurgency State under the auspices of a National
Security Doctrine whose stated priority was the defeat of the "internal enemy."
The Report, even while acknowledging that the United States played a role33 in
the initiation and development of the conflict through its hegemonic foreign
policy, interference in Guatemala's internal affairs and sometimes "direct...
support .. . [for] some of the State's illegal operations,"34 nevertheless
concluded that the diehard roots of the conflict were homegrown.35
One of the most deeply rooted divisions in Guatemalan society is
manifested in the extreme racism against the indigenous population, which
comprises a significant portion of the nation's citizenry.36 While that racism is
33. It has been suggested that a "truth commission" be formed to inquire into the United States role
in Guatemala leading up to and during the conflict in Guatemala. This moral inquiry could likewise take the
form of legal conclusions about the obligations of States in relation to the human rights of citizens of foreign
nations. Given the increasing sensitivity to international obligations to protect human rights and the
advancement of human rights law, such an inquiry would contribute a great deal to illustrating the way in
which countries might confirm their commitment to protect those rights. The excuse that the cold war
demanded drastic responses would put the United States on the same side of the debate as the Guatemalan
security forces responsible for the atrocities and who have voiced those same arguments.
34. Speech, Professor Tomuschat, on occasion of the presentation of Guatemala: Memory of
Silence, February 25, 1999, text on file with author. Author's translation.
35. The Oslo Accord mandated that the Commission consider both internal and external factors in
its clarification of the causes of the conflict. The Commission also alluded to the provision of military
training for the Guatemalan guerrilla by Cuba and noted that other than the United States declassified
documents, other countries, like Argentina and Nicaragua failed to respond with information requested by
the Commission. Israel responded that it had no information about official aid and that it could not control
the private activities of its citizens abroad. Guatemala:- Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, 129. There is literature
supporting allegations of direct training and involvement of intelligence specialists from Israel and Argentina
aiding the Guatemalan military, particularly in urban counter-insurgency operations and during the period
when the United States withdrew some of its military support in the late 70s. Clearly, however, the
overwhelming aid and support for the development of the counter-insurgency apparatus came from the United
States. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, Annex 7, a graph detailing the international context of
the conflict from 1962-96.
36. The data on the number of indigenous people in Guatemala is debated, as is the question of the
criteria for determining ethnic identity. The estimates range from forty to sixty percent of the population. The
present government has asserted that the indigenous population does not exceed forty perent while others
claim that this group comprises 60-80% of the population. This difference of opinion not only reflects the
unreliability of the censuses, but differing concepts of how to determine ethnic identity. The Commission
relied heavily on the victims' self-attribution of identity as well as on information contained in national
censuses. The national censuses relied on in the REPORT, contain data regarding numbers of Indigenous and
Ladino population in each of the municipalities.
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not often acknowledged publicly, there is a clear historic reality demonstrating
that the indigenous peoples have not been treated as full citizens. Whether your
measure is the level of investment of public monies in areas primarily populated
by Mayans, 31 the overwhelming poverty, low life expectancy, among other
measures of well-being, the absence of indigenous languages in the justice
system, public education or other services, or whether it is the not-so-distant
reality of compulsory forced labor for indigenous peasants, the message is clear.
The deep-seated racial hatred and mistrust represented by a long history of
repression and severe discrimination precipitated the grossly disproportionate
levels of violence directed by the State against the Mayan-indigenous peoples
within the overall context of this fratricidal conflict. The historic attribution of
particular characteristics to the "indigenous masses," an integral part of the
racist construct, determined the choice of military tactics against geographically
defined portions of this group when it was determined that 'they' constituted
a threat.
The ethnically Mayan-indigenous population suffered a full eighty-three
percent of all of the violations registered directly by the Commission.38
Without underestimating the brutality and intensity of the State-sponsored
violence against the Ladino39 or non-indigenous population,' the acts of
37. There are twenty-one separate ethnic identities that comprise the Mayan-indigenous population
of Guatemala. The remaining indigenous groups are the Xinca and Garffona. They have historically
inhabited primarily the Atlantic coast regions of the country.
38. "[The Mayan population has paid the highest cost for the irrational logic of the armed conflict,
particularly during the years of heaviest violence from 1978-83 when, in various regions of the country the
military identified groups of the Mayan peoples as natural allies of the guerrilla. This false conviction
increased the number and aggravated the nature of the human rights violations that were perpetrated against
the Mayans. This fact is evidenced by the aggressive, racist and extremely cruel nature of the violations that
resulted in the massive extermination of defenseless Mayan communities." Presentation Speech, Professor
Christian Tomuschat, Feb. 25, 1999, on file with author. Author's translation.
39. The "Ladino" population in Guatemala refers to the identity with group comprised by those
descended from the Spanish conquerors. The large mestizo, or mixed Mayan-Spanish population, comprises
the largest portion of the 'Ladino' group. This group identifies itself and is identified as separate from the
Mayan-indigenous ethnic group. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1, Ch. I, Sec. II, Historical Causes,
250. See also generally, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XVIII Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity and
Cultural Identity of the Indigenous Peoples.
40. There is no parallel among the documented abuses against the Ladino population. Members
associated with particular professions or types of organizations, such as unions, peasant leagues, opposition
political parties, law and humanities professors, schoolteachers, student organizations, the church and even
the judiciary were singled out for attack. Indeed, based on the Commission's information if genocide against
political groups was recognized, some of the political and union organizations would have had very credible
claims that genocide had been committed against them. But, in neither of these cases is there a wholesale
attack on entire towns, killing everyone and destroying homes and means of subsistence. Some may claim
this reflects the difference between urban and rural guerrilla warfare tactics. I am unconvinced. As I see it,
the ethnic identification among Ladinos meant that they could not entirely destroy the "other," because they
would be destroying a part of themselves. The divisions among Ladinos were based primarily on class,
although political association and other perceptions about "loyalty" also played a role.
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genocide, the report concludes, reflect a strategy and approach that maximized
the numbers of dead, tortured and disappeared, based on the ethnicity of the
victims."'There is a measure of justice in revealing the stark reality of a purpose
behind the deaths of tens of thousands and the suffering of hundreds of
thousands more human beings. In the end, the Commission's finding of State-
sponsored acts of genocide against groups of Mayan-indigenous peoples placed
squarely in the center of national debate one of the deepest fissures in
Guatemalan society, the struggle over the recognition of Guatemala's
multiethnic and multicultural national identity.' 2
IV. THE TRUTH ABOUT GENOCIDE
Truth has many attributes, including an individual and social
significance.43 While individual truth may vary according to perspective, social
truth demands the airing of multiple coexisting and often divergent, points of
view. The truth about genocide in Guatemala, while determined by a legal
definition, must take into account the experiences and perspectives of both the
aggressors and the victims.
The truth of genocidal intent centers around the process of the construction
of the "other," as the enemy. Statements by public officials, written references
contained in military documents and testimonies from members of the military'
indicated the choices of strategy and tactics at the command levels. Those
references betray the belief that the indigenous population possessed certain
inherent characteristics such as belligerency, unpredictability, gullibility, mis-
trust, and defiance of the State and its institutions. The group the Report refers
to as "Mayan-indigenous peoples," was identified in military documents as the
"indigenous highland peasants" or the "great masses of indigenous people."' 5
41. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I1, Ch. II, §. XXI, Genocide, 3584-91.
42. As part of the peace package, an Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples was
negotiated. All of the Accords can be found at the United Nations Verification Mission website, (visited Feb.
18, 2000) <http://www.minugua.guate.net>. The constitutional reforms which related to the implementation
of the Accords were defeated in a 1999 referendum.
43. The Report of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission [hereinafter TRC Report]
identified types of truth: factual or forensic truth, narrative or individual truth, social or restorative truth.
This last version of the truth, the TRC refers to as "the kind of truth that places facts and what they mean
within the context of human relationships - both amongst citizens and the State and its citizens." TRC
REPORT, Vol. I, Ch. 5 p. 113.
44. While secrecy was mandated around the identity of witnesses who spoke with the Commission,
the testimonies themselves are quoted throughout the text. Cites are to cases or key witnesses by number.
Occasionally, the cite refers to the quality of the witness, by referencing them as a former or actual member
of the armed forces and according to their rank, e.g., soldier, official or high-level official.
45. See the discussion of the State's general policy perspective in N 3226 to 3239, Guatemala:
Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II Sec. XXI, Genocide.
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The perceived propensity to sympathize with or to be part of the guerrilla,
based on monolithic preconceptions, is repeatedly affirmed by military
strategists. At the same time, references to the "great masses of indigenous
people" and their general situation of poverty and oppression serve to enhance
the stereotype of the Mayans' as natural enemies. Rather than deriving an
obligation to address the poverty or marginalization identified as the source of
disaffection, these elementsbecome yet anotherjustification for the perception
of the "other," as enemy. The conclusion of a military intelligence manual is
representative of this attitude when it asserts that, "[Tihe enemy has the same
sociological characteristics as the inhabitants of our highlands." '47 This clear
allusion to the Mayans, given that they constitute the overwhelming majority
of the inhabitants of the highland areas of Guatemala is characteristic of the
double-speak that attempts to rationalize and, at the same time, obscure an
entrenched sense of the "other."
The environment that permitted the creation of this construct is aptly
summed up by Guatemalan anthropologist, Marta Casaus Arzdi. Upon
completing an empirical study about attitudes towards race and class among
members of Guatemala's dominant classes, she reports that in addition to the
expressed preferences for miscegenation or continuing segregation as a means
of containing or resolving "the indigenous problem," some reported "preferring
ethnic cleansing.., between four and ten percent ... indicating their choice of
drastic and profoundly intolerant solutions for the indigenous population. This
sector expresses on various occasions being in favor of the extermination of the
indigenous population, of their disappearance both physically and culturally."48
Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the military tactic of destruction
was motivated by a fear that the support of this large community-based rural
population could result in a serious political and military challenge, including
the possibility of international recognition for the guerrilla forces were they
able to wrest control over a part of the national territory. In either event, the
Commission concluded that at the time and in the regions under consideration,
the enemy was conceived in ethnic terms, and that the violent acts constituting
genocide comprised, in turn, the implementation of the stated military objective
46. The Commission resolved the issue of identity by reference to subjective and objective
manifestations of this construct. The Constitutional recognition of the existence of Mayans, the allusions in
official documents reflecting perceptions of Mayans or indigenous as essentially a single group and the self-
identification of the Mayan-indigenous peoples based on a number of factors. (See Akayesu, shared language
and geography).
47. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. 1HI Ch. XXI, Genocide, 3229.
48. Id. at Vol. HII Genocide, 3235, citing Guatemala: Lineaje y Racismo, Marta Casaus Arzi,
1995, p. 274. Author's translation.
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to destroy the guerilla and its parallel organizations. However, this time the
destructive intent was directed at a particular ethnic group.49
In the Commission's view, the motive for these genocidal acts (e.g., to win
the war) was distinguishable from the intent with which they were carried out.
Thus, it was concluded that in each of the four regions studied, the totality of
the killings, torture, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, the
destruction of entire villages and Mayan religious and cultural symbols,
community and religious leaders among other atrocities "perpetrated by State
agents or allied para-military groups with the knowledge, or by order of the
highest military authorities,"50 were all carried out with the intent to destroy a
substantial part" of the Mayan-indigenous peoples present in those areas of
operations at the time of the attacks.52
49. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. XXI, Genocide, 13256.
50. Speech of Professor Christian Tomuschat on occasion of the presentation of the Commission's
Report, 25 Feb. 1999.
On the basis of having concluded that genocide was committed, the Commission also
concludes that, without prejudice to the fact that the participants in the crime include
both the material and intellectual authors of the acts of genocide committed in
Guatemala, State responsibility also exists. This responsibility arises from the fact that
the majority of these acts were the product of a policy pre-established by a superior
command and communicated to the principal actors. The State also failed to comply
with its obligation to investigate and punish the acts of genocide committed within its
territory. Author's translation.
51. The author stated in Guatemala: Memory of Silence Vol. III, Ch. I, Sec. XXI, Genocide,
3225.
The destructive capacity of the aggressor is determined... by the physical scope of
his actions, that is, the portion of the population capable of suffering the attack given
the area within which the destructive acts occurred. So, for example, the genocidal
acts committed by a single military unit that operated in a particular region can only
be analyzed in relation to the overall population of a particular ethnic group inhabiting
that particular region. Consequently, in determining whether a substantial portion of
the group was affected, the analysis measured the destruction proportionally according
to the numbers of people belonging to the ethnic group that fell within the physical
scope of the operation.
Author's translation, original in Spanish follows.
La capacidad destructiva de la accitn del autor esti determinada, a su vez, por su ftea
de dominio que es la parte de la poblaci6n sobre la cual podrfa ejercer las acciones de
exterminio. Por ejemplo, las acciones de genocidio que cometi6 una unidad militar
que operaba en una determinada regitn, dinicamente se pueden analizar con relaci6n
a la poblaci6n de determinado grupo dtnico que se encontraba en esa regi6n. En
consecuencia, para determinar si se afect6 a una pare substancial del grupo, el andlisis
se realiz6 tomando en cuenta la proporci6n de poblaci6n del grupo dtnico que se
encontraba bajo el Area de dominio del autor."
52. The study analyzes the totality of acts and circumstances from 1980-83 in these regions, but
concludes that acts of genocide occurred there during 1981 and 82, the period representing the crescendo of
destructive violence. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. U, Sec. XXI Genocide, 3586 and 1
3601.
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V. THE LEGAL ANALYSIS
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
its Rule 61 Decision in the case against Karadzic and Mladic13 provided the
Commission with an important framework for the discussion of intent. That
decision validated the idea that genocidal acts could occur even where the
overall objective of the aggressor was not necessarily genocide. An ICTY Trial
Chamber laid out three categories of analysis for interpreting the specific intent
requirement for genocide:
1. the general political doctrine of the aggressor;
2. the repetition of discriminatory and destructive acts; and
3. the perpetration of acts which violate or are perceived by the
aggressor as violating the foundations of the group, whether or
not they constitute the enumerated acts prohibited in genocide
definition, and so long as they are part of the same pattern of
conduct.-
This third category -permitted the consideration of acts traditionally
qualified as representative of the concept of "cultural genocide," and histori-
cally excluded from the genocide definition, which is limited to the construct
of physical or mental" destruction. The Commission considered acts of
cultural destruction as signposts of the subjective intent of the attackers, when
they were committed together with the acts of physical destruction specifically
proscribed in the Genocide Convention. Thus, incidents of bombing of sacred
Mayan lands used for ritual worship or the deliberate burning of 'huipiles,'
traditional dress reflecting both the geographic origin and ethnicity of the
wearer, or the prohibition on ritual burial of the dead were indicative of an
intent to destroy the group, as such.
53. ICTY Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & No. rT-95-18-R61, Karadzic and Mladic, Decision of Trial
Chamber I, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, July 11, 1996.
54. ICTY Case No. IT-95-5-R61 & No. IT-95-18-R61, Karadzic and Mladic, Decision of Trial
Chamber I, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 11 July 1996, 94.
55. Art. il(b) of the Genocide Convention reflects this view when it prohibits acts "causing serious
physical or mental harm to members of the group" when they are committed with the intent to destroy the
group, in whole or in part, as such. See also Kelly Dawn Askin, WAR CkiMEsAGAiNST WOMEN (1997). "The
process of 'systematic human destruction is not only limited to physical extermination but also extends to
other forms of dehumanization.' Genocide can be demonstrated by an intent to destroy, wholly or partially,
physically or emotionally, an ethnic group." Id. at 338, (emphasis added), (citation omitted). See also Adrien
Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchn, Rape, Ethnicity and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black
America, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L REV. 1 (1993).
On the other hand, the religious and cultural significance that the Mayans
attribute to the cultivation of the land, and particularly of maize, also weighed
in on a second part of the analysis. The all-encompassing destruction
represented by the 'scorched earth' tactics left fleeing survivors, who lived
under marginal economic conditions in any event, with virtually no means of
subsistence, including no access to food, water, or shelter. These devastated
communities compelled to flee into unsettled mountain areas to seek refuge
from attack, were especially prone to disease in their weakened state. This led
to the conclusion that the destruction of homes and crops and entire villages
that formed part of the military attack, in addition to demonstrating a genocidal
intent, constituted the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to
bring about the partial physical destruction of the group.56
The overall approach to the issue began through the evaluation of
information contained in the database that registered the violations reported to
the Commission directly. Measured by numbers of deaths, the years from
1981-83 were identified as constituting the most violent period of the conflict.
An analysis of military strategies and patterns of violence leading up to and
following that period, including levels of guerrilla activity, revealed three stages
of military action that occurred in each of the four regions where acts of
genocide were documented.
The first stage, beginning prior to 1980, demonstrated a pattern of
selective repression57 characterized by the military targeting of the local
community, religious, and political leaders for death. These types of actions
increased in frequency over time and continued appearing in the second stage
as well. The second-stage violence reflected as its dominant mode, "indiscrim-
56. Art. Ill(c) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
57. This region is comprised by three municipalities in the northern portion of the Quich6 province,
Chajul, Cotzal and Nebaj. What follows is a description of the pattern of selective massacres in the Ixil
region. The security forces surrounded the community and gathered the people in the town square or
church... :
1) The women and children are separated from the men, (separation);
2) One hooded person identifies the guerrilla collaborators, this person generally
being from the same community, (selection);
3) Before the execution, biblical references are used, "Judgment day has come."
"We are going to divide those who are going to heaven from those who are
hellbound;"
4) The execution is carried out publicly, (killing).
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II, Ch. XXI, Genocide, 1 3284. Author's translation.
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inate massacres""8 and "scorched earth" tactics, where survivors were
compelled to either face starvation in the mountains or turn themselves in to
suffer death, torture or mistreatment. During the third stage, military efforts
reflect a focus on measures to consolidate the control gained through the
campaign of terror that resulted in the destruction and displacement of large
portions of the population. Offers of amnesty were made, based on the idea that
the fleeing population was somehow guilty of offenses. Effectively, the offer
of amnesty constituted an exchange of relative safety for signing a loyalty oath
and submitting to military control. The entrenchment of total military control
over the rural areas was achieved through the consolidation of the system of
military commissioners, 9 Civilian Defense Patrols and the organization of
model villages under the auspices of national and local "reconstruction"
committees. During this final period, rapes, killings, disappearances, and
torture continued on a diminished scale against this captive population.
The selective repression characteristic of the first stage debilitated the
communities' and left them without resources to organize their own defense.
During this stage, apart from spreading terror, the military gathered information
for intelligence assessments aimed at destroying the capability for local
communities to organize among themselves. The army often used its
intelligence capabilities, including masked informers, to forcibly recruit,
torture, or other wise single-out religious and political leaders, health workers,
and teachers, etc. Often members of these same communities were compelled
to participate in or witness the humiliation, torture, and death of respected
members of their own communities. The act of targeting leaders was
58. In my view the use of the word "indiscriminate" is somewhat misleading given the argument
that indigenous peoples were specifically being targeted. The idea being conveyed is that there was no effort
to separate out people as targets based on some objective criteria. Rather, the fact of ethnic affiliation was
sufficient to determine that they were a target, even if, as in the case of infants and young children, they could
not be said rationally to pose any possible military threat.
59. The numbers of military commissioners increased greatly in the 1960s. Previously, apart from
military recruitment, the commissioners were used as middlemen to enforce the system of compulsory
seasonal labor imposed on the indigenous peasants and at other times as the middlemen in the business of
supplying seasonal agricultural laborers to the large-scale plantations, found primarily in Guatemala's
southern coast. The REPORT talks about the role of military commissioners and civil defense patrollers in the
conflict and as part of the military strategy. See Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. I, Ch. II, Sec. V and
VI, respectively.
60. Based on an interpretation of references contained in various Guatemalan Constitutions since
1945, the following is a definition of the designation "community:" "(a) the terms 'groups' or 'communities'
allude to entities that have a collective existence. It is not just a matter of individuals. It is the collectivity
that is the subject of rights and has the right to exist as such; (b) the concept of 'community' supposes the
existence of a collective identity and of an historical and socio-cultural identity that gives it cohesion. It does
not refer to a recently formed group. One is born and fives in the community." Guatemala: Memory of
Silence, Vol. II, Ch. lI, Section XVlI, Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity, and Cultural Identity
of the Indigenous Peoples, 1 2861.
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considered by the Commission to be directed at destroying the foundations of
the Mayan communities under attack. While the Commission refers to the
deliberate singling-out of leaders as an indication of intent to destroy the group,
it is the second-stage violence that exposes the determination to destroy the
group. During this stage the attacks became more generalized, targeting not
only leaders but also all members of the community, including men, women,
children, infants, and the elderly. As one declassified CIA document put it:
"The army's well-documented belief61 that the indigenous-Ixil population is
almost totally in favor of the EGP, has created a situation where you can expect
that the army will give no quarter to combatants and non-combatants alike. 62
Not only did the scope of the violence broaden, but also the mobilization
of forces reflected high-level coordination and planning in the attacks. For
example, the Ixil region and the northern strip of the Huehuetenango Depart-
ment (Maya-chuj and Maya-q'anjobal) where different military units were
mobilized even included the use of air support. In the municipality of Zacualpa,
Quich6 (Maya-k'ichd) the Commission identified a force of three platoons
aided by civil patrollers, with possible collaboration from a special military
strike force.63
In other regions where there was a less apparent showing of military
might, deliberate actions were taken to exploit local tensions between the
Ladino-controlled municipal township and the primarily indigenous villages,
over local resources. In the municipality of Rabinal (Maya-achi) in Alta
Verapaz, the Commission's information indicates the violence was primarily
perpetrated by a local military detachment together with Civil Defense Patrols. 6
61. The constituted violations that represent the predominant mode of destruction in the period
when genocide occurred were, by definition, attacks on defenseless civilian population. Defenseless is
defined by the Commission's Report as a situation of total or relative defenselessness, given that in some
communities they tried to defend themselves with machetes and stones against attacks by armed soldiers.
Thus, whether the Mayan-lxiles sympathized or not with the EGP faction of the guerrilla, is irrelevant for
determining whether the attacks were massacres. This is consistent with the perspective of human rights and
humanitarian law.
62. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. 11, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 3253, citing a partially
declassified CIA document released to the Commission by the United States Government.
63. The Gumarcaj Strike or Task Force took its name from the seat of the Quichd government
destroyed by the Spanish as part of its conquest of Guatemala. Gumarcaj is on the outskirts of the City of
Santa Cruz del Quichd and Mayan ritual ceremonies are still celebrated there.
64. The Civilian Self-Defense Patrols were formed as part of the military strategy to control the
local population and prevent the entrenchment of the guerrilla in the countryside. The patrollers were
obligated to patrol regularly and report their observations to the military commissioner or local military
commander. Often the patrols resulted in the capture of a person or persons to be handed over to the military
or other authorities or they were attacked directly by the patrollers for suspected guerrilla activity. The
patrollers were also victims of the violence when they were obliged to commit acts of violence against others,
or when they were themselves attacked or killed by the military. Patrolling was one form of demonstrating
fealty but accusations also made patrollers themselves targets. They were considered by the Commission as
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This modality was also used in areas where larger numbers of troops were
deployed. For example, the Ixil region and the northern strip of Huehuetenango
Department (Maya-chu and Maya-g'anjobal) different military units were
mobilized and included the use of air support. The methods used to promote
attacks by members of the Mayan-indigenous ethnic group against members of
their own ethnic group, were interpreted as a deliberate strategy directed at
destroying the group's very foundations.
In each of the four regions, the report explores the strategic location as a
transport corridor for the guerilla and an area where the guerilla had the
political sympathy of members of the local population because of organizing
work with peasant leagues that had been formed under the Arbenz Government
in the 1950s, in conjunction with land reform efforts. In Rabinal, it is not
unlikely, according to the Commission's account, that one of the factors that
determined the target group was the Achi communities' reluctance to give up
communal lands to a large dam project which was considered beneficial to
other local interests. On the other hand, Rabinal also represented a
geographically-strategic location as a transport corridor for the guerrilla and an
area where the guerrilla had the political sympathy of members of the local
population because of organizing work with peasant leagues formed under the
Arbenz Government in conjunction with land reform efforts under that
government. These additional layers of motive, all of which were related to the
conflict and its underlying causes, did nothing to dissipate the Commission's
conviction that the acts under consideration in each of the four regions during
the 1981-83 period, demonstrated the same pattern of genocidal intent and
action. The determination to enter the second stage of the violence was a
deliberate military decision in the Commission's view.
At the same time that the attacking group's general political doctrine
identified members of the group, "Mayan-indigenous peoples" as the target, the
similarities in the patterns of violence within and among the four regions and
the disparate impact of the violence on the Mayans as opposed to the Ladino
population inhabiting the same geographic areas, reflected a pattern of
repetitive and discriminatory65 acts of violence.
agents of the State responsible for acts of violence, however, the obligatory nature of the patrols also
constituted a violation of the patrollers' right to freely exercise their rights of association, as well as an illegal
delegation of State police powers. The specific section of the PACs, explores the operation of the patrols,
their formation, training, structure, functions, and their role in the overall counter-insurgency strategy.
65. The conclusion that the acts were discriminatory is supported in two ways. One, the statistical
conclusion showing a disparate proportional impact between numbers of Indigenous and Ladino victims from
among the population in each of the areas studied. Second, the narrative portion relates instances where the
Ladino population was specifically excluded from attack or warned to leave the area in advance of the attack.
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The patterns in the way the massacres" were conducted reflected planning
on the one hand and measures designed to maximize the number of victims, on
the other. They were carried out on market days when people from outlying
areas would gather in the towns, or the community would be called to gather in
the town center, only to be surrounded and attacked. Women and children were
often separated from the men in order to begin the macabre ritual of torture,
killing, and destruction. Sixty-four percent of the massacres occurring during
the thirty-four year conflict took place between June 1981 and December 1982.
Of particular relevance to the Commission was the observation that:
When faced with all the available alternatives to combat the insur-
gency, the State opted for the one that was most costly in human lives
from among the civilian non-combatant population. Ruling out other
options, such as political struggle to arrive at agreements with the
non-combatant civilian population it considered disaffected, their
relocation to areas outside the conflictive zones, or the arrest of
insurgents, the State opted for the annihilation of those it considered
to be its enemies. The State made this determination despite the fact
that it had access to the sources of information necessary to identify
the insurgent combatants, assess their military capacity, and enable
them to distinguish the insurgents from civilian non-combatants.67
66. The Commission defined massacre as an attack on the defenseless. In the cases where there was
resistance, if it was so disproportional to the attack that the resistance was futile, the incident was still
qualified as a massacre.
".... What characterizes the majority of the massacres, apart from the executions, is
an accumulation of grave violations of human rights, such as torture, cruel and
inhuman treatment, forced disappearances and rape, and also aberrant acts such as the
mutilation of cadavers, and the destruction of personal, communal, and religious
property.
The CEH [Historical Clarification Commission] has defined a massacre as the
arbitrary execution of more than five people, committed in a single place and as part
of a single operation, when the victims are in a state of absolute or relative.
defenselessness."
"... Lo que caracteriza a la mayorfa de las masacres, ademis de las ejecuciones, es
una acumulaci6n de graves violaciones de derechos humanos, como torturas, tratos
crueles, desapariciones forzadas y violaciones sexuales, y tambiin hechos aberrantes,
tales como la mutilaci6n de cadAveres, y la destrucci6n de bienes de personas,
comunitarios y destinados al culto.
"La CEH ha definido una masacre como la ejecuci6n arbitraria de mis de cinco
personas, realizada en un mismo lugar y como parte de un mismo operativo, cuando
las vfctimas se encontraban en un estado de indefensi6n absoluta o relativa."
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XX, Collective Violence against
the Collective Population, 1 3058-59.
67. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. Ill, Ch. U, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3600.
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The means of the violence, its extreme barbarity and deliberately public
nature, were other indicators of the intent to destroy the group by causing
serious physical or mental harm to members of the group. These extremes,
representing the nuance captured by the third category of acts, designed to
attack the very foundations of the group, included: the display of mutilated,
tortured, and sexually violated victims; obligating members of the group to
commit acts of violence against one another and in full view of the entire
community; the killing of girl-children, infants, women, and the elderly;
systematic, public and gang rapes of women; including girls and pregnant
women; and the gouging of fetuses from women's bodies. The sexual
mutilation and display of cadavers and similarly horrific acts were the kinds of
brutality that the Commission opined was designed to not only physically
destroy members of the group, but to destroy any basis for social cohesion
within the group. The dehumanization of the victims by their aggressors was
both another layer in the construction of the enemy "other," and a means of
attacking the group's very foundations.
The tactic of turning members of the group against one another was also
a way of inflicting serious mental harm on members of the group.6" It varied in
its modality. Different shades of "obligation" were represented, from direct
threats on life to inciting mistrust among neighbors or neighboring communi-
ties. In both cases the Commission determined they were borne of a conscious
decision to compromise the loyalties of the members of the group as one avenue
of its destruction. Those people who were obligated, upon threat of death or
serious physical harm to themselves or others, to either perpetrate atrocities
against members of their own communities or to witness them, had been caused
"serious mental harm" as proscribed under the Genocide Convention. They
were included, if not statistically, then in principle, as among the victims of the
genocidal attacks. 9
Similarly, the accounts of sexual violence took on particular importance
for the Commission beyond constituting a cause of death or serious physical
and mental harm. Eighty-nine percent of the rape victims registered by the
Commission were indigenous women and girl-children, the latter constituting
thirty-five percent of the victims. The sexual violence against women during
the height of the violence was most often a prelude to their murder. The rapes
were inflicted in a way that the entire community would share the shame and
terror. Like the obligation to participate in the torture and murder of neighbors
or community leaders, these occurrences, in addition to damaging the women
68. Art. 1ll(b) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.
69. The effect of destroying the social cohesion of the group characteristic of these acts [causing
physical and mental harm to members of the group] corresponds to an intent to annihilate the group
physically and spiritually. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 1 3592.
themselves altered the relationship between them and other members of their
communities. This form of violence, almost exclusively directed against
women and girl-children, was an act of violence not only against individual
women as women or girl-children as girl-children, but also an attack against
their ethnic group as a whole. In Mayan society, as in many others, women play
roles of significance both to the biological reproduction and social continuity
of the group. For the commission, the systematic, public, massive and graphic
perpetration of sexual violence against Mayan-indigenous women and girl-
children betrayed an intent to destroy both individual members of the group and
the social ties that bound it together.
While the Commission does not reach the explicit conclusion that these
practices constituted the "imposition of measures intended to prevent births
within the group," as prohibited by Art. 11(d) of the Genocide Convention, the
section on sexual violence against women does contain testimonies attesting to
the effects of these types of violence on the physical and psycho-social ability
of the women affected to form intimate relationships or exercise their
reproductive prerogative in the context of their communities. The only explicit
references to "measures that impeded births within the group" allude to the
reported cases where fetuses were ripped from their mother's wombs or of
sexual mutilation.70
The special section on Sexual Violence against Women 7 reveals much
about the effects of the violence on the indigenous communities as a whole.
The vast majority of testimonies about the rapes came from persons other than
the direct victims of these acts, demonstrating a reluctance of the surviving
victims to speak about how they were attacked.
In most cases the suffering of women rape victims is unknown by even
their closest family members, children, husband, or parents, and in the cases
where the whole community knows, it is silenced or denied, a fact which
demonstrates the extreme shame that rape survivors and their communities
feel. 72 This fact also demonstrates the extent to which the victimized women
are compelled to suffer from the effects of rape alone and in silence.
While it is recognized that rape was used on a massive and systematic
scale as part of the overall insurgency attack and despite the Commission's
acknowledgment that rape can constitute a crime against humanity under
international criminal law, it does not state a general determination with regard
to rape in the Guatemalan conflict. Instead, the findings on genocide assert that
the sexual violence causing serious physical or mental harm to members of the
70. There are accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence against men, but they constituted
less than one percent of the sexual violence reported.
71. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II1, Ch. II, Sec. XIII.
72. Id. 1 2382.
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group and committed in the context of the violence in the four regions studied,
were constituent acts of genocide and, at the same time, indicia of the intent to
destroy the group. The Commission clearly relies on the record of the
systematic use of brutal and often public sexual attacks against women and girl-
children as evidence of the intent to destroy the group, as such.73
The conclusion that genocidal acts had been committed in all four regions
was reached on the basis of the analysis I have just described. There are
additional facts and circumstances not specifically mentioned which are similar
to some of the ones discussed here. There are also attendant circumstances
which were not. specifically factored into the analysis. For instance, the
massive and forced military recruitment of indigenous youths. These troops,
wrested from the heart of their communities, may have participated in brutal
attacks against their own or other indigenous communities.
Nevertheless, the effects of violence are amply explored in both the section
on Violations of the Rights to Existence, Integrity, and Cultural Identity of the
Indigenous Peoples74 and in the fourth volume of the Report that documents the
consequences of violence for indigenous communities." Reference is made to
the consequences of the violence for traditional Mayan forms of authority and
organization, including religion, community values, and other expressions of
cultural identity. Implicitly, these consequences were foreseeable and go far
towards explaining what we mean when we say that there is an intent to destroy
an ethnic group. However, they do not form part of the specific genocide
analysis that concludes that the military, as an agent of the State, was directly
responsible for acts of genocide and that the State was also responsible for
genocidal acts in failing to investigate and punish those crimes under
international and Guatemalan law.
Additionally, a statistical study was performed to determine the percentage
of the indigenous population killed in each region. The results indicated that
sixteen percent of the Maya-Achi indigenous group in the Rabinal Municipality
73. This conclusion is not novel. In July 1996, a trial chamber in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave ample support for this view in its affirmation of the indictments
against Karadzic and Mladic for genocide, supra note 50. Scholars have echoed this view as well: When all
surrounding circumstances point to the conclusion that women (or men) were sexually assaulted with an
intent to destroy their particular protected group by physical destruction or mental anguish, a charge of
genocidal rape should be sustained. Kelly Dawn Askin, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN PROSECU TON IN
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 276 (1997). See also Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-
Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 243 (1994). Ukewise,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found defendant Akayesu guilty of genocide based on acts
of sexual violence. See Akayesu Judgment, September 2, 1998 at <http'//www.ictr.org> (visited Feb. 18,
2000.)
74. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. II1, Ch. 11, Sec. XVIII, 2889-2903.
75. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. IV, Ch. ll Sec. IV, Rupture of the Social Fabric, N
4325-4413.
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were killed. In Zacualpa, 8.6% of Maya-K'ichds were killed and in the Ixil
region, 14.5% of the Mayan-Ixiles, while in the northern strip of
Huehuetenango, 3.6% of the Maya-Chuj and Maya-Q'anjobal peoples residing
in that area were assassinated.76 These statistics do not take into account the
members of the group who survived, having suffered from serious physical or
mental harm as a result of the violence or who were compelled to live under
conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction.
While the statistics confirm high numbers of deaths, they do not resolve
issues that may arise around the definition of the targeted ethnic group. Nor do
they clarify what we mean when we refer to "the foundations of the group," that
is, the essential values underlying the concept of a human group that is
protected by the Genocide Convention. Nor do they rule out the logical defense
to these findings, that the acts were committed with the intent to subjugate and
control, but not to destroy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Commission's conclusion that the Guatemalan State, through the
direct acts of its military and para-military forces committed acts of genocide
against the Mayan-indigenous peoples, and that the State was also responsible
for those acts by virtue of its failure to investigate and punish them as required
under Articles IV" and VP8 of the Genocide Convention, has generated its own
polemic. On the date of the celebration of Army Day, June 30th, 1999,
President Arzti was reported in the Guatemalan press as making the following
statements:
The President denied that there was genocide during the armed
conflict, disagreeing for the first time with the Historical Clarification
Commission Report that affirms the opposite position. 'Genocide
represents the extermination of an ethnicity and that didn't happen in
Guatemala,' he said ... Arzti, gave his personal opinion that he,
'doesn't believe that there was genocide because that was not the
motive for the brutal conflict that we lived through and that tore apart
76. See respective conclusions for each region in Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Vol. III, Ch. II,
Sec. XXI Genocide, and Vol. XII, Annex III, Methodology Document Elaborated by The American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Graphs 3 and 4.
77. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 111 shall be punished
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals. Art. IV, Genocide
Convention.
78. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction. Art. VI, Genocide Convention.
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the social fabric of the country."79
In its recommendations, the Clarification Commission had called on the
State to vigorously apply the National Reconciliation Law by criminally
prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators of genocide, torture, and forced
disappearances."0 The Presidential denial, albeit a "personal" opinion, fails to
address the obvious alternative. Whether or not those acts documented by the
Commission constitute genocide or not, they are certainly war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Once that is conceded, it becomes important to ask
the question of whether the extreme barbarity of those acts and their scope
preclude any rational interpretation of these coordinated attacks as a means of
achieving control.
The inquiry into the subjective intent of the perpetrators must necessarily
rely on all the manifestations of intent, whether they are found in the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the acts themselves, statements that reveal the
intent with which they were committed, or the overall context in which they
occurred. It would be artificial to eliminate from the radar of genocide-
prevention those cases where more subtle forms of discrimination translate into
acts intended to destroy one of the protected groups, under the pretext of a cold
war, civil war, or any other pretense. The classic examples of genocide,
represented by the Holocaust and the killings in Rwanda in 1994, do not make
less apparent efforts to destroy a social, racial, ethnic, or national group in
whole or in part, any less pernicious.
The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission's conclusions are
instructive in this regard. In the analytical summary referring to the Ixil region,
the Commission stresses that the intent to partially destroy the Maya-Ixil ethnic
group emanates from a tactical military decision that was reached, based on
particular pre-conceptions:
In the Commission's judgment, the totality of violent acts perpetrated
by the State against the Maya-Ixil population from 1980-1983,"'
79. "... el presidente neg6 que haya habido genocidio durante el conflicto armado, discrepando
por primera vez con el informe de la Comisi6n para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico... que afirma lo contrario.
'El genocidio representa el exterminio de una etnia y eso no se dio en Guatemala', dijo. Arzd opin6 ayer, a
titdlo personal, que 'no creo' que haya habido genocidio porque 'ese no fue el motivo del brutal conflicto que
nos toc6 vivir y que desgarr6 el tejido social del pats,"' in Arzfi Aboga por Espinoza, Prensa Ubre,
Wednesday June 30, 1999. Author's translation.
80. The 1996 NATIONAL RECONCILIATION LAW, Decree 145-96, also makes reference to the
possibility of prosecuting crimes that are not capable of being prescribed according to domestic law or
international treaties ratified by Guatemala. Genocide is, in any event, a criminal offense under Guatemalan
law. See GUATEMALA'S CRIMINAL CODE DECREE 17-73 as reformed (1997) Art. 376.
81. The use of the 1980-83 time period refers to the totality of circumstances that led to the
conclusion that acts of genocide have been committed. However, the overall conclusion in this section refers
permits the conclusion that acts of genocide were committed. These
acts were inspired by a strategic determination of a genocidal
character. The objective of the counter-insurgency military campaign
was the partial destruction of the victim group, based on the
consideration that this would ensure the enemy's defeat.82
In the discussion about the definition of the crime of genocide, what
continues to be lacking is a dialogue about the characteristics of a human group
that give definition to its existence. In the case of Guatemala, there is no doubt
that the Mayan-indigenous peoples experienced the attacks against them as an
attempt to destroy them and their way of life. This sentiment is repeatedly
expressed in the testimonies gathered by the Commission and reproduced in the
text of the report. It is equally clear that criminal law focuses on the
aggressor's intent in carrying out these atrocities, especially when culpability
for a specific intent crime such as genocide is at issue. As questions begin to
be addressed, the overall query that remains is how the collective Guatemalan
community, Indigenous and Ladino together, will meet the challenge of forging
a peace based on mutual respect and the adherence to fundamental principles
of human rights.
Will a Commission be sensitive to the word "truth"? If its interest is
linked only to amnesty and compensation, then it will have chosen not
truth, but justice. If it sees truth as the widest possible compilation of
people's perceptions, stories, myths and experiences, it will have
chosen to restore memory and foster a new humanity, and perhaps
that is justice in its deepest sense.83
to acts of genocide having occurred between 1981 and 1982, in consideration of this period as representative
of the all-encompassing indiscriminate violence. The discussion of each region refers more specifically to
the massacres and surrounding acts it considers genocidal.
82. Guatemala: Memory of Silence Vol. I1, Ch. 11, Sec. XXI, Genocide, 13357.
83. Antjie Krog, COUNTRY OP MY SKULL 16 (1998), referring to the process of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.
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I. DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT
At first blush, development would appear to be the prime vehicle for
promoting realization of human rights such as the right to an adequate standard
of living; rights of education, food, and housing; the right to work; and the right
to social security. Similarly, it would seem that environmental preservation and
rehabilitation would figure high on the priorities for development. However,
development, as currently practiced in the countries of South Asia, has
overtaken poverty as the single-largest course of human rights violations and
of environmental degradation. Numerous examples abound. Take for example
Bhopal, the worlds worst industrial disaster, a typical example of the dumping
of hazardous technologies and substances in the name of industrial technology.
The much vaunted "green revolution" in agricultural development has left
in its wake departed soul, chemical, and energy intensiveness and dependency.
It has had multiple negative impacts on the availability of water, the pollution
of groundwater, drought, and desertification. Deforestation and unsustainable
use of forest resources has both caused and contributed to such drought and
deforestation. Reforestation programs that involve monocropping of eucalyp-
tus trees for timber production have further depleted already scarce water
President, International Center for Law in Development.
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resources, and it is hardly a surprise that local communities are ripping out
eucalyptus seedlings as fast as they are planted. Fisheries' resources are being
over-exploited by trawler fishing, and subsistence fisherfolk in South Asia are
facing the destruction of their livelihood. Environmentally unsustainable
projects of acquaculture are exacerbating the situation for both subsistence of
fisherfolk and subsistence of farmers. Large scale infrastructure projects (such
as the Narmada Dam - building project) have displaced thousands of people
and, left in their wake, hundreds of internally displaced persons.
Urbanization is taking place at a pace and manner that is creating
megaslums; increasing numbers of debt-bonded construction workers;
intolerable air pollution and traffic jams; and an insatiable thirst for energy
which can only be met through environmentally disastrous projects such as
Narmada and Enron, India. Air pollution, water pollution, and noise pollution
go unabated and checked in an insatiable race to develop and an unconscionable
pursuit of profits at any cost.
Indeed, the situation in many parts of South Asia is best described in a line
verse by Shel Silverstein:
Oh if you are bird, be the early bird,
And catch the worm for your breakfast plate,
If you are a worm,
Sleep late.
The development countries in South Asia have become a world of
development predators and developmental victims and indeed, as the Bhopal
tragedy shows, even the option of "sleeping late" may not prove a viable
survival strategy.
As we sit here this morning, amidst oak paneled walls and marble
fireplaces, I urge you to transport yourself back in time for a moment to a late
night fifteen years ago in December to the city of Bhopal. A young man by the
name of Kailash Panwar struggled back to consciousness to find that he was at
the bottom of a pile of human bodies being taken in a truck to a mass cremation.
An explosion in a storage tank in Union Carbide's pesticide producing plant
had released forty tons of methyl-isocyanaide and other lethal gases in the
atmosphere. As the poisonous cloud spread over the populous city, it left death
and devastation in its wake. The accident occurred in part because as a cost-
cutting measure, several of the safety precautions (including spending
approximately $50 per day to keep the deadly gas refrigerated as required by
the company's own operating manual) had been discontinued. The plant had
been running at a loss recently, because, after years of profit from the over
application of the pesticide, the pests had now grown immune! Not so,
unfortunately for the designs of Bhopal. Young Kailash Panwar spent the next
six years of his life in extreme pain and suffering, shuttled from one hospital
bed to another, with doctors unable to even alleviate, leave alone cure, the
deadly legacies of his exposure on that fatal night.
II. RESPONDING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED STRATEGIES
In India, South Asia, and indeed throughout the developing world, Bhopal
catalyzed and inspired the search for effective counter strategies and three basic
human rights strategies have emerged.
A. The Right to Development
In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Right to Development. The United States was the lone Member State
casting a negative vote, and a few European countries abstained. Since 1986,
the right to development has been reaffirmed by consensus, (with no dissent
whatsoever) at several United Nations global conferences as a "universal and
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights."
The right to development is both an inalienable and collective right, and,
like other solidarity rights, seeks to realize Article 28 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights which states, "[e]veryone is entitled to a social
and international order in which ... rights and proceedings... can be fully
realized."' The right to development has several important and unique factors:
1. It redefines development as a "comprehensive economic, social,
cultural, and political process which aims at the constant
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals."
2. It makes "realization of all human rights" the sole rationale of
development.
3. It reiterates the right of "active, free, and meaningful
participation," both individual and collective, in all decisions
relating to development.
4. It proscribes exclusion or discrimination from development.
5. It prescribes for distribution of the benefits from development.
6. It mandates that development must be human-centered.
7. It requires "measurable realization of human rights," an
essential criteria for evaluating development.2
I. Information Technology Section of the Department of Public Information, Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (visited Feb. 19, 2000). <http://www.un.org/rights/
50/decla.htm> [Hereinafter "Human Rights"].
2. Id.
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Thus, the right to development provides a normative basis both for
prohibitive unsustainable development and for promoting human development
which is environmentally sustainable.
B. Enforcing Human Rights as a Strategy for Protecting the Environment
The preamble of the Draft Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment (Draft Principles), annexed to the report of the United Nations
Special Rapporteur On Human Rights and Environment, clearly reiterates,
"human rights violations lead to environment degradation and environmental
degradation leads to human rights violations."3
The Report of the Special Rapporteur analyzes the effects of the
environment on the enjoyment of fundamental rights, notably the right to self
determination; the right to life; the right to health; the right to food and housing;
the right to safe and healthy working conditions; the right to information; and
the right to popular participation, freedom of association, and cultural rights.
Thus, the enforcement of human rights, both civil and political, as well as
economic, social and cultural, provides a strategy for protecting the
environment. In particular, as the Indian courts have shown, the right to life
can be interpreted in a manner that proscribed several environmentally sound
practices. Other rights of particular importance are the right of self
determination (to "freely pursue" development); the right to equal participation
of the law, and freedom from discrimination.
C. The Right to Environment and Environmental Human Rights
There are environmentalists who believe that while the strategy of
enforcing human rights to protect environment is a useful one, it is not enough.
They have been working therefore to get recognition and enforcement of the
right to environment and environmental rights.
1. The Right to Environment as a Human Right
Although the right to environment has not yet gained recognition under
international law, the constitutions of forty-nine countries do recognize the right
to environment. The substantial context of such a right varies from being the
right to clean, safe, or healthy living environment. The procedural context of
such a right includes one or more of the following components:
.3. Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, The 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights
and the Environment (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http'/www.tufts.edu/departments.fletcher/multi/www1994-
decl.html> [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
The right to know and act; the right to participate (and realize the
principle of subsidiary as articulated at Rio); and the right to judicial
and/or administrative remedies including preventive remedies. At
times, the right to participate is accompanied by the requirement of
conducting environmental impact assessments.
2. Environmental Human Rights
The Draft Principles set out in the Annex to the Right of the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Human rights and Environment set out a virtual
character of environmental human rights. Part I of the Draft Declaration details
key general concepts. Principle 1 reiterates the interdependence and
indivisibility of human rights, an ecology sound environment, and sustainable
development. Principle 2 reaffirms the right to freedom of discrimination in
regard to actions and decisions that affect the environment. Principle 4 sets out
the principle of intergenerational equity.
Part I of the Draft Declaration details the following substantive
environmental human rights:
I. The right to freedom from pollution, (Principle 5), as an
integral part of the rights to life, health, work, privacy, personal
security, and development. Principle 5 makes clear that the
right to freedom from pollution applies within, across, or
outside national boundaries.4
2. The right to the highest attainable standard of health, free from
environmental harm. (Principle 7).-
3. The right to safe and healthy food and water adequate to ones
well-being. (Principle 8).6
4. The right to adequate housing, land tenure, and living
conditions in a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound
environment. (Principle 10).'
5. Freedom from eviction and the right to participate effectively
in decisions regarding resettlement. (Principle 1 ).'
6. The right to timely assistance in the event of natural or other
catastrophes. (Principle 12).'
7. The right to benefit equitably from the conservation and
sustainable use of natural resources. (Principle 13). 1o
4. Id. at princ. 5.
5. Id. at princ. 7.
6. Id. at princ. 8.
7. Id. at princ. 10.
8. Draft Declaration, supra note 3, at princ. 16.
9. Id. at princ. 12.
10. Id. at princ. 13.
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8. The right of indigenous peoples to control their land and natural
resources. (Principle 14)."
Part Ed of the Draft Declaration sets out procedural aspects of environmental
human rights including:
1. The right to information. (Principle 15).12
2. The right to hold and express opinions and to disseminate ideas
and information regarding the environment. (Principle 16). "
3. The right to environment and human rights education.
(Principle 17). 14
4. The right to active, free, and meaningful participation and the
right to prior assessment of the environmental, developmental,
and human rights consequences of proposed actions. (Principle
18).15
5. The right to free and peaceful association for the purpose of
protecting the environment. (Principle 19).16
6. The right to effective administrative and judicial remedies and
redress. (Principle 20)."7
Part IV of the Draft Declaration sets out the following correlative duties:
1. Of all persons, individually and collectively to protect and
preserve the environment. (Principle 21)."8
2. The duties of States to protect the environment in all acts of
commission or omission, (Principle 21),"9 with several
correlated duties regarding environmental impact assessment;
control; licensing; regulation; and prohibition; public
participation; monitoring and management; and reduction of
wasteful processes of production and patterns of consumption.
The State duties include the duty to "take measures aimed at
ensuring that transnational corporations, wherever they operate,
11. Id. at princ. 14.
12. Id. at princ. 15.
13. Draft Declaration, supra note 3, at princ. 16.
14. Id. at princ. 17.
15. Id. at princ. 18.
16. ld. at princ.19.
17. Id. at princ. 20.
18. Draft Declaration, supra note 3, at princ. 25.
19. Id.
2000]
carry out their duties of environmental protection and respect
for human rights." (Principle 22).2o
3. Special duties regarding destruction of the environment in
connection with armed conflict. (Principle 23).21
4. The duty of "all international organizations and agencies" to
observe the Declaration. (Principle 24).22
Part V of the Draft Declaration sets out special considerations
1. To pay special attention to vulnerable persons and groups
(Principle 25), including women, children, indigenous peoples,
refugees, and the disable poor.23
2. The rights in the Declaration may be subject only to restrictions
provided by law which are necessary to protect public order,
health, and the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
(Principle 26).4
3. All persons are entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights in this declaration can be fully realized.
(Principle 27).2
The Draft Declaration has a potential to make significant contributions to
protecting human rights and environment by advancing a standard-setting
process; by raising awareness of the public, national governments, and
international organizations; by advancing the process of creation of
implementing monitoring and redress mechanisms; and by facilitating the
mobilization of public pressure for the protection and promotion of human
rights and the environment. After all, environmental human rights, like all
human rights, do not function solely through formal international procedures,
although such procedures and their national counterparts, are indeed important.
The principles in the Draft Declaration do address the key issues implicated in
the interrelationships between human rights and the environment. Widespread
dissemination, discussion and action on the Draft Declaration, will help
promote and protect human rights and the environment through recognition,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental human rights.
20. Id. at princ. 22.
21. Id. at princ. 23.
22. Id. at princ. 24.
23. Draft Declaration, supra note 3, at princ. 25.
24. id. at princ. 26.
25. Id. at princ. 27.
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Il. LIBERATING OURSELVES, FROM OURSELVES
Environmental activists and human rights activists, at times, tend to be at
odds with one and another. The "deep ecologists" are disdainful of the
anthropocentric nature of human rights activists as being excessively
confrontational and adversarial. Human rights activists are disdainful of
concentration strategies that tend to protect the environmentfrom people rather
than for people. A common middle ground would appear to be the right to
environment and environmental human rights. But until international law does
recognize such rights, it would be desirable to use the international human
rights treaties and conventions that do exist. After all, as yet, we do not have
an international convention on sustainable development. We only have the Rio
principles. We need enforceable international law to address the growing
environmental problems resulting from practices of economic globalization, the
so-called paradigm shift from development through aid to development through
trade and investment. Let me close by returning to the story of Kailash Panwar.
After six years of intolerable suffering, Kailash Panwar committed suicide by
setting fire to himself in his hospital bed.
Milan Kundera, the Czech author reminds us that "the struggle of man
over power is the struggle of memory over forgetting."
Let us pledge never to forget Kailash Panwar and to learn from the tragedy
of Bhopal and its countless counterparts all over South Asia, and indeed the
world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental importance of the issue of Human Rights and the
environment to any society is deeply appreciated today. Indeed one of the
main challenges before mankind today is the preservation of the environment
and ensuring the protection of human rights. It assumes critical importance in
South Asian countries where the issue is intricately linked to complex socio-
political and economic factors. The legal infrastructure for the protection of
these. rights is still in a developmental phase. There is an urgent need to foster
awareness in this area and to formulate and implement policies which are
consistent with globally achieved standards while addressing the local realities.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS
The issue of human survival brings a lot of attention to the debate as
human life and environment cannot be separated. Technology and human
activity have been the biggest donors in bringing about the change in the natural
environs and in making some areas unfit for human survival for both present
and future generations.
* The author is a lawyer in Pakistan and a S.J.D. candidate at the Notre Dame Law School.
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The so-called developmental projects, which should have brought
prosperity with them, have in fact brought violations of Human Rights and
environmental degradation. The glaring examples of India, Burma, Nigeria,
and Guyana have made it indisputable that serious environmental harms impact
human rights and that Human Rights violations lead to degradation of Human
Rights.' There is growing consensus that environmental problems are no
longer limited to pollution but envelope. As the Special Rapporteur has noted,
"a world wide hazard threatening the planet and the whole of man kind, as well
as future generations."2 There is also consensus that the conservation of the
environment serves the common good of mankind.
The area of Human Rights Environment and Development has received a
lot of attention by the United Nations and which also has helped in generating
a response towards this crucial issue around the planet. It is true that when the
United Nations embarked on the glorious journey of Human Rights which can
be traced back to 1945, time when the United Nations Charter was drafted, the
environment and its preservation was not an issue at all. Neither international
nor regional or even at the national level. This is also apparent by the fact that
both the United Nations Charter, as well as declaration have not precisely
addressed the connection between human rights and environment. It has been,
about thirty years or so that the scholars have started addressing the issue. It is,
however, true that the time and happenings around the world have stressed upon
all to address this issue of environment and its relation with life. It is only since
then that the Human Rights norms have been used in addressing the issues
pertaining to environment and moving towards a common platform where it
could be agreed that the Human Rights and environment are interrelated and
safeguarding; one leads to the protection of the other.
In 1968, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the connection
between worth of human environment and the enjoyment of basic Human
Rights. It is also important to mention here that since 1968, there has been a
remarkable increase in declarations and statements in determining the basic link
between Human Rights and the environment.
Environment, development, and Human Rights interrelationship has been
stipulated by several international legal human rights stipulating that there are
legal relationships between the three. The Stockholm Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development is perhaps among the pioneering documents that
provide the importance of environment and sustainable development. Human
Rights, environment and development are now more and more acknowledged
as different aspects of the same basic concern. The experiences from all over
1. Statement of the International Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights and Environment Sustainable
Development in the Context of Globalization, (June 23 - 27 1997), New York.
2. Fatima Zohra Ksentini, Second Progress Report, July 26, 1993, at 35, E/CN.4 Sub. 2/1993/n.
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the world have shown that development which does not take appropriate
measures in its quest and ignores Human Rights and environment incurs huge
losses. The international community also has recognized Human Rights as a
broad concept that encompasses a range of economic and social rights,
including the right to development and the right of all human beings to a
healthy and productive environment."
There is a consensus that the conservation of environment serves the
common good for mankind. A scholar has written "in reality, the apparent
conflict between humanity and intrinsic value of the environment does not exist
because it is impossible to separate the interest of mankind from the protection
of the environment." She has further added that, "humans are interlinked and
interdependent participants with duties to protect and conserve all elements of
nature, whether or not they have known benefits or current economic utility.
The anthropocentric purpose should be distinguished from utilitarianism."3
The environmental problems directly impact on human welfare, since the
degradation of environment diminishes the quality of life. Globalization has
affected all spheres of human life, as pointed out in the Statement of Interna-
tional Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights and Environment, "Inhumane wrongs
constituting grave human rights violations and environmental devastation are
justified in terms of expediency and necessity for development and the need for
business as usual. Life itself has devalued and even more so has the future of
our globe."4
It is important to discuss the land mark judgment given by a Pakistani
Supreme Court in Ms. Shela Zia and Others v. Wapda.s In this case, four
citizens protested to Wapda against the construction of a grid station in the
green belt of a residential locality in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. In this
judgment, which has been cited both nationally and internationally, the
Supreme Court held that the right to a clear environment is a fundamental right
of all the citizens of Pakistan covered by the "right to life" and the "right to
dignity" provided under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan of 1973. This landmark judgment prevented the
establishment of a high voltage grid station in a residential area of Islamabad
on the ground that it might adversely affect the health of the residents of the
area and as the Judgement directed:
[W]hile planning and deciding to construct the grid station WAPDA
and the Government Department acted in a routine manner without
3. Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment. 28 STAN. J. INT'LL. 103.
4. supra note 1, at 6.
5. PLD 1994 SC 693. (Also stated in the Case summary prepared by Hassan & Hassan Advocates,
Lahore, Pakistan).
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taking into consideration the latest research and planning in the field
nor any thought seems to have been given to hazards it may cause to
human health. In these circumstances, before passing any final order,
with the consent of both the parties we appoint NESPAK as Commis-
sioner to examine and study the scheme planning, device, and
technique employed by WAPDA and report whether there is any
likelihood of any hazard or adverse effect on health of the residents
of the locality. NESPAK may also suggest variation in the plan for
minimizing the alleged danger ... The supreme Court also directed
the WAPDA in its pertinent parts as WAPDA is further directed that
in future prior to installing or constructing any grid station and/or
transmission line, they would issue public notice in newspaper, radio
and television inviting objections and to finalize the plan after
considering the objections, this procedure shall be adopted and
continued by WAPDA till such time the Government constitutes any
commission or authority as suggested above.
It is, however, true that environmental problems often spark Human Rights
abuses as well, especially where outside forces are give priority over the local
communities. The so-called development projects do not bring any economic
benefit to the local communities. The amount of wealth involved in these
mega-projects have brought the environmental activists under a direct threat,
either by the government or by its tacit approval. A famous and a very well
known example relates to Chico Mendes, the leading organizer for rubber
tappers in Brazil, who was murdered by ranchers with close ties with the
government, and his crime was his efforts to gain protection for rubber tapper
reserves. In Nigeria, Ken Saro Wiwa and his other activist friends are raising
voice against the environmental concerns in their Ogoni lands. In India, Medha
Paktar and other environmental activists have been arrested time and again and
subjected to beatings. Their crime is to raise voice against the Narmada Dam
and efforts to protect their homes for being flooded.'
A. Yadana Gas Pipeline Project
A Yadana Gas Pipe Line Project and off shore drilling project is a joint
venture between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, the
Burmese military regime); several multinationals corporations; and its
petroleum company, the Maynamar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).
6. David Hunter, James Salzman and David Zaelke, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY, p. 1306, New York, (NY Foundation Press 1998).
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B. Unsustainable Development Practices
Use of intimidation and coercion and force in implementing the project.
Complete lack of transparency and participation in the implementation of the
project. Lack of accountability regarding the environmental impacts of the
project. Absence of environment impact assessment.
C. Human Rights and Environmental Impacts
The project has adverse environmental impacts on local communities and
ecosystems both onshore and offshore. Dumping and drilling wastes and toxic
muds have polluted water and endangered marine life. Deforestation has
affected climate, watersheds, and the livelihood of people dependent on dry rice
cultivation. There are water shortages and flooding in the rainy season which
affects food production. Gas emissions from offshore drilling is'very substan-
tial (equal that from 7,000 cars each driving fifty miles a day). There is the
disturbance of animal habitats, and problems with landslides and earthquakes
that make the pipeline hazardous.
Coercion, violence, forced labor, confiscation of property, and sexual
abuse of women has characterized the implementation of the project. Villagers
have lost both homes and jobs. There has been instances of torture and killings
associated with the project, and victims have no redress given the absence of
a functioning judiciary.7
D. The Dabhol Power Project More Commonly Known as the Enron
Power Project
As a part of the Indian government's efforts in liberalizing the economy,
the Enron Corporation was asked by the Maharashtra state government to build
what would be the worlds largest electricity generating plant costing around $3
billion. The operating'company would be Dabhol Power Corporation, a joint
venture of three United States companies: The Enron Corporation, General
Electric, and the Bechtel Corporation.8
7. Summary profile prepared by the author of Case submitted by Burmese Farmers of the
Tenasserim region before the International Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights And Environment, New York
(June 22 - 23, 1997).
8. Human Rights Watch, The Enron Corporation Corporate Complicity in Human Rights
Violations at 2 [hereinafter Enron] (1999).
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E. Fresh Water
The project's circulation of water, as per Enron's estimate, will be 8,338
liters of fresh water per minute. As a result of which, and at the expense of the
villagers, the water supplies were diverted to the project.
According to an interview mentioned in the Human Rights Watch report
on Enron by Professor Pawar he explained:
[W]here there is water, there is prosperity. Farmers desperately need
water. Had they [the government] provided water, the entire region
would have become prosperous. People are angry about this. For
thirty years, people have demanded water without any success. Now
people are not amused to see water shipped to Enron. 9
In 1996 through 1997, the company arranged for the water supply to the
inhabitants be brought in tankers, which by itself shows how intense the
problem would be as the scarcity in the fresh water supply was due to the
diversion of the fresh water. The DPC, in order to compensate for the water
shortage, dug wells in villages. Later, the water supply scheme was announced
in Dabhol Samvad. Despite the fact that there was an urgent need for the
supply of fresh drinking water to the villages around the project, in the summer
of 1996, there was no solid commitment by the company to bring back the
water to the original levels; but, the only commitment they had was the supply
of water through the tankers and the wells to the villages. It is unfortunate to
mention here that the company noted that the water level in the area will have
a direct bearing on the success of the program. According to a local leader who
was in opposition of the project said that "the villages had 300,000 liters of
water daily before the project. Enron's program only provides 40,000 liters of
water a day and have been unable to fulfil the request to provide 100,000 liters
of water a day. This shows that the condition of the villagers is even worse
than in 1994.
It is sad to state here that the situation of villagers in the village Valdur is
worse because of the project. The existing problem is combined by the sewage
contamination of potable water. The waste from the restrooms built by the
company, in 1995, for the site workers was discharged into the water supply of
the local villages. According to the villagers, the water supply is far below the
requirement of the village and is thus inadequate.
An interview which was recorded by the Human Rights Watch who was
studying the issue is mentioned here. He says:
9. Id.
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Villagers used to have drinking water twenty-four hours a day. Since
the Enron project started, they only have one hour of water every day.
In contrast, Enron has its own pipeline and wastes water regularly.
For two months in June and July [ 1997], there was no drinking water.
Villagers would have to go to the river, but now untreated sewage is
dumped into the river and the water is un-potable.' °
F. Contamination of Salt Water:
The other issue related to the water, and particularly to the fishing villages,
is the discharge of the hot water into the bodies of water. The water is first
used to cool the Dabhol power plant. According to the minutes of the meeting
between government officers and Enron dated March 12, Enron pointed out that
seawater cooling required. Water requirement for the plant will be around
2,500 gallons per minute (13.5 million liters per day).
It is important to mention here that once the water is circulated through the
plant, it will be discharged into the sea, which at that point is higher in
temperature. This water, which is expected to increase the water temperature,
may cause pollution and it might have toxic effluents which will kill fish and
prawns. This would result in absolute destruction of the source of earning of
the fisher people.
In an interview of Vithal Padyal conducted by Human Rights Watch, he
says that:
The [Dabhol Power] project has benefits and losses. As and when
they start discharging hot water into the sea, the whole community
will be at a loss. Even today, drinking water tastes different due to
contaminants and sewage. The only benefit of the project is that, at
the moment, it generates some income opportunity for our sons. But,
opposition to the project is justified. So far, all our earlier genera-
tions sustained themselves on the sea. When the fisheries are
destroyed by hot water discharge, what are next generations going to
do for their livelihood."l
G. Human Rights Violations:
The protests against the Dabhol Power project started in 1994, the time the
construction began at the site in Ratangiri. The protestors included politicians,
fisher people, local farmers, shopkeepers, and other inhabitants of the area. It
is, however, pertinent to mention here that the protestors were always peaceful
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According to the Human rights Watch Report, "About 1,500-2,000
protestors had marched from Guhagar village to the site of the Dabhol Power
Project." The protests largely consisted of shouting slogans and chants in front
of the company gates. The police response was out of all promotion: protesters
were beaten during a lathi charge, tear-gassed, and then arrested. Ms. Snehal
Vaidya, head of the village council at Anjanvel, described the protest to an
AIPRF fact-finding team led by retired Bombay High Court Justice S.M. Daud:
At 9:30 in the morning as we started out in a morcha (protest march),
shouting slogans against Enron, MNC's [multinational corporations],
and the Alliance Government, the police tried to surround us and
obstruct our progress. However, due to our massive numbers they
were unsuccessful and we reached the site of the main demonstra-
tions. Here, however there was a huge police force deployed and
even as were peacefully shouting slogans, they began pushing and
obstructing us... Suddenly, without warning, began a brutal lathi
charge. Many of the constables were armed with freshly cut
branches of trees, others with lathis, with which they indiscriminately
beat up all those who had gathered. 2
The protests against the project were inclusive of activists, members of
organizations, and villagers who have been subjected to short term detentions,
time and again, and abuse in the custody of the Police. No wonder those
arrested were arrested under the Laws of preventive detention. But the
detention in these cases continued for several days and in violation of the law
that requires the detainees to be produced before the magistrate within twenty-
four hours as per the Indian Law.
According to the interview of Medha Patkar recorded by Human Rights
Watch, who participated in this demonstration, she stated, "After an hour, the
police told us to go. We knew we were going to be arrested, so we held hands.
They pulled me by the hair. The police molested women, so they started yelling
at the police which made the police more angry."' 3
In these mass arrests, the demonstrators were subject to physical beating
by the canes, more commonly known as lathis or assaulted and in several cases
inflicting severe injuries. The Police have used the tear gas upon peaceful
demonstrators.
The State government of Maharashtra has not only misused the laws of
preventive detention, but have also been involved in the suppression of the
12. S.M Daud, A.Gajbhiye, V. Karkhelikar, and Stephen Rego, "In the service of a Multinational:
How the Indian State Deals with Popular Resistance to Enron," a fact-finding mission for the All Indian
Peoples' Ressistance Forum (AIPRF), April 1997, Bombay, p.13. Enron. supra note 8, at 60.
13. Id. at 63.
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rights of freedom of expression and peaceful demonstration coupled with
arbitrary arrests and beatings. The police have also failed to give attention to
the complaints filed by the demonstrators against the perpetrators of attack on
them and has hence failed to proceed against them. The human rights violated
are the right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, protection against
unjust arrest and detention, and police mistreatment.14
Another incident involved Patkar and some of her colleagues from the
National Alliance of Peoples Movements (NAPM), and took place in the town
of Mahad, near the Dabhol Power Project. Under the pretense of preventing
damage to property and loss of life, police served Paktar with prohibitory orders
under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on May 29, 1997, and
then surveilled, arrested, beat, and detained the activists on the eve of her
departing for Raigad and Ratangiri districts with plans to lead a series of
protests against the DPC project and other industrial projects. The incident
merits detailed treatment. Due to its being subsequently investigated by the
Indian governments National Human Rights Commission, it is usually well
documented and provides a close look at the process driving the issuance of
prohibitory and extermment orders.
The National Human Rights Commission determined, moreover, that the
order against Paktar under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was
"unjustified." The behavior of the government led the commission to com-
ment:
The case of Ms. Medha Patkar deserves anxious attention,. . . as
some basic human rights issues are involved. In a free and demo-
cratic set up, the Fundamental Rights of individuals cannot be
allowed to be infringed upon without impunity.... State machinery
should not be misused or ulterior aim and gains of the party in power,
out to strangulate the voices of dissent. 5
Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and India is a party to it.
Suppression of the right of peaceful assembly, as well as arbitrary and illegal
arrests, as well as detentions, are prohibited under Article 21of the ICCPR. It
is also important to note that Article 9, as well as Article 9 (2), (3), (4), and (5)
of the ICCPR were also violated as the demonstrators had the right to know
about the reason behind their arrests. They also had the right to be produced
before the judicial officer promptly. Victims of unlawful arrests have a right
to compensation.
14. Id.
15. National Human Rights Commission of India, Inquiry Report- Alleged Human Rights Violation
of Ms. Medha Patkar and Other activists, July, p. 17. Enron, supra note 8, at 67.
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Article 3 of the United Nations Code of Conduct of Law Enforcement
officials states that "Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly
necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty." The
plain reading of this provision from the code makes it clear that the police
beating of the demonstrators, protesting against the Dabhol, is in absolute
contravention of the code.
R- Indian Laws
The Constitution of India safeguards the rights of freedom of speech,
expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement in its Article 19.
The article addresses restrictions and the maintenance of public order, but
makes it clear that in applying these restrictions the concept of reasonableness
should be kept in mind.
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides the safeguards against
arbitrary arrests or detention. The arrested person must be told the reasons for
his arrest and should also be presented before the magistrate within twenty-four
hours of his or her arrest; if not, then the detention is illegal. In a case where
the police wants to detain a person for more than twenty-four hours, they need
permission for the same by the magistrate. 6
Globalization has brought about the realization to the effect that the
environmental problems are also global in nature. This idea is further
supported by the fact that globalization has brought about the changes on the
Earth; and the changes are not for good, but for the worse as it is evident from
the majority of cases that it has threatened the existence of human beings and
has violated their basic human rights.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by stating that:
1. Development which degrades the environment also produces
violations of human rights.
2. Development projects which condone the violation of human
rights in the process of their implementation also tend to
condone activities which degrade the environment.
3. Development projects which consciously aim at protection of
the environment also end up promoting the realization of
human rights.
4. Development projects which consciously seek to protect and
promote the human rights of the poor also end up promoting the
environment.
16. Enron, supra note 9, at 100-103.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTINOMIES AND
CONTRADICTIONS OF AN ERA OF HISTORICAL
TRANSITION: RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NATO
ARMED INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO
Edward McWhinney*
We live today in an era of historical transition. The 20th century really
ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This heralded the end of the
Bipolar system of World public order that had dominated the post-World War
II era in its various phases. From the early, Stalinist, Cold War years of nuclear
confrontation, through the pragmatic accommodations of Peaceful Coexistence,
and on, finally, to an active East-West cooperation under the rubric of Ddtente.
The post-Cold War (more accurately, post-post-War) system of World
public order is harder to identify in terms of its political Grundnorm or basic
premises, to which all the legal ground rules ("rules of the game") must be
logically related. Bipolarity has disappeared now into history. Is it now a
Unipolar model of World public order, dominated by the single remaining
superpower, the United States; or is it, rather, a plural, multipolar system,
whether centered in the United Nations or operated, de facto, by a new
oligarchy of which the United States, the European Union (or Germany, at
least), Japan, China, Russia, and probably India too, must, by virtue of a
combination of military and economic and geopolitical factors, become the
principal players?
The patterns are not clear, and are frequently quite contradictory, and this
is to be expected in aperiod of fundamental and rapid change in international
society. The accidents of personality in political leadership, created by the
changing of the guard and generational replacement in the political 6lites, have
their impact today.
For the first time, the dominant political and also military dlite in all of the
main post-industrial societies is without direct, personal experience of World
War H or active military service under combat conditions. A good deal of the
"One World" idealism that, in reaction to World War II, inspired the creation
of the United Nations and its sophisticated institutions and processes for
resolution of international conflict, has gone. A form of atrophy was already
there during the Cold War period, as emerging Coexistence and then Ddtente
* Edward McWhinney, Q.C., LL.M, SJ.D., LL.D., M.P.; Barrister and Solicitor; Professor(Em.)
of International Law. Prdsident de l'lnstitut de Droit International (1999-2001); Member of Parliament
(Canada) and sometime Parliamentary Secretary (Foreign Affairs).
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produced special, bilateral, inter-bloc, international law-making. This was
achieved through Summit Meetings of the two bloc leaders, Soviet and
Western, and manifested in a whole series of Soviet-Western pragmatic,
empirical, step-by-step, problem-solving exercises, in nuclear and general
disarmament, security of territorial frontiers, control of international terrorism,
and related subjects.
The first post-Cold War election of a new United Nations Secretary-
General in 1991 and the choice in that election of the brilliant International
lawyer and reform-minded activist, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, seemed to presage
a post-Cold War return to the United Nations in its original, 1945, spirit of the
main arena for international law-making. But that promise was lost in the
emerging conflicts between the United Nations Secretary-General and the
United States State Department in which, in part at least, the political joinder
of issues involved major intellectual differences over the new, United Nations-
based, multipolar paradigm of World public order which Boutros-Ghali was
considered to be projecting. United States President George Bush, though
stressing United States primacy in any decisions on maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, had felt able, nevertheless, to operate easily enough
under the United Nations aegis, and he was able to obtain the necessary prior
United Nations legal authority, in the form of the United Nations Security
Council umbrella Resolutions, to support and legitimate the allied military
operations in the Gulf War crisis in 1990-1. His successor, President Clinton,
in contrast, in stated fear of a possible Veto in the Security Council by either
Russia or the People's Republic of China (though the matter was never tested
concretely), and putting aside the alternative law-making route through the
United Nations General Assembly on the Uniting-for-Peace precedent
successfully sponsored by then United States President Harry Truman and
United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Korean War crisis in
1950, chose to by-pass the United Nations in the Kosovo situation.
President Clinton's decision on Kosovo was to operate, instead, through
the vestigial Cold War military alliance, North American Treaty Organization
(NATO). This left the combined North American-Western European military
action against the former Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) over Kosovo without
a positive law, International Law base. It is elementary that the NATO
organization could not hoist itself by its own bootstraps into legal powers that
it does not have under the United Nations Charter, or, a priori, outside the
Charter.
A legal dispensation from the United Nations Charter's absolute
prohibition on the use of force or from the Charter definition and limitation of
the collective self-defense exception under § 51 of the Charter, would have to
come from the United Nations Security Council or, failing, that, from the
United Nations General Assembly. A political and legal tidying-up of the
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Kosovo operation, such as it was, thus had to occur ex post facto: at the
political level, by bringing in the Russians and placating the Chinese (P.R.C.),
and leading on to the final, consensus settlement, at the legal level, by a United
Nations Security Council Resolution adopted on June 10, 1999, with the
support of Russia and with a Chinese abstention.
Would it not have been politically and legally wiser to have tried such a
multilateral approach, based on a multipolar consensus and within and through
the United Nations, from the very beginning? In the East Timor situation that
followed immediately afterwards, that was the approach that was adopted from
the outset: the Security Council was asked to approve armed intervention under
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, and by Resolution adopted by unanimous
vote of the Security Council, including all the Permanent Members, gave that
legal authorization on September 15, 1999.
The contradictions of an era of historical transition continue, in both
substantive-legal and also processual-legal terms. The project to establish an
International Criminal Court of universal jurisdiction was finally signed in
Rome in July 1998, but it was indicated that four at least of the five Permanent
Members of the United Nations Security Council would be unlikely to ratify it,
for fear of submitting their own nationals (civil and military) to any new
international criminal jurisdiction. Can the new International Criminal Court
have any real role without the effective working participation and cooperation
of the major powers? Meanwhile, the ad hoc United Nations War crimes
tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda continues, but with its mandate
apparently being interpreted so as not to extend to intervening states from
outside the region concerned. Will there be no legal opportunity, therefore, for
testing the relevance and applicability of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
Geneva Convention of 1949, to the contemporary law of aerial bombardment
with particular relevance to civilians and civilian property?
As a municipal, national tribunal, the judicial committee of the British
House of Lords, has voted to remove the legal claims to Sovereign Immunity
against possible extradition to Spain to face charges of Crimes against
Humanity that had been advanced before it by Chilean ex-Head-of-State
General Pinochet. The legal initiative before the British tribunal falls wholly
within municipal national law and is based on the incorporation into British law
of International Law norms (here international treaty norms). It is paralleled by
populist participatory democracy action - in default of larger, diplomatic
progress on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (including action by the five existing
members of the "Nuclear Club" to reduce their own nuclear weapons stock-
piles) and in the face of the somewhat restrictive, no-clear-majority holding by
the International Court of Justice in the recent Advisory Opinion on the legality
of Nuclear Weapons, to spark the recent middle-power initiative for-a Land
Mines Treaty, banning the production and sale of these particular, vicious
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weapons of modem armed conflicts. Within ten months of its signing by a
record 121 countries, the Land Mines Treaty has been ratified by the minimum
number of forty states necessary for it to enter into legal force. But this has
been done without the United States and other Permanent Members of the
United Nations Security Council who feared a diminishing of their operational
military power under the treaty, and who thus lobbied, in some cases strenu-
ously, against the measure.
The new confidence of non-Permanent Members of the Security Council
and particularly of those who, in the new international economics terms, may
realistically aspire to a recognition of their claims to superpower status and
those same new powers' disaffection with the failure of the World Community
to up-date and reform United Nations basic structures and processes so as to
take more account of contemporary realities in the World Community, may be
expected to produce increasing fractionalism within the United States led,
Western political-military alliance, and in turn, to encourage more local or
regional, direct democracy initiatives in new international law-making, of the
sort seen in the case of the General Pinochet extradition caper and the Land
Mines Treaty initiative.'
I. The present study draws on the author's monograph, "The United Nations and a New World
Orderfora New Millennium, Self-Determination, State Succession and Humanitarian Intervention" (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 2000).
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I. RECOLLECTING EMOTION
I am not sure about the poetic tastes of my distinguished colleagues on the
panel. But, I think we could all agree with William Wordsworth's definition
of "poetry" as "emotion recollected in tranquility."
"Emotion recollected in tranquility." From lovers of Wordsworth to lovers
of E. E. Cummings, I think all of us on the panel would agree that the World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, indeed, the WTO
system itself, was born amidst a great deal of emotion on January 1, 1995. And,
I think that all of us would agree that, perhaps to our surprise, the emotion
surrounding the DSU and its operation during the last five years has, if
anything, become more heated, dare I say passionate.
Defenders of the system point to the large volume of cases, including high-
profile disputes, that the system has handled with a reasonable degree of
success in terms of quality decisions and compliance. Detractors call the
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. A.B. (Economics), Duke,
1984; M.Sc. (Economics), London School of Economics, 1985; M.Sc. (Management), Oxford, 1986; J.D.,
Harvard, 1989. Marshall Scholar, 1984-86. Professor Bhala is the author of International Trade Law: Cases
and Materials (second edition forthcoming, 2000), and the co-author of World Trade Law (1998, 1999
Supplement). These remarks were presented in New York on November 6, 1999 at the Panel on WTO
Dispute Settlement at the International Law Weekend 99 at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York.
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system non-transparent, exclusive if not elitist, and insensitive to important
environmental, labor, human rights, and even national security concerns.
Our challenge is to reflect on the emotion surrounding the DSU and its
operation, and as lawyers, to evaluate the various defenses and detractions that
have been made. We are to try to look back, and look ahead, with a somewhat
paradoxical, but really quite unifying, mind set familiar to the greatest of poets:
a dispassionate one that nevertheless preserves heart-felt sentiments and
instincts.
My distinguished colleagues are far more able than I to lead us through in
a tranquil manner the particular ups and downs of the last five years with this
mind set. Wordsworth's poetry is famous for its landscapes put into words.
My particular challenge is to sketch the outlines of the landscape for the poetry
of my colleagues to come. To put it in less metaphorical terms, my task is to
discuss some of the grand theoretical themes that have emerged, or are
emerging, in and as a result of WTO adjudication.
II. THEME #1: THE MORIBUND STATE OF JOHN AUSTIN
We have all heard it said that "international law is not really 'law."' The
adage is based on the perception that international rules are unenforceable. It
is an adage based on the positivism of John Austin. To Austin, "law" is the
command of a sovereign that is habitually obeyed under a threat of punishment.
I think that on our landscape, international trade law, Austinian positivism
is in a moribund state. It may have been alive and well in the pre-Uruguay
Roundera. Cases like Oilseeds were the food for this corpus of jurisprudence.
Now, we have arguably the most sophisticated dispute resolution system in all
of the international law specialties.
We have a mechanism with real deadlines. We have a mechanism with set
procedures. Best of all, we have a mechanism that, to put it in its mildest form,
expresses a clear preference for compliance, and failing compliance, ineluctably
leads to compensation or retaliation.
The Bananas and Beef Hormones, and possibly Turtle-Shrimp cases
notwithstanding, losing WTO Members are implementing reports within the
typical 15-month time frame. There, then, is the command of the sovereign that
is habitually obeyed under threat of punishment. That "sovereign," or central
authority in a very loose sense, is the DSB. That threat of punishment is
retaliation.
To be sure, there is a legitimate debate about whether the DSU actually
compels compliance, whether it means to avoid giving the losing Member an
option to comply, pay damages, or accept retaliation. How you read the
relevant DSU provisions affects your stance here, and I think there are strong
points on both sides. Nevertheless, to say that "international law, at least
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international trade law is not really law" is now a statement borne more of
ignorance than truth.
III. THEME #2: THE COLD WAR BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Can we identify any schism in the global economy of the new millennium
that is any wider, and growing any faster, than that between the First and Third
Worlds? Fifty years of trade liberalization has done a lot for a handful of
countries, and very little for the bulk of them; or, at least, that is the perception.
The WTO is an elite club dominated by the United States, European
Union, Japan, and Canada, all of which are far more interested in gaining
market access in, or shutting imports out from, the likes of India, Costa Rica,
Brazil, and sub-Saharan Africa; or, at least, that is the perception.
WTO adjudication is a war that the hegemonic trading nations are best
able to fight, because they have the armies of international trade lawyers, the
forward deployments of fully staffed experts in Geneva, and the backing of
multinational corporate interests; or, at least, that is the perception.
WTO adjudication is extraordinarily expensive, and developing countries
can neither afford the weaponry needed, in the form of a counsel of choice, nor
is it firmly established that they have a right to private-sector attorneys; or, at
least, that is the perception.
Now, in this war, perception is reality. If the governments of four to five
billion people feel a certain way, then that feeling cannot be dismissed. Maybe
it can be assuaged by pointing out that small countries like Costa Rica win
cases against big countries like the United States. Then, what do you say to the
small countries of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific who feel they are being
sent to a guillotine operated by Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte? How do you
rationalize a demand for private party access to WTO panels and the Appellate
Body if that access would drive up the legal costs of developing countriesbecause they would be named as respondents in a wave of lawsuits? Indeed,
how do you rationalize even the current, sovereign-state-only access system
with the pathetically small budget of the-WTO dedicated to the legal defense
interests of Third World countries? (Overall, the WTO's budget is pathetically
small, roughly $122 million, with a staff of a little over 500. It is said that the
total WTO budget is roughly equal to the International Monetary Fund's annual
travel budget.) It will not do to say that the budget will increase, and a center
to help these countries will be established, if the new-found resources cannot
be used to bring cases against the First World.
What I am saying, at bottom, is that if the WTO adjudicatory mechanism
continues to be perceived as an un-level battle ground on which developed
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country interests tend to be advanced, then that mechanism will be increasingly
suspect, resented, and maybe even ignored.
IV. THEME #3: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY, OR THE RESURRECTION
OF IMMANUEL KANT
To put it differently, the legitimacy of that mechanism will be undermined
by the gaping schism between the "haves" and "have nots." Indeed, the
struggle for legitimacy, or what we might dub the resurrection of Immanuel
Kant, is the third theoretical theme on the landscape that I wish to sketch.
I believe that when the history of international trade law is written half a
century or a century from now, scholars will look back and draw parallels
between the new-born DSU mechanism and the American Supreme Court of
our Great Chief Justice's days. In a very different context, Justice Marshall
struggled mightily to establish the legitimacy of the Court, and so too are the
panels, Appellate Body, and DSB, or, at least, they ought to be.
What do we mean by legitimacy? At bottom, it means an acceptance, a
respect, that transcends the mere threat of punishment. An acceptance and
respect that is based on a sincere belief in the procedures, substantive
reasoning, competence, and most importantly, fairness, of the adjudicator. How
do the addressees of panel and Appellate Body reports, and other parties
affected by these reports, come to see the DSU system as legitimate?
Individuals and businesses have no direct access to that system. Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) have only the most indirect and tenuous
access. Yet, individuals, businesses, and NGO's can rightly point to the
growing body of international relations theory that tells us that a principle tenet
of realism, that sovereign states are not the main players in the global economy,
is wrong. After all, nations do not trade. People trade. Corporations trade.
It was Immanuel Kant who counseled us in his essay, Perpetual Peace,
that the center of the international law must be the normative status of the
individual, that it is wrong to conceive of international law as concerned only
with the rights and duties of states as the fundamental unit of that law without
also examining each state's domestic political system and its treatment of its
citizens. To Kant, the business of international law was inextricably linked to
the question of domestic justice. To Kant, international law, and we can extend
this to international trade law, is legitimate only if its founded on an alliance of
separate, free nations united by their moral commitment to individual freedom,
not merely by their allegiance to the international rule of law and the mutual
benefits of peaceful intercourse. Put bluntly (as many are in connection with
the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle), whether the General Agreement
Tariffs and Trade (GAT), WTO regime is "legitimate" or "just" depends very
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much on whether the WTO Members are committed to domestic justice in the
realms of human, labor, and environmental rights.
So, then what is this World Trade Organization? Is it, perhaps, really a
Sovereign State Trading Organization? What are we to make of this Sovereign
State animal that produces decisions that, however persuasive in terms of
GATT Article XX:(b) and (g), horrify environmentally-minded observers. How
are we to deal with the fears of labor and human rights activists, who see their
interests as the next ones to be sacrificed at the altar of Most Favored Nation
(MFN), national treatment, tariff bindings, non-discriminatory application of
quotas, or some other trade-liberalizing principle? However noble that
principle may be on the black boards of the neo-classical economists, in the
equations of the game theorists, or in the theories of the positivist philosophers,
obviously it has not been universally persuasive.
In other words, there is a loud, even violent, clash of philosophies and
cultures here. On the one side, there are traditionalists who focus on trade
liberalization and its merits. On the other side, there are those who see beyond
comparative advantage doctrine, who push the trade agenda to include new
concepts and concerns.
The pressure to push out the boundaries is exacerbated by the adjudicatory
process itself. It is seen by many activists, not unfairly, as non-transparent. An
irony indeed, given that the judges of Geneva certainly would embrace GATT
Article X, and have in a few decisions, for others! Can anyone sit in on a panel
or Appellate Body hearing? Can anyone obtain the briefs in a case? Can we
turn on Court TV and watch the proceedings? The answer to these sorts of
questions is "no." What about the routine use of outside experts to inform the
judges of Geneva about the issues at stake? Here we see a hesitant, ad hoc
approach. How, then, are we to agree the DSU process is "legitimate" if much
of that process excludes important voices, if much of that process is hidden
from our eyes, if that process does not always call upon the best and brightest
specialists to help resolve a dispute?
V. THEME #4: DE FACTO STARE DECISIS
It cannot be denied that the WTO adjudicatory process has produced
opinions impressive in number. It cannot be denied that virtually every one of
those opinions is replete with citation to previous opinions. It cannot be denied
that many of those citations are for more than purposes of guidance or
illustrating consistency, but that veer towards and even cross the line, between
citation for guidance and continuity, on the one hand, and authority, on the
other hand.
Shall we then continue to assert, with Article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice and Section 102 of the Restatement on Foreign
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Relations Law (Third), that judicial decisions are mere evidence of the law, not
the law itself? Shall we continue to believe that there is no body of interna-
tional common law on trade that is emerging? Shall we hold fast to the pretense
that stare decisis does not operate in a defacto sense?
My leading questions suggest my own view. Whether you agree with that
view or not, I think you can see the tremendous theoretical challenge posed by
the corpus of WTO decisions. Is that corpus illustrative of a re-defining of the
way in which Anglo-American and civil law cultures interact? Is it a sort of
hybrid between the two cultures? Or, is it an incarnation of a trend in civil,
including French, legal culture toward an increasing reliance on precedent,
notwithstanding the rhetoric of the civil code? Put in more culturally
insensitive terms, is the use of precedent in WTO decisions an illustration of
what we know from Coke, McDonalds, Madonna, Steven Spielberg, Nike, and
Levi's, namely, that "globalization" means "Americanization?"
I dare say that this issue is likely to become all the more poignant in the
coming years. Why? The vast majority of the leading international trade
lawyers of the new millennium who are from outside of the United States are,
or are seeking, LL.M. degrees in the United States. America is exporting
human capital that is being schooled in the ways of common law reasoning.
Like Alexandria a few millennia ago, like Oxbridge more recently, the
extraterritorial influence of the American academy is unparalleled, indeed,
essentially unchallenged. If it is indeed the case that a de facto stare decisis
doctrine is operating in WTO adjudication, ought we to consider admitting this
openly and, further, amending the DSU and WTO Agreement where necessary
to make this doctrine official, that is, a de jure one whereby reports really
possess the potency of precedent?
VI. THEME #5: THE MISSING MUSES, OR THE DREADFUL
QUALITY OF WRITING
It would be an evil overstatement for me to urge that every panel and
Appellate Body report bespeaks the extraordinarily poor writing skills of the
panelists and Appellate Body members. For the most part, I do not know
personally the panelists and Appellate Body members so I cannot say if their
innate writing skills veer more to a Wordsworth or a trashy romance novel in
the slush pile of a New York editor.
But, I do think it fair to say that whatever writing assets they do have,
these assets are not used as frequently as they ought to be. It does not seem to
me that the panels and Appellate Body realize the direct link between their
legitimacy in the eyes of the world, on the one hand, and the quality of their
written product, on the other hand.
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Why are the opinions of Justice Marshall, Justice Holmes, Lord Mansfield,
or Lord Diplock so revered? Is it only for their substantive content? Of course
not. It is because those opinions were so well composed. For the most part,
they were concise, avoiding redundancies. For the most part, they drew on the
richness of the English language, using words and phraseologies that excited
our imaginations. They used cleverly constructed analogies that inspired our
intellects, and, for the most part, they dealt squarely and sternly with the issue
at hand, not burying their prose in technicalities, not shrinking from the grand
underlying tensions.
I suggest that most panel and Appellate Body reports lack these virtues.
In connection with my work on the second edition of my International Trade
Law casebook, and on various law review articles, I am having the experience
of reading a large number of these reports. While I am odd enough to find it
pleasurable, most would not.
Why must you read, re-read, and read again passages to ascertain their
meaning? Why must you wade through paragraph after paragraph of the
arguments of the parties, and of third parties, only to find these arguments
summarized later in the discussion? Why must you mentally correct grammati-
cal errors, be they split infinitives or misplaced commas? Are you wrong to
demand of our supreme adjudicators of international trade law better writing?
I think not. I think it eminently fair to ask these panelists and Appellate Body
members to recall their education in not just Wordsworth, but also Homer,
Gibbon, and Churchill, and to unleash the spirit of the Greats in an effort to
make their contemporary work more appealing, and more worthy of acceptance.
VII. FILLING IN THE LANDSCAPE ...
I shall stop at this point, in the hope that some of these themes may
resonate in you and serve as a sketch of the landscape that my colleagues are
now going to discuss in greater practical detail. Let me thank you for your
gracious attention, and express my special appreciation to Steve De Luca for
this opportunity to recollect, and to forecast, emotion amidst tranquility.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
The concept of self-determination presents a useful example of how
change comes about in legal norms, particularly in the international arena.
Most scholars recognize self-determination as a concept that has already
undergone considerable transformation. This paper will try, again, to grasp the
evolving nettle of self-determination in light of the recent events in Kosovo and
East Timor. Nettles may sting if not handled properly, but they also have a
range of restorative properties. Struggles for self-determination tend to inflict
injury or loss, but the pain is usually considered worth bearing if it results in
larger measures of autonomy for the group initiating the struggle. The
progressions in the development of the concept of self-determination have often
been noted:' the steps proceed from Wilsonian pronouncement, to United
Nations Charter inclusion, through the overthrow of colonialism to the
development of individual and group human rights generally; they move
towards the increasing specificity of the right, first to participate in governance
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
I. See, e.g., Valerie Epps, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 433 (1997).
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and then to participate fully in the life of the nation; they continue through
examination of the characteristics of the groups that may claim non-full
participation, culminating in a declared right of "full autonomy" or even a right
of "secession" for groups not fully experiencing participation in the larger
society.
11. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S REFERENCE OPINION ON QUEBEC'S
RIGHT TO SECESSION
A recent opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada2 presented a rare
judicial opinion on the international law surrounding the issue of self-
determination and secession. In the summer of 1998, the Court issued a
reference opinion answering, among other things, the following question:
Does international law give the National Assembly, legislative or
government of Quebec the right to effect secession of Quebec from
Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determina-
tion under international law that would give the National Assembly,
legislative or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession
of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?3
Though the Court was willing to concede the right of a people to self-
determination as a general principle of international law, the Court stated that
the right must "be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing
sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial
integrity of those states."' In general then, the right of self-determination,
whatever it may mean and whoever may claim it, can usually only be exercised
within the framework of the existing state structure. The Court did, however,
go on to say that it is only in "exceptional circumstances [that] a right of
secession may arise."5 Before addressing those circumstances, the Court turned
its attention to defining the "peoples" who may claim the right to self-
determination.
The Court's discussion of the definition of "peoples" never really got off
the ground because the Court decided that it was "not necessary to explore this
legal characterization"6 because, regardless of the correct definition, the Court
was not willing to find that the Quebec population had a unilaterally right to
secession. The Court did not explore the question of whether the population of
2. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 Can. S.C.R. 217 (1998) (hereinafter Secession of Quebec].





Quebec was a "people" for the purposes of claiming self-determination because,
even if they were, the Court remained convinced that the circumstances
necessary to trigger the right of self-determination, in the sense of secession,
did not exist in Quebec. The Court did note however that "a people" may
include "only a portion of the population of an existing state,"7 thus recognizing
that the right of self-determination, including the right of secession in certain
circumstances, may attach to certain sectors of the population located within a
larger territorial unit of the state.
The Court noted that self-determination will normally be "fulfilled through
internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social,
and cultural development within the framework of an existing state"' and that
the "right to external self-determination (which [may take] the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances."9
The Court cited the 1989 concluding document of the Vienna Meeting of
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the follow-up to the
Helsinki Final Act which referred to "peoples having the right to determine
'their internal and external political status',"l° but noted that the statement of
this right is "immediately followed by express recognition that" the state will
always act in conformity with the United Nations Charter including those
principles relating to territorial integrity of states. The states participating in
the Vienna Meeting specifically stated in Principle 5 of the concluding
document that any action aimed "at violating the territorial integrity, political
independence or unity of a state"'2 will not be recognized as legal by the
participating states. Leading scholars have interpreted this to mean that "no
territorial or other change can be brought about by the central authorities of a
State that is contrary to the will of the whole people of that State."'3 The Court
concluded that a:
[S]tate whose government represents the whole of the people or
peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and
without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determina-
7. Secession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 124. The Court also stated that it was not "necessary to
examine the position of the aboriginal population within Quebec." Id. 125.
8. Id. 'i 126. (Emphasis added).
9. Id. (Emphasis added).
10. Id. 1 129. (Emphasis applied).
11. Succession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 129.
12. Id.
13. A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A LegalReappraisal, at 287 (Cambridge University
Press) (1995).
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tion in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection
under international law of its territorial integrity.
14
What then are the "extreme cases" in "defined circumstances"' 5 that may
justify piercing the territorial integrity of the state framework? The Court lists
three examples of a people's right to secession. It is ready to agree that the
"right of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination by
breaking away from the 'imperial' power is now undisputed."' 6 Similarly,
where a people "is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation
outside a colonial context,"' 7 there is a right to external self-determination.
Lastly the Court gives credence to the proposition that "when a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession,"' 8 although
that proposition may not yet be "an established international law standard."' 9
The problem for Quebec was that, in the Court's view, the province does
not fit within any of the above three "extreme cases." The Court documents the
dominant position of Quebecers in national politics, in the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government and concludes that since Quebecers are
in no way in "a disadvantaged position,"'2 the "exceptional circumstances
[giving rise to a right to secession] are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec."'"
The Court is therefore quite clear in its view that Quebec, at the present time,
has no right under international law to unilateral secession.
The last part of the Court's opinion addresses what it calls the Recognition
of a Factual/Political Reality: The 'Effectivity' Principle.22 Here the Court
demonstrates its appreciation that the world does not necessarily arrange, or
rearrange, itself according to legal rights. The Court recognizes that "interna-
tional law may well, depending on the circumstances, adapt to recognize a
political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps leading to
its creation."'2 The Court is fully aware that if a clear majority of Quebecers
voted, on a clear question, for secession, the federal government of Canada
would have to negotiate with the leaders of Quebec and that there might
eventually be recognition of an independent Quebec both by Canada and by
14. Id. 1130.









other countries. The Court, nevertheless, took the view that at present, an act
of unilateral secession would be illegal, even though the illegal act of secession
might eventually lead to a recognized state within the international framework.
The possibility of subsequent legitimacy of the newly created state would not,
in the Court's view, provide a retroactive basis for declaring that a present act
of secession would be legal.24
M. NEW PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE QUEBEC CASE
A. The Right to Secession
Commentators have been asking whether the Quebec decision breaks new
ground for the law of self-determination. I think it does in two ways. First, the
Court by recognizing the right to secession when "a people is blocked from the
meaningful exercise of self-determination internally"25 clearly links self-
determination to secession. This right of secession arises when there is no
meaningful exercise of internal self-determination. The Court, in discussing
"internal self-determination," defines it as "a people's pursuit of its political,
economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state."26 This language comes from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the
Vienna Declaration, and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations.2 The Court does not, however, expand
upon the meaning of political, economic, social, or cultural development. The
Vienna Declaration requires that a government represent "the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind."28 This, together with
the whole backdrop of the United Nations Charter and human rights law
generally, requires equality of representation certainly in the political process
and presumably also in the economic, social, and cultural arenas too. This
much is clear from the Court's opinion. The exact nature of what can be
claimed by "peoples" beyond the democratic right to equal political representa-
tion in the context of self-determination is less clear. We are given no clue to
the content of the pursuit of economic, social or cultural development, or the
minimum necessary level of the facilitation of their exercise.
24. Id. 155.
25. Succession of Quebec, supra note 2, 1 134.
26. Id. 126.
27. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; G.A. Res. 2625, 24 Oct. 1970; Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF. 157/24, 25 June 1993; Declaration on the Occasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations; G.A. Res. 50/6, 9 Nov. 1995.
28. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF. 157/24. 25 June 1993.
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B. The Effectivity Principle
The second way in which the Quebec opinion breaks new ground is its
wise discussion of the "effectivity" principle in law. The Court does not shy
away from recognizing the "after-thought" aspect of legal legitimacy. The law
changes in both neat and not-so-tidy ways. A new norm of international law
can burst on the scene by a new multilateral treaty signed and rapidly ratified
by virtually all states. Such change is neat and clean and satisfies all the legal
niceties. But in the area of "rights," change seldom comes about through such
means except at the end of a process where it may well be possible to declare
the right's existence even before a treaty's confirmation.
Much eighteenth and nineteenth century legal/philosophical debate
centered on trying to define rights. When anyone announced a new right, the
legal philosophers would boldly denounce the claim because it did not fit the
rigid rules laid down by whichever philosophical school was in vogue. The
modern rights philosophers are much happier to recognize that rights are often
statements of a preference for how the world. should be ordered. Such
preferences are not to be dismissed as mere whimsy because it is now firmly
understood that if the particular "right" catches hold of the public's imagination
and enough people, over a long enough time, declare the right to exist, it may
eventually come to exist through the convergence of a variety of norm-creating
mechanisms. The non-governmental organizations, often predominantly
populated with non-lawyers, appreciate this fully - so do political crusaders.29
The development of the concept of self-determination as incorporating a
right of secession under certain circumstances follows the same legal route
from the "ought" to the "is." Kosovo and East Timor are two examples of a
people's "ought" helping to transform a principle into an "is." The Quebec
court understood this "legality follows reality" maxim in the context of self-
determination and its exposition on the "effectivity principle" broke new
ground, not because no one had ever recognized the effectivity principle before,
but because the principle was linked to the specific right of secession in the
context of self-determination.
IV. THE EXAMPLE OF KOSOVO SUPPORTS THE RIGHT TO SECESSION
Alistaire Cooke wrote an enlightening column in March of 1999 where he
described in detail the negotiations of the Versailles Treaty at the end of World
29. Take the statement "Americans have a right to health insurance" as lawyers, we know that is
not true. Indeed, we know that forty-five million Americans have no such insurance. But we also know that
it is really a statement that all Americans ought to have health insurance and, sooner or later, the crusaders
believe they will convince the people and the Congress that they should press for and pass legislation to that
effect, so that the right will exist.
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War I and the redrawing of the map of Europe based in part on Woodrow
Wilson's concept of "self-determination." Cooke calls Wilson's fourteen point
plan "a sublime example what can be called begging the question - which
means taking for granted as having happened what you dearly want to
happen."3 Cooke was convinced that the present break up of Yugoslavia can
be traced to its creation in 1919, together with the creation of the concept of
self-determination.3' The Kosovars were a minority guaranteed protection in
1919 in return for Serbia's being granted sovereignty. It is unclear whether the
Kosovars of 1919 are the same "people" who inhabit Kosovo today. Certainly,
there have been large ethnic shifts in the region since that time. Cooke's
observations are, as ever, astute, but he offers us no alternative to a Wilsonian
utopia.
How should we view the experience of Kosovo in the context of self-
determination? Kosovo certainly was not a colony of Yugoslavia under any
common understanding of the term. The Albanians, who make up over ninety
per cent of the population of Kosovo, certainly have a claim to be a "people"
on the basis of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. They were, and are,
a group distinct from the ruling dominant Serbian group. They inhabit a
distinct area of territory.32 Their lack of representation in the national
government and their brutal oppression by Milosovic's regime is well
documented. 3 In terms of the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion Kosovo fits
the "extreme circumstances" exception to the general rule against secession.
But, of course, the Kosovo example broke new ground because this was
the first time that a powerful, regional, military force (NATO) threw its weight
in on the side of the oppressed and overrode the rule of no break up of
territorial integrity. The NATO forces violated article 2(4) of the Charter and
no theory of self-defense under article 51 can be credibly advanced to authorize
the invasion. Nor, in my view, can any credible theory of Security Council
permission be supported. The fact that the Security Council rejected a vote to
condemn the NATO invasion3' does not constitute authorization, though it
30. Alistaire Cooke, Letter From America, The Pursuit of Self-Determination, BBC News (visited
Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.bbc.co.uk.com>.
31. See generally Nathaniel Berman, ThE iNTFRNATIONAL LAW OFNATIONALISM: GROUP IDENTrY
AND LEGAL HisTORy, 25 (David Whippman ed. International Law and Ethnic Conflict 1998).
32. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
33. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 843
(1999).
34. Twelve out of fifteen members of the Security Council voted to reject the Russian resolution
of March 26, 1999, condemning the NATO action. The argument has been made that Security Council
Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), "effectively ratified the NATO action and gave it the Council's support."
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L at 826 (1999).
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certainly represents the extreme ambivalence of the Council's attitude towards
NATO's action.
In evaluating NATO' s invasion of Yugoslavia, the international law rule
on no use of force absent an armed attack or Security Council authorization and
no intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states came slap up against
the great body of human rights law which sets standards for a government's
treatment of its own people and declares violations of those standards to be
violations of international law, though it does not provide any external
enforcement mechanisms to ensure those rights, absent a state's consent. This
immutable convergence was bound to happen sooner or later and the interna-
tional community is now busy fashioning the rules of justifiable forceful
"humanitarian intervention."3 5 Despite the fact that the Rambouillet Accords
only speak of "autonomy" for Kosovo, no one doubts that Kosovo will become
independent (or possibly merge with Albania) and will not be ruled by Serbia.
What would have happened without NATO? I suspect rather the same
scenario as we are witnessing in Chechnya. The Chechens had some sporadic
success but will, at least for the time being, be crushed. When there is no
credible outside threat from national, regional, or international forces, minority
group claims to secession are seldom successful.
Kosovo is an example of those extreme circumstances giving rise to the
right to unilateral secession enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The
fact that secession will no doubt eventually take place will provide one more
case of state practice moving the secession principle towards crystalization of
the norm.
V. THE EXAMPLE OF EAST TIMOR SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF SECESSION
With the fall of President Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, the stage was set
for the possibility of reversing the 1975 invasion of East Timor by Indonesia.
As a result of an extraordinary amount of international attention and pressure,
and through the facilities of the United Nations Secretary-General's Office,
Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement in New York on May 5, 1999,36
agreeing to allow the Secretary-General to arrange for "popular consultation"
' 7
of the East Timorese people by means of a "direct, secret and universal ballot"38
on whether they wished to become part of a special autonomous unit within the
framework of the Republic of Indonesia. In the event that the East Timorese
35. See generally Scan Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving
World Order, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 115 (1996).
36. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor, May 5, 1999, New York [hereinafter Agreement].
37. Id. at art. 2.
38. Id. at art. 1.
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rejected the special autonomous unit, the Indonesian government was to
"terminate its links with East Timor,"39 and there was to be a "peaceful and
orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations... to begin
a process of transition towards independence."'
Amazingly, this process has occurred, although with a heavy toll of loss
of life. Perhaps the paramount error of the agreement was to provide that the
"Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and
security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried
out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence
or interference from any side.""' Everyone now knows that the ballot was not
free from violence and intimidation, but no one doubts that Indonesia would not
have signed the May, 1999 agreement without such a provision, and the people
of East Timor refused, often at great personal cost, to be intimidated.
The events in East Timor do not result in much credit for the international
community. One-quarter of the population of East Timor is dead and, by all
accounts, the country is devastated. Nothing short of massive reconstruction
aid will be necessary to help rebuild East Timor. East Timor then is yet another
example of the lack of adequate international machinery and political will to
prevent patent illegality. There was ample warning of pending disaster4 2 and
the international law was, for once, relatively clear.
East Timor was recognized by the United Nations as a non-self governing
territory and therefore had the right to self-determination in the sense of
secession43 from the colonial power of Portugal. The political reality was,
however, that East Timor had been effectively ruled by Indonesia for a quarter
of a century. The independence of East Timor will be a great victory for the
East Timorese people. It will not set a huge unchartered precedent in
international law if viewed as a case of independence from a colonial power.
Perhaps, however, it is too easy to say that East Timor was a colony and
therefore had the right to self-determination in the sense of independence.
After all, Indonesia had been the defacto government of East Timor for twenty-
four years. If viewed as wresting independence from Indonesia, then the East
Timor example does set a more radical precedent. East Timor would then be
a successful example of a people claiming the right to rule themselves because
they were not fully represented in the Indonesian government, and indeed
suffered gross violations of human rights. The fact that the United Nations was
39. Id. at art. 6.
40. Id.
41. Agreement, supra note 36, at art. 3.
42. See, e.g., Geoffrey Gunn, East Timor and the U.N.: The Case for Intervention (1997).
43. Catriona Drew, The East Timor Popular Consultation: Self-Determination Denied, 4 HUM.
RTS. L. Rev. 3 (1999). Tlis article is published in the University of Wottingham, U.K. Human Rights Law
Review.
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available to broker and, more or less, supervise both the final deal and the vote
and will also provide the. transitional regime, permitted the current outcome.
The cup is both half empty and half full. Viewed as a colony finally
moving to independence, the international community must answer first, for not
resisting and then, for supporting the government who invaded East Timor.
Viewed as a people's successful bid for independence from a non-representa-
tive and repressive government, East Timor moves the norm of self-determina-
tion towards secession, at least when the government does not treat its citizens
equally and practices widespread violations of human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A MECHANISM TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT
TO SECESSION AND TO IMPLEMENT IT
What the world needs is an international mechanism authorized to
determine whether a people has manifested the "extreme circumstances"
outlined in the Supreme Court of Canada's opinion, and if so, we need a body
authorized to implement that decision. As long as those mechanisms are not
there, it will only be in a haphazard conglomeration of circumstances that the
results will follow East Timor or Kosovo and even then with colossal loss of
life. There may be a few national courts, such as the Canadian Supreme Court,
with the necessary impartiality to render such a decision and a few governments
willing to implement decisions in favor of secession, but these will be few and
far between. Kosovo and East Timor must spur us on to create the mechanisms
for peoples to be able to secede. At the moment, we tend to run around picking
up the broken pieces in the hope of salvaging something.
What might these mechanisms look like? First we need an impartial body
that can be appealed to in order to determine the right to secede by peoples
claiming "extreme circumstances." Obviously, the definition of "extreme
circumstances" will have to become much more concrete than it is at present.
Secondly, we need a body with the power to implement any such decision
-granting the right to secede. This body might have a number of functions
ranging from monitoring abuse to supervising plebiscites. These bodies would
clearly begin to crack the barrier that sovereignty and territorial integrity
present to secession. Sovereignty and territorial integrity would begin to be
eclipsed in favor of equality of treatment and the right of self-governance. The
international community has yet to make its views clear that this is the direction
it wishes to pursue, but the Quebec decision and the examples of Kosovo and
East Timor begin to provide the shadow of a useful blueprint.
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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A- Self-Determination as an Evolving Legal Precept
Numerous scholars have traced the early origins of self-determination from
the Marxist precepts of class liberation to the Wilsonian ideals of democracy
and freedom. However, from the moment those words were first uttered by
Wilson there was an almost immediate retreat (most notably by United State's
Secretary of State Robert Lansing) out of fear that it might be seen as a rallying
point for independence movements outside the context of the Austro-Hungarian
and Ottoman Empires.'
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the concept of "self-
determination of all peoples" was incorporated as part of international
conventional law but within the statist framework of the United Nations
Charter.2 The push for decolonization in the 1960s, however, elevated self-
determination to a right and brought to full light the need to contend with its
humanistic components.
* Professor Laurie Graham currently serves as the Assistant Professor of Law for Suffolk
University Law School in Boston, Massachusetts. Graham has served in the capacity of Visiting Professor
to the Legal Studies Department at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and Lecturer/Program Director
to Harvard Law School.
I. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); HURsT HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990).
2. C.f U.N. CHARTER, art 1, para 2 with art. 2, para 4.
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This shift in legal doctrine is evidenced in the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations which condemns
"the subjugation, domination, and exploitation" of peoples as contrary to "the
promotion of international peace and security."3  It similarly links self-
determination to the idea of full participatory rights without distinction as to
race, creed, or color. Equally important are the limitations it imposes on the
principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty when a state fails to meet its
obligation of a "government representing the whole people."4 Within the
international human rights movement, both the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights6 state that "all peoples have the right of self-
determination," which includes the right to "freely determine their political
status," to "freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development," and
to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources."
Just as international law has evolved from being solely concerned with the
rights and duties of sovereigns to include both individual as well as collective
rights of human beings, so too has self-determination evolved into a legal
precept benefiting "human beings as human beings and not sovereign entities
as such."7 The term "peoples" evidences the collective nature of the right. And
while much scholarship has been written on what the right of self-determination
encompasses and who are the "peoples" entitled to that right, states themselves
have been slow to acknowledge the relevance of this precept beyond the
classical colonial context.8
3. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N G.A. Res. 2624, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. 28 at 121,
U.N. Doc A18028 at 121 (1970) (hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
4. Id.
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966,993 U.N.T.S.
3, 6 L.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 at 490) (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6I.L.M.
368 (1967) (G.A. Res. 2200,21 GAOR,Supp. 16 U.N. Doc A/6316, at 52)(entered into force Mar. 23,1976).
7. S. James Anaya, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996). See also The Right to
Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, at 31 (1981) (Aureliu Cristescu, Special Rapporteaur); Hurst Hannum, Self-
Determination as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTs IN THE WORLD COMMUNrrY: ISSUES AND ACTION 125
(Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1992).
8. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 1, at 67-155; Hurst Hannum Rethinking Self-Determination, 34
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. Supp. No. 40, at
142-43, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984). See also infra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
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B. Self-Determination in Practice
Yet if we were to consider for a moment how that right has played itself
out in practice, most notably in the last six months, we may once again be
evidencing a shift in the conceptual understanding and scope of self-
determination sufficient to warrant a re-examination of group claims to that
right - in particular indigenous claims. This examination is critical given that
the evolution of self-determination as a legal construct is continuously shaped
by the realities of practice.
From an analytical standpoint, the application of this principle can be
traced back in time to the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman empires, followed by the demise of classical colonialism, and more
recently to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. Given the focus of today's panel, however, I will limit my remarks
to the United States - led NATO intervention in Kosovo and it relationship to
indigenous rights.
I. AsSESSING RECENT EVENTS IN Kosovo
My intent today is not to assess the "correctness" of the intervention as a
matter of international law or policy, both of which have been widely debated.9
Rather it is to consider what that intervention - and the entire Kosovo response
-might signal for the future recognition of indigenous peoples' right of self-
determination. I will begin with the United States position on respecting the
right of self-determination for the Kosovar people and then attempt to draw
some parallels to the aboriginal context.
In a recent address on the Balkan question, Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott noted that "how to translate th[e] phrase [self-determination]
into practice - and into peace - was one of the challenges at Versailles eighty
years ago, just as it was at Rambouillet six months ago, and just as it is in
Pristina today."' While self-determination at Versailles meant "the
dismant[ling] of empire[s] and the formation of a whole cluster of new nation-
states," Talbott states that the Balkans of today require "new answers to those
old questions about nationhood, statehood, democracy, and self-determination."
He points to the complexity of the Kosovo situation in particular given the
external suspension of Belgrade's power over the province, the ethnic
Albanians' desire for independence, and the United States' hope for some form
9. David Fromkin, KosovoCROSSING (1999); Michael Mandelbaun, A Perfect Failure: NATO's
War Against Yugoslavia, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999, at 2; Henry Kissinger, New World
Disorder, Newsweek May 31, 1999, at 41.
10. Strobe Talbott, Address at the Aspen Institute (visited August 24, 1999) reprinted at
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1999/990824-albot-aspen.html>
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of self-governing autonomy should Serbia free itself from the existing regime
of tyranny and oppression.
The provisions of the Rambouillet Agreement are a fairly good
representation of where the United States and other NATO allies stood on the
right self-determination for the Kosovar people. After paying homage to the
"sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
the Agreement calls for a substantial transfer of sovereign power from the
federation to the people of Kosovo." Among other things, it provides for the
adoption of a new constitution as well as the establishment of legislative,
executive and judicial branches of government.' 2
Although there were important departures from the Rambouillet
Agreement at the end of the conflict - most notably the absence of any
referendum after a fixed period of time to decide Kosovo's ultimate status -the
immediate goals prevailed. Kosovo is at the moment under the auspices of the
international community and with the assistance of various international
organizations is moving toward a United Nations Security Council mandate of
"substantial autonomy." 3 The United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo is the most "far-reaching" executive mission ever undertaken by the
United Nations and is specifically designed to ensure that the Kosovar people
have full participatory rights in the institutions of government under which they
live, which in turn will provide them with greater control over their cultural,
economic, and social developments.' 4
While noting that the "ultimate status of Kosovo is a question for the
future," Talbott also provides some insight into current United States thinking
on the future application of the right of self-determination beyond Kosovo. 5
It includes creating an environment in which self-determination can flourish
through a "pooling of sovereignty in certain areas of governance, and in other
areas granting greater autonomy." He notes that the trend is already away from
the "the old system of nation-states - each sovereign in its exercise of supreme,
absolute and permanent authority" - to one of regional if not global interdepen-
dence. Obvious examples being the European Union and various multinational
forces deployed around the world. The counterbalancing trend is the devolution
11. Rambouillet Accords, "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo" (visited
Feb. 19, 2000) reprinted at <http:www.state.gov/www/regions/Eur/ksvo..rambouilet.text.html>.
12. See id., Chap. 1 (Constitution), Chap. 1, Art. n (Assembly); Chap. 1, Art. III (President of
Kosovo); Chap. 1, Art. IV (Government and Administrative Organs); Chap. 1, Art. V (Judiciary).
13. U.N. Security Council Res. 1244, 401 lth meeting (June 10, 1999).
14. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution
1244, U.N. Doc. S/1999/672 (1999); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interm
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (1999) (visited Feb. 18, 2000) reprinted at
<http://www.un.orgDepts/dhl/da/Kosovo/Kosovo3a.html>.
15. See Talbott, supra note 10.
of power as a means of accommodating "communal identities and sensitivities."
Two examples include Spain, which has transferred substantial autonomy to
culturally distinctive communities such as Catalonia, and the United Kingdom
with the establishment of new parliaments in Scotland and Wales.
Recent scholarship has similarly emphasized the contradictions inherent
in limiting the concept of self-determination to "mutually exclusive 'sovereign'
territories." Professor James Anaya states that such a limited conception of
"peoples" as it relates to a contemporary understanding of self-determination
"ignores the multiple, overlapping spheres of community, authority, and inter-
dependency" that actually exists in the world today.' 6 These concepts of
"autonomy" and "enhanced interconnectedness," while gaining new pro-
minence in the conceptual understanding of self-determination, are historically
represented in indigenous thought and identities. For instance, the founding
political philosophy of the Haudenosaunee or Iroquois Confederacy under the
Great Law of Peace is built on the dual principles of unity among nations as
well as mutual respect for distinct identities or difference among societies.' 7
This conceptual understanding of self-determination in practice has its
critics. For instance, there are those who perceive the goal of autonomy - or
"diversity-within-unity" -for culturally cohesive communities as nothing more
than a train stop on the way to secession, pointing to the current thinking on the
future status of Kosovo. Others continue to equate the scope of self-
determination with the process of decolonization and independent statehood.t"
Indeed, secession may be an appropriate remedy in certain situations
where the "substantive aspects" of self-determination are not effectively
attainable by other means or where there is a persistent pattern of violence and
oppression against a particular group.'9 Examples abound from the East
Timorese to the people of Tibet. And it may ultimately be true for the Kosovo
Albanians. Yet it is equally true that appeals to territorial integrity and
sovereignty - which serve important stabilizing functions in the global
community - can no longer be used as a shield against continued violations of
16. Anaya, supra note 7, at 77-79.
17. See Oren R. Lyons, The American Indian in the Past, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 13,
32-42 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., 1992; See also Anaya, supra note 7, at 79.
18. This interpretation of self-determination is difficult to support given the recent turn of events
in Kosovo and elsewhere. See infra notes 40-1 and accompanying text. See also Anaya, supra note 7, at 77-
85.
19. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See also Anaya, supra note 7 at 84-85; Ved
Nanda, The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL REGIONAL, AND
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 193 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds, 1980). Professor Anaya
reconceptualizes the principle of self-determination into a framework consisting of both substantive elements
and remedial prescriptions. For a further discussion of this framework, see infra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text.
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self-determination and other human rights. As Secretary of State Madeline
Albright noted in relation to the Kosovo crisis, a leader of a state "gives up the
right to argue sovereignty ... when he decides to ... unilaterally ... exile a part
of a community that lives within his borders."2
Once the substantive aspects of self-determination have been substantially
violated, an appropriate remedy -that is not necessarily secessionist in character
-must be considered and implemented.21 This is what the Rambouillet
negotiations had hope to achieve, what the U.S-led NATO forces believed they
had achieved, and what the current United Nations' mission is now attempting
to implement. Certainly one can only speculate whether the situation in Kosovo
might have taken a different course had international procedures and
institutions been in place to address early on alleged violations of a group's
claim of self-determination. As Professor Ved Nanda argued some twenty
years ago "the absence of guidelines for hearing and evaluating such claims will
leave little alternative to violence. 2
Perhaps this is a lesson learned from the Kosovo experience - a lesson that
could, along with recent events in places such as East Timor, pave the way for
the development of appropriate procedures and institutions. At the very least,
the Kosovo experience calls into question any lingering claims by participating
States that the right of self-determination is limited in scope by the theoretical
construct of territorial sovereignty. More importantly, it appears to signal a
change in the conceptual understanding of self-determination, which brings me
to the issue of indigenous peoples' rights.
Im. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLE FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION
In the past several decades, indigenous peoples have garnered international
support for their rights to live and develop as distinct communities whose
cultures and traditions are rooted in history and land.23 Their efforts have
brought about significant changes in both conventional and customary
international law.24 One primary example is ILO Convention No. 169, which
recognizes "the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over
their own institutions, ways of life, and economic development, and to maintain
20. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, (The PBS Newshour With Jim Lehrer, June 10, 1999),
(visited Feb. 18, 2000) reprinted at <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990610c.html>.
21. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
22. See Nanda, supra note 13, at 209.
23. See Anaya, supra note 7 at 45-58.
24. See id. at 47-58.
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and develop their identities, languages and religions within the framework of
the States in which they live."25
Even more far-reaching than Convention 169, however, is the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.26 In 1982, the United Nations
Economic and Social Council, along with the United Nations Human Rights
Commission authorized the formation of a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, made up of five experts from the Sub-commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.27 The Working
Group's original mandate was the development of international standards
concerning the rights of indigenous populations. In 1993, a Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was completed and subsequently adopted
by the Sub-commission. That same year, the General Assembly proclaimed the
International Decade of the World's Indigenous People beginning December
10, 1994.28 These two events are conceptually linked in that the eventual
adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly is a major goal of the
International Decade. In 1995, the Commission on Human Rights established
an open-ended, inter-sessional working group to consider the various provisions
of the draft declaration.29
The declaration specifies all the various freedoms and conditions
necessary for a people to be fully in control of its own destiny and affirms,
among other things, indigenous peoples' fundamental freedom to
nondiscrimination, religion, self-government, control over lands and resources,
and protection of their identities and cultures without assimilation.30 The draft
declaration also recognizes their right of self-determination, stating in Article
3 that "Indigenous Peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." Article 31 further articulates that:
25. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention
169), June 27, 1989, (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
26. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/199512, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
27. Human Rights Commission Res. 1982/19 (Mar. 10, 1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, May 7, 1982,
U.N. ESCOR, 1982, Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc V_1982/82 (1982).
28. G.A. Res. 48/163 (1993) (commencing Dec. 10, 1994).
29. Human Rights Commission Res. 1995/32 (March 3, 1995). The meetings mark the first time
in United Nations history that organizations without official consultative status at the United Nations have
been involved in this level of United Nations policy-making. For indigenous peoples, this was an important
step in the recognition of their rights to fully participate in matters affecting their future.
30. See Draft Declaration, supra note 22. A similar declaration is under consideration by the
Organization of American States. See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
OEA/Ser/LV/.l.95, Doc.6 (February 26, 1997).
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Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to
self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including, culture,
religion, education, information, media, health, housing, employment,
social welfare, economic activities, land and resources management,
environment and entry by non-members.
Several states involved in the negotiations have expressed reservations
against the affirmation of indigenous self-determination on two primary
grounds: that indigenous peoples are not "peoples" entitled to the legal right
of self-determination and that self-determination as a norm outside the
decolonization context is at best debatable. For instance, in its 1995 Statement
on Article 3, the United States stated that "there [is] no international practice
or international instruments that recognizes indigenous groups as peoples in the
sense of having the .legal right of self-determination" and that "in the context
of colonialism, the term has been interpreted to mean the right to an
independent state. As a result, the draft declaration ... [goes] beyond the
principle of self-determination as set forth in the Charter and other international
instruments.' In a more recent statement on the issue, the United States
articulated its objections in somewhat broader terms contending that "no
international practice or instrument recognizes sub-national groups as. having
the legal right of self-determination" and further that the United States. has
"concerns about adopting a declaration which suggests that all indigenous
groups ... have a right to be sovereign, independent states. ' '32
In an attempt to find common ground, Professor Anaya has suggested an
approach to the issue of self-determination that distinguishes between the
principle's substantive and remedial aspects.33 Substantive self-determination
includes the right to participate in "the creation of or change in institutions of
government" as well as the right "to make meaningful choices in matters
touching upon all spheres of life on a continuous basis."'  "The substance of
the norm," however, "must be distinguished from the remedial prescriptions
that may follow from a violation of the norm, such as those developed to undo
colonization., 35 He notes that the remedies currently being explored in the
31. Statements of the United States of America on the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples to the UN Intersessional Working Group, at 5 (November 27, 1995)[hereinafter U.S.
Statements].
32. The United States Statement on Self-Determination to the UN Intersessional Working Group
on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( December 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 18, 2000)
reprinted at <http://www.hookele.comnetwarriors/1998.html>.
33. See Anaya, supra note 7 at 80-5.
34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id. at 80.
2000] Graham 463
context of indigenous peoples' rights do not suggest the formation of new
states.36
The substantive and remedial aspects of self-determination may in fact
take many different forms. One recent example would be the birth of Nunavut,
the newest Canadian territory, which provides substantial autonomy for the
territory's 27,000 residents, 85% of whom are Inuit. Similar attempts to
negotiate substantial autonomy for indigenous populations are being explored
throughout the Western Hemisphere.37 Regardless of the form, Professor Anaya
suggests five international norms that are essential to any substantive-remedial
scheme designed to ensure indigenous self-determination: non-discrimination,
respect for cultural integrity, control over lands and resources, social welfare
and development, and self-government.38
While indigenous groups have expressed support for these various
approaches to articulating the content of their right of self-determination, they
are equally concerned with any attempts by states to "qualify or define-away"
that right -a right which they see as the essence of their survival.39 This is not
to say that the prevailing indigenous views on self-determination are
secessionist in character. Indigenous groups have stated on any number of
occasions that they are not looking to dismantle nation-states. However, they
do insist on the right to control their own territories, resources, and decision-
making institutions, and to maintain their own distinct cultures.' In the case
of Quebec mentioned earlier, the Cree People have stated that if the province
of Quebec were ever to leave Canada they would "exercise [their] right of self-
36. Outside the colonial context, Professor Anaya suggests that the remedy of secession be limited
to situations where "substantive self-determination for a particular group cannot otherwise be assured or
where there is a net gain in the overall welfare of all concerned." id. at 84-85.
37. For instance, the agreement between the Miskito Indians and the government of Nicaragua,
which seeks to ensure greater administrative autonomy over their daily lives while at the same time providing
for fuller participation in the Nicaraguan government. See Anaya, supra note 7, at 78-79, 87-88.
38. See Anaya, supra note 7, at 97-125. Since Indigenous peoples have suffered both historical as
well as contemporary violations of their right of self-determination, they are entitled to an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 85-86.
39. See, e.g., Statement by Assembly of First Nations to the Fourth Inter-sessional U.N. Working
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 8, 1998) (visited Feb. 18,
2000) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>; Opening Statement of the Navajo
Nation Delegation to the Fourth Inter-sessional U.N. Working Group (November 30, 1998) (visited Feb. 18,
2000) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/l998.html>.
40. See, e.g, Supplemental Opening Statement of the Navajo Nation to the Fourth Inter-sessional
Working Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 1, 1998) (visited
Feb. 18, 1999) reprinted at <http://www.hookele.con/netwarriors/1998.html>; Statement by the National
Coalition of Aboriginal Organizations, Australia, at the 75th session of the International Labour Conference
(June 13, 1988).
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determination to choose to remain in Canada."-41 Moreover, it is worth noting
that secession is of limited practical value for many indigenous communities
given their location, size, resource limitations, and security concerns.42
With that said, it must be asked why indigenous peoples should be
expected to accept restrictions or limitations on their claims of self-
determination, even if recognition of that right meant political independence for
the small few that would benefit from such an endeavor. The Declaration on
Friendly Relations provides for just such a remedy when a state fails to meet its
obligation of a government representing the whole people. 3 Moreover, where
serious human rights violations persist and no other remedy is available
secession may be the only proper course of action. The Canadian Supreme
Court in its recent decision on the secession of Quebec reached a similar
conclusion, noting that:
[Ilntemational law . . . generates . . . a right to external self-
determination in situations of former colonies; where a people are
oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or
where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government
to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development."
The Quebec situation further highlights the practical importance of
recognizing indigenous self-determination. Should the people of Quebec ever
vote in favor of secession, recognition of indigenous self-determination ensures
that the aboriginal peoples of the province are guaranteed the right to
participate fully in any negotiations affecting their future. While the
government of Canada appears to be moving toward a broader more inclusive
understanding of indigenous self-determination,45 other states, such as the
United States and Australia, appear to be at a standstill after almost five years
of negotiations on the draft declaration.46
41. Dr. Ted Moses, Grand Council of the Crees, Address at the Australian Reconciliation
Convention (May 27, 1997).
42. See Erica-Irene Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination, TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9 (1993).
43. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 3.
44. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1373 (1998).
45. See Statement of Canada on Self-Determination to the U.N. Working Group on the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (December 7, 1998) (visited Feb. 18, 1999) reprinted at
<http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>.
46. See the following internet site for various statements of participating states (visited Feb. 18,
1999) <http:www.hookele.com/netwarriors/1998.html>. See also U.S. Statements, supra notes 31 & 32.
IV. RESPECTING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Yet, as I stated earlier, the Kosovo response may represent a shift in the
conceptual understanding and scope of self-determination sufficient to warrant
an honest re-examination of indigenous claims. As Deputy Secretary Talbott
noted one of the major challenges for the 21st century is how to translate the
phrase "self-determination" into practice and into peace. The Rambouillet
Accords and what followed thereafter were an attempt -however imperfect -to
articulate and uphold that principle for a "sub-national group" in a non-colonial
context. The seriousness of the injustices wrought on the Kosovar people after
failed negotiations served as the remedial justification for setting aside the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
What we have then is recognition by the United States and others that the
right of self-determination is a fundamental human right of all "peoples," the
beneficiaries of whom are not limited by adherence to specious appeals to
sovereign boundaries. Equally important is the realization that self-
determination is not limited in its practical application to the act of secession,
but rather embodies in its fullest sense the right to live and develop as culturally
distinct groups, in control of their own destinies, and under conditions of
equality.47 These recent events suggest that at minimum Indigenous peoples'
claims of self-determination should be accorded equal consideration, since all
human rights -including the right of self-determination -are universal in scope.
Unequal application of this principle would impugn the fundamental integrity
of those opposing such rights as well as the international legal system itself.
Yet adhering to principles of equal rights and indigenous self-
determination will not lead inevitably to the kind of political instability and
disruption of territorial unity often alluded to in arguments against such claims.
Indeed, just the opposite may be true. Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes
notes that "the far more realistic fear" is that the denial of self-determination for
Indigenous Peoples will "leave the most marginalized and excluded of all the
worlds' peoples with out a legal, peaceful weapon to press for genuine
democracy in the states in which they live."'48
Let me just close by saying that in the last six weeks I have heard it twice
stated that the defining issue in international law for the 21 st century is finding
compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of
borders. In the context of indigenous claims, both the Draft Declaration and the
Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples currently under discussion at the
United Nations offer the best hope for finding just such a compromise -first
through the recognition of indigenous peoples' fundamental rights and second
47. See, e.g., Anaya supra note, at 77-88.
48. See Daes, supra note 35.
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through a process of negotiated settlements between states and indigenous
communities.
FROM BOSNIA TO KOSOVO AND EAST TIMOR:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORY
Ralph Wilde*
In recent years there has been a resurgence in projects where territorial
units are administered by international organizations. In Bosnia and
Hercegovina ('Bosnia'), Kosovo and East Timor, international organizations
have been given wide powers of administration, covering a broad range of
activities. I am currently undertaking a study of this phenomenon, what I term
'International Territorial Administration' (ITA). Today, I would like to make
some observations on the role of the United Nations in creating and carrying out
the administration projects in these three territories.
With respect to Bosnia, the starting point is the General Framework
Agreement of 1995, collectively known as the Dayton Agreement.' Annex 10
of the Dayton Agreement established the Office of the High Representative
(OHR), with responsibility for the implementation of civil administration in
Bosnia.2 The civilian role of OHR is complemented by the military role of the
NATO-led body, called at first the Implementation Force (IFOR), and later the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Annex 1-A of Dayton invites the Security Council
to establish IFOR, effectively granting the force total military control in
Bosnia.'
The Dayton Agreement also allocates further aspects of Bosnia's
administration to other international actors, from the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) being requested to set up and run the
electoral system, 4 to three members of the Constitutional Court being appointed
by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.5
* Whewell Scholar, Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 ITQ, UK. This paper was delivered in the
"Development of International Law" panel of the International Law Association (American Branch) Annual
Conference, New York, November 6, 1999. The author would like to thank Professor James Crawford SC
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft and the Trustees of the Trinity College Eddington Fund for their
generous support that enabled the author to attend the conference.
1. Bosnia and Hercegovina - Croatia - Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Hercegovina with Annexes, Dec 14,1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
2. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 147.
3. Id. at 92.
4. Id. at 115.
5. Id. at 118.
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The formal participants in the Dayton Agreement and the Annexes vary
between the different instruments, being drawn from Bosnia, Croatia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the two Entities that make up
Bosnia. A common theme, however, is that the relationship between these
participants, on the one hand, and the subject matter of the Dayton Agreement,
on the other, is incongruous. Only a small part of the Dayton Agreement is
concerned with the obligations inter se of the formal participants, for example
refraining from the use of force.6 Most of the Dayton Agreement sets out how
Bosnia and its two Entities will function internally and the powers of
international organizations over this. None of the organizations involved are
formal participants, apart from two limited areas. First, Annex 1-B is a series
of agreements "between" NATO and Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and the
FRY.7 It is notable that, unlike the other Annexes, the status of the formal
participants, such as being "parties," is not specified. Annex 1-B is.
comparatively minor, covering matters ancillary to the main powers outlined in
Annex 1-A, to which NATO is not a party.' Second, SFOR and OHR, despite
not being parties to the Annexes that set out their main powers, are each given
final authority in theatre to interpret the provisions of their respective Annex.9
Sweeping powers, and the final authority in theatre to interpret these powers,
are therefore given to international organizations that are not parties to the
agreements that give them these powers. A further peculiarity is that one of
these organizations, OHR, is not only empowered, but also created by the
relevant agreement.°
The legal authority for the arrangements in Bosnia and Hercegovina does
not stop at the Dayton Agreement. In Resolution 1031 of December 15, 1995,
the Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, supports the Dayton Agreement
and in particular OHR and SFOR's prerogatives.1" It also authorizes the
establishment of SFOR.'2 This Resolution thereby realizes the Dayton
Agreement's invitation to authorize a military force 13 and makes certain
provisions of the Dayton Agreement binding as a matter of Security Council
law, in addition to their status in treaty law.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 109.
8. Id. at 92.
9. Id. at 100, 148.
10. Id. at 147.
11. United Nations: Report of the Secretary General on the Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR
and Addendum on Cost Estimates, Including Security Council Resolutions 1031 (1995) and 1035 (1995),
Addressing the Political Settlement in the Former Yugoslavia and the Transfer of Power from UNPROFOR
to IFOR December 13-21, 1995, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 235 (1996) [hereinafter Resolution 1031].
12. Id. at 253.
13. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 92.
Turning to the international administration in Kosovo, the starting point
is the Peace Plan of June 3, 1999 (Peace Plan). 4 The FRY and the Republic
of Serbia agree to the deployment of an international civil and security
presence, authorized under Chapter 7.V' Like most of the Dayton Agreement
Annexes, the Peace Plan is a one-sided acceptance of international
administration by host country actors, without the participation of those
organizations that will carry out this administration. However, a separate
agreement was made between KFOR, the FRY and the Republic of Serbia on
June 9, 1999, authorizing in some detail the plenary occupation and control of
Kosovo by KFOR (KFOR Agreement).' 6 Unlike in Bosnia, therefore, the
military force is a party to the main agreement delineating its powers. 7
The terms of both the Peace Plan and the KFOR Agreement make the
arrangements they contain dependent on authorization by the Security
Council. 8 This came in Resolution 1244, passed on June 10, 1999."9 The
Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, endorses the Peace Plan and
welcomes the KFOR Agreement. 20 It also authorizes the establishment of an
international security force and elaborates on the powers of this force.2' Here,
as with Bosnia, the Security Council reinforces existing obligations, and creates
new obligations regarding a military force. The difference is that in addition
to this, it authorizes the Secretary General to establish an international civil
presence, now called UNMIK, and sets out in full the powers of this presence.2
The role of the United Nations is even more pronounced in the East Timor
administration project. In Resolution 1272, passed on October 25, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter 7, established the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, (UNTAET).23 In the words of the resolution,
14. Letter Dated 7 June 1999 From the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/649
(1999) <http://www.un.orgtpeace/kosovols 1999649.pdf> (Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move
towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin,
Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, 3 June 1999) [hereinafter Peace Plan].
15. Id. at art. 3.
16. Military-technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/682 (1999) <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s99682.pdf> [hereinafter KFOR Agreement].
17. Dayton Agreement, supra note 1, at 92.
18. Peace Plan, supra note 14; KFOR Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 1.2.
19. G.A. Res. 1244, U.N. Security Council, 4011 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
<http://www.un.org/Docstscres/1999/99sc1244.htm> [Hereinafter "Resolution 1244"].
20. ld. at arts. 1-2, 5.
21. Id. at arts. 7, 9.
22. Id. at arts. 6, 10, 11.
23. G.A. Res. 1272, U.N. Security Council, 4057 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1272 (1999)
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/9931277E.htm> [hereinafter Resolution 1272].
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UNTAET is given "overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor
and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority."'24
Strikingly, the mission includes its own military component, with a "strength
of up to 8,950 troops."'2
Taking the three projects together, we can see a shift in the role played by
the United Nations. As for creating the projects with Bosnia, the Security
Council played a secondary role, essentially giving the Dayton Agreement its
seal of approval. With Kosovo, it determined more of the project itself,
especially the civil component. With East Timor, Resolution 1272 is the main
legal authority for all aspects of the project. Of course, with Bosnia and
Kosovo the states who used diplomatic means to trigger the formal legal
processes were largely the same. The Contact Group countries who brokered
the Dayton Agreement were also instrumental in the adoption of the Kosovo
Peace Plan, the KFOR Agreement, and Resolution 1244.26 The change as
between Bosnia and Kosovo was that these states channeled their diplomatic
efforts much more through the United Nations legal system than through ad hoc
legal processes.
Differences in the legal processes setting up the projects mirror changes
in the actors carrying them out. As for the civil component, in Bosnia and
Hercegovina the main role is performed by a sui generis entity. By contrast, in
Kosovo and East Timor it is controlled by the United Nations. As for the
military component, in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosovo this is conducted
by an international force authorized by the Security Council. It is only in East
Timor that the United Nations takes on the military component of
administration itself.
I would make three observations on this renewed role for the United
Nations.
Having such international administration projects authorized through the
Security Council may be a positive development. An important objective of
international administration is, of course, to assist a particularly weak territorial
entity. When this is effected through a treaty signed by the entity concerned,
the weakness of this entity renders consent meaningful particularly in a narrow,
formal sense. In a more general sense, international administration projects are
imposed. Given this, such projects should be legally authorized through a
24. Id. at art. 1.
25. Id. at art. 9.
26. The Contact Group is made up of the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States. These countries appear as 'witnesses' to the Dayton Agreement, supra note
1. The Peace Plan, was negotiated by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European
Union, and Viktor Chemomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation, supra
note 14. NATO, whose members include France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States,
signed the KFOR Agreement, supra note 16.
process with the power of unilateral imposition, namely the Security Council
acting under Chapter 7. Furthermore, the changing nature of an administration
project requires a regulatory regime that operates flexibly. In this respect, the
comparatively quick process of adopting Security Council resolutions compares
favorably with the cumbersome process of treaty-making and revision.
However, the fact that the United Nations both authorizes and carries out
international administration projects is a mixed blessing. The Security Council
scrutinizes keenly those operations that are set up and run by the United
Nations. At the same time, concentrating the creation, conduct and regulation
of international administration through one actor raises concerns about the
efficacy of checks and balances, even given the constitutional and political
differences between the Security Council and United Nations missions.
Finally, it is too early to tell whether the United Nations will succeed in
carrying out its responsibilities in Kosovo and East Timor. For some, a
multilateral institution is the appropriate actor for the conduct of this activity,
and the United Nations brings a wealth of experience and expertise. Those with
a less favorable view of the United Nations would prefer sui generis and/or,
regional organizations to carry out international administration projects. It
remains to be seen whether the United Nations can fulfill what are two of the
most ambitious mandates it has ever been given. The role the United Nations
plays in future administration projects, and indeed whether future
administrative projects are created, depends largely on what happens in Kosovo
and East Timor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to speak about the status of the negotiations on the draft
agreement on Liability for Damage to the Antarctic Environment, which are
being undertaken by the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and their prospects for
success.
There are some key points I'd like to make at the outset:
(1) The parties to the Antarctic Treaty have a legal obligation to conclude
an agreement on Liability. This follows from Article 16 of the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (which entered into force on
14 January 1998), which provides:
[tihe Parties undertake to elaborate rules and procedures relating to
liability for damage arising from activities taking place in the
Antarctic Treaty area and covered by this Protocol.. Those rules and
procedures shall be included in one or more Annexes.
* Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand. Contact information: Private
Bag 18 901; Wellington, New Zealand; Tel: 64 4 494 8500; Fax: 64 4 494 8520; email:
don.mackay@mfat.govt.nz.
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(2) While the issues of legal liability for environmental damage are notably
complex in whatever context, they are particularly difficult in the Antarctic
context. Unlike other liability negotiations, in the case of Antarctica there is no
economic or commercial enterprise involved which will ultimately bear the cost
of liability (and which can build it into its cost structure). In Antarctic the
activity is primarily governmental and science related, and that's where most
of the burden will fall. Moreover the liability regime will cover damage to the
environment per se - not to the economic interests of others (although that may
be a minor element of it) - and will be extremely difficult to quantify. The
Antarctic environment is a unique and fragile one, and impacts are difficult to
assess, although we may perhaps be able to draw on American experience in
Alaska. Overlying all of this is the complication that in Antarctica we are not
dealing with undisputed sovereign territory.
(3) The Antarctic Treaty parties have however shown themselves able in
the past to resolve the most complex of issues. The Antarctic Treaty itself
reflects a unique capacity for problem-solving.
(4) The United States is key to a successful outcome. The Liability Annex
will have to be adopted by consensus by Antarctic Treaty parties, and will have
to be ratified by all parties. At the moment many countries are sheltering
behind the United States position, and are not declaring themselves. If the
United States comes to the party, these other countries will have to as well. The
United States also hhs a huge capacity for "creative lawyering," of the sort that
is required here to try and solve the issues. We need active United States
engagement.
(5) We need some lateral thinking to break the current impasse, and as
American lawyers you are well placed to provide it.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
What we have now is a stalemate, polarized around two competing texts
and quite different approaches. One is the so-called "Eighth Offering" - a
Chairman's text produced by Professor Rudiger Wolfrum who chaired a "Legal
Experts Group" dealing with Antarctic Liability, which was set up by the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and held nine meetings over six years
until it was transformed into a fully fledged negotiating group at this year's
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Lima, Peru. The other text is the
"United States draft," which was introduced by the United States three and a
half years ago at a meeting of the Legal Experts Group in Utrecht, Netherlands.
A. The Eighth Offering
As its name implies, this Chairman' s text is in its eighth revision. It is the
Chairman's personal product, although it does of course reflect considerable
MacKay
input from delegations. It takes a comprehensive approach to the issue of
liability for environmental damage, and is highly complex, reflecting the
application of impressive of intellectual capital by the Chairman, but it also
leaves many issues unresolved. The basic framework (as yet not entirely
agreed) is as follows:
(1) Operators conducting activities in the Antarctic incur liability
if they cause damage to the Antarctic environment;
(2) Damage is defined as any harmful effect of an impact on the
Antarctic environment, which is over a particular threshold (to
exclude de minimus), with certain exceptions including for
impacts identified during an environmental evaluation process;
(3) Liability is strict (and also probably joint and several where
several operators are involved);
(4) An operator is required to take reasonable precautionary
measures, and also to take response action where an incident
occurs;
(5) When an operator does not take response action another State
Party, or in certain circumstances another entity or person, may
do so;
(6) The operator is then liable to reimburse the reasonable costs of
the other party for the response action they have taken;
(7) Where the damage to the environment cannot be repaired, the
operator has to contribute an amount to an "Environmental
Protection Fund," by processes yet to be determined;
(8) The Fund would be used to compensate States and other entities
for the costs of response action in those situations where
liability (and reimbursement) do not attach;
(9) There would be financial limits on liability;
10) Non State operators would be required to take out insurance or
other financial security to cover liability;
(11) States Parties would have residual liability for damage caused
by their operators, but only to the extent that they have failed to
carry out their own obligations as a State Party; and
(12) A dispute settlement regime would be included.
As I have said, this is a comprehensive and complex regime. While the
general framework is there, and some provisions have been exhaustively
discussed and are close to finality, others are much less so. A great deal
remains to be resolved.
B. The United States Proposal
The United States draft is much simpler. It takes a less comprehensive
approach than the Eighth Offering, and is designed to cover "environmental
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emergencies" only. Article 15 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty imposes an obligation on Parties to take response action
in the event of emergencies, and under the United States proposal liability
would attach only where a Party failed to take such action. An element of the
United States Proposal is, however, that a further annex or annexes could be
drawn up to cover other aspects of liability for environmental damage.
C. The Different Positions
The United States draft was introduced at a time when the liability
discussions had been going through a particularly bleak period, with little
progress being made on the Chairman's current "Offering." The United States
introduced its proposal to try and break the stalemate. Its introduction
coincided, however, with a spurt of progress on the Chairman's "offering," with
the result that many delegations viewed the United States text as an unnecessary
distraction from the main game.
Since that time' modest progress has continued on the Chairman's
"offerings" although, as noted, a great many issues remain to be resolved. For
its part, the United States text has remained on the table, and continues to
reflect the United States position (as well as that of some other countries).
Accordingly, the future elaboration of a liability regime is bedeviled by a
fundamental difference of approach between delegations. This is over the basic
question of whether we should be seeking to elaborate a so-called "comprehen-
sive" (or single) annex, or a so-called "limited" annex (which could be the first
in a series of annexes focussing on particular aspects of the liability problem).
Until this fundamental issue is resolved there will inevitably be limits as to the
further progress that will be possible.
D. The Need for a ".Third Way"
The two approaches have been extensively debated in the past, without
resolution, and it is fair to say that further debate between these two options per
se is unlikely to resolve the matter. With neither side willing to move from its
basic position, delegations have increasingly talked of the need for a 'Third
Way" - that is to say, an approach which is neither the "comprehensive"
approach or the "limited" approach, but which bridges the two positions or
takes yet another road.
Ideally, too, it should also be designed to make the work more manageable.
As the discussion of Antarctic Liability has developed, there has been an
increase in the magnitude and number of issues needing to be negotiated, which
adds to the complexity of pulling together a package as such. And as the
potential time span for producing a concrete outcome has grown commensu-
rately, there is inevitably a danger that the negotiating process will flag.
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Moreover, as we shall have to produce an outcome which can be adopted by
consensus, and which can then be ratified by all Parties within a reasonable
time, size and complexity is unlikely to assist such an outcome.
At the end of the negotiations on liability which I chaired, at the Lima
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting earlier this year, that is the challenge
which I put to delegations.
While the Lima negotiations had made progress in some areas, it was
apparent to me that resolution of these fundamental differences in position was
required.
My Personal Report to the Lima ATCM, as Chairman, which is annexed
to this paper, canvasses this question. It also identifies one possible "Third
Way," which would comprise the following:
(1) a single annex providing for a comprehensive regime, thus
meeting the objectives of many delegations. The annex itself
would include all the generic items which would be common to
a liability regime of whatever nature, and in respect of which
there is already agreement or agreement is foreseeable. It
would utilize a great deal of work already done and (without
wishing to minimize unduly the complexity of the issues
remaining)could, hopefully, be developed reasonably quickly.
(2) It would contain a binding commitment to subsequently develop
detailed schedules, by way of measures, on (1) Preventative
Measures, (2) Damage from Environmental Emergencies, (3)
Response Action and Remedial Action, and (4) Unrepaired and
Irreparable damage. (Using measures to build on the Annex
would not be an entirely novel concept; all of the other An-
nexes to the Protocol can be amended or modified by way of
measures, which are adopted by consensus).
This approach would also have the advantage of reducing. our work to
reasonably digestible bites. It would enable a step by step approach while
meeting the positions of delegations wanting a single annex and comprehensive
coverage.
I stress that this is not the only way through this impasse. And it may not
be without its own difficulties. It has been suggested to me, for example, that
there might be difficulty getting the United States' Senate to ratify an Annex
which was "open-ended" in this way. My response would be that the Antarctic
Treaty, which has been ratified by the United States, is similarly open-ended,
in that it allows measures to be adopted subsequently which are "binding" on
States. My proposal would be no more open-ended than that. And, as with the
adoption of measures under the Antarctic treaty, a consensus would be required
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for their adoption, which would require specific United States agreement in
each instance.
F_ The Next Steps
What is now needed is some lateral thinking. This is where we need your
help. I have the greatest admiration for the creativity of American lawyers, and
I don't believe that. the current dilemma is insurmountable. We need a "third
Way." Would the proposal in my report work, or can you see another "third
Way." I'm sure you can come up with an answer to this, unfettered by
governmental positions. If you cannot do it today then maybe you or (if you are
involved in the academic area) your students, can do it subsequently. It's a
great case study. And we would very much welcome your contribution.
Ell. ANNEX'
As indicated in the Report of Working Group I on Item 10, this paper is
circulated, on a personal basis, in an endeavor to identify a way forward. It
should be viewed purely in that light.
As is also evident from the Report of Working Group 1 on Item 10, there
was useful progress in a number of respects in this first round of negotiations
in the Working Group. The Report identifies various areas of convergence, and
it is fair to say that other prospective areas of progress can also be seen at this
stage. Ultimately, however, what we are talking about is a package, or several
packages, and convergence is not likely to develop in some key areas until the
overall shape of the package (or packages)is clearer.
Some valuable work was also done in the informal contact groups, which
were set up to facilitate discussion on a range of subjects. The coordinators of
some of these groups were able to produce texts reflecting the stage reached in
their discussions, and as I foreshadowed in Working Group 1, these are attached
as a matter of record so that this work is not lost. It must be clear, however, that
these texts do not reflect agreed positions, either on the part of those participat-
ing in the informal contact groups or the meeting as a whole. They are simply
to aid further discussion. Indeed, some delegations specifically entered
reservations in respect of some of these texts, and on others there was not time
for discussion.
On the basis of comments made in the meeting, and to me informally, I
think it will be useful in future meetings to continue using informal contact
groups to help clarify differences between delegations on particular issues - and
hopefully identify solutions - as this is sometimes difficult across the confer-
ence floor. It needs to be emphasized that such groups are open ended (that is
1. Personal report of the chairman on the liability discussion in WGI.
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to say, open to all delegations with an interest in the issue in question), although
this of course creates a practical limitation on the number of groups which can
be established at any one time, given the pressure on small delegations.
Another very useful development at this meeting, was a much more
integrated approach involving SCAR and COMNAP. This helped inform the
discussion, even though both organizations were not able to be present for all
of the time, and points the way towards an even more integrated approach in the
future, including outside of formal meetings. For example, future informal
contact groups on some issues are likely to benefit from being multi-disciplined,
and having in them scientists and operators as well as lawyers and policy
experts. It may also be appropriate to include other representative organizations
on occasion, such as IAATO on behalf of tourism operators.
Notwithstanding these positive and encouraging developments, however,
the future elaboration of a liability regime remains bedeviled by a fundamental
difference of approach between delegations. This is over the basic question of
whether we should be seeking to elaborate a so-called "comprehensive" (or
single) annex, or a so-called "limited" annex (which could be the first in a
series of annexes focussing on particular aspects of the liability problem). Until
this fundamental issue is resolved there will inevitably be limits as to the further
progress that will be possible.
This issue has been extensively debated in the past, without resolution, and
it is fair to say that further debate between these two options per se is unlikely
to resolve the matter. On the one hand, it is clear that many delegations are
now willing to negotiate on the basis of a so-called "limited" annex, which
would involve a fundamental departure from their position. Other delegations,
however, are unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the sort of "comprehensive"
approach that would follow the approach of the eighth offering, as this would
depart from their fundamental position. This in no way derogates from the
hugely useful work done in the Group of Legal Experts, and the Chairman's
offerings, as acknowledged at the Tromso ATCM. It is entirely due to that
work that we are able to identify the issues involved in putting together an
Antarctic liability regime, together with a range of possible solutions (it is also
worth noting that other bodies outside of the Antarctic Treaty System have
found liability issues extraordinarily complex and difficult to solve). We are,
however, now in a new phase of our work, that of negotiation in Working
Group 1 as mandated by the Tromso ATCM.
That new phase, and the fundamental differences that I have referred to,
suggest that we should now be looking for a new approach which bridges the
two positions or takes yet another road. Ideally, it should also be designed to
make our work more manageable. As the discussion of Antarctic Liability has
developed, there has been an increase in the magnitude and number of issues
needing to be negotiated, which adds to the complexity of pulling together a
20001
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package as such. And as the potential time span for producing a concrete
outcome has grown commensurately, there is inevitably a danger that the
negotiating process will flag. Moreover, what we shall have to produce is an
outcome which can be adopted by consensus, and which can then be ratified by
all Parties within a reasonable time. Size and complexity is unlikely to assist
such an outcome.
Attached to this document is one possible new approach, which would
bridge the fundamental differences I have referred to. There may be others
which occur to delegations, but it is in terms of a new approach that I believe
we should now be thinking.
The approach attached is a framework for a liability regime as follows:
1) a single annex providing for a comprehensive regime, thus
meeting the objectives of many delegations. The annex itself
would include all the generic items which would be common to
a liability regime of whatever nature, and in respect of which
there is already agreement or agreement is foreseeable. It
would utilize a great deal of work already done and (without
wishing to minimize unduly the complexity of the issues
remaining)could, hopefully, be developed reasonably quickly.
2) It would contain abinding commitment to subsequently develop
detailed schedules, by way of measures, on 1) Preventative
Measures, 2) Damage from Environmental Emergencies, 3)
Response Action and Remedial Action, and 4) Unrepaired and
Irreparable damage. (Using measures to build on the Annex
would not be an entirely novel concept; all of the other An-
nexes to the Protocol can of course be amended or modified by
way of measures, which are adopted by consensus).
This approach would also have the advantage of reducing our work to
reasonably digestible bites. It would enable a step by step approach while
meeting the positions of delegations wanting a single annex and comprehensive
coverage. It would require a decision as to which schedules should be
developed first, but this might be guided by COMNAP' s identification of the
most pressing area of concern - damage from environmental emergencies - on
which we already have a substantial proposal before us. Another possibility
might be to consider parallel work on the prevention of damage, which would
require closely integrated input from a range of disciplines including scientists
and operators. Care would obviously need to be taken to ensure that the
schedules did not overlap unduly, and also that the sequential entry into force
of the schedules did not create problems for one schedule vis-a-vis another.
I would recommend this to colleagues as a possible way forward. If not,
we need to find some other approach to bridge these fundamental differences.
MacKay
IV. POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR ANNEX VITO THE PROTOCOL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
To THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
A. Purpose
B. Scope of Application
C. Relationship with Other International Agreements
D. Definitions






...[other terms which may be common to the Annex and the Schedules...]
E. Obligations of Parties
F. Establishment of Jurisdiction
G. Schedules
To enable the effective implementation of this Annex, the Parties
undertake to adopt measures, in accordance with Article IX(i) of the Antarctic
Treaty, comprising the following Schedules to this Annex:
Schedule 1: Preventative Measures
Schedule 2: Damage from Environmental Emergencies
Schedule 3: Response Action and Remedial Action
Schedule 4: Unrepaired and Irreparable Damage
IR Standard of Liability
I Joint and Several Liability
J. State Liability and Responsibility
K Financial Limits
Liability under this Annex shall not exceed the amounts set out in the
relevant Schedule.
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L Time Limits of Liability
Liability under this Annex shall be subject to any limitation periods set out
in the relevant Schedule.
M. Antarctic Environment Protection Fund
N. Dispute Settlement
0. Amendment or Modification
MacKay
V. SCHEDULES TO ANNEX VI
Preventative Measures
Damage from Environmental Emergencies
Response Action and Remedial Action
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The year of 1999 witnessed extensive activity in the two United Nations
ad hoc Tribunals established to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda. By the end of 1999, the three Trial Chambers of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY")' had handed
down six judgments (five after trials on the merits2 and one sentencing judg-
ment after a guilty plea'). Two of these judgments (the Aleksovski Judgement
and the Jelisid Judgement) were rendered by an ICTY Trial Chamber in 1999.'
The three Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR") s have handed down five judgments (three after
trials on the merits6 and two sentencing judgments after guilty pleas).7 Three
1. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc.
S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192 (1993).
2. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadid, Opinion and Judgment, IT-94-I-T, May 7, 1997; Prosecutor v.
Zejnil Delalid et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundlija, Judgement, IT-
95-17/1-T, Dec. 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, IT-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999;
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Judgement, IT-95-10-T, Dec. 14, 1999.
Please note that this article will use either "Judgment" or "Judgement" consistent with the
official usage of the particular decision.
3. Prosecutor v. Dralen Erdemovid, Sentencing Judgement, IT-96-22-Tbis, March 5, 1998.
4. An extremely important 1999 achievement of the Yugoslavian Tribunal was the issuance of the
Milogevid et al. Indictment on May 24, 1999, bringing charges against Slobodan Milogevid and four other
top Serbian military and political leaders for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo between January and May
of 1999. The other Accused are Milan Milutinovid, Nikola gainovid, Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Vlajko
Stojiljkovid. Charged with personal and superior responsibility under 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute (only
ainovid is charged exclusively under 7(1)) for violations of Articles 3 (violations of the laws or customs of
war, for murder) and 5 (crimes against humanity, for deportation, murder, and persecution) of the Statute,
the Accused are alleged to have planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in
a campaign of terror, violence, destruction, and massacres directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians.
Both Tribunals have several cases at various stages of the pretrial process; in addition to the
judgments, hundreds of decisions have been rendered in the form of orders or other decisions on motions
before the Trial and Appeals Chambers. Similarly, each Tribunal has added public indictments or joined or
amended existing indictments during the year. Due to the limited scope of this article, these other
indictments, decisions, or events will not be discussed here.
5. International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, SC Res. 955, annex, UN SCOR, 49th
Sess., Res. & Dec., at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/59 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994).
6. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T,Sept. 2, 1998; Prosecutor v.
Clement Kayishema &Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1 -TMay 21, 1999; and Prosecutor v. Georges
Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, Dec. 6, 1999.
7. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, ICTR-97-23-T, Sept. 4, 1998;
Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Sentence, ICTR-98-39-S, Feb. 5, 1999.
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of these, the Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, the Rutaganda Judgement,
and the Serushago Sentence, were rendered by an ICTR Trial Chamber in 1999.
Also in 1999, the purportedly common Appeals Chamber8 handed down what
is apparently 9 the final judgment in the Tadidcase.'° The Appeals Chamber has
several cases and motions pending from both Tribunals.
I. THE APPEALS CHAMBER
According to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the Appeals Chamber hears
decisions appealed by persons convicted by either the ICTY or ICTR Trial
Chambers, or from the Prosecutor of an error on a question of law invalidating
the decision, or on an error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
It is also empowered, under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to review a
decision at the request of a state directly affected by an interlocutory decision
if such decision concerns issues of general importance to the Tribunal. After the
Tadid Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, it could also be said to have
established a precedent for hearing other appeals considered of general
importance to the Tribunal."
II. 1999 APPEALS CHAMBER JUDGMENTS: TADIC JUDGEMENT
On July 15, 1999, the Appeals Chamber rendered its Judgement in the
Tadid case, the first such decision discharged by the Appeals Chamber.
Because the Appeals Chamber is common to both the Yugoslavian and
Rwandan Tribunals, this decision has important implications for both Tribunals.
The Trial Chamber Judgment in Tadid had been handed down in the ICTY by
Trial Chamber II on May 7, 1997, finding the Accused guilty on nine counts,
guilty in part on two counts, and not guilty on twenty counts. Of these twenty
not-guilty verdicts, eleven of the counts were acquitted because a majority of
the Trial Chamber held that the grave breach charges brought under Article 2
of the Statute were inapplicable because it had not been proven that the victims
were protected persons, an element of the offence.
8. "Purportedly" because it has to date been made up exclusively ofjudges elected to the ICTY.
9. "Apparently" because it is unclear whether Tadid can file or has filed an appeal from the
Appeals Chamber's Judgement when it found him guilty on nine counts for which he was previously found
not guilty by the Trial Chamber. Such a right to appeal from an Appeals Chamber decision is not provided
for under the Statute or Rules.
10. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
11. while not explicitly provided for in the Statute or the Rules (since the appeal was lodged by
Tadid prior to his trial and conviction), the Appeals Chamber nevertheless determined it had authority to hear
an appeal by Tadid challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid a/k/a "Dule,"
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-I-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, App.
Ch., at f 4-6, (seemingly basing its authority on "common sense," practicality, and the interests of justice).
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In its appeal against the Trial Chamber's Judgment, the Defense argued
that Tadid' s right to a fair trial was prejudiced because he was denied "equality
of arms" between the Prosecution and the Defense, due to the prevailing
circumstances in which the trial was conducted. It further asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred as to finding him guilty of the murders of two Muslim
policemen, Osman Didovid and Edin Begic. Leave to file an appeal concerning
conduct of his former counsel had been previously denied by the Appeals
Chamber, so these were the only two remaining appeals against the Judgment.
In the appeal against the Judgment, the Defense sought to have the guilty
verdicts set aside and a re-trial ordered. In the alternative, Tadid sought to have
the guilty verdicts, as to the two policemen, reversed and correspondingly, that
the sentence be reviewed.
Five cross-appeals were filed by the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter
"OTP"). Of the eleven not-guilty verdicts relating to grave breaches, seven
were appealed by the Prosecution, and in addition, two of the not guilty verdicts
were appealed in regards to murder charges alleging Tadi' s participation in the
killings in Jaskidi. There were thus a total of nine acquittals appealed by the
OTP in the first two cross-appeals. The three remaining cross-appeals
concerned questions of general importance to the work of the Tribunal: the OTP
challenged the Trial Chamber's determination that a crime against humanity
cannot be committed for purely personal reasons; it challenged the Trial
Chamber's finding that discriminatory intent is a required element of crimes
against humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute; and it argued that a
majority of the Trial Chamber erred in a November 1996 decision denying a
Prosecution motion for production of defense witness statements, creating an
untenable precedent.
A. Tadie's Appeal Against Judgment
1. Inequality of Arms
The first ground of appeal by the Defense concerned a complaint that due
to circumstances disproportionately impacting the Accused's case (such as the
failure of the Republika Srpska to cooperate by securing witnesses) Tadid's
right to a fair trial was prejudiced because there was an inequality of arms
between the Prosecution and the Defense. Equality of arms - the principle that
"each party must have a reasonable opportunity to defend its interests 'under
conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-A-vis his
opponent ' - is guaranteed by the fundamental right to a fair trial, as embodied
in human rights instruments and Article 21(4)(b) of the ICTY Statute.
12. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
The Appeals Chamber decided that because of the Tribunal's limited
enforcement powers and its reliance on state cooperation, this principle must
be given a liberal interpretation in the ICTY. Additionally, noting that the
Chambers are empowered to issue any necessary orders, summonses,
subpoenas, warrants, and transfer orders to aid an investigation or effectuate a
trial, 3 the Appeals Chamber determined that a Chamber therefore, "shall
provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and
Statute when faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its
case."' 4 However, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Appellant/Defense was
not complaining that the Trial Chamber had not responded adequately to its
requests for assistance, and indeed it was uncontested that the Trial Chamber
took virtually all measures within its authority to assist the Defense when
requested and necessary. The Appellant had remained silent as to certain
difficulties encountered in defending its case, and then relied on the equality of
arms principle to complain not that the Trial Chamber had failed to assist it
when seized of a request to do so, but instead that Tadid did not receive a fair
trial because authorities in the Republika Srpska had not cooperated in securing
the attendance of certain witnesses. As such, the Appeals Chamber denied
Tadid's appeal on this ground, holding that the Appellant failed to establish that
he was denied equality of arms by the Trial Chamber.
2. Appeal of Conviction for the Murder of Two Policemen
The remaining ground of appeal by the Defense concerned a complaint
that an error of fact lead to a miscarriage of justice, and consequently, Tadid
should not have been convicted of the murder of two policemen. It was
uncontested that reasonableness is the standard to be used in determining
whether the Trial Chamber's factual finding should stand. In the appeal, Tadid
complained that he was convicted of these murders solely on the testimony of
one unreliable witness. Noting that the Trial Chamber Judges have the task of
hearing, assessing, and weighing the evidence presented at trial and must
necessarily be given a margin of deference to findings of fact reached by the
Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Appellant failed to
establish that the witness was suspect or that his testimony was inherently
implausible. Finding no merit to the claim that the Trial Chamber acted
unreasonably in relying on this testimony in finding that the Appellant killed
the two policemen, this basis of appeal was also rejected.
13. Id. at$ 52.
14. Id.
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B. Cross-Appeals by the OTP
Five cross-appeals were filed by the Office of the Prosecutor. The first
two concerned acquittals. The three remaining cross-appeals were not alleged
to have had a bearing on the verdicts or that an appeal laid under Article 25(1)
of the Statute. However, both sides agreed that the issues were matters of
general importance affecting the conduct of trials before the Tribunal and
therefore were deemed to merit the attention of the Appeals Chamber. Hence,
the Appeals Chamber pronounced its opinion in these matters.
1. Grave Breaches and "Protected Persons"
The first ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chamber's finding that it had not been proven that the victims were "protected
persons" under Article 2 of the Statute (which gives the Tribunal jurisdiction
over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). For Article 2 to apply,
it must first be established that the nature of the conflict was at all relevant
times international in character, and second that the grave breach alleged was
perpetrated against persons or property "protected" by one or more of the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The Appeals Chamber noted that an internal armed
conflict may in certain situations become international if another state
intervenes in the conflict through its troops or if some of the participants in the
internal conflict act on behalf of another state.15 The Appeals Chamber found
that international law provides for applying three different tests to determine if
individuals or groups may be regarded as defacto organs of the state or agency:
1) a test of "overall control" to determine if the acts of armed groups can be
attributable to a state; 2) a test of "specific instructions (or subsequent public
approval)" to determine if individuals or militarily unorganized groups act on
behalf of states; and 3) a test of "assimilation of individuals to State organs on
account of their actual behavior within the structure of a State (and regardless
of any possible requirement of State instructions."' 6 After analyzing the facts,
the Appeals Chamber concluded that the armed forces of the Republika Srpska
were acting under the overall control of and on behalf of the FRY. Thus, "even
after May 19, 1992 the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the
Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be
classified as an international armed conflict."'
' 7
In determining whether the victims were "protected persons," the Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the Fourth Geneva Convention was intended to protect
15. Id. at 84.
16. Id. at9 141.
17. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadid, Judgement, 17-94-1-A, July 15, 1999.
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civilians to the maximum extent possible and to provide protection to civilians
who do not have diplomatic protection and who are "not subject to the
allegiance and control" of the state in whose hands they may find themselves,
and therefore, it is the substance of relations between the parties, not their legal
characterization, which is controlling. 8 In essence, under this criteria, it does
not matter if the victims (Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and perpetrator
(Bosnian Serb) are technically from the same nationality. Determining that the
victims in this case were "protected persons" who found themselves in the
hands of armed forces of a state of which they were not nationals, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber erred in acquitting Tadid of the
grave breach charges on the ground that the grave breaches regime was not
applicable. It thus reversed the not guilty verdicts of the seven grave breach
counts appealed.
Perhaps the most surprising articulation in this section is the suggestion in
footnote 113 that the four conditions set out in Article 4 of Geneva III for
determining the legitimacy of combatants "may now be considered to have been
replaced by the different conditions set out in Article 44(3) and 43(1) of
Additional Protocol I."
2. Insufficient Evidence as to the Killings in Jaskid
The second ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chambers finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Tadid
had participated in the killings of five men in Jaskidi. In this regard, the
Prosecution complained that the Trial Chamber misapplied the standard of
proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, as the only reasonable conclusion that
could be drawn from the facts is that the Accused was guilty as charged.
Further, the OTP contended that in determining that the Prosecution did not
meet the burden of proof, the Trial Chamber misapplied the common purpose
doctrine, which essentially holds that "if a person knowingly participates in a
criminal activity with others, he or she will be liable for all illegal acts that are
natural and probable consequences of that common purpose" 9 After reviewing
the case law, the Appeals Chamber held that common design as a form of
accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and is
implicit in the Statute. It also determined that case law has demonstrated its
applicability to three distinct categories of cases. The actus reus of
participation in a common design requires: 1) a plurality of persons; 2) the
existence of a common plan, design, or purpose to commit a crime justiciable
under the Statute; and 3) participation of the Accused in this common design.
18. Id. at 168.
19. Id. at 175.
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The mens rea differs depending upon the category of common design under
consideration. In the Tadiecase, the Appeals Chamber concluded, based upon
the factual findings of the Trial Chamber, that Tadic had actively participated
in a common criminal purpose and that he actively took part in a common
criminal purpose to attack Jaskidi by rounding up and severely beating some of
the men from Jaskidi. As a result, the Appeals Chamber held that the only
possible conclusion the Trial Chamber could have drawn was that Tadid had the
intent to participate in the common criminal purpose to commit inhumane acts,
and willingly took the foreseeable risk that members of the group being
attacked might be killed during this attack. The Appeals Chamber therefore
held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that it had not been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that Tadid had any part in the killing of the five men from
Jaskici. Setting aside2" the Trial Chamber's not guilty verdict on these charges,
the Appeals Chamber found Tadid guilty in the death of these men.
3. Crimes Against Humanity - Purely Personal Motives
The third ground of cross-appeal by the OTP involved the Trial Chambers'
finding that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for purely personal
reasons. In order to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, the
Prosecution must prove the existence of an armed conflict and that there was
a sufficient nexus between the armed conflict and the acts alleged. After
reviewing Article 5 of the Statute and customary international law, the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the motive of the perpetrator does not acquire any
relevance for establishing evidence of crimes against humanity. It thus opined
that the requirement that an act must not have been carried out for purely
personal motives does not form part of the prerequisite elements necessary to
prove the commission of the crime.2
4. Crimes Against Humanity - Discriminatory Intent
The fourth ground of cross-appeal by the OTP concerned the Trial
Chamber's finding that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory
intent. In interpreting the text of Article 5 of the Statute and surveying
customary international law, the Appeals Chamber determined that
discriminatory intent is not a required element of crimes against humanity. In
reviewing the Report of the Secretary-General and statements made by some
members of the Security Council concerning *Article 5 of the Statute, these
20. The Trial Chamber uses the terms "set aside" and "reverse" the verdict/judgment
interchangeably.
21. Prosecutor v. Du~ko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-1 -A, July 15, 1999.
"interpretive sources" were deemed to be insufficient to establish that all crimes
against humanity need be committed with a discriminatory intent.22 Thus, the
Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes
against humanity require a discriminatory intent.
It is unclear exactly how this part of the decision will affect the Rwanda
Tribunal, as the ICTR Statute's crimes against humanity provision differs in
significant terms from the crimes against humanity provision enumerated in the
ICTY Statute. Indeed, under the terms of Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the
ICTR has the power to prosecute certain crimes, including murder, inhumane
acts, and "persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds," when these
crimes are committed "as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."
Yet, this language may be interpreted narrowly as a result of paragraph 284 of
the Tadid Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, which states that because the
Yugoslavia Statute has a persecution subsection for crimes carried out "on
political, racial and religious grounds," to interpret the Statute and the law as
requiring that all crimes against humanity require discriminatory intent would
render the persecution subsection "illogical and superfluous" as the
presumption is that law-makers enact rules that are meaningful in all their
elements. Applying this analysis to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute would make
the chapeau of the Article in conflict with the remainder of the Article, which
too includes a persecution subsection. The Appeals Chamber notes that
supplemental means of interpretation can be resorted to when the text of an
instrument is unclear.23 Consequently, if the text of Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute is challenged and determined to be ambiguous due to its duplicative
persecutorial requirement which may render one or the other superfluous, then
turning to customary international law for guidance, and drawing on the Tadid
Judgement in this regard, it could conceivably be determined that Article 3 of
the ICTR Statute could be interpreted as not imposing a discriminatory intent
for all crimes against humanity.24
5. Disclosure of Defense Witness Statements
The fifth ground of cross-appeal by the OTP resulted from an earlier denial
of the Prosecution's motion for disclosure of a prior statement of a defense
witness after he had testified. The Prosecution maintained that this decision
remained persuasive authority for the proposition that the Defense cannot be
22. Id. at 1 293.
23. Id. at 1 303.
24. Id. at 1 292 (stating that customary international law "does not presuppose a discriminatory or
persecutory intent for all crimes against humanity.")
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ordered to disclose prior witness statements. Accordingly, the issue concerned
the power of a Trial Chamber to carry out its judicial functions while
conducting a fair and impartial trial, including the Trial Chamber's duty to
ascertain the credibility of witnesses. The Appeals Chamber opined that the
lawyer-client privilege does not cover Defense witness statements, and held
that, depending on circumstances of each case, a Trial Chamber may order the
disclosure of Defense witness statements after examination-in-chief of the
Witness.
C. Summary
In the TadidJudgement, the Appeals Chamber denied the two remaining
grounds of appeal sought by the Appellant/Defense. It allowed the OTP's
cross-appeals, and reversed the Trial Chamber's verdict as to the grave breach
charges appealed, and also reversed the Trial Chamber's determination that the
Accused had played no part in the killing of five men from the village of
Jaskidi. The Appeals Chamber further determined that a crime against
humanity can be carried out for purely personal motives and that discriminatory
intent is not required for all crimes against humanity, only for the persecution
crimes covered by Article 5(h) of the Statute. Finally, it held that depending on
the facts of each case, a Trial Chamber may order the disclosure of Defense
witness statements after examination-in-chief of the witness.
Because the Appeals Chamber denied Tadid's appeal on all counts, and
allowed and reversed as to each of the Prosecution's cross-appeals, it resulted
in Tadid being found guilty on nine additional charges. This of course means
that the Appeals Chamber found the accused, Tadid, guilty on nine counts for
which the Trial Chamber had previously found him not guilty. The
consequences of such a determination are currently unknown, as the new
convictions have apparently not been challenged by appeal. In the ICTY
Statute, Article 24 only provides for an appeal "from persons convicted by the
Trial Chambers" - it does not explicitly provide for an appeal for a person
convicted by the Appeals Chamber. Thus, it is unclear whether there is an
absolute denial of any right of appeal from an Appeals Chamber. Yet, because
Tadid was found guilty of nine counts for the first time, it could be argued that
he has a right to appeal these convictions, despite the fact that they were
imposed by the Appeals Chamber.' If such a right is asserted and found, the
appeal would clearly need to be heard by a differently constituted Appeals
Chamber. As noted by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadid Interlocutory Appeal
25. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, Judgement, IT-94-I-A. July 15, 1999.
on Jurisdiction, narrowly interpreting the jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber
"falls foul of a modem vision of the administration of justice. '2 6
In addition to the aforementioned appeals, the Defense also filed an appeal
against the Sentencing Judgement imposed by the Trial Chamber. However,
because Tadic was convicted on nine additional counts by the Appeals
Chamber, this portion of the appeal was deferred until the Appeals Chamber
sentences Tadid on the new convictions.
111. 1999 ICTY TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENTS
A. Aleksovski Judgement
The Indictment against Zlatko Aleksovski was issued on November 2,
1995, confirmed on November 10, 1995, and he was arrested on June 8, 1996
by the Croatian police acting pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the
Tribunal. He spent ten months and twenty days in detention in the Republic of
Croatia before being transferred to the ICTY Detention Center in The Hague
on April 28, 1997. The trial began on January 6, 1998 and ended on March 23,
1999. The judgment was pronounced orally on May 7, 1999, and the written
decision rendered on June 25, 1999. The oral judgment was announced before
the written judgment was completed because Aleksovski's detention time
exceeded the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber. Aleksovski was
sentenced to a mere two and one half years' imprisonment for the one count on
which he was found guilty and as his total detention time amounted to two
years, ten months, and twenty-nine days, he was ordered immediately released,
notwithstanding any appeal.
The Aleksovski trial was heard by Trial Chamber I. The Indictment
charged Aleksovski, commander/warden of Kaonik prison, with three counts:
Article 2 of the Statute, grave breaches (inhuman treatment; and wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health); and Article 3 of the
Statute, violations of the laws or customs of war (outrages upon personal
dignity.) The Indictment alleged that during a six month period in 1993,
hundreds of Bosnian Muslim civilians were detained under Aleksovski's
custody in Kaonik prison. Additionally, during this time the detainees "under
his control" were subjected to deplorable conditions in the prison and to various
forms of physical and psychological mistreatment within and outside the prison,
including physical and psychological abuse leading to death. Aleksovski was
charged under 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute for individual criminal responsibility
for his implicit and explicit participation in the offences alleged and for his
26. Prosecutor v. Dufko Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, App. Ch. at 16.
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responsibility as a superior for the acts committed by military or civilian
persons under his authority and control.
In its Judgement, the Trial Chamber noted that Articles 2 and 3 of the
Statute apply only when the offences alleged are committed in the context of
an armed conflict and with a sufficient nexus between the offence and the
armed conflict. The nexus requirement was interpreted to mean that the act was
perpetrated against the victim "because" of the conflict.27 The Trial Chamber
noted that it was not disputed that an armed conflict existed. However, because
under traditional interpretations of Article 2 (the grave breach provisions) the
armed conflict must be international in character, the Trial Chamber was unable
to agree on the applicability of Article 2 as to the facts established at trial. The
majority concluded that the victims were not "protected persons", a status
which is required to incur criminal liability for violating the grave breach
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. As such, Aleksovski was found not
guilty on the two grave breach counts, without the Trial Chamber examining
whether the offences alleged amounted to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. This acquittal could be in jeopardy as a result of the Appeals
Chamber holding in the TadidJudgement, discussed above.
The remaining count, alleging violations of Article 3 of the Statute,
charged as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
under the proscription of committing outrages upon personal dignity, was then
considered by the Trial Chamber after it reached general conclusions as to the
Accused's behavior, position, authority over, and responsibility for conditions
and mistreatment within and outside Kaonik prison.
As to incurring 7(1) liability, an Accused can be held responsible not only
for crimes they perpetrate physically, but also for "crimes committed by others
which [the Accused] is said to have personally ordered, instigated or otherwise
aided and abetted."2 Participation may occur before, during, or after the act is
committed and need not be manifested through physical assistance, as moral
support, encouragement, and sometimes mere presence is sufficient to incur
liability if it has a significant effect on the commission of the crime.29 As to
incurring 7(3) liability, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that an Accused can
be held criminally responsible for failing to take steps to halt, prevent, or punish
crimes committed by subordinates, when there is a means and a legal duty to do
so. "Superior responsibility", used to capture both doctrines of command
responsibility (usually attributed to military authorities) and superior authority
(usually attributed to political/civilian leaders), may be ascribed to an Accused
27. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, IT-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999.
28. Id. at 1 59.
29. Id. at 719 62-64.
if (i) there exists a defacto or dejure superior-subordinate relationship between
the Accused and the perpetrator; (ii) the superior knew or had reason to know
a crime had been committed or was about to be committed; and (iii) the
superior failed to take all the necessary and reasonable measures under the
circumstances existing at the time to prevent or halt the crime or to punish the
perpetrator.
Under facts established at trial, the Trial Chamber found Aleksovski
responsible under both 7(1) and 7(3) theories of responsibility for his
participation, through acts or behavior, for crimes committed within the Kaonik
prison compound. It also held that he aided and abetted in the use of detainees
as human shields or trenchdiggers, incurring 7(1) responsibility. In regards to
7(3) liability, the Trial Chamber found a superior-subordinate relationship over
prison guards sufficiently established, but not such relationship over HVO
soldiers. It held that the Accused could not be held responsible for crimes
committed outside the Kaonik prison compound. It remains unclear whether
Aleksovski was, as warden/commander of Kaonik prison, a civilian or military
leader.
The Trial Chamber then turned to Aleksovski's responsibility under 7(1)
for crimes committed within Kaonik prison, either physically by the Accused,
or by ordering, instigating or otherwise aiding and abetting in the crimes, and
under 7(3) for crimes committed by persons under his control and authority.
For 7(1) responsibility, the Trial Chamber considered it proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Aleksovski was responsible for the detention conditions
in Kaonik prison, and that it was his duty to see to the hygiene, health, and
welfare of the detainees. However, the Trial Chamber held that while the
conditions were extremely poor and clearly did not meet international human
rights standards, it had not been adequately proven that the Accused failed to
take measures incumbent upon and available to him or that he deliberately
ordered or allowed the conditions to arise.3 °
As to the physical and psychological abuse, the Trial Chamber found it
sufficiently proved that in some instances the Accused aided and abetted in
mistreatment by means of verbal or expressive encouragement or by silence
when it was his duty to oppose or repress the acts; at times he physically
participated in physical violence; other times he ordered the beating and other
mistreatment of detainees.31 Consequently, the Trial Chamber found that the
violence inflicted within the Kaonik prison, both individually and by persons
under his authority, constituted an outrage upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment within the meaning of Common Article 3,
30. !d. at 1221.
31. Id. at j 86-89.
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as justiciable under Article 3 of the Statute for individual criminal
responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute. Further, the use of
detainees as human shields or trench-diggers was also held to constitute an
outrage upon personal dignity. Aleksovski was held responsible under 7(1) for
aiding and abetting in these crimes.
Perhaps the most surprising part of the Aleksovski Judgement is the
stunningly low sentence imposed for the conviction. Aleksovski was found
guilty of one count for violations of the laws or customs of war under two
theories of responsibility, which established the culpability of the Accused for
the physical and emotional violence inflicted on detainees in Kaonik prison.
As noted above, in pronouncing its sentence, the Trial Chamber imposed two
and a half years' of imprisonment, which exceeded the amount of time
Aleksovski had already been in detention, so he was immediately released.
While brought under one count, and convicted of only one count, the outrages
upon personal dignity charge consisted not of a single crime, but a course of
conduct comprising a series of heinous crimes committed by Aleksovski and by
persons under his authority against a large number of individuals.
Judge Rodrigues attached a dissenting opinion as to the applicability of the
grave breach provisions, determining that the international character of the
conflict was indeed established, even though it was his opinion that such
characterization of the conflict is not a condition prerequisite before Article 2
of the Statute can be applied. The majority, Judges Vohrah and Nieto-Navia,
also attached a joint opinion on the applicability of Article 2 of the Statute,
explaining its finding that the victims were not "protected persons" within the
meaning of Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which enunciates the
persons and property protected by the grave breach regime. The majority
concluded that to be a protected person, the civilian victim must hold a
nationality different from that of the captors/perpetrators.32 The majority found
that the detainees (Bosnian Muslims) held the same nationality as their captors
(Bosnian Croats, who may or may not have held a dual nationality as
Croatian).33 However, as discussed above, a contrary determination was made
by the Appeals Chamber in the TadidJudgement Also note that although not
considering the merits of the grave breach charges because the prerequisite
elements were deemed not to have been satisfied, the Trial Chamber considered
that the violence inflicted on the Muslim detainees of Kaonik prison constituted
"a grave violation of the principles of international humanitarian law arising
32. Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgement, rr-95-14/1-T, June 25, 1999.
33. Id. at 71 32-34.
from the Geneva Conventions", language which indicates it might constitute a
grave breach if an international armed conflict were found.'
B. The JelisidJudgement
On October 19, 1999, Trial Chamber I rendered its Judgement against
Goran Jelisid. This case represents the first genocide trial to be held in the
ICTY. Jelisid, who called himself the "Serb Adolf," was charged in the
Indictment with one count of genocide, twelve counts of violations of the laws
or customs of war for murder, three counts of violations of the laws or customs
of war for cruel treatment, one count of violations of the laws or customs of war
for plunder, twelve counts of crimes against humanity for murder, and three
counts of crimes against humanity for inhumane acts. The Indictment alleged
Jelisid's participation in crimes committed against Muslims and Croats at the
Luka camp in northern Bosnia, where he "held a position." He was charged
exclusively under 7(1). In October 1998, Jelisid pleaded not guilty to the
genocide charge, but guilty to the thirty-one remaining charges of crimes
against humanity and war crimes. Trial on the one count of genocide, which
alleged that the Accused committed or aided and abetted in killing members of
the group, ended in acquittal in a Judgement announced on October 19, 1999.
According to the press release, the Trial Chamber found that the OTP failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jelisid acted with the requisite intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslim population as a national,
ethnic or religious group, or that he had "the clear knowledge that he was
participating in genocide, that is to say the destruction, at least in part, of a
given group." Nonetheless, the acquittal appears to based primarily on a
finding that the OTP had failed to establish that genocide had been committed
in the region, and it therefore had difficulty finding the Accused guilty of
genocide. The Trial Chamber also appeared to take into account the fairly low
status of Jelisid, and the language of the Judgement indicates there was some
hesitation to find a low level actor guilty of genocide, particularly when it was
not firmly established that genocide had been committed in the region.
As to the guilty plea on the thirty-one counts of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, pursuant to Article 62 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the guilty plea is
voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and that "there is a sufficient factual basis for
the crime and the accused's participation in it." The Trial Chamber determined
that the evidence established there was no doubt that Jelisid committed the
crimes he admitted, and it agreed with the Prosecutor's legal qualification of the
34. Id. at '1228.
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crimes as constituting crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or
customs of war. He was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment.
IV. 1999 ICTR TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENTS
A. Serushago Sentence
On September 24, 1998, the Indictment against Omar Serushago, alleging
six counts of violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the ICTR Statute, was filed by the
OTP, but only five of these counts were confirmed by Judge Ostrovsky, who
dismissed one count of the Indictment. The remaining counts alleged one count
of genocide, and four counts of crimes against humanity for murder,
extermination, torture, and rape.
On December 14, 1998, Serushago pleaded guilty to four of the five counts
of the modified Indictment; he pleaded not guilty to the rape count.
Subsequently, the rape charge was withdrawn by the OTP.3 5 In reviewing the
charges and the acknowledgement of the Accused of his culpability for the
crimes, and after considering the case on its merits and general principles
regarding the determination of sentences, Trial Chamber I rendered its
Judgement on February 5, 1999.
Considering the gravity of the offences, including Serushago's guilt for
genocide, regarded as the "crime of crimes," and the fact that the Accused
personally murdered four Tutsi and that thirty-three other people were killed by
militia under his authority, the Trial Chamber noted that he committed these
crimes knowingly and with premeditation. In considering mitigating factors,
the Trial Chamber noted the youth, family, and social background of the
Accused, and particularly stressed that Serushago cooperated with the Office
of the Prosecutor, he voluntarily surrendered, he entered a guilty plea, and had
expressed remorse and contrition. It concluded that exceptional mitigating
circumstances afforded him some clemency. As such, Serushago was sentenced
to a single term of fifteen years' imprisonment.
B. Kayishema & Ruzindana Judgement
On May 21, 1999, after the joint trial of Clement Kayishema and Obed
Ruzindana, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR rendered the Rwanda Tribunal's
second judgment after a trial on the merits. The trial against Kayishema, the
Prefect of Kibuye Prefecture, and Ruzindana, a commercial businessman in
Kigali, began on April 11, 1997 and adjourned on November 17, 1998. The
35. See short discussion in Kelly D. Askin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Its
Treatment of Crimes Against Women, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, CHALLENGES &
PROSPECTS (John Carey & John Pritchard eds., vol. I1, 2000).
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Accused, both Hutu, were charged under Articles 2-4 of the Statute with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II. These charges were also brought pursuant to Articles
6(1) and 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, which grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to
prosecute persons responsible for individual and superior criminal
responsibility.
Kayishema alone was charged under counts one through six with genocide
(genocide,' without specificity as regards to acts of Art.2(2)(a)-(e) of the
Statute), crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, and other inhumane
acts), and violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II (violence
to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder
as well, as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment) for a massacre at a Catholic Church and Home in St. Jean. He was
charged identically under counts seven through twelve for a massacre at a
Stadium in Kibuye Town. Kayishema was again charged with these same
crimes and acts under counts thirteen through eighteen for a massacre at a
Church in Mubuga. Counts nineteen through twenty-four charge both
Kayishema and Ruzindana with these identical crimes and acts, for alleged
massacres committed in the area of Bisesero.
1. Genocide
The Trial Chamber noted that before an Accused can be held responsible
for genocide, it must be proven that the Accused had the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a racial, ethnic, religious, or national group by committing one
of the specified prohibited acts. The Trial Chamber focused primarily upon the
prohibited acts of killing and/or causing serious bodily harm to members of a
group, and determined that both Kayishema and Ruzindana, did intend to
destroy the Tutsi group by means of killing or seriously injuring them. As to
the massacres at the Complex and Stadium, Kayishema was held to have
instigated; ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, and execution of genocide by killing and causing serious bodily
harm to Tutsis; as to the massacre at the Church, Kayishema was held to have
intended to have aided and abetted the preparation and execution of the
massacres. Both Kayishema and Ruzindana were held to have instigated,
ordered, committed, and otherwise aided and abetted in the preparation and
execution of the massacre of Tutsis in the Bisesero area.
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2. Crimes Against Humanity
Enunciating the elements of murder, the Trial Chamber held that an
Accused can be held accountable if, when engaging in unlawful conduct, s/he
(i) causes the death of another; (ii) by a premeditated act or omission; (iii)
intending to kill any person or intending to cause grievous bodily harm to any
person.36 Articulating the elements of extermination, the Trial Chamber held
that an Accused can be held accountable for participating in the mass killing of
others or in creating conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others
through acts or omissions, for having intended the killing, or being reckless, or
grossly negligent as to whether the killing would result and, for being aware
that their acts or omissions form part of a mass killing event, if the acts or
omissions form part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.3 7 Elements
of other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity were stipulated as follows:
the Accused must (i) commit an act of similar gravity and seriousness to the
other acts enumerated in the Statute; (ii) with the intention to cause the other
inhumane act (whether against a victim or witness); and (iii) with knowledge
that the act is perpetrated within the overall context of the attack.3"
3. Violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
In order for an act to breach Common Article 3 and Protocol II, the Trial
Chamber stated that the following elements must be established: (i) that the
armed conflict in Rwanda during this period was of a non-international
character; (ii) there is a link between the Accused and the armed forces; (iii) the
crimes must be committed ratione loci and ratione personae; and (iv) there
must be a nexus between the crime and the armed conflict.39 This Trial
Chamber thus concurs with the Akayesu Trial Chamber's restrictive
interpretation that serious violations of Common Article 3 are only justiciable
when committed by persons acting in furtherance of the war effort.'
36. Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1-T, 140, May
21, 1999.
37. Id. atl 144.
38. Id. atj 154.
39. Id. at 169.
40. Id. at 175. It is also interesting that the Trial Chamber imposed a requirement of proof that
the conflict is internal, as the common Appeals Chamber held in the Tadid Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction Decision that Common Article 3 and most parts of Additional Protocol II are part of customary
international law, applicable to internal and international armed conflicts. See. Prosecutor v. Dulko Tadid
a/k/a "Dule," Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94- I-AR72, 2 Oct.




As to the first three massacre sites, of which solely Kayishema is charged,
the evidence established that thousands of Tutsis seeking refuge from various
communes fled to each of these sites, historically regarded as safe havens, to
escape atrocities perpetrated by the Hutus throughout Kibuye Prefecture. At
each of these sites, gendarmes under Kayishema's authority and control
guarded the entrances and prevented Tutsis from leaving. Conditions inside the
sites became desperate, as food, water, and other supplies were neither provided
nor allowed. During a five day period, the tens of thousands of Tutsi
imprisoned at these sites were systematically slaughtered; only a handful
survived. It was not disputed that the massacres occurred. The issue was
whether Kayishema incurred criminal liability by means of his presence, acts,
omissions, words, or authority. The Trial Chamber deemed it proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that Kayishema was present at each of the massacres, and
participated in the attacks by such means as encouraging, ordering, instigating,
inciting, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the attacks.
As to the charges against Kayishema and Ruzindana for massacres in the
area of Bisesero, the evidence established a series of massive, organized attacks
by Hutu against Tutsi during which thousands of Tutsi civilians were
systematically slaughtered. The Trial Chamber was satisfied that Ruzindana
and Kayishema, acting on some occasions in concert and on other occasions
separately, personally attacked Tutsis seeking refuge in Bisesero, and by their
words or acts, further aided in the "mass murder" of these victims. Indeed, the
Trial Chamber held that both Accused orchestrated and directed many of the
massacres in Bisesero.
In reaching its verdict, the Trial Chamber found both Accused guilty of
each genocide count charged against them. However, they were found not
guilty as to each crimes against humanity, Common Article 3, and Additional
Protocol II charge. A majority of the Trial Chamber held that as to counts
charging the Accused with crimes against humanity by means of extermination
and murder, these crimes were, under the facts of this case, "fully subsumed"
by the genocide crimes. It is important to emphasize that the judgment did not
hold that crimes against humanity are always subsumed within genocide. It was
the particular facts of this case - the same acts (murder, extermination)
committed against the same victims - that caused a majority of the Trial
Chamber to reach this conclusion. Judge Kahn however dissented on this point,
pointing out that in the practice of the Tribunals this issue is dealt with in the
sentencing phase (by imposing concurrent sentences when found guilty of the
same act under different Articles of the Statute), not in the guilt phase.
The Trial Chamber unanimously held that the Accused were not guilty of
committing inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. While the Trial
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Chamber noted that the Accused did indeed commit inhumane acts as a crime
against humanity, it rejected the use of "inhumane acts" as a "catch all"
category of crimes, and determined that because the OTP, while generally
alleging and referring to widespread violence, mutilation, and abuse, did not
specifically identify precisely which inhumane acts were being prosecuted and
did not adequately particularize which pieces of evidence supported these
charges, it found the Accused not guilty on these counts." The not guilty
verdicts as to the Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II counts were
made based on determinations that the Prosecution did not prove that the
Accused, both civilians, were supporting the Government efforts against the
RPF (the standard seemingly erroneously adopted in Akayesu), and that
therefore the Accused did not incur criminal liability for their crimes under
Article 4 of the Statute.42
In conclusion, four guilty verdicts were rendered against Kayishema on the
genocide counts, although he was then held to be not guilty on four crimes
against humanity counts, four violations of Common Article 3 counts, and four
violation of Protocol II counts. One guilty verdict was rendered against
Ruzindana on the genocide count, and he was similarly acquitted on one count
each alleging crimes against humanity, violations of Common Article 3, and
violations of Additional Protocol II. Kayishema was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and Ruzindana was sentenced to twenty-five years'
imprisonment.
C. Rutaganda Judgement43
On December 6, 1999, Trial Chamber I rendered its Judgement against
Georges Rutaganda, a prominent businessman and second vice-president of the
Interahamwe on the national level, for crimes committed during April 1994 at
the outbreak of the genocide. Rutaganda was deemed to have ordered, incited,
and carried out murders and to have caused serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the Tutsi ethnic group, by such means as distributing firearms and
other weapons to Interahamwe members and by taking part in attacks in
Kicukiro and Nyanza, during which hundreds of Tutsis were massacred.
41. Prosecutorv. Clement Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, ICTR-95-1 -T, May 21, 1999.
42. Id. at 1618, 624.
43. Please note that because this judgment was rendered after this article was written, it is not given
extensive treatment here.
Rutaganda was convicted of one count of genocide" and two counts of
crimes against humanity for extermination and murder. The Indictment had
charged Rutaganda with one count of genocide, four counts of crimes against
humanity (one count for extermination, three counts for murder), and three
counts of violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (all
brought as murder charges). Thus, while convicted on three counts, he was
found not guilty on five counts, with the two counts of crimes against humanity
considered subsumed within the genocide conviction, and the three Article 4
charges (for violations of Common Article 3) deemed to have been
insufficiently proven.
The reasoning for the not-guilty verdicts for two of the crime against
humanity charges for murder are explained as being a lesser included offence
of extermination as a crime against humanity, and therefore an Accused cannot
be held criminally responsible for both extermination and murder on the basis
of the same act.45 However, he was also convicted on one count of murder as
a crime against humanity for the slaying of a specifically named individual
whom Rutaganda killed with a machete. In regards to the acquittals for all
Common Article 3 charges, even though the Trial Chamber found the existence
of an internal armed conflict and a nexus between the armed conflict and the
crimes committed by the Interahamwe militia, it nevertheless unconvincingly
determined that it had not been adequately established that a nexus existed
between the criminal culpability of the Accused and the armed conflict.46
Rutaganda was sentenced concurrently to life imprisonment for the
genocide conviction, life imprisonment for the crime against humanity
(extermination) conviction, and fifteen years' imprisonment for the crime
against humanity (murder) conviction.
As of December 31, 1999, not a single person has been convicted in the
ICTR of war crimes (the charges brought under Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II for crimes committed in internal armed conflicts).
44. In this judgment, it is also interesting to note that crimes of sexual violence appear to be
subsumed within the genocide verdict, even though sexual violence was not specifically charged in the
indictment. For instance, in the section on Legal Findings for genocide, the Trial Chamber held: "Some
young girls were singled out, taken aside and raped before being killed. Many of the women who were killed
were stripped of their clothing. The soldiers then ordered the Interalramwe to check for survivors and to
finish them off. The Accused directed the Interahamwe ... The Chamber finds that is has been established
beyond any reasonable doubt that the Accused was present and participated in the Nyanza attack.
Furthermore, it holds that by his presence, the Accused abetted in the perpetration of the crimes." Prosecutor
v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, 1417, Dec. 6, 1999.
45. Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Judgement, ICTR-96-3-T, § §5.3-5.4,
Dec. 6, 1999.
46. See id. at §5.6.
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ACCOUNTABILITY BECKONS DURING A YEAR OF
WORRIES FOR THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP
Craig Etcheson*
The year 1999 saw a series of extraordinary developments in the search for
justice in the case of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. After twenty years during
which there was little or no official movement to bring the Khmer Rouge to
justice, international and domestic Cambodian momentum for genocide justice
accelerated dramatically.
A suitable point of departure for a discussion of these developments would
be a report delivered to United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan on
February 18, 1999.' Some twenty months earlier, on June 21, 1997, the Co-
Prime Ministers of Cambodia, First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh
and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen dispatched a letter to the United Nations
Secretary-General (UNSG) requesting international assistance in the matter of
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice.2 Due in part to the very deliberate nature
of United Nations processes and in part to political instability in Cambodia, the
arrival of a team of United Nations experts in Cambodia to prepare recommen-
dations pursuant to the letter of the Co-Prime Ministers was delayed more than
a year. During this intervening period, the Khmer Rouge political and military
organization collapsed, and most of the Khmer Rouge leadership surrendered
and applied to the government for various forms of mercy. Feeling thus
emboldened by his own successes in dealing with the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen
(by now the sole Prime Minister) rejected the recommendations from the United
* Craig Etcheson is a consultant on accountability for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. He left the faculty of Yale University in January 1998. At Yale he served as Program
Manager for the Cambodian Genocide Program from 1994 through 1996, and as Acting Director during 1997.
Etcheson also founded the Documentation Center of Cambodia in Phnom Penh, serving as its Director in
1995 and 1996. He is the author of three books ARMS RACE THEORY: STRATEGY AND THE STRUCTURE OF
BEHAVIOR, Greenwood, 1989; THE RISE AND DEMISE OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, westview Press and
Pinter Publishers, 1984; and the forthcoming CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND
JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA, The Mellen Press, forthcoming June 2000).
1. The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
52/135, by Ninian Stephen, Chairman, Rajsoomer Lallah, and Steven R. Ratner, dated February 18, 1999,
is presented as an annex to the United Nations document, Identical Letters Dated March 15, 1999from the
Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President ofthe Security Council, U.N.
GAOR, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item1 10(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850 and S/1999/231 (1999).
2. Letter from Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen to UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan (June 21, 1997) (distributed on the Internet via the Camnews news group, June 25,
1997).
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Nations Group of Experts that the United Nations establish an ad hoc
international tribunal drawing on the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This decision effectively rendered the Report
of the United Nations Experts dead on arrival. It is nonetheless useful to
consider the main recommendations of that report:
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The above discussion contains, we hope, an exhaustive treatment of the
issues assigned to the Group of Experts by the Secretary-General. Without
attempting to restate all of our recommendations, we reiterate those of most
importance. We recommend that:
1. That in response to the June 21, 1997 request of the government
of Cambodia, the United Nations establish an ad hoc international
tribunal to try Khmer Rouge officials for crimes against humanity
and genocide committed from April 17, 1975 to January 7, 1979.
2. That as a matter of prosecutorial policy, the independent
prosecutor appointed by the United Nations limit his or her investiga-
tions to those persons responsible for the most serious violations of
international human rights law and exercise his or her discretion
regarding investigations, indictments, and trials so as to fully take
into account the twin goals of individual accountability and national
reconciliation in Cambodia.
3. That the Security Council establish this tribunal or, should it not
do so, that the General Assembly establish it.
4. That the tribunal comprise two trial chambers and an appellate
chamber, and that the United Nations actively seek to include on the
tribunal a Cambodian national whom it believes is qualified,
impartial, and appropriate.
5. That the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda serve as the Prosecutor of the new tribunal, with a Deputy
Prosecutor specifically charged with responsibility for this tribunal.
6. That the tribunal, including the office of the Deputy Prosecutor,
be established in a state in the Asia-Pacific region but not in
Cambodia; that the Prosecutor establish an investigations office in
Cambodia; and that the United Nations, in cooperation with the
government of Cambodia, arrange for the unfettered dissemination
of the proceedings in Cambodia by radio and television.
7. That the full panel of judges appointed by the United Nations
not commence full-time- service until at a least some indictees have
been arrested.
8. That the United Nations undertake special measures for the
protection of physical evidence and of witnesses as necessary, and
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that states with evidence and witnesses on their territory make them
available to the Prosecutor.
9. That the tribunal established provide for the possibility of
reparations by defendants to victims, through a Trust Fund or some
other special fund, and that states holding such assets arrange for
their transfer to the tribunal as required to meet the defendants'
obligations in this regard.
10. That the United Nations, in cooperation with the Cambodian
government and non-governmental sector, encourage a process of
reflection among Cambodians to determine the desirability and, if
appropriate, the modalities of a truth-telling mechanism to provide a
fuller picture of the atrocities of the period of Democratic Kampu-
chea.
In asking for United Nations assistance, the government of Cambodia has
responded to what we sense is the desire of the Cambodian people for justice
and their knowledge that it is impossible to simply ignore the past. Rather, it
is necessary to understand the past and move beyond it by seeing justice done
for those responsible for it. This process has been too long delayed for
Cambodia and the time for action is here. If these and our other recommenda-
tions are pursued by the United Nations now with the support of the govern-
ment of Cambodia, we believe they will lead to a process that will truly enable
Cambodia to move away from its incalculably tragic past and create a genuine
form of national reconciliation for the future
Thus, to summarize the thrust of the Report, the Experts recommended that
the United Nations, through either the Security Council or the General
Assembly, clone the existing ad hoc international tribunals to create chambers
for Cambodia; that the tribunal be seated near but not in Cambodia; that
personal jurisdiction be limited to those "most responsible" for serious
violations of international humanitarian law; and that the temporal jurisdiction
of the tribunal extend from April 17, 1975 to January 7, 1979, the period of the
Khmer Rouge regime. Other significant aspects of the recommendations
included establishing a trust fund for reparations to victims of the Khmer
Rouge, that the United Nations should arrange broadcasts of the tribunal
sessions to the Cambodian people, and that Cambodia should consider
establishing some form of truth-telling mechanism or truth commission as an
adjunct to the judicial process.
But politics has a way of trumping justice. A senior official of the Royal
Cambodian Government said that the decision to reject the recommendations
of the United Nations Group of Experts was taken within days after the Group
3. Report of the Group of Experts, op. cit., pp. 59, 60.
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of Experts had completed their mission to Cambodia in November 1998,"
before those recommendations had even been formulated. Only later, after the
capture of the last hardline Khmer Rouge holdout, General Ta Mok, did the
Cambodian government decide to establish its own tribunal for the Khmer
Rouge.
Even so, the United Nations was not prepared to take "no" for an answer,
at least not yet. With prodding from the Secretary General's Special Represen-
tative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Thomas Hanrnarberg, the Cambodian
government agreed to entertain a new initiative from the United Nations. At the
United Nations, the Office of Legal Affairs labored through the summer to
define a new model of "international" justice, a "mixed" tribunal which would
be established under Cambodian domestic law and be seated in Phnom Penh,
but which would still be dominated by international personnel in order to
ensure that impartial justice would be done.
On August 25, 1999, a United Nations delegation headed by Assistant
Secretary General Ralph Zacklin arrived in Phnom Penh to negotiate with the
Cambodian government about possible United Nations participation in a
tribunal for the Khmer Rouge leadership.5 The Cambodian government
promptly presented the United Nations delegation with a draft charter for a
tribunal which would judge the Khmer Rouge leadership on charges of
genocide and crimes against humanity.6 The Cambodian plan proposed what
is fundamentally a, national, rather than an international tribunal. Under the
Cambodian draft charter, the court of first instance for prosecution of the
Khmer Rouge would be the existing Phnom Penh Municipal Court (which is not
known for its judicial independence). There would be two levels of appeals,
also within existing Cambodian judicial structures. A majority of personnel at
all levels of the judicial process would be Cambodians, and all legal personnel
involved in the Khmer Rouge trials, international as well as domestic, would
be appointed by the Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy (which has
also been accused of political taint).
In addition to the proposed institutional structures, the Cambodian draft
also contains what is essentially domestic implementing legislation for the
Genocide Convention. This implementing legislation crafts a new definition
of genocide, one which is obviously designed to fit precisely the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge and remove any legal ambiguity which may exist concerning
4. A senior minister of the Royal Government outlined this chronology privately for the author in
March 1999.
5. A more thorough analysis of this mission will be presented in the author's new volume, Craig
Etcheson, CRIMES OFTHE KHMER ROUGE: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE iN CAMBODIA, Mellen Press
(forthcoming 2000).
6. "Projet: Loi relative A la rdpression des crimes de ginocide et des crimes contre l'humanitd,"
typescript, n.d., n.p. (August 26, 1999, Council of Ministers, Phnom Penh, Cambodia).
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whether or not what the Khmer Rouge did was "genocide." In and of itself, it
is a progressive definition of genocide, adding political, economic, and other
groups to the list of "protected groups" for purposes of enforcement. However,
the Cambodian draft also specifies that this new definition will be "retroactive."
Temporal jurisdiction of the "tribunal" would be 1975 to 1979. The contours
of personal jurisdiction remain slightly ambiguous in the Cambodian draft.
The United Nations delegation responded to the Cambodian proposal by
saying the Secretary General's requirement that any Khmer Rouge tribunal
should be "international in character"7 could not be met simply by arbitrarily
grafting a few foreign lawyers onto existing Cambodian judicial institutions.
Zacklin also pointed out that a new definition of genocide could not be made
retroactive, if the Cambodians desired that the Khmer Rouge tribunal comply
with "international standards" of justice. The Assistant Secretary argued that,
in any event, there was no need for a novel definition of genocide, because any
Khmer Rouge perpetrators who might evade conviction on charges of genocide,
due to the restrictive wording of the Convention, could certainly be convicted
of crimes against humanity for those very same acts.8
The United Nations subsequently presented its own draft charter for a
Khmer Rouge tribunal, one which would involve going outside existing
Cambodian legal institutions to create a special forum uniquely designed for the
purposes of trying the Khmer Rouge leadership.' The new United Nations plan
called for a tribunal with one trial chamber and one appeals chamber, and, like
the Cambodian plan, it would prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity.
This tribunal would function under the jurisdiction of Cambodian law, with
appropriate implementing legislation to be promulgated prior to the convening
of the court. There would be a majority of international personnel, working
alongside a minority of Cambodian colleagues. The Cambodians would be
welcomed to nominate their own candidates for these positions, subject to
appropriate professional qualifications, and all tribunal personnel, international
and domestic, would be appointed by the Secretary General. As with the
Cambodian plan, temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal under the United Nations
plan would be from 1975 to 1979. Personal jurisdiction would encompass
7. Identical Letters, supra note 1, at 3.
8. These comments were made both in writing (Comments on the Draft Law Concerning the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, August 27, 1999, annex to a letter from
Assistant Secretary-General Ralph Zacklin to H.E. Sok An, Minister of State, Royal Government of
Cambodia) and verbally (Aide Memoire: Second Meeting Between the Cambodian Task Force on the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal and the Visiting UN Delegation, Council of Ministers, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, August 28,
1999).
9. Draft: Law on the Establishment of a Tribunal for the Prosecution of Khmer Rouge Leaders
Responsible for the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights, annex to a letter from Assistant Secretary-
General Ralph Zacklin to H.E. Sok An, Ministerof State, Royal Government of Cambodia, August 27, 1999.
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those "most responsible for the most serious violations" of international
humanitarian law. Funding would be through a Trust Fund designed for this
special purpose.
The two proposed plans were literally a world apart, and little progress
was made in bridging the gap during the week that the United Nations
delegation spent in Cambodia. At the conclusion of the final negotiating
session, the Cambodian team proposed another meeting with the United Nations
team in New York around September 17th in conjunction with the annual
opening of the General Assembly. The Cambodian side committed to prepare
a second draft of their charter for the tribunal, taking into account comments on
the first Cambodian draft by the United Nations side. That was agreed, but that
was just about the only thing which would be agreed.
When the two sides met again in New York in the middle of September,
this second Cambodian draft had not yet materialized. The negotiators
achieved no progress in narrowing their differences in New York. Indeed, it
appears that the gap actually got a bit wider, with the Cambodians hardening
their stance on grounds of "sovereignty."
On September 16th, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen met with UNSG
Kofi Annan, and delivered an aide memoire outlining his government's position
on the tribunal issue. It has to be said that it was a rather uncompromising
presentation. Senior members of the ruling Cambodian People's Party have
long said they simply do not "trust" the United Nations. If any evidence of that
were needed, we have it here.
In his note to the Secretary General, the Prime Minister complained about
support for the Khmer Rouge through the 1980s from the international
community and the
United Nations which allowed [the Khmer Rouge] to sit at the United
Nations while they committed genocide from 1975-1979. This group
continued to occupy the seat until 1982 and from 1982 to 1993 was
part of a tripartite coalition government and legal party of the
Supreme Council of Cambodia under the Paris Peace Accord.' °
Turning to the substance of the tribunal negotiations between Cambodia and the
United Nations, Hun Sen wrote
We must also recognize that both parties remain divided on the
mechanism for the functioning of the trial. In compliance with its
sovereignty, Cambodia must proceed with Cambodia's existing
10. Aide Memoire on the conversation between Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government
of Cambodia, and H.E. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, September 17, 1999, New York
[unofficial translation].
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national court and introduce additional legislation to allow foreign
judges and prosecutors to take part in the trial. As for the United
Nations legal experts, their intention to create a special tribunal, to
implement special laws in Cambodia, which in reality is outside the
umbrella of the Cambodian constitution and laws, will not be
applicable. n
This amounted to a formal rejection of the proposal put forward by the United Nations
team in August.
The Prime Minister then listed three "options of participation or non-participation"
for the United Nations in a Cambodian tribunal on the Khmer Rouge:
1. The United Nations participates by providing legal expertise to
help draft appropriate legislation, and by providing judges and
prosecutors to take part in a trial conducted within the framework of
Cambodia's existing judiciary;
2. The United Nations provides legal expertise in helping to draft
appropriate laws, but does not play a direct role in the trial, ie., the
United Nations would not supply judges, prosecutors or other
officials for the tribunal;
3. The United Nations ends its involvement in the process of
trying Khmer Rouge leaders, and Cambodia goes on with the process
as it desires.
In closing his memo, Hun Sen wrote, "Cambodia will utilize this
opportunity not just to find justice for the Cambodian people, but also to make
a major practical step in its efforts to end the culture of impunity, which has
received no attention from anyone for more than 20 years."' 2 The final clause
of that sentence, one last jab at the United Nations and the international
community, demonstrated considerable chutzpah on Hun Sen's part; he has led
the nation for the last fifteen years, and he is often accused of being prominent
among those who have given little attention to the problem of impunity. It
would be an unprecedented development if Hun Sen's government were to take
this opportunity and actually strike an effective blow against impunity in
Cambodia. Generally speaking, Cambodian courts have been one of the central
pillars of impunity in Cambodia.
The prospects for United Nations involvement in a Khmer Rouge tribunal
thus appeared increasingly remote. When the United Nations team visited
Cambodia in August, they pointed out to the Cambodian side the United
Nations view that (a) the Cambodian legal code does not presently contain the
laws necessary to prosecute the Khmer Rouge on charges of genocide and
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side to remedy this problem does not comply with international legal standards;
and (c) that in any event, simply adding a few foreign legal specialists to
existing Cambodian judicial institutions would not satisfy the
Secretary-General's requirement that the tribunal should be "international in
character." Assuming that the United Nations holds to the views expressed in
those negotiations, then, the first of Hun Sen's options would not be acceptable
to the United Nations. The second option might still be possible, insofar as it
is widely recognized that Cambodia's reservoir of legal expertise on matters of
international humanitarian law is quite shallow, and they do need help. But
given the apparent determination of the Cambodian government to assert their
sovereignty and independence in this matter, and to proceed in defiance of the
best advice the United Nations can offer, the third option, withdrawal by the
United Nations -- might be the only possible choice for the world body.
After Hun Sen's meeting with the Secretary General, a United Nations
spokesman observed that "the discussion was frank."' 3 Disappointment at the
United Nations with the Cambodian position was palpable, and at least some
United Nations officials felt the negotiating process had reached a dead end.
There has been no other public comment on this matter from the United Nations
Secretariat, as they continued to await the long-promised second draft of the
Cambodian charter for the tribunal.
Hun Sen is on firm legal ground in arguing that while the United Nations
does not have an affirmative legal obligation to prosecute genocide, under the
Genocide Convention, Cambodia does indeed have the primary duty to
prosecute acts of genocide committed on its territory. By taking refuge in such
legalisms, however, Cambodia exposes itself to three risks: first, having twice
rejected United Nations proposals to form a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge,
Cambodia opens itself to the risk that the United Nations will walk away,
unwilling to thrice suffer rejection of its views; second, without the assistance
of the United Nations, which has developed a deep reservoir of expertise in
prosecuting the most complex crime of genocide, Cambodia risks finding itself
unable, from a technical perspective to properly manage such a difficult
undertaking in a way that conforms to international standards of justice; and
third, the reputation of Cambodia's judicial institutions in the world is such
that, even if Cambodia succeeds against the odds in carrying out a credible
tribunal to judge the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia risks finding in the
end that the international community will not believe that impartial justice has
been done. This would be a tragic conclusion to the search for genocidejustice
in Cambodia.
13. United Nations, Read-out of the Secretary-General's Meeting with Hun Sen, the Prime Minister
of Cambodia, September 16, 1999.
Etcheson
After his meeting with the Secretary General, Hun Sen addressed the
United Nations General Assembly. In that September 20th speech, Hun Sen
declared,
We are firmly resolved to do whatever is needed to provide an open
trial of those responsible for genocidal crimes in the country in the
past. In holding this trial we will carefully balance, on the one hand,
the need for providing justice to our people who were victims of this
genocidal regime and to finally put behind us the dark chapter of our
national history with, on the other hand, the paramount need for
continued national reconciliation and safeguarding the hard-won
peace, as well as national independence and sovereignty, which we
value the most. 4
Hun Sen was quite right, of course, when he observed in this speech that
there is a tough balancing act to be done between the conflicting imperatives of
justice and national reconciliation. And in a nation which has been as gravely
wounded as Cambodia, the Prime Minister's consistent appeals to themes of
nationalism may be precisely calibrated to reforge the tattered bonds of national
unity.
Thus, it began to dawn on interested observers that the Cambodian
government intends to proceed with a genocide tribunal for the Khmer Rouge,
and that Cambodia is not particularly interested in cooperating with the United
Nations on the issue. This was underlined on September 29th, as Hun Sen told
reporters in Cambodia, "It would be best if the United Nations should not
involve itself with the trial and allow Cambodia to proceed within the
framework of the country's sovereignty." Anticipating international rejection
of a tribunal held in Cambodian courts, he added, "When a Cambodian court
tries the Khmer Rouge and if the United Nations refuses to recognize the
verdict, this will mean the United Nations recognizes the Khmer Rouge for its
entire existence . . . . I am not asking anyone to recognize the court's
verdicts."' 5
The Cambodian government continues to show signs that it intends to
proceed on an independent path toward a Khmer Rouge tribunal. Among these
signs has been a search for independent international legal talent, which might
provide some expertise without the strings which would be attached to
14. Remarks before the United Nations General Assembly on September 20,1999, as excerpted in
the New York Times; see Hun Sen, U.N. Oratory: Pleas for Help, Pride in Democracy, N.Y. Times,
September 20, 1999 at A12.
15. "Hun Sen says United Nations recognition of genocide tribunal unnecessary," Associated Press,
September 29, 1999.
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assistance from the United Nations or Western governments. 16 Some of the
names being bandied about in the Phnon Penh press include John Quigley, an
American academic who assisted in Cambodia's 1979 People's Revolutionary
Tribunal (which found Pol Pot and Ieng Sary guilty of genocide, and sentenced
them to death in absentia), and who, coincidentally, is on the verge of
publishing what will be a very handy compilation of documents from that
trial.17 Another purported prospect is French professor of public law, Claude
Gour, of the University of Social Sciences in Toulouse. Gour is said to have
assisted in preparing the draft Cambodian charter for a domestic tribunal
presented to the United Nations delegation in August; he also assisted in
drafting the new Cambodian Constitution in 1993. Another American, former
United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, has also been mentioned. Clark
has distinguished himself in recent years by his vigorous denunciations of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He has been active in the defense of a
Rwandan man who has been indicted by the ICTR, attempting to prevent his
extradition from Texas to the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania. The apparently
irrepressible Clark also delivered a brief to the Cambodian government some
months ago, arguing that the government should not cooperate with the United
Nations on a Khmer Rouge tribunal. But for now, the names of the prospective
international experts approached by the Cambodian government remain
shrouded in official secrecy. Cabinet Minister Sok An, who chairs the
government's task force for the tribunal, recently said that a complete list of
"prominent experts from several countries" would be released by the govern-
ment.
Meanwhile, in the "former" Khmer Rouge zones of Cambodia, senior
Khmer Rouge officials were working to stay ahead of the game. On September
2nd, Ieng Sary released a statement from his quasi-autonomous zone in western
Cambodia, declaring that he "supports resolutely the [Royal Governmeit's]
idea and stance on defending national sovereignty by taking for priority the
existing national tribunal in collaboration with foreign judges and prosecutors
whose number is lesser than those from Cambodia."' 8 leng Sary was Pol Pot's
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and significant evidence has been
amassed suggesting that he fed victims into the Khmer Rouge killing machine.
Thus, he would be a prime target of any independent genocide prosecutor.
16. See, e.g., Anette Marcher, Go-It-Alone Tribunal Seeks Foreign Gloss, Phnom Penh Post,
October 1 - 13, 1999.
17. By coincidence, Professor Quigley participated in the International Law Weekend 99
Conference. The pending volume is GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE TRIALOF POL POTAND
IENG SARY, Howard J. DeNike et al. eds, (University of Pennsylvania Press), (forthcoming 2000).
18. "Statement of the Democratic National Union Movement on the so-called 'UN Plan,"'
September 2, 1999, Pailin, Cambodia; signed by leng Sary.
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When such a figure endorses the government plan for a genocide tribunal, the
red flags go up. Has some kind of deal been cut between leng Sary and Hun
Sen? Perhaps this is what Hun Sen means when he speaks of the importance
of national reconciliation. Has the Premier calculated that the residual power
of Khmer Rouge leaders such as Ieng Sary remains too powerful to challenge?
Has Hun Sen converted to a philosophy of forgiveness for genocidal leaders?
Is it, as one member of the ruling party told me recently, a matter of "cash
flow?" Or is Hun Sen preparing to double-cross leng Sary? Perhaps we will
not have long to wait to find answers to these questions.
One observer described the current situation as a "lose-lose" scenario for
Cambodia. On the one hand, after having taken such a "strong stand" in
asserting Cambodia's sovereignty and arguing that Cambodian courts are
capable of carrying out a genocide tribunal which would meet "international
standards," for the Cambodian government to climb down from that position
now would constitute a serious loss of face, especially in terms of domestic
politics, where the opposition has been arguing that an internationally-
controlled tribunal is the only way to achieve justice for the Khmer Rouge. On
the other hand, if the Cambodian government continues along the current path
and proceeds with a national tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, it is likely that little
bi-lateral or multi-lateral assistance for such an undertaking would be
forthcoming, making it all the more likely that the conduct of such a trial would
fail to pass muster with legal analysts. Moreover, any verdicts resulting from
a purely domestic tribunal would most likely be criticized by much of the
international community, insofar as Cambodia' sjudicial underdevelopment has
created a general presumption that fair trials on such a politically-loaded issue
would be impossible. So either way, whether the government compromises or
not, Cambodia loses. It is a rather bleak assessment, but perhaps not far from
the truth.
After the talks between Cambodia and the United Nations became
moribund in September 1999, the United States engaged in a flurry of
diplomatic activity, attempting to bridge the gap between the Cambodian and
United Nations positions. This diplomacy was pursued with an unusually high
level of secrecy. But sources close to the talks claimed to be hopeful that a
compromise could be found which would permit the international community
to endorse Cambodia's plans for the tribunal.
The new talks appeared to find some middle ground between the two
sides: a special tribunal would be established outside of existing Cambodian
judicial institutions, including a court of first instance and an appeals chamber;
Cambodian jurists will compose a majority of the personnel at all levels of the
court, but at least one international jurist would have to concur with the
decision of the majority for any decision to stand, a concept being called a
"supermajority." The prosecution would be structured as a combination of the
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civil and common law systems, with both an investigating magistrate, as in the
French system, and a prosecutor, as in the United States system. How that
amalgam might work in practice is not immediately obvious.
Still, that was progress, though some important details remained unclear:
the United Nations has demanded some kind of commitment from the
Cambodian government that all those indicted by the tribunal will be remanded
into the custody of the court by Cambodian officials. Whether this commitment
will be undertaken by the Cambodian government is not clear. In their first
draft of the charter, the Cambodians proposed a unique new definition of
genocide, which poses obvious problems since they intend to apply it
retroactively; whether Cambodians have been dissuaded from this course is
unclear. The two Khmer Rouge suspects currently in custody - military chief
of staff General "Ta Mok," and the head of the Khmer Rouge secret police,
"Duch" - are being held under a 1979 instrument known as "Decree Law
Number One," a law whose probity is suspect since it was promulgated by a
revolutionary regime not recognized by the United Nations. Whether the
government intends to go forward charging suspects under revolutionary
decrees is unclear, as is whether this would be acceptable to the United Nations.
Such details may be potential deal-killers from the United Nations
perspective. Thus we are not there yet. But we should not be in suspense for
very much longer, because Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has declared
that he will submit the new draft to the United Nations before the end of
November 1999, and regardless of whether or not the United Nations approves
and agrees to participate, that he intends to seek approval of the charter in the
Cambodian National Assembly in December - approval which is all but
certain - and proceed with the tribunal early next year. So it appears we will
have a Khmer Rouge tribunal; precisely what kind of tribunal it will be, and
whether it will produce credible justice, remains to be seen. But one thing
seems certain: the genocide tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, whether there is
United Nations involvement or not, will be quite different from the other
international trials we have seen in recent years.
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A factor that has focused international attention on capital punishment in
the United States is the infliction of this punishment on foreign nationals.
Because of the decline in the use of capital punishment in many states of the
world in recent decades, most foreigners who are subjected to capital
punishment in the United States are nationals of an abolitionist jurisdiction.
These foreign states typically adopt a negative position towards the imposition
of capital punishment on their national, even if the offense is quite serious and
the proof of guilt is strong.
The legal issue most frequently raised by a foreign state in this situation
has been consular notification. In many instances of the imposition of capital
punishment on foreigners, the state of nationality has objected to such
punishment on the ground that the individual had not been informed at the time
of arrest of the right of access to the protective services of its consuls. Under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty to which 163 states are
parties, detaining authorities must inform a foreigner, upon detention, of the
right to contact the home state consulate for assistance in preparation of a
defense. Police in the United States rarely comply with this obligation,
however, resulting in the situation that most foreigners presently under death
sentences in the United States were not informed of their right of consular
access.
The issue has been raised in courts in the United States, although to date
most challenges to imposition of a death sentence have failed on the ground of
having been raised too late in the process, after appeals had been exhausted.
Both state and federal courts have refused to entertain claims of a failure of
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. The author has
served as counsel to the Government of Mexico in its appearance as amicus curiae in cases in United States
courts involving issues raised in this article.
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notification about consular access. The courts have invoked the doctrine of
procedural default, which requires that most legal issues be raised early in the
criminal process, and in any event prior to the post-conviction or habeas corpus
stage.1 The American Branch of the International Law Association has filed
amicus curiae briefs in a number of these cases, urging strict compliance with
Article 36.
Many of the foreigners sentenced to death in the United States are
Mexican nationals, and Mexico has been active in seeking to challenge
convictions and death sentences where it has appeared that its national was not
informed of the right of consular access. In 1997, Mexico asked the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights to issue an advisory opinion on the consular
access issue. The Court, an organ of the Organization of American States
(OAS), is empowered to issue advisory opinions at the request of a state
member of the OAS, on the meaning of provisions in human rights treaties to
which American states are parties, even if states in other regions are parties as
well.2
The function of consular assistance is to enable foreign nationals to defend
themselves properly and thus to ensure that trials are fairly conducted. In its
request to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Mexico asked not only
for interpretation of the right of consular access as found in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, but as well for elucidation of the question
of whether a failure to inform a detained foreign national of the right of
consular access results in a due process defect that, in a capital case, requires
reversal of the conviction and death sentence.
In response to Mexico's request, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in 1999 issued an advisory opinion that called for strict compliance with
the right of consular access as codified in the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and that determined that a failure to inform a detained foreign
national of that right constituted a due process violation. Focusing on
application of the right of consular access in capital cases, the Court found that,
consistent with due process, a death sentence rendered in a case in which a
foreign national has not been informed of the right of consular access cannot
stand. The Court's analysis is that consular assistance is an element of due
process since it allows the foreign national to present a proper defense.'
1. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
2. American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 64, Treaty Series No. 36, O.A.S. Official Records
OEA/Series K/XVYI. I.
3. Solicitud de opini6n consultiva presentada por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
Nov. 17, 1997 (distributed by Inter-American Court of Human Rights, no document number).
4. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, El derecho a la informaci6n sobre la asistencia
consular en el marco de las garantlas del debido proceso legal, Opini6n consultiva OC-16/99/ de I de
Octubre de 1999, solicitada por los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
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I. CONSULAR ACCESS AS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
In the course of its opinion, the Inter-American Court gave its views on a
number of issues that have proven controversial in the application of the right
of consular access in United States courts. The Court concluded that Article 36
provides a right directly to the individual, a right that the individual therefore
may invoke before a domestic court. It referred to language in the preamble to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that states that the purpose of the
privileges and immunities mentioned in the Convention "is not to benefit
individuals, but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular
posts on behalf of their respective States."5 The United States had, to support
its argument against enforceable rights on the part of the detained foreign
national, stated in its brief to the Inter-American Court that this language shows
that there was no intent in the treaty to give a detained foreign national any
rights that she or he could enforce judicially.6
The Court concluded, however, that the term "individuals" in the preamble
refers only to consular officers.7 In the context in which the term "individual"
appears in the preamble, the Court is correct in its interpretation. The
Convention is one whose main purpose is to define the role and functions of
consuls, and this preambular language is an obvious reference to consuls.
The Court makes one other point in arriving at its conclusion that Article
36 creates a right that may be invoked by the individual.8 It notes that in the
Teheran Hostages Case, the United States referred to the right of foreign
nationals to consular access as a right of the individual.9 It cites, in that regard,
the memorial filed by the United States in the Teheran Hostages Case.'° In the
Teheran Hostages Case, the United States invoked the compromissory protocol
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Affairs as a basis for jurisdiction over
Iran and, in arguing the relevance of the Vienna Convention to the hostage-
taking situation, said that Article 36 provides a right to consular officers to
fulfill their functions and to foreign nationals to avail themselves of consular
services."
5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, preamble, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
6. Written Observations of the United States of America, Request for Advisory Opinion OC- 16
(on file at Inter-American Court of Human Rights) at 27.
7. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at 74.
8. Id. at 9 80, 84.
9. Id. at 75.
10. Id. citing I.C.J., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(U.S.A. v. Iran) (memorial of U.S.A. at 174).
I1. I.C.J., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S.A. v. Iran)
(memorial of U.S.A.) at 174.
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The Court also addressed the question, raised specifically by Mexico,
whether the right of the individual existed apart from whether the sending state
protests the failure of the receiving state to fulfill its obligations. Elaborating
on its conclusion that the right is personal to the individual detained foreign
national, the Court concluded that such a protest is not required. The right, said
the Court, is provided by Article 36 itself as a right adhering to the individual, 2
and therefore it exists irrespective of whether the sending state takes any action
in the particular case.' 3 This conclusion is in line with the general rule
regarding rights of individuals specified in a treaty. It is the treaty that provides
the right, hence it is unnecessary for the sending state to protest before the
receiving state is under the obligation imposed by the treaty.
While this conclusion may appear so obvious as not to require discussion,
the matter has been one of some controversy with regard to Article 36, because
the receiving state is under simultaneous and related obligations to the sending
state and to the detained national of the sending state. It had been suggested,
therefore, that if the receiving state failed to inform the national of the right of
consular access, but if the sending state did not protest the failure, then there
was no breach by the receiving state. The Court, however, finds no need for
action by the sending state before there is a breach by the receiving state.
I1. ASCERTAINING A DETAINEE'S IDENTITY
The Court also addresses a matter raised by the United States as a
justification for not implementing the right of consular access in certain cases.' 4
The United States indicated in its brief to the Inter-American Court that not
infrequently the detaining authorities are unaware that the detained person is a
foreign national.'" The Court notes that there may even be cases in which the
foreign national seeks to hide the fact of being a foreign national, either out of
fear of being deported, or out of concern that the sending state may act against
him in some fashion.' 6
The Court states that each case may turn on the particular facts, but it finds
the receiving state under an obligation to ascertain the identity of persons it
detains. 7 In the Court's view, a receiving state may not refrain from taking
action to ascertain the individual's nationality and then justify its failure to
12. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at 190.
13. Id. at 97.
14. Id. 93, citing Written Observations of the United States of America, at 13.
15. Written Observations of the United States of America, supra note 6, at 13.
16. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at 1 95.
17. Id. at 196.
inform the individual of the right to consular access on the grounds of a lack of
knowledge of an individual's nationality."8
The Court notes that., given the difficulty in some cases of establishing
immediately the person's nationality, a receiving state should, to ensure
compliance with Article 36, routinely inform all detainees at the time of arrest
of the rights that detainees enjoy if they happen to be foreigners.' 9
III. TIMING OF THE COMMUNICATION
Mexico had also asked the question of how soon the detaining authorities
must inform a foreign national of the right of consular access. Article 36 uses
the phrase "without delay." Mexico raised the question with reference to
capital cases only, but the Court said in its reply that it could not distinguish the
meaning of "without delay" in a capital case from its meaning in a non-capital
case.
20
Responding to the question, the Court first explained the purpose of
informing the foreign national of the right of consular access, describing it as
being to allow the detainee to prepare an effective defense.2' Working from
that premise, the Court concluded that the information must be communicated
at the time the person is first deprived of liberty, and in any event before the
person provides her or his first statement to the authorities.22
Although the Court does not go into detail regarding the background for
Mexico's question about the time at which the information must be communi-
cated, in a number of cases in the United States a foreigner has been detained
and interrogated without being informed of the right of consular access. The
detainee then seeks in court to challenge the admissibility of an incriminating
statement made during the interrogation, on grounds of non-compliance with
the obligation to inform of the right of consular access. At this point the
question arises of whether the authorities were required to provide that
information before taking a statement.
One United States district court has said that the information must be
communicated immediately upon arrest.23 A panel of the Ninth Circuit,
addressing the question of the admissibility of a foreign national's incriminating
statement made after arrest but before information about the right of consular
access was communicated, said that the statement is not admissible as evidence,
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (H 100-01.
21. Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, at 106.
22. Id.
23. U.S. v. Superviiie, 40 F.Supp. 2d 672, 675 (D.V.I. 1999).
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at least so long as some prejudice appears to have resulted from the failure to
provide this information.24
The Inter-American Court's approach seems to be in line with the intent
of the framers of the Vienna Convention. A detainee makes decisions
immediately upon arrest that may significantly affect the case, such as whether
to make a statement, and whether to retain counsel.
IV. THE QUESTION OF REMEDY
The cases concerning incriminating statements also raise the issue of the
required remedy for an Article 36 violation. The question of remedy arises as
well when a foreign national is convicted of a crime without being advised of
the right of consular access. In a number of cases in United States courts, the
convicted person has argued for a reversal of the conviction.
In its Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights does
not deal in detail with remedies. It took an approach that had been suggested
to it in oral argument by Hector Gros-Espiell, a former judge of the court,
namely to state the general principles regarding remedies but not to address
each procedural posture in which a consular access claim might be made. The
Court did, however, make clear that a judicial remedy is required.
Due process, said the Court, requires that an accused that is in a situation
of disadvantage be placed on a par with others. Thus, the Court said, an
accused who does not know the language in which the proceedings are being
conducted must be provided a translator, and an accused who is a foreign
national must be informed of the right of consular access.25 The Court said that,
for an accused person, "notification of the right to communicate with a consular
official of his country will materially improve his possibilities of a defense,"
and "procedural measures, including those taken by the police, will be done
with greater concern for legality and greater respect for the dignity of the
person."26 The Court said that the right to be informed of the right of consular
access "is a means of defense for the accused that is reflected, on occasion in
a determinative way, in the respect shown for his other procedural rights." 2
The Court addressed the question of remedies in the specific situation of
the imposition of a death penalty, since that was how Mexico formulated the
question to the Court. The Court said that the imposition of a death sentence
without compliance with the obligation to inform of the right of consular access
constituted arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation of the International
24. U.S. v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999). This opinion, however, was
withdrawn when the Court of Appeals decided to hear the case en banc, 188 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).




Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the American Convention on
Human Rights.28
On this point Judge Jackman dissented, taking the view that while a failure
to inform a foreign detainee of the right of consular access "may have an
adverse, and even a determining, effect on the judicial process to which such
a person may be subjected, with result that might amount to a violation of that
person's 'right to a fair trial," this is not necessarily so in each instance of a
failure to provide the required information.29 Judge Jackman wrote that:
It is difficult to see how a provision such as that of Article 36. 1(b) of
the Convention, which is essentially a right on the part of an alien
accused in a criminal matter to be informed of a right to take
advantage of the possible availability of consular assistance, can be
elevated to the status of a fundamental guarantee, universally eligible
as a conditio sine qua non for meeting the internationally accepted
standards of due process. This is not to gainsay its undoubted utility
and importance in the relatively specialized context of the protection
of the rights of aliens, nor to relieve states' parties to the Convention
from their duty to comply with their treaty obligation."
Judge Jackman's reference to "the possible availability of consular
assistance" is stressed to the Court by the United States in its submissions, that
a consul has no obligation actually to provide services to a particular co-
national, and thus that access to a consul may not in every instance result in
consular assistance. The majority, however, was not troubled by this circum-
stance. The majority's view evidently is that the right of access is so fundamen-
tal that one need not inquire whether consular service, or any particular type of
consular service, would have been forthcoming in the particular case.
Making that finding, to be sure, may be so difficult as to undermine
protection of the right when it is violated. One can, moreover, infer from the
inclusion of the right that the states parties considered it a right of fundamental
significance to a detained foreign national. A consul's functions are so varied
that a court cannot realistically inquire what a particular consul might have
done. One may not be able to determine after the fact whether, and at what
level, the particular foreign state would have provided service to the detainee.
Such findings would of course involve considerable speculation. Thus, the
majority is on more solid ground in concluding that non-complianceper se with
Article 36 requires reversal of a conviction.
28. Id. T 137.
29. Advisory Opinion, JACKMAN, supra note 4 (dissenting).
30. Id.
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THE IMPRINT OF KOSOVO ON THE LAW OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Julie Menus*
For nearly ten years, human rights advocates have tried to focus public
attention on Kosovo. They issued report after report of gross and systemic
human rights abuses in the troubled region.' International policy makers' had
overwhelming evidence that the pressure in Kosovo was mounting and that an
even greater human rights disaster loomed near,2 yet, they treated the warnings
as that of the boy who cried "wolf' too many times without a wolf being
present. Without the "wolf' of all-out war, international leaders failed to treat
Kosovo seriously.
Flash ahead to March 23, 1999: NATO war planes commence military air
operations and missile strikes in Yugoslavia. Suddenly, Kosovo becomes a lead
story in every media outlet.3 Kosovo finally comes into focus, but the optic is
blurred. In a rush to "do the right thing" or just "do anything," many human
rights advocates,' like the diplomats they criticize, start to get sloppy. They
accept a false slate of diametrically, opposed choices - intervention or no
intervention; protection of Serbian sovereignty or denial of Serbian
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, author of Kosovo: How MYTHS AND
TRuTHs STARTED A WAR (1999). See also Julie Mertus, The Imprint of Kosovo on the Law of Humanitarian
intervention, - WM. & MARY L. REV. (2000) (forthcoming expanding version of article). The author
acknowledges the support of the Ohio Northern University faculty summer research stipend and the research
assistance of Katherine Guernsey and Barbara Wilson in the preparation of this article. In addition, the author
would like to thank John Norton Moore, Paul Szasz and Jeff Walker for their insightful comments; the
opinions expressed are those of the author alone.
1. See, e.g., Mertus & Mihelic, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo, HELSiNKI
WATCH, (1994); Systematic Rights Abuses Reported in Kosovo, NEw EUROPE ON-LINE, Aug. 28, 1998, at
WL 24015766, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, 10 Human Rights
Watch Report 9(D) (1998) .(visited Feb. 4, 2000)<http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/>.
2. See Peter Humphrey, Albanians Victims Of Serbian Police, NEWSDAY, June 1, 1993, at WL
11375416; U.S. Dept. of State, SERBIA-MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES for 1995, March 1996
(visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http:llwww.usis.usemb.se/humanlhuman95/serbiamo.htm>; U.S. Dept. of State,
Serbia-Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, January 30, 1997 (visited Feb. 18,
2000) <http://www.usis.usemb.sehuman/human96/serbiamo.htnl>; Neil King Jr., Hague PanelMay Indict
Milosevic: Kosovo Killings Could Prompt Charges, WALL STEET JOURNAL EUROPE, March 16, 1998 at
WL-WSJE.
3. See, e.g., Norman Harper, Live a Moment of History, ABERDEEN PRESS AND JOURNAL May 6,
1999, at 16; U.S. Newspapers Roll Victory Drums in Kosovo Crisis, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 4, 1999;
Stephen Castle, European Elections: Swing To Apathy In Every Part Of Europe, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON) NEWS, June 14, 1999, at 9; R.C. Longworth, Bridge To Brighter Future Must Span Ancient Hate,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE NEWS ZONE: C, May 30, 1999, at 1.
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sovereignty - without questioning what each choice actually means under
international law.
Czech President Vaclav Havel, among many others, claims that the NATO
alliance "acted out of respect for human rights" and that the war was probably
the first one that had been waged "in the name of principle and values."4 If
only this were true, the legitimacy of actions in Kosovo would be much clearer.
But NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of
NATO countries offered-a cafeteria of justifications for their actions. The
Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in Kosovo
solely on humanitarian rights grounds.5 Instead, the Administration offered an
array of justifications. Humanitarian concerns were rolled together with other
factors: the need for regional stabilization, the stemming of refugee flows, and
the need to protect NATO's reputation.6
Dr. Javier Solona, Secretary General of NATO, also bundled together
humanitarian and non-humanitarian concerns. At one point, he said that
NATO's "objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression
and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo."7 In another breath, he
characterized NATO's efforts as "support[ing] international efforts to secure
Yugoslav agreement with an interim political settlement." 8 In other words -
bombing to get a deal. This latter justification - use of force to coerce a
political leader to sign an agreement - was clearly extra-legal. Under the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion
has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."9 Legal
justifications for the use of force in Kosovo should have been offered apart
from the mere desire to force a political leader to sign a "take it or leave it"
agreement.'°
4. Vaclav Havel, "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State," The New York Review of Books, June
10, 1999, at 6.
5. The author spoke with members of Clinton's staff who said that they considered and rejected
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as the sole grounds for intervention in Kosovo. Instead, they
deliberately decided to come up with a laundry list of factors supporting intervention. Washington D.C. (June
1999).
6. Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation on NATO Airstrikes (March 24, 1999), in SECURITY ISSUES
DIGEST March 25, 1999 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://usa.grmbl.com/sl9990325h.html>). See also Jim
Garamone and Linda D. Kozaryn, NATO Attacks Serbs to Stop Kosovo Killings, U.S. Dept. of Defense,
DefenseLink, March 24, 1999 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar1999/n03241999_9903245.html> (quoting White House spokesman Joe Lochart).
7. Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, Press statement (March 23, 1999) (visited Feb.
5, 2000) <http://www.nato.intldoculpr/1999/p99-040e.htm>.
8. Id.
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 Vienna Article 52, Entry Into Force:
27 January 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 39/28, U.K.T.S. 58 (1980), 8 I.L.M. 679.
10. Serbia did offer a counterproposal. While the proposal would have rejected the presence of
Mertus
By failing to specify clearly the legal parameters of their actions, NATO
allies opened themselves up to the criticism that they were not operating under
any legal grounds at all." At the same time, by failing to provide clear legal
justifications for intervention on human rights grounds, human rights advocates
opened themselves up to criticism that they were outside the law.
Human rights advocates bought into the notion that the legal debate over
humanitarian intervention consists of a tension between two competing
principles: respect for the "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
of states and the guarantees of "human rights" and "self-determination.' 2 This
framing of the issue hides the real questions at hand. The principles of
"territorial integrity" and "human rights" need not conflict. On the contrary,
they complement one another. In sum, territorial integrity cannot be had
without human rights and the realization that human rights can support the
integrity of a territory."
Today, I will explain why "territorial sovereignty" should not be the focus
when it comes to cases like Kosovo. Instead, more attention should be paid to
the parameters set for the "use of force" by international law. In my brief
remarks, I will outline the legal analysis of NATO actions under two sets of
basic international law documents: the United Nations Charter and the Geneva
Conventions. In doing so, I will examine two questions: 1) whether
international law supports the decision to use force in Kosovo; and 2) whether
international law supports the means chosen for the use of force in Kosovo.
The short answer is yes and no.
At face value, the words of the United Nations Charter appear to favor
anti-interventionists who are rightly concerned that intervention is susceptible
to misuse."' Anti-interventionists point to the first part of Article 2(4) of the
NATO troops in Kosovo, it would have permitted the presence of other (unarmed) internationals. For the text
of the proposal, (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm>.
11. See, e.g., Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and International Law, available on the Web at (visited
Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.htm>.
12. See, e.g., Paul Szasz, "The Irresistible Force of Self-Determination meets the Impregnable
Fortress of Territorial Integrity: A cautionary fairy tale about the clash in Kosovo and elsewhere," Address
at the University of Georgia School of Law, Georgia Society of International and Comparative Law, Banquet
(April 8, 1999) (Speech on file with author).
13. The main opponent to this view, Louis Henkin, counters: "[c]learly it was the original intent
of the Charter to forbid the use of force even to promote human rights ... Human rights are indeed violated
in every country... But the use of force remains itself a most serious- the most serious- violation of human
rights." Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and US. Policy, in RIGHT v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 61 (1989).
14. Domingo E. Acevedo, panelist at the American Society of International Law Proceedings,
Collective Self-Defense and the Use of Regional or Subregional Authority as Justification for the Use of
Force Address at the American Society of International Law Proceedings (April 12, 1984) in 78 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 1984, at 68, 73 (on the possible misuse of intervention); But see Barry M. Benjamin, Note,
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force To Prevent Human Rights Atrocities,
20001
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Charter, which declares that states "shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. .. They also rely heavily on Article 2(7), which
states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state.. ." The general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is
supported by language in subsequent General Assembly resolutions.' 6
Only three explicit Charter exceptions exist to the general prohibition on
the use of force. None of these appear to apply to Kosovo. First, states may act
in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Even a broad reading of self-
defense is not particularly instructive with respect to Kosovo. The concept of
self-defense applies only to states; it does not protect individuals against their
16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 120, 147-48 (1992/1993) (stating that "[any individual state action which is
permitted, such as self-defense, may result in potential abuse, but this potential abuse applies to almost every
legal rule. Obviously, not all states that invoke the doctrine of self-defense, a legal right, to justify their use
of force, do so truthfully. The benefits of self-defense, however, legitimize the doctrine despite the potential
abuse of its invocation. The same should be said for humanitarian intervention."). Id.; See also MYRES
McDoUGAL & FLORENTINo FEuciNO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBuC ORDER 416 (1961); Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984).
15. This provision is self-executing because it does not require a state to do anything; it simply
prohibits the commission of certain acts.
16. The 1966 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and Their Independent and Sovereignty provides that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for whatever reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements are condemned ... [The
practice of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the
United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international
peace and security.
G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966). This resolution was
affirmed by the General Assembly in the 1970 adoption of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (Annex), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
See A. Tanca, The Prohibition of Force in the U. N. Declaration on Friendly Relations of 1970, in TIHE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 307 (A. Cassese, ed., 1986).The International Court
of Justice has not issued a definitive ruling on the merits on humanitarian intervention in "Kosovo-like
situations." Its decisions narrowly construe the right of states to use force on human rights grounds. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)('The Court concludes that the
argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for
the conduct of the United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal strategy of the
respondent State, which is based on the right of collective self-defense."). Id. 249. See N. Rodley, Human
Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 321
(1989).
own states." The self-proclaimed Albanian Kosova has never been recognized
as a state and the NATO countries undertaking the intervention were never
attacked or threatened with attack. Thus, the self-defense exception would
require an extremely expansive interpretation in order to apply to Kosovo.
A second exception to the general ban on the use of force is Security
Council enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. 8 Security
Council enforcement actions are limited by the requirement that that the
Security Council Act. The United Nations Security Council did adopt three
main resolutions concerning Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing. First, in
March 1998, the Council issued Resolution 1160, which imposed an arms
embargo on both parties and called upon the FRY and the leadership of Kosovo
Albanians to enter into meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of
internal strife.' 9 In September 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1199,2 which found the existence of "a threat to the peace and security in the
region" and enjoined the FRY to certain actions, including "ceas[ing] all action
by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal
of security units used for civilian repression."2 The Security Council warned
that "should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution not be taken, [it
would] consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore
peace and stability in the region."22  In the third main Security Council
Resolution, Resolution 1203, adopted on October 24, 1998, the Council
endorsed the OSCE and NATO agreements with FRY, and demanded once
more that FRY comply with the conditions set forth in Resolution 1199.23 It
would be a strain to contend that under any Security Council resolution the use
of force was authorized or approved. On the contrary, as it was clear that China
and Russia would veto the use of force, the Security Council failed to include
17. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING
WORLD ORDER 139 (1996).
18. See U.N. CHARTER, Article 2,17 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
.. but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement mechanisms under Chapter VII.").
19. SC Res. 1160, adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, March, 31 1998 (visited
Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.nato.int/kosovoldocu/u98033 Ia.htm>.
20. SC Res. 1199, adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting September 23, 1998
(visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.nato.inttkosovo/docu/u980923a.htm>.
21. Id. I 4(a).
22. Id. 16.
23. SC Res. 1203, adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, October 24,1998 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm>.
24. Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: LegalAspects, 1O EJlL 1 (1999) (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.ejil.org/joumallVoll/Nol/abl.htnl>. As Paul Szasz has pointed
out, the fact that the Security Council failed to act here cannot be interpreted as a rejection of any particular
course of action. "In a sense, by failing to act it rejected all alternative courses of action, including full
support for Milosevic." Paul Szasz, letter to Julie Mertus, dated July 25, 1999 (on file with author).
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in these resolutions the magic use of force language - authorization of the use
of "all necessary means.
'25
After the NATO bombing commenced, the Security Council had at least
two opportunities to approve of the NATO intervention ex post. At the height
of the NATO bombing, on May 14, 1999, it issued Resolution 1239.26 This
resolution neither supported nor condemned the NATO bombing. The
resolution merely "not[ed] with interest the intention of the Secretary-General
to send a humanitarian needs assessment mission to Kosovo and other parts of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and "[r]eaffirm[ed] the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of all states in the region."27 At the conclusion of the NATO
campaign, the Council issued Resolution 1244.28 While this resolution
"decid[ed] on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of
international civil and security presence, with appropriate equipment and
personnel as required,"29 it was wholly prospective in nature. The resolution
declined to comment on previous international intervention in Kosovo. These
and other Council statements fall short of offering ex post approval of the
NATO bombing and, thus, the Chapter VII exception to the use of force cannot
be said to apply to Kosovo.
The third explicit exception to the general prohibition on the use of force,
found in Chapter VIII of the Charter, permits actions undertaken by "regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security."3 Regional arrangements may undertake
any action in this regard that is "consistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'" Even if NATO is seen as a regional arrangement under Chapter
VIII, regional actions also require Security Council authorization, none of
which was granted with respect to Kosovo.
32
25. Cf SC Res. 678 (1990)(SC resolution re. Kuwait), adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd
meeting, on November 29, 1990 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/
undocslscd/scouncil/s90/32> and SC Res. 794 (1992) (SC resolution re. Somalia), adopted by the Security
Council at its 3145th meeting, on December 3, 1992 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at
<gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocslscd/scounciVs92/69>. The language of the Kosovo declarations
implied only that the Security Council might authorize that "all necessary means" be taken in Kosovo at some
stage in the future.
26. SC Res. 1239 adopted by the Security Council at its 4003rd meeting, May 14, 1999 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.nato.int/kosovoldocu/u990514a.htm>.
27. Id.
28. SC Res. 1244, adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting, June 10, 1999 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>.
29. Id. 15.
30. U.N. CHARTER, Article 52,1 1.
31. Id.
32. U.N. CHARTER, Article 53,1 1.
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Thus, the explicit exceptions in the United Nations Charter do not apply
to Kosovo. Is this the end of the story? No. Other provisions of the United
Nations Charter implicitly permit the use of force under certain limited
circumstances. This implicit grant of authority can be said to apply to Kosovo.
By its very terms the Charter does not prohibit all threats or uses of force.
Article 2(4) prohibits force against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. .." We need to look closely at these words. As
interpreted in treaties and diplomatic history, "territorial integrity" refers not
to the "territory of a state" but to the "integrity of the territory. 33 An essential
condition of this integrity is the maintenance of certain standards of
administration on the territory, including the protection of fundamental human
rights norms. Forfeiture of that duty of maintenance opens the door for
intervention.34 Humanitarian intervention in such a case falls below the
threshold set in Article 2(4) since the intervenors do not seek to deprive the
state of its integrity but, rather, to enhance it. 3' Alternatively, intervention in
such cases could be justified on a "waiver" theory. Under this theory,
governments that commit violations of human rights forfeit any claims against
intervention by others for the protections normally offered by sovereignty.36
These arguments are in line with modem conceptions of sovereignty. The
doctrine of human rights restricts the ability of states to do what it will with
their own citizens. Also, sovereignty refers not only to state borders, but also
to political sovereignty, that is, the ability of people within those borders to
effect choices regarding how they should be governed and by whom. 37 Those
who threaten that ability (be they internal or external in origin) violate the
33. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS 56-72 (rev. ed.
1995).
34. A somewhat more extreme view is that governments who abuse the human rights of their
citizens are in fact criminal in nature. Just as criminals lose their right to participate in the self-determination
of their state, so does a government. Consequently, if a government can be viewed as criminal, it then
becomes permissible for other states to take on the role of "policemen" and act to end the violations of human
rights. Michael J. Smith, Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues, in ETHICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 271-295, 286 (Joel H. Rosethal, ed. 2nd. ed. 1999), drawing heavily upon
MICHAEL WALTZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (New York, 1977).
35. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 19, at 71 (paraphrasing but not agreeing
with the argument of W. Michael Reisman in Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (R. iUllich, ed., 1973)). Contra IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 265 (1963) (arguing from a review of
travauxpreparatories for the United Nations Charter that the phrase "territorial integrity" was added to the
Charter A COMMENTARY 117 (B. Simma, ed., 1994).
36. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REvISION 844 (1971); See also Mitchell A. Meyers,
A Defense of Unilateral orMulti-Lateral Intervention Where a Violation ofInternational Human Rights Law
by a State Constitutes an Implied Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 IlSA J. INT'L & COMP. L 895 (1997).
37. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 866, 872 (1990).
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sovereignty of the people.38 Accordingly, when another state intervenes to
protect human rights in such circumstances, it is not violating a principle of
sovereignty, but instead bolstering it.39
A more complete reading of the United Nations Charter further supports
the use of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo-like situations. Here, I will
suggest four points. First, the United Nations Charter advances central
principles that could not be protected in Kosovo without intervention. The
most central purpose of the organization is the maintenance of international
peace and security.' International peace and security means more than the
absence of war, there is a human rights element that must be remembered.
Human rights violations short of all-out war also constitute major breaches of
peace and security.4 In situations such as Kosovo, peace and security cannot
be said to exist so long as the state is free to commit gross and systemic human
rights abuses against its own people.
Second, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter includes, as a central
purpose, development of "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples..." 2 Also included as a central purpose is "encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.. ."4 Self-determination does
not mean the ability of all groups of people to make their own state, but rather
the ability to participate in one's government and enjoy basic human rights."
38. See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 229 (1993).
39. Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 872.
40. U.N. CHARTER, Article 1, 1 1.
41. The United Nations Security Council has recognized that "non-military sources of instability
in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security." See
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 143, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3046 (1992).
42. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 1, 2.
43. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 1, 13. See also U.N. CHARTER Art. 55.
44. Article 1(2) states that the basic purpose of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples... "
Article 55 ties the principle of self-determination to respect for human rights. See supra note 44-45. The
principles of self-determination are also found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967) ("All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development." Id at Article 1); the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (same wording); the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) ("All peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter."). For an exhaustive collection of documents related to self-determination see DOCUMENTS ON
AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RiGrrs (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993).
The prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) does not rule out the use of
force designed to the central goals of the United Nations. Where, as in Kosovo,
a government flouts respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination and violates the most basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms of individuals, the use of force may be the only way to see the goals
of the United Nations upheld.
Third, humanitarian intervention may be required or permitted under the
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter.45 Specifically, Articles
55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter implore "all Members [to] pledge
themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. . . ." The international community has an
interest in the protection of human rights of all people, regardless of state
borders.47 Where, as in Kosovo, a state is incapable of protecting human rights
or is itself the perpetrator, the use of force on human rights grounds, that is,
humanitarian intervention, may be the only solution. The grounds for
intervention are particularly strong where the case at hand concerns allegations
45. Commentators supporting this view include: FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANrTARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 173-74 (2d ed., 1997); Michael J. Bazyler,
Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and
Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: -PROCESS AND
PROSPECT, supra note 35, at 226; Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada,
the Falkiands and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HAirV. INT'L L J. 621 (1986); Richard Lillich,
Humanitrarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie anda Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 231-32 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974); Richard Lillich, Intervention to Protect
Human Rights, 15 McGL. L.J. 205 (1969); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Responses by
Professors McDougal and Reisman, 3 INT'L LAW. 438 (1969).
46. Paul Szasz argues that the provision "in cooperation with the organization" can only refer to
actions that the United Nations undertakes itself, not actions that certain Members undertake where the
United Nations is not taking any action. (Private correspondence with author, July 1999). The author is in
agreement, however she would read both "taking action" and "in cooperation" broadly to include acts
undertake by states which are consistent with overall goals of the United Nations.
47. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: The Protection ofRights ofindividuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (982).
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of genocide,4" crimes against humanity," and certain war crimes50 subject to
universal jurisdiction and responsibility.5 '
The final argument supporting NATO action in Kosovo rests on the United
Nation's own failure to act. If the United Nations were functioning as it was
intended, unilateral intervention would not be needed. Yet, because the United
Nations system has failed to function properly as a collective body addressing
human rights and other security concerns, states retain the right to act
unilaterally.52 Article 43 of the Charter envisioned the creation of a system
48. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
entered into force Jan. 12, 1951. [hereinafter Genocide Convention] The Genocide Convention defines
genocide as:
[A]cts comitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. at Art. II. See also LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLmCAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (198 1).
49. Crimes against humanity are defined as:
"[Cirimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated..."
"Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT)," in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), August 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. See also Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity:
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999).
50. See the Geneva Convention, Articles 1, 3, 13-16 and 23-24 (applying to attacks on and
treatment of both internationals and co-nationals) and Articles 146-147 of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
51. Henry T. King, Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for
U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 47, 53-4 (Winter 1999).
52. W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 279 (1985). The question as to the extent to which the United Nations Charter affects the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention that existed prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter is the subject
of a more expanded analysis. For centuries, sovereigns have claimed a right to unilateral humanitarian
intervention in the affairs of another if the subjects were being grossly mistreated. See Fonteyne, The
Customary International Law Doctrine ofHumanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the United
Nations Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 203, 214 (1974). Considerable debate exists as to the extent of
acceptance of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention at the time of the drafting of the United
Nations Charter, and the impact of the Charter that doctrine. Cf. Richard IUllich,/Intervention to Protect
Human Rights, 15 MCGI.L L. J. 205, 210 (1969) with Wil D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under
International Law, 32(3) NErH. L REv. 357 (1985). Professor Lauterpacht conflicted himself as to whether
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has ever become part of customary international law. Cf L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 312 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) ("There is general agreement that, by
virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a State can treat its nationals according to its discretion. But
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whereby states would make available to the Security Council, "on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreement, armed forces, assistance
and facilities ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security."53 These agreements were to be "negotiated as soon as possible
by the Security Council." 4 To this date, no such agreements have been
negotiated. Article 106 of the Charter envisioned the creation of "transitional
security arrangements" whereby signatories to the Charter could undertake joint
action to maintain peace and security as stop-gap measures until the signing of
Article 43 agreements. The NATO action could be seen as one such stop-gap
measure.55 All of the arguments, taken together, provide an international legal
basis for the decision to use force in Kosovo. The next problem is whether the
means of intervention in Kosovo was appropriate. Did the intervention itself
violate international humanitarian norms?
The most fundamental principle of the law of war is that combatants must
be distinguished from noncombatants and military objectives from protected
property or protected places (i.e. civilian, cultural, and religious property and
places). 6 To this end, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Protocol ) protects civilians from "indiscriminate
attacks. 5 7 Attacks are considered indiscriminate when they are "not directed
there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that
discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in
such a way as to deny their fundamental rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the
interest of humanity is legally permissible.") with H. Lautherpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International
Law, 23 B Rrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 46 (1946) ("The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never become a fully
acknowledged part of positive international law.").
53. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 43, 1.
54. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 43, 1 3.
55. The argument for intervention by states due to the failures of the United Nations is not without
precedent. Enforcement actions by the Security Council have almost always been impossible owing to
permanent member veto power. To circumvent this problem during the Korean crisis in 1950, the General
Assembly exercised its own powers reserved under Articles 10-11 and 14 to address "general problems in the
maintenance of peace and security" and to "recommend measures for peaceful adjustment of any situation."
Specifically, the General Assembly adopted the Charter by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which provides
that:
[1]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of breach of the peace of act of aggression
the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
GA Res. 377A(V) November 3, 1950.
56. See Protocol 1, Article 48. See also U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2000) 5-5.
57. Protocol I, Article 51(4).
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against a specific military objective,"58 "employ a method and means of combat
the effects of which cannot be directed at a specific military objective,"59 or
"employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required" by the protocol (e.g., attacks that may cause the "release of
dangerous forces"' or collateral damage "excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."). 61
Whether NATO can justify its actions in accordance with these
requirements remains to be seen. Grave concerns are raised by the number of
accidental attacks on non-military targets due to the planes flying at high
altitudes where verification of targets was impossible.62 Clearly, the bombing
was designed in order to avoid any allied casualties. To do so entailed a greater
risk that civilians would be hit. It is not within the spirit of the Geneva
Convention IV and Protocol I to increase disproportionately the risk to civilians
to avoid casualties of your own military.63 Collateral damage to civilians is
permitted. But should all the damage to civilians be considered "collateral"?
Particularly troubling is the choice of targets in the NATO campaign and
the adequacy of its efforts to limit civilian casualties.' United States Secretary
of Defense, William S. Cohen, stated at the outset of the NATO campaign, "We
are attacking the military infrastructure that President Milosevic and his forces
are using to repress and kill people. NATO forces are not attacking the people
of Yugoslavia." '65 Nonetheless, in the third week of the bombing, NATO forces
began to target electrical facilities in Serbia power, depriving much the civilian
population of electricity.' NATO also targeted the factories and other property
belonging to supporters of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslav
television and radio stations, bridges, and civilian cars.67 All of these targets
58. Id. I (a).
59. td. (b).
60. Protocol I, Article 56.
61. Protocol 1, Article 51(5)(b).
62. For example, on April 12, NATO bombed a civilian passenger train that was crossing a bridge
and on April 14, NATO attacked civilian refugee vehicles in Kosovo. See Michael Dobbs, Karl Vick, Scores
ofRefugees Killed on Road; NA TO Says Jets Aimed at Military, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, April
15, 1999, at AO1.
63. One could not kill 1,000 Serbian or Albanian civilians in order to save one allied pilot. This
would violate the principle of proportionality. The author is in debt to Paul Szasz for this point.
64. See generally Human Rights Watch, Select Chronology of NATO Attacks, March 24-May 7,
1999 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.hrw.orgcampaigns/kosovo98/index.shtml>.
65. DOD News Briefing, (March 24, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Marl999/t03241999_0324sd.html>.
66. Philip Bennett and Steve Coil, NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid, WASHINGTON
POST, May 25, 1999 at Al.
67. Human Rights Watch identified these incidents in a letter stating its concerns under
international law to United Nations Secretary General Javier Solana. The text of the letter is available on the
Web at (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http'J/www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/kosovo981solana.shtml>.
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may be considered a "dual-use" object, that is, the military as well as civilians
may use them. Under Protocol I, these may be legitimately targeted only if, by
their nature, location, purpose, and use, they make an "effective contribution to
military action" and their capture, neutralization, or destruction, "in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military advantage. 68
Whether all of the targets fulfill these criteria is open to question.69
It is unclear whether the targets chosen all made an effective contribution
to Serbia's military action. The media targets, to take one difficult example,
were instrumental in spreading propaganda throughout Serbia and, by making
Serbs feel like victims, the media made it easier for them to justify being
perpetrators.70 However, unlike the case of Rwanda, where the media
disseminated directions for committing the genocide, the media in Serbia did
not disseminate military instructions. The Serb media was not as clearly related
to Serbia's military actions.7
Some targets appear to have been chosen because of their impact on
civilians. Protocol I prohibit targets intended to "spread terror among the
civilian population."72 If the main purpose of targeting the media, one of the
most visible pillars of Serb society, was to spread terror among civilians, the
targeting of the media was against international law. Similarly, if the purpose
of targeting the electrical grid was to demoralize and terrorize the civilian
population and not to achieve a concrete military objective, that target was
impermissible. Statements made by allied forces during the air campaign seem
to support the notion that these and other targets were chosen and deemed
effective because of their psychological impact on civilians.
A word on the electrical grid: NATO's attacks on Serbia's electrical grid
was likely to have had a severe impact on civilians in exchange for limited
military utility. NATO knew this. Modem military such as Yugoslavia's have
back-up generators.73 Thus, the attacks on civilian electrical transformers was
likely to have little impact on the country's ability to wage war. The targeting
of the electrical transformers was also suspect under Article 54 of Protocol I,
68. Protocol 1, Article 52(2).
69. See Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and International Law, (and in particular part (6)) (visited Feb.
6, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.litm>.
70. This thesis is developed in JULIE MERTus, KOSOVO; How MYTHS AND TRTHS STARTED AWAR
(1999).
71. Hurst Hannum has made this argument. See Chat with International Law Professor Hurst
Hannum, Is NATO Crossing the Line? (ABC News World, May 14, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 2000)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/chathannum990514.htmbl>.
72. See Protocol I, Article 51(2).
73. Human Rights Watch identified this issue in a letter stating its concerns under international law
to United Nations Secretary General Javier Solana. The text of the letter is available on the Web at (visited
at February 6, 2000) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/kosovo98/solana.shunl>.
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which prohibits the destruction of objects that are indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population. Electrical transformers are an indispensable object
for modem societies such as Serbia.
Aside from pointing to specific bombing targets, the overall course of the
NATO bombing and specific actions undertaken should be examined under the
principle of proportionality.7" The concept of proportionality requires an ends-
oriented assessment. "The anticipated loss of life and damage to property
incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained.""5 Should military planners be able
to realize their goals without loss of civilian life, they should change their
course of action accordingly. Throughout the bombing campaign, the principle
of proportionality required NATO to undertake action designed to elicit some
permissible objective. To the extent that the bombing campaign was viewed as
necessary for ending human rights abuses and returning deported civilians, the
action was within the scope of international law. Unavoidable and unplanned
damage to civilian targets incurred while attacking legitimate military targets
could be termed permissible "collateral damage." Yet, the action became
questionable when it became apparent that the bombing was not effectively
advancing military objectives and the impact of the bombing was one felt
mainly by Serb civilians. NATO refused even to threaten the use of ground
troops, which potentially meant an indefinite continuation of the bombing.
When it became clear that the chosen military means were poorly related to the
desired ends, the means should have been changed, that is, either ground troops
should have been introduced along with the bombing or the bombing should
have been halted and other means employed.
In summary, a close reading of the United Nations Charter supports the
decision to intervene in cases like Kosovo. While the explicit Charter
provisions permitting force do not appear to be applicable to the intervention
in Kosovo, the Charter may be read as implicitly permitting such actions. The
strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to
affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural
limitations. While the intervention in Kosovo was initially within the limits of
international law, it also appears that the bombing campaign eventually strayed
outside those limits.
74. See generally J. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
391 (1993).
75. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 5-4. (emphasis in original). See also
McDougal & Feliciano, Conditions and the Expectation of Necessity, in LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 240 (1961). See also Article 57 of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol
THE IMPRINT OF KOSOVO ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Diane F. Orentlicher*
In several respects, international responses to recent developments in
Kosovo have had a significant-in some respects, profound-impact on
international law. While that impact has been especially notable with respect
to the law governing humanitarian intervention, responses to the Kosovo crisis
have important implications for other areas of international law as well.
But, if recent developments vis-A-vis Kosovo have had a significant impact
on international law, their implications remain unclear and can be assessed only
in highly tentative terms. This is notably the case with respect to the law
governing self-determination. Not until the final status of Kosovo is resolved
will it be possible to even characterize the precedent established. Even so,
responses to Kosovars' claim for independence bring into sharp relief a
potentially profound, if subtle, evolution in the law governing separatist claims.
Contemporary challenges to bedrock principles of international law are
reflected in the Security Council resolution establishing the terms of Kosovo's
post-war governance, SC Resolution 1244 (1999).' That resolution includes a
talismanic nod to time-honored principles of territorial sovereignty-and
proceeds to eviscerate them. While reaffirming "the commitment of all [UN]
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia .... the resolution provides for an "interim [United
Nations] administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,"
pending a final political settlement of Kosovo's status.2
At the risk of oversimplification, developments in the immediate aftermath
of the military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO"), as reflected in SC Resolution 1244, seem to signal an emerging
norm: A state that severely, systematically, and persistently represses the rights
of a segment of its citizens may thereby forfeit the right to exercise full
sovereign authority over that population. But (and here is a crucial qualifica-
tion), it does not necessarily follow that the oppressed population is entitled to
secede-at least not immediately. Even so, responses to developments in
Kosovo have moved external actors further down the road toward recognizing
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
I. SC Res. 1244, 110 (1999).
2. Id.
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that a presumptive legitimacy may attach to certain types of secessionist claims,
particularly when the population in question has endured persistent, systematic,
and severe repression at the hands of its dejure sovereign.
Before I elaborate, it may be helpful briefly to recall, as a baseline, widely
accepted interpretations of the right of self-determination under international
law. In brief, when the "principle of self-determination," formerly associated
with the redrawing of Europe's borders following World War I, metamorphosed
into a "right," the accepted meaning of "self-determination" also was trans-
formed. It became a right of colonized territories to determine their political
status. The "peoples" who enjoyed a right to secede were defined in territorial
terms, and the territories whose populations could exercise the right of self-
determination were colonies. Beyond this generally accepted interpretation,
certain developments originating in the inter war period and continuing into the
period of decolonization suggested that groups that were systematically
repressed on a continuing basis: at least groups that were excluded from full
political participation based upon their race and creed: might be entitled to
secede.3 For reasons that need no elaboration, the latter possibility may have
obvious relevance for Kosovars.
In recent years, scholarly views have begun to coalesce around another
additional meaning for the right of self-determination, emphasizing its internal
dimension.4 In multi-ethnic democracies, the rigit has often and increasingly
been invoked to support greater autonomy for defined minorities within
established states.
In an article published last year,5 I argued that these established interpreta-
tions may need to make room for a somewhat broader approach to the right of
self-determination, one that reflects contemporary developments in interna-
tional law first heralded seven years ago in an important article by Thomas
Franck. "Democracy," he wrote, "is on the way to becoming a global
entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective
international processes." Although Professor Franck's article did not examine
3. Particularly relevant to this interpretation of contemporary international law is the U.N. General
Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8018 (1970). For analysis of the implications of this resolution
for separatist claims, See Antonio Cassese, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 108-
24(1995).
4. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal
Focus? 16 MicH. J. INT'L. L. 733 (1995); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L.
L. 1, 57-63 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 46 (1992).
5. Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims,
23 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1 (1998).
6. Franck, supra note 3, at 46.
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the significance of this nascent law for separatist movements, I believe that
principles underlying the "democratic entitlement" have substantial implica-
tions for the legitimacy of their claims.
To put the case succinctly: Since the core idea of democracy is govern-
ment by consent of the governed, it cannot be irrelevant to the legitimacy of a
government that a defined portion of its population persistently rejects its
authority to govern them. This much seemed plain to John Stuart Mill.
Affirming that "the question of government ought to be decided by the
governed," Mill continued: "One hardly knows what any division of the human
race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various
collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves."7
This does not mean that the boundaries of states are perennially open to
challenge. The continuing consent of the state's citizens can generally be
assumed; indeed, this assumption is essential to the daily practice of democ-
racy. But if consent is manifestly and irrevocably absent on the part of a
significant portion of a state's citizens, the legitimacy of that state's sovereignty
over the rebel population is surely placed in doubt.
This point becomes apparent when considered in light of a cardinal rule
of international law: Alien states may not lawfully impose their rule upon non-
consenting peoples. Put differently, international law no longer abides
colonization or forcible annexation. If these forms of non-consensual rule are
incompatible with accepted principles of self-determination, surely those same
principles are at least challenged by a state's continued assertion of sovereignty
over a defined population that has unambiguously and irrevocably rejected its
sovereignty.
This basic point was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in an
important decision rendered last year. Asked to advise on whether the province
of Quebec could unilaterally secede from Canada, the Court concluded that,
because Canada's political institutions "are premised on the democratic
principle," an expression of the democratic will of Quebecois to secede would
confer legitimacy on their quest: although not a right to secede unilaterally.'
Instead, Canada's other provinces would be obliged to enter into good faith
negotiations over Quebec's status. What is noteworthy about this decision is
the Court's concession that a region's democratically expressed will to secede
obliges its national partners to take the claim seriously.
7. John Stuart Mill, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOvERNMENT (1861), in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 392 (Everyman's ed.
1993).
8. In the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act (Reference re Secession of Quebec),
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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Turning to Kosovo, at the proverbial first blush it is difficult to discern a
similar approach in the responses of states that attempted to broker a solution
to the Kosovo crisis, including the United States. Throughout its failed efforts
to secure-a negotiated resolution of the crisis in the months preceding NATO's
intervention, the United States made clear its unwillingness to endorse the
claims of Kosovar separatists.
In even stronger terms, the Administration of then-United States President
George Bush opposed in the early 1990s the secessionist claims of Slovenia and
Croatia, the first of the former Yugoslavia's republics to proclaim independ-
ence. Some eight months after Slovenia made its first formal move toward
secession, the United States as well as European states voiced strong support
for Yugoslav unity. During a visit to Belgrade in mid-1991, then Secretary of
State James Baker warned that the breakup of Yugoslavia "could have some
very tragic consequences." Nor, he added, would the United States recognize
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia "under any circumstances." 9
Against this background, little-noted remarks of President Clinton during
a visit to the capital of Slovenia in the immediate aftermath of NATO's victory
take on special significance. Remarkably in light of United States policy at the
time Slovenia sought to secede from the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton
hailed the success of Slovenia's brief war of independence. "Eight years ago,"
he said, "Mr. Milogevid triggered a military assault on your nation. But you
resisted. You secured your freedom, and you proclaimed that it would never
be the same again. Now, all the people, all the people of every part of Europe
must be able to do the same thing."'0
Although ostensibly addressing Slovenia rather than Kosovo, President
Clinton's remarks in Ljubljana, coming a scant week and a half after NATO's
victory in its war against Yugoslavia over Serbia's conduct in Kosovo, has to
be seen as a statement of the principles thought to have been defended by
NATO's intervention. But what principles, precisely, did President Clinton
have in mind?
Here, again, we are thrown back upon the ambiguities of developments
whose final outcome is not yet known. Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that President Clinton's remarks expressed an implied claim--that
Slovenia's secession from a non-democratic state was supported by
internationally-recognized principles of democracy and personal liberty."
9. Quoted in the Talk of the Town, NEw YORKER, Aug. 12, 1991, at 21.
10. William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the People of Ljubljana, June 21, 1999, reprinted in
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DoCumEiNrs, June 24, 1999 Vol. 35, No. 25, pp. 1165-66
[hereinafter Clinton's Remarks in Ljubljana].
11. I do not believe that this is the sole implication of President Clinton's remarks to the Slovenians
assembled to greet him in Ljubljana. Other aspects of his brief speech seemed to emphasize the nature of the
democracy that Slovenia had established (as distinguished from the independence it had secured). For
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Recalling "how many armies have marched through this square, how many
flags have been raised over your city," President Clinton continued, "Now, at
last, the flag flying in this capital stands for independence and democracy and
the better life you are building. Congratulations, and God bless you.' 12 By
implicitly linking Slovenia' s quest for independence to democratic principles,
President Clinton's remarks in Ljubljana seem to partake of the same spirit as
the position sketched out by Canada's Supreme Court one year ago.
It remains to be noted that these signposts of an emerging approach toward
separatist claims-an approach that recognizes the relevance of democratic
principles in legitimizing at least some of those claims - raise a raft of vexing
questions. If democratic principles are relevant to the claims of breakaway
republics, what precisely are their implications? Would President Clinton have
hailed Slovenia's successful bid for independence in terms of democratic
principles if the rump Yugoslavia had not been associated with campaigns of
"ethnic cleansing" and military force?
Returning to the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court does the
legitimacy of a separatist movement turn upon whether its claim is expressed
through democratic processes? To the extent that the Court's views rested upon
what it saw as a duty on the part of all relevant actors to negotiate with each
other in good faith, what would that Court counsel if one party refused to
negotiate in good faith--or at all?
CONCLUSION
The complexity of these issues and the profound dilemmas they present
once again highlight the importance of early intervention in addressing crises
that might lead toward separation, perhaps violently, if not addressed in a
timely and effective fashion. The implications of the emerging norms I have
sketched in this essay are sobering indeed. Surely, we must be deeply unsettled
by the specter that aspiring statelets such as Kosovo, and perhaps Montenegro
next, may effectively be compelled to withdraw from their former sovereign in
order to secure fundamental rights.
example, immediately following the remarks quoted infra at text accompanying note 2, President Clinton
said: "All over the world, people seek the same kind of freedom and justice and peace that you have brought
here - from Northern Ireland to the Middle East, to southern Africa, and in central and southeastern
Europe." In a similar vein, after congratulating Slovenians for "resist[ing]... Mr. Milolevid ['s] ... military
assault on [their] nation," President Clinton continued: "Democracy, tolerance, and human rights must
prevail everywhere." The focus on the nature of Slovenia's democracy reflected in these remarks does not,
however, detract from the inference that the statements quoted in the text express support - if only
retrospectively - for Slovenia's quest for independence from the former Yugoslavia.
12. Clinton's Remarks in Ljubljana, supra note 10.
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CHANGING HEARTS AND MINDS: THE
DOMESTIC INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS
Belinda Cooper*
I have been observing events in Kosovo as someone interested not only in
international tribunals, but also in German history, and especially in the way in
which Germany has dealt with the legacies of World War I and the Holocaust.
A significant outcome of the Kosovo war has been the spotlight suddenly
trained on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
[ICTY], which became virtually a household word following the indictment of
Slobodan Milosevic. This event underscored the increasing tendency to look
to an international court to provide justice in the aftermath of brutal conflicts.
Looked at in light of the German experience, however the only example we
have to date of the long-term effects of post-conflict international prosecution
on a society the issue becomes more complicated. The question that particu-
larly interests me involves the extent to which an international court can
exercise an influence within the country whose case it is considering be it
Germany, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda or any other. I would like to highlight
what I believe are some of the limitations on the domestic impact of an
international court, using Germany's experience as a basis, and why our
expectations should therefore perhaps be lowered or made more realistic with
regard to such tribunals. I will also suggest ways in which the modem
international criminal tribunals are behaving differently from the Nuremberg
tribunal, as well as ways in which they should behave in order to increase their
impact. Finally, I will briefly mention what I think international criminal courts
can accomplish why they remain important regardless of their domestic effect.
Perhaps because the criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda were in part responses to the failure of the world community to prevent
violence in those countries, and also perhaps because human rights activists had
been working so long and hard to make them a reality, the tribunals have
become something of a repository for the hopes disappointed by the interna-
tional political system. In speaking and writing about the tribunals, commenta-
tors have suggested they can prevent collective resentments by individualizing
guilt. By revealing irrefutable facts and truths, they can prevent the develop-
ment of new myths about conflicts and thus, contribute to breaking the cycle of
* Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute, New School University; J. D., Yale Law School, 1987.
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violence. Additionally, they can contribute to reconciliation by ensuring justice
to victims, and ultimately can help establish peace. This view of their functions
does not appear to have abated with the Kosovo war. If anything, even more
hopes attach to the tribunal now that its credibility seems strengthened and it
commands greater respect and more resources. A further factor in this
development may be the chastening realization that even when the international
community does at last intervene, it cannot resolve all problems which again
turns attention toward the international tribunal as a source of hope.
But I believe we ask too much of the international tribunals if we expect
them to have an impact of this magnitude within the country for which they are
created. While it is true that today's courts are different from the Nuremberg
tribunal, some of the fundamental issues remain the same, as do the limitations
on the court. This is not to suggest that tribunals serve no purpose, but that
their purpose is not domestic. They do not exist to cure internal problems of
transition or to rehabilitate a country, though every case is different and they
may, in fortunate cases, play some such role.' Attempting to ascribe broad
curative powers to international courts misunderstands their function and
carries with it the danger that, should they fail to accomplish the lofty purposes
imagined for them, they may become targets of frustration generated by
renewed disappointment. Additionally, requiring too much of these judicial
organs risks abdicating political responsibility.
This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the Nuremberg tribunals,
about which so much has been written.2 However, a brief listing of some of its
flaws is merited, in order to better understand some of the reasons it was not
accepted in Germany, and to allow discussion of what the present-day
international tribunals have done and can do to avoid similar pitfalls.
Nuremberg was looked upon as victors' justice by many because of the
composition of the bench, made up of Allied judges alone. It was considered
hypocritical due to the presence of the Soviet Union among the judges, despite
its own documented war crimes and crimes against humanity. Crimes like the
Katyn massacre, known to have been perpetrated by the Soviets, were
purposely ignored by the tribunal. Germans, in particular, also objected to what
they saw as the ex poste facto nature of the laws the tribunal applied.
In part because of these problems, the Tribunal's effect within Germany
was limited. It did not, as has sometimes been asserted in its favor, force most
Germans to confront the crimes committed in their name, if not by them. While
1. The attempted prosecution of Augusto Pinochet of Chile by a Spanish court has had a
significant effect within Chile, triggering national soul-searching and prosecutions within the country.
Although it does not involve an international tribunal, this is an example of the positive effect international
prosecutions might also have, given the right context.
2. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OFTHENUREMBERG TRIALS (1992); Robert E. Conot,
JUsTICE AT NUREMBERG (1983) .. , among many other accounts.
the Tribunal did serve to establish irrefutable truths as a legacy for later
generations, these truths were frequently rejected by average Germans after the
war; or if accepted, they were not considered to possess personal significance.
There was little internalization of remorse. The first trial at Nuremberg, the
International Military Tribunal, did bring a measure of justice, at least in regard
to a small number of top perpetrators. However, the political choice of the
defendants somewhat tarnished this record, as did some of the sentencing
decisions. Furthermore, most of the defendants convicted at the twelve
American follow-up trials were released by the mid-1950s, largely for political
reasons, as the United States courted West Germany as a Cold War ally.
Germany's leaders in fact insisted on their release as a condition for alliance.3
Scholars have shown that German courts expressly refused to acknowledge the
validity of any of the Nuremberg convictions.4
While new concepts of law began to enter Germanjurisprudence following
the war, in part as a result of Nuremberg, it would take time for them to make
significant inroads. In the meantime, though trials were held in Germany in the
immediate post-war period, they did not often result in truejustice. Thejudicial
system was staffed mainly by holdovers from the old regime, essentially
judging themselves; and their unwillingness to condemn their own back-
grounds, along with their concept of positive law, led to much judicial
reinterpretation and manipulation of both laws and facts to prevent criminals
from suffering severe penalties.' The attitude was summed up in the words of
one post-war German politician who, defending his actions as ajudge under the
Nazis, argued, "What was legal then cannot be illegal now."
Thus the impact of Nuremberg on the post-war German legal system,
though not non-existent, was limited and this despite Germany's unique
situation, subject to occupation by the Allies and their attempts to reeducate in
the early post-war years. It was not until much later, in the course of Ger-
many's development over the years, that German law would embrace the
Nuremberg approach to law and justice as, for example, in its methods of
dealing legally with members of the East German leadership and border guards
responsible for the killings at the East German border.6
3. See Peter Maguire, Nuremberg: A Cold War Conflict of Interest, in WAR CRIMES: THE
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 67-86 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
4. See Jdrg Friedrich, Nuremberg and the Germans, IN WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG, 102-105 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
5. For detailed discussions of a number of such cases, see, e.g., JORG FRIEDRICH, DIE KALTE
AMNESTIE: NS-TATER IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK (1994).
6. In a number of cases, border guards and higher officials of the East German government have
been convicted of human rights violations despite the fact that their actions did not technically violate East
German law at the time; the courts have used arguments that incorporate international humanitarian law.
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In addition to these legal obstacles, Germany in the 1950s and 1960s also
faced social obstacles to a full reckoning with the Nazi past. Postwar Allied
attempts at denazification essentially came to an end with the onset of the Cold
War, and many former Nazis retained their positions in government and at all
levels of society. There was thus little incentive for them to confront their
complicity with the Nazi regime; the legal and medical professions, for
example, took years to begin this process. Though Germany has paid millions
of dollars in reparations to many victims, there was (and in fact continues to be)
a great deal of resistance to these payments. They were originally instituted at
the insistence of the Western allies, whose ranks Germany hoped to join.7
The Tribunal did not reconcile Germans with their victims or their victims
with them, though Germany differed from some of the more modern conflicts
for which reconciliation is often discussed: most of the victims were either
dead or had left the country. (In this way, it perhaps most closely resembled
"ethnically cleansed" regions such as parts of the former Yugoslavia). The few
Jews who remained were physically protected, but because of the general
failure of postwar German society to acknowledge guilt or responsibility, there
could be little in the way of psychological or social reconciliation. Other
victims of Nazism (Gypsies, homosexuals, Communists) were marginalized or
not acknowledged at all.
Germany today is admittedly a very different place than it was in the first
Cold War decades. It has become one of the most introspective of nations,
undergoing an almost obsessive process of self-examination that is exemplary
and probably unique. But this change happened for reasons largely independent
of the international prosecutions. Domestic legal proceedings against
concentration camp guards in the late 1950s had some effect; but a society-wide
process of questioning began in earnest only with the student upheavals of the
late 1960s, during which young people confronted their parents' silence about
the past. This process was largely a function of changes in social and political
institutions, education, and most importantly, the change in generations that
permitted greater distance, and thus a greater ability to deal honestly with the
past.
It must also be remembered that we are speaking here only of the
perpetrators (and their descendants), and the attempts they have made to come
to terms with their own past. Over fifty years after the events, the feelings of
the victims and their descendents, within and outside of Germany, remain
complicated, and their relationship with the perpetrator society is far from
resolved!
7. [sources on reparations].
8. For a skeptical view of the usefulness of international tribunals for victims, see Julie Mertus,
Only a War Crimes Tribunal: Triumph of the International Community, Pain of the Survivors, in WAR
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This history leads me to believe that we must be more realistic about the
probable effects of today's tribunals. These tribunals are simply not created,
at least in the short run, for the sake of the societies whose crimes they are
dealing with. They may well provide victims with a degree of vindication and
empowerment; but they are unlikely to have much effect on the immediate
situation the relationship between victims and victimizers, or the way the
victimizers deal with their complicity. Convicting those responsible for
atrocities in Kosovo will not make Yugoslans more willing to face unpleasant
truths.
Of course, there are differences between the Nuremberg tribunal and the
current tribunals, and the context, too, is different. The fact that the current
tribunals are truly international, and not composed solely of representatives of
victorious or stronger powers, gives them greater hope of legitimacy in the eyes
of those at whom they are directed. Also, at least in the Yugoslavia case, the
fact that indictees have come from all sides in the conflict increases the
tribunal's chances of acceptance. The tribunal's willingness to at least look at
NATO's activities during the Kosovo war, even though this is unlikely to lead
to any indictments, also tends to make it more credible. The Rwanda tribunal,
which has indicted only Hutu thus far, lags in this respect.
Less resistance exists today to the law being implemented by the tribunals.
It was relatively easy for Germans, with their positivist legal tradition, to deny
the legitimacy of the apparently retroactive laws under which they were being
prosecuted: But developments over the past fifty years, including the large
number of concrete international instruments, have made it difficult to deny the
reality of international humanitarian law; most countries are party to one or
another treaty or convention.
Nuremberg might have had a greater immediate impact in Germany at least
to the extent of keeping former Nazis out of public office had the political
situation of the day been different. However, exigencies of the Cold War
required that Germany be wooed as an ally against the Soviet Union, preventing
a consistent policy against members of the old regime and those complicit in its
policies. But the problem of politics persists today. The political community
did avoid repeating the post-Nuremberg situation by excluding indicted war
criminals at Dayton, but the lack of will to arrest current indictees is a new
political hurdle. Also, the indictment of Milosevic could not help leaving an
impression of political manipulation, however unjustified, coming as it did at
the height of the NATO campaign against him. The failure to indict Croatian
leader, Franjo Tudjman, for his role in the wars in the former Yugoslavia may
have left a similar impression. Lack of consistency that can be interpreted as
political makes it even less likely that a tribunal will have an impact in the
CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG, 229-243 (Belinda Cooper, ed., 1999).
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country upon which its investigations are focused. Here tribunals could utilize
public relations and educational tools to increase the chance of influencing, or
at least being heard by, the populations of these countries.
There is an additional point, though, that is more difficult to remedy and
which should be mentioned in connection with both Nuremberg and the current
tribunals. This is the issue of individualizing guilt, which is the main point of
a criminal tribunal concerned with accountability and an end to impunity. A
tribunal fixes guilt on individuals, particularly those at the top; but crimes such
as those committed in Germany, Rwanda, and to some extent the former
Yugoslavia are often mass crimes, abetted and/or condoned by a majority in the
country. Pinning guilt on individual leaders may have two effects. It may
allow transference of guilt by those who were complicit: it wasn't me, they can
say, it was those at the top, and now that they've been dealt with, I have no need
to worry about the past or consider its connection to me. Or, it can lead to
denial and to identification with those on trial, a sense of wrongful persecution.
Germans responded to Nuremberg and its successor trials in both these ways.
Obviously, neither response is constructive to the kind of domestic processes
truth-finding, ensuring justice, or beginning reconciliation that are generally
considered desirable after a period of conflict. Mass crimes thus cannot be
dealt with exclusively through individualized legal proceedings. By concentrat-
ing on individual top perpetrators, such proceedings can even be counterproduc-
tive to a goal within the country of confronting and dealing with the past, by
giving the majority a way to keep from facing its own complicity. Here, once
again, tribunals cannot be looked upon as a major part of the domestic healing
process.
None of this makes international tribunals any less important. Tribunals
sanction the behavior of leaders, establish their accountability for their actions,
and make it clear that internationally recognized crimes cannot be committed
with impunity. Assuming that enforcement can be ensured, it is to be hoped
they will act as a deterrent against future crimes. And they serve to develop a
system of internationally agreed upon values and legal norms, with all the
social, psychological, and political impact these can have. All of these are
highly desirable goals that need not be developed at length here. My point is
that we should not imagine a court to be more than a court. It may, but will not
necessarily, contribute to healing damaged societies. But it cannot provide
national psychotherapy and it may not even be widely accepted. A country's
"rehabilitation," in the sense of internalized comprehension of and remorse for
wrongs committed, is less likely to come about as a result of the external
pressure of court decisions than to develop gradually from within. As in
Germany, I believe, outcomes within a country that will permit it to move
forward true confrontation with the past, admission of complicity, and some
form of reconciliation, whatever that may mean or require demand quite
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different approaches from those of a tribunal. In the wake of Kosovo, as the
international tribunal takes a greater hand in post-conflict developments, we
should simply remain aware that at least as history has so far shown a tribunal
can only do so much, and should only be expected to do so much.
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN A GLOBAL
ENFORCEMENT ARENA
Diane Marie Amann*
It is a commonplace that crime, no less than other industries, has become
a global venture. Criminal networks routinely cross borders to produce or
distribute commodities that range from drugs to endangered species, and to
purge the ill-gotten profits of their taint. Indeed, crimes occur in borderless
space. Money is laundered, bets are made, pornography is viewed over the
Internet. Internet transmission of digital hallucinogens is just one new crime
on the horizon.'
With increased awareness of the global nature of crime has come increased
international cooperation among law-enforcement officers. This includes
informal joint ventures between nation-states; bilateral and multilateral
conventions on extradition, evidence-gathering, and prisoner transfer; and
coordination by international and regional agencies.2
The United States is a leader in international law-enforcement cooperation,
posting more than 1,500 agents overseas and training police in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere.' A recent White House publication suggests that these efforts
will lead to less crime and greater global security - to the best of all possible
worlds.4 This sounds encouraging, until one recalls the source of the phrase.
It is Voltaire's novel Candide. Candide frequently declares that his is the best
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law; B.S., 1979, University
of illinois; M.A., 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1986, Northwestern University. I wish
to thank Angel K. Leung for research assistance.
1. See Tony Thompson, London Observer Service, Technology Key Player in Future Crime, S.F.
ExAM., Oct. 31, 1999, at B-7.
2. See generally, Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201, 1261-72 (1998) [Hereinafter "Amann,
Whipsaw"]. See also generally, Bruce Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational
Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L REV. 1401 (1998).
3. See Amann, Whipsaw, supra note 2, at 1262-63 & n.367; See also Zagaris, supra note 2, at
1464 ("The sheer size of the United States, its huge economy, its diversity, the important role of the judiciary,
and the power of organized crime, all guarantee that the United States will remain the place where many
experiments are made in the fight against transnational organized crime.").
4. See WHrrE HousE, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY 93 (1998) (stating that the
international crime control strategy of the United States "will lead us to a more secure and law abiding world
in which Americans as well as our friends and allies abroad can prosper in peace").
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of all possible worlds, even as he suffers the worst calamities.5  He is the
quintessential optimist.
I am afraid that I am more skeptical.
It may be that greater law-enforcement cooperation will increase global
security. But one wonders. Few contend that efforts to combat international
drug-trafficking, for instance, have been effective. With regard to money
laundering, a crime that is often transnational, it is estimated that only 0.0062
of every dollar illegally earned from drugs is subject to a governmental removal
6action.
It also may be that cooperation will aid protection of individual rights.
Bilateral and multinational cooperation agreements include some provisions
that work to protect individual rights.7 International human rights conventions,
most notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' provide
a basis for development of a spectrum of rights inhering to those suspected or
accused of transnational crime.9
I am afraid, however that the threats to individual rights are more
imposing, even menacing.' ° There are a number of reasons for this.
5. See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (Pierre Malandain ed., 1989) (orig. pub. 1759).
6. Usa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
161,201 n.8 (1995) (quoting HERBERTE. ALExANDER &GERALD E. CAIDEN,THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
OF ORGANIZED CRIME 40 (1985)).
7. One commentator states that "[mlutual assistance in criminal matters may also be seen as a
means of achieving better justice, of improving the quality ofjustice .... " Bert (A.H.J.) Swart, Human
Rights and the Abolition of Traditional Principles, in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 505, 507 (Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992). As a particular example,
he states that treaty-based transfers of criminal proceedings may lead to better "social rehabilitation of
offenders." Id.; See also Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. -_ (page proofs at 14-15) (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter "Amann, Harmonic Convergence"] (noting that joint ventures in fighting crime may encourage
convergence in criminal procedure norms).
8. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
9. See id. at art. 14 (guaranteeing equal, fair, public, and speedy trial before a competent tribunal;
a presumption of innocence; the rights to be informed of the charges, to have the assistance of an interpreter,
and to have adequate time and resources to prepare a defense; assistance of counsel, appointed if necessary;
the rights to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to compel testimony from favorable witnesses; the rights
to silence and to an appeal; and the right against double jeopardy).
10. See, e.g., Edward M. Wise, Foreword: The International Association of Penal Law and the
Problem of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L REv. 1281, 1300-01 (1998) (stating that the association had
made organized crime the theme of its September 1999 international congress "mainly in order to sound
alarm bells about the extent to which the world-wide legislative reaction to organized crime, in large part
inspired by developments in the United States, stands in contradiction to the emphasis on proportionality and
restraint, on respect for the rule of law and the rights of the accused, which lies at the heart of 'classical'
criminal law"); Zagaris, supra note 2, at 1464 ('The area of most concern has been in the application of
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International criminal cooperation - what United States. courts recently
have called "cooperative internationalism"" - has led to the greater use of
electronic surveillance and undercover operations, techniques familiar in the
United States, but once anathema to the rest of the world.'2 The insistence on
uniform laws has led to the abolition of bank secrecy, not long ago considered
an aspect of personal privacy.' 3 Fears of further governmental encroachment
into individual privacy are at the heart of the current encryption debate.
4
Considerations unrelated to criminal justice, such as the desire for greater
economic discourse or continued foreign aid, may compel ill-advised coopera-
tion detrimental to individual rights. In a joint United States-Chinese heroin-
trafficking investigation, for example, Wang Zong Xiao, a defendant arrested
and charged in China, was flown to San Francisco to testify for the government
at the United States trial of other defendants. 5 In the course of his testimony,
Wang recanted his confession, which he said had been coerced, and asked for
political asylum.'6 The desire to proceed with the joint effort seemed to have
constitutional law and international human rights."); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Rethinking the Law of
International Criminal Cooperation: The Restrictive Function of International Human Rights Through
Individual-Oriented Bars, in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 489,
489 (Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992) ("In a period in which states are showing a steadily growing
political willingness to cooperate in criminal matters, especially with respect to certain forms of criminality
like terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc., human rights protection of the individual who is
confronted with such cooperation procedures is a legitimate concern.").
11. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666,693 (1998) (acknowledging that increased cooperation
may pose threats to individual rights); see id. at 714 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing "powerful" similarity
between the state-federal law-enforcement cooperation that prompted extension of U.S. Bill of Rights in mid-
twentieth century and international cooperation now).
12. See Wise, supra note 10, at 1302.
13. See Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts -
Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped
Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L REV. 1401, 1464-65 (1996) (discussing how United Nations
convention requires state parties to abolish bank secrecy for purposes of drug-trafficking investigations);
Francis R. Monaco, Europol: The Culmination of the European Union's International Police Cooperation
Efforts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 247, 262-63 (1995) (discussing how the European Convention Against
Money Laundering authorizes states in the European Union to release banking information).
14. See Michael Hatcher et al., Computer Crimes, 36 AM. CRIM. L Rev. 397, 440-41 (1999)
(discussing encryption debate); Jeri Clausing, In a Reversal, White House Will End Data-Encryption Export
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at 1st. bus. pg. (reporting on Clinton Administration's retreat, from
linkage of eased encryption export controls to its demands that the government receive "back-door key to
unscramble communications when they suspect a crime has been committed").
15. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (N.D. Cal. 1993) [hereinafter "Wang r'],
afTd sub nom. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Wang IT'].
16. Wang 11, 81 F.3d at 811.
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blinded the United States prosecutor to earlier indications that the confession
might have been coerced and unreliable. 7
The structure, or rather absence of structure, of transnational criminal law
fosters inequity. In domestic criminal justice systems like that of the United
States, the political and judicial branches, special-interest organizations, and
defendants themselves participate, achieving a kind of balance between the
need for public safety and the desire to protect individuals from undue or
arbitrary governmental intrusion. It is at best a rough balance, one constantly
threatened by uncritical reactions to fears of crime. In the transnational arena,
there are few established institutions, and thus the threats loom larger.'
International criminal tribunals and regional judiciaries are exceptions to
this general state of anarchy. These novel institutions 9 adjudicate crimes that
cross borders, either in actual fact or because the crimes outrage the interna-
tional community. They do so with some consistency because they must adhere
to founding statutes or conventions. 2 Nevertheless, there is room for concern.
The laws governing the regional bodies were designed to regulate domestic
criminal justice systems and are not always easily converted to the transnational
context.2' In the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, procedural and
evidentiary rules have undergone more than a dozen revisions.22 States have yet
17. Wang 1,'837 F. Supp. at 1551-56 (discussing "clear indications" of coercion of Wang's
testimony, including: discrepancies in Wang's statements to Chinese police; background knowledge of the
role coerced confessions played in the Chinese criminal justice system; the "staged" nature of Wang's
discussions with United States investigators; and Wang's"peculiar posture," suggesting injuries to his hidden
left side, in a videotape of his Chinese confession).
18. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 489 ("While it is often difficult to achieve this balance
within a 'domestic' criminal justice system, it is all the more difficult in transnational criminal cases... ").
19. The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have yet
to mark their tenth anniversary, while the proposed permanent International Criminal Court is likely years
away from operation. Even the oldest such institution, the half-century-old European Court of Human Rights,
has just undergone a radical transformation into a full-time judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction. See Peter
Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protections: Is Enlargement Compatible
with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoN'rEMP. PROBS. 313, 319-20 (1998).
20. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res., annex (Nov. 8, 1994),
reprinted in 33 I.LM. 1598 (1994); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 68(3), U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 999 (1998); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 5-8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
21. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 49 1.
22. See Basic Legal Documents, (visited Nov. 8, 1999), <http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm>
(indicating that as of July 1999, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia had been revised sixteen times).
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to agree on similar rules to govern the proposed International Criminal Court.23
Ad hoc tribunal interpretations of statutory provisions, moreover, have drawn
criticism. The furor over a ruling allowing the prosecution to withhold from the
defense identities of certain witnesses provides one example.24 Also troubling
is the rejection of the defense claim that it had been denied equality of arms
because one state had rebuffed orders to produce witnesses.25
Most persons suspected or accused of transnational crime do not enjoy
even this modicum of consistency; rather, they are investigated, tried, and
sentenced according to the vagaries of whichever national system asserts
jurisdiction. 6
The status of cross-border defendants makes matters worse. In the
domestic context, defense interests receive some attention from the advocacy
and educational efforts of special-interest groups like the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL). There is not yet an equivalent
transnational defense bar association. Defendants themselves, diverse
23. Draft proposals have engendered some criticism. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Pre-Trial Rights in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Vol. 2, No. 3, International Criminal Court
Briefing Series (Feb. 1999) (expressing concern that the ICC Statute does not protect persons suspected but
not yet charged, and calling for additional procedural protections, particularly during interrogation and arrest).
24. See Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Decision on the Prosecutor's
Motion Requesting Protective Measures (ICTY Aug. 10, 1995), reprinted in 7 CRIM. L.F. 139 (1996).
Compare Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 235 (1996) (criticizing decision) with Christine M. Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 75 (1997) (supporting it).
25. See Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. 1T-94-1-, Appeals Chamber Judgment (ICTY July 15, 1999),
(visited Mar. 31, 2000),
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgementtmain.htm>. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the
Trial Chamber had not caused Serbia's noncooperation; in fact, it had tried to help the defendant as best it
could. Although it could "conceive of situations where a fair trial is not possible because witnesses central
to the defense case do not appear due to the obstructionist efforts of a State," the Appeals Chamber ruled that
such a situation had not occurred, at least in part because the defendant had not requested a stay to secure
Serbia's cooperation. Id. 1 55. The ICTY's ruling is understandable, given its inability to force compliance
from such a key state. The result, however, creates a risk of unfairness to the defendant. See Representing
the General, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1999, at 17 (reporting complaint of the Los Angeles-based attorney for ICTY
defendant Gen. Tihomir Blaski that "the brand of justice that's practiced at the ICTY puts the defense at a
distinct disadvantage," in part because of noncooperation). Cf. Zagaris, supra note 2, at 1448 (criticizing
transnational cooperation agreements that grant certain rights to governments but not to private persons).
26. Indeed, persons accused of crimes that outrage the international community may be tried in
national courts, as exemplified by Spain's effort to prosecute former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. See
Regina v. Bartle (H.L. Mar. 24, 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999) (ruling 6-1 that Pinochet is not
immune from extradition to Spain for crimes after 1988, when English law first proscribed extraterritorial
torture). See also Clifford Krauss, Pinochet at Home in Chile: A Real Nowhere Man, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2000, at §1, p. 12 (reporting that although England released Pinochet for medical reasons, he still may face
prosecution in Chile).
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individuals with no common cause until they are in custody, are unlikely to
band together.
They are, moreover, among the world's most despised individuals.
Animosity is obvious with regard to fugitives accused of torture or other
atrocities.27 It applies as well to less notorious defendants. There is little
tolerance or sympathy for those accused of importing heroin or bombing
airliners. Fueling the animosity is xenophobia, evident in the media's emphasis
on the ethnic origins and supposedly alien customs of transnational defendants.
We read of "Colombian drug traffickers,"2 of "Palestinian terrorists,"29 of the
"Russian mafia," and of "Chinese tongs" with secret-society origins.3 ! It thus
becomes easier for us to care less about these defendants.
Yet we need to care. We need, in these cases as in others, to preserve the
rule of law. We need to give proper due to the rights of these defendants, not
only because that is the right thing to do, but also to assure that the rights of
law-abiding individuals are not abridged without justification.32 We need to
assure that transnational prosecutions are deemed fair and legitimate,33 not in
the least in order to maintain support both for the means by which we are
fighting global crime and for the money we are spending to do it.
27. A keen example of how animosity may hinderjustice is the case of John Demjanjuk, who often
was referred to as "Ivan the Terrible." See Richard J. Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and
Machinery in Defending Borderless Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1634 (1997). Following
his extradition from the United States to Israel in 1986, Demjanjuk was convicted of war crimes and spent
seven years under sentence of death before his conviction was reversed on the basis of new evidence
demonstrating he had been misidentified. See United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1466 n.5) (11th Cir.
1997) (Birch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998). Subsequent United States litigation revealed
that the branch of the U.S. Department of Justice established to find and expel Nazi war criminals had failed
to disclose evidence tending to exculpate Demjanjuk. Id. (discussing Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338,
356 (6th Cir. 1993) (vacating prior denial of writ of habeas corpus on account of "prosecutorial misconduct
that constituted fraud on the court"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994)).
28. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Colombian Drug Cartels Exploit TechAdvantage, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 1999, at A17.
29. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Plea by Clinton Unleashes Ire Among Israelis, LA. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1998, at AI.
30. See, e.g., Richard C. Paddock, A New Breed of Gangster Is Globalizing Russian Crime
Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at Al.
31. See, e.g., Larry D. Hatfield, Chinatown Tong Unity Raises Eyebrows, S.F.EXAM., Feb. 5,1993,
at Al.
32. Cf In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("If we are ever to develop
an orderly international community based on recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that
the necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge
and vindictiveness.").
33. For an insightful discussion of how dilution of criminal justice standards in an effort to contain
conflict in the North of Ireland delegitimated British rule see Susan Coutin, Ethnographies of Violence: Law,
Dissidence, and the State, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 517, 529-37 (1995).
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Some limits on the exercise of repressive power already exist. For
example, extradition treaties and other international criminal cooperation
agreements sometimes include provisions requiring that the conduct under
investigation be considered a crime in both states, although this double
criminality requirement recently has been relaxed.' Some treaties respect a
state's refusal to hand over its own nationals.35 Others prohibit transfers of
fugitives if they will be prosecuted for political offenses or if they will suffer
discrimination for impermissible reasons such as race, ethnicity, or religion.36
Other principles, however, operate to block the protective effect of such
provisions. Most stem from the abiding resistance of many states to the
application of international norms within their borders. To demonstrate this I
could aim at an easy target, like China, which regularly argues that its internal
affairs are none of the international community's business. There, executions
number in the thousands each year, and the coercion of confessions is
reportedly routine. Yet China recently adopted new codes of criminal law and
criminal procedure. These articulate a number of rights alien to many Chinese
but familiar to Westerners; for example, the right to counsel and a presumption
of innocence.37
Furthermore, states with a long tradition of such rights do not necessarily
welcome international norms that may differ from domestic law. The United
States, for example, has been reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, and has
done so only after attaching reservations or declarations that gut safeguards.3"
The United States also maintains that key provisions are not "self-executing,"
and thus have no mandatory domestic effect absent implementing legislation.39
Although President Clinton recently characterized resistance to international
34. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 490-95; Jonathan 0. Hafen. International Extradition:
Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REv. 191, 194, 197-214 (1992).
35. See Swart, supra note 7, at 531-34.
36. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 494.
37. See Amann, Harmonic Convergence, supra note 7, at 49-55 (analyzing developments in
Chinese criminal justice system).
38. See William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK J. INT'L L. 277 (1995). Accord Wilson, supra
note 27, at 1606 ("[Tlhe United States ... has staunchly refused to make itself a party to any international
human rights instrument which might subject it to review of allegations of individual violations of human
rights, whether in the criminal process or any other."). 1
39. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHEFOREIGNRELATiONSLAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATES§ 111(4)
& cmt. h (1987). See generally Diane Marie Amann, Cynthia R.L. Fairweather & Vivian H. Rhoe, Using
International Law to Defend the Accused, I CAL. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 2000) (visited Feb. 18, 2000),
<http://www.boalt.org/CCLR/>.
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norms as a "New Isolationism," the United States long has resisted pressure
from outside. Indeed, in the area of law enforcement, the Executive Branch, by
the positions it has taken in transnational criminal litigation, has fostered
isolationism.
Nor is the United States judiciary without blame. In transnational criminal
cases the United States Supreme Court has followed a policy of extreme
deference to the political branches, lest its decisions upset foreign relations.4'
In the area of extradition, courts adhere to a rule against inquiring into the
fairness, of the requesting state's legal system."2 Courts have sustained
legislation depriving defendants of standing to challenge violations of
international law that had been incorporated into statutory law.43 Although
United States courts sometimes look to international law to determine the scope
of the United States Constitution, a number of sitting Justices contend that
international norms play no role in constitutional interpretation."
Against this backdrop the holdings in 1990s trilogy of United States
Supreme Court opinions in transnational cases are not surprising. First came
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,45 in which the Court refused to accord the
Fourth Amendment's protections to a noncitizen defendant against whom the
United States government intended to introduce evidence obtained in a
warrantless search in Mexico.' Then, in United States v. Alvarez-
40. See David E. Sanger, Clinton Says 'New Isolationism' Imperils U.S. Security, N.Y. TMES, Oct.
15, 1999, at Al.
41. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 697 ("Because foreign relations are specifically committed by the
Constitution to the political branches, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2, we would not make a discretionary
judgment premised on inducing them to adopt policies in relation to other nations without squarely
confronting the propriety of grounding judicial action on such a premise").
A classic expression of such deference, albeit outside the criminal context, occurs in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
42. Compare Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry
in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991) (supporting this rule of
noninquiry, enunciated in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901)) with Wilson, supra note 27, at 1619-23
(criticizing rule).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11 th Cir.) (sustaining 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d),
which precludes use of international law to challenge searches and seizures pursuant to Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §1901 et seq.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 834 (1989).
44. See Amann, Whipsaw, supra note 2, at 1259-60n.356. Cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (holding executions of sixteen year-olds constitutional without mention of international norms, though
those same norms informed dissent. See id at 389-90, 405 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
45. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
46. The Chief Justice and four colleagues rejected the contention that "every constitutional
provision applies wherever the United States Government exercises its power." Id. at 269. Lower courts also
have limited the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects United States nationals. See United States
v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J.) (United States-foreign search overseas need
comply only with the law of the foreign country, and not with United States law); See also United States v.
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Machain, the Court, over the objection of the Mexican government,
interpreted the United States-Mexico extradition treaty to allow the kidnaping
of a defendant, at the behest of United States agents, in order to procure the
defendant's presence in a United States court. Finally, in United States v.
Balsys,8 the Court held that a witness in a United States court may not invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if she fears that her
compelled testimony would be used against her in a foreign, rather than a
domestic, criminal proceeding.49
Not all United States judges are at fault. Some United States courts do
consult international norms to determine the scope of United States constitu-
tional provisions.5" In the Wang case discussed earlier, the United States courts
insisted that the Chinese witness receive asylum.5" Other judges have refused
to sanction certain extradition efforts and certain evidence-gathering proce-
dures.52
Furthermore, not all states have followed the path of most resistance.
Indeed, in some cases, states are moving toward more acceptance. The forty-
one members of the Council of Europe, for example, must conform their
domestic criminal justice systems to the rules articulated by the European Court
of Human Rights.53 Another example is Canada, which has interpreted its
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to constrain the investigative activities of
Canadian agents abroad.54
Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir.) (applying Peterson to allow evidence obtained after United States and
Australian agents, without warrants or magisterial review, twice burglarized and bugged defendant's ship),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1090,515 U.S. 1169 (1995).
47. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
48. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
49. Id. at 697-98. For a fuller discussion of this opinion, see Diane Marie Amann, International
Decisions: United States v. Balsys, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1998).
50. See, e.g., Mark Andrew Sherman, Indirect Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty Provisions
in Criminal Cases in United States Courts, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 719 (1997); Hans A. Linde,
Comments, 18 INT'L LAW. 77 (1984); Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform
Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L 39 (1981).
51. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996), af 'g Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837
F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
52. See Zagaris, supra note 2, at 1464 (attributing such rulings to judicial disapproval of the
"United States Executive's unwillingness to provide for due process for defendants and third parties in
evidence gathering.")
53. See Amann, Harmonic Convergence, supra note 7, at 19-23 (discussing Court); Van den
Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 490 (stating that European human rights regime has "penetrate[ld] into the day-to-
day 'legal culture' of both practitioners and academics in the member states").
54. R. v. Cook, (visited Feb 18, 1999) <http://www.droit.umontreal.ca/doc/csc-
scc/en/pub/1998/vol2/html/1998scr2_0597.html>.
2000]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:555
How can we guarantee that the rights of those accused of transnational
crimes are honored?
We need to give dignitary interests their due, to ensure that even in cross-
border criminal cases individuals do not suffer unfair or arbitrary governmental
intrusion. The balance between the needs for public safety and private
autonomy must be restored.55 The International Association of Penal Law
recently suggested principles that may guide this process: maintaining the rule
of law; adhering to the legality principle; using the least invasive investigative
techniques; interposing judicial supervision of investigations; prosecuting only
when mens rea and individual culpability can be securely established; making
punishment proportional to the crime; and assuring the presumption of
innocence.- 6
We need to establish a defense lobby. There is a need for an organization,
along the lines of the NACDL, that will both advocate for the interests of the
internationally accused and train its members to represent defendants in
transnational cases with skill.5" The fledgling International Criminal Defence
Attorneys Association, founded in Montreal in 1997, has made a good start.5
The association concentrates on redressing one of the great failings of the
55. Accord Swart, supra note 7, at 506 ("In the interest of combatting crime, states should engage
in the closest international co-operation possible. Basic individual rights set a limit, that cannot be
transgressed.").
56. See Wise, supra note 10, at 1303. In a recent article, a former United States prosecutor argued
for adoption of ethical rules by which prosecutors would consider factors like potential harm to innocent third
parties in choosing appropriate investigative techniques. See generally Rory K. Little, Proportionality as
an Ethical Preceptfor Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723 (1999). Although
the proposal has merit, imposition of a proportionality requirement by an external entity, rather than by
internal policy, would seem more likely to encourage adherence.
57. Even absent a defenders' association, skilled counsel are likely to push systems toward fairer
proceedings. See, e.g., Amann, Harmonic Convergence, supra note 7, at (discussing how attorneys from
nongovernmental organizations have injected new procedures like cross-examination into some national
systems); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common
Law, 92 MICH. L REv. 1047,.1069-72 (1994) (linking origins of privilege to emergence of defense counsel).
58. See International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association (ICDAA) website (visited Feb. 15,
2000), <http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/> [hereinafter "ICDAA website"]. The association's
membership includes 120 individuals, and several nongovernmental organizations and bar associations, from
twenty-three countries. Telephone interview between author and tlise Groulx, ICDAA president, Feb. 8,
2000 [hereinafter Groulx interview].
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international criminal tribunals: the absence of any defense organ.59 It has
wide-ranging plans to improve the lot of defendants.'
We need to work toward the development and elaboration of common
norms of criminal justice, based on the principle that individuals have certain
fundamental rights. Here we, as United States lawyers, need - and here again
I borrow a phrase from Candide - to tend our own garden.6 This means that
when an international criminal justice norm provides the individual greater
protection than does domestic law, we must work to persuade United States
courts to embrace the more protective norm. When we fail to do so, we should
file petitions in regional courts and before supranational bodies like the Human
Rights Committee.62 Even if the decisions of those bodies prove unenforceable,
they will serve a norm-setting function and aid movement toward a customary
international law that is readily understood and applied.63
If we can do these things to improve cross-border criminal justice, perhaps
one day we will enjoy the best of all possible worlds.
59. See ICDAA website, supra note 58. Cf. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 23,
at 11 (stating that experiences in the ad hoc tribunals had "shown that there is a need to ensure that the
defense is provided with adequate resources, facilities and expertise," and thus calling "for the establishment
of a legal assistance unit within the Registry that would be charged with supporting fair trial rights before
the ICC, in particular the right to counsel) (emphasis in original).
60. According to its president, the association intends eventually to train lawyers, and to work to
better policies and practices relating to the defense, in national as well as supranational systems. To date,
it not only has lobbied for a defense unit in the proposed International Criminal Court, but also has filed with
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda an amicus brief on the right to counsel of choice and has
cosponsored a conference at The Hague. Groulx interview, supra note 58; see ICDAA website, supra note
58.
61. VOLTAIRE, supra note 5, at 163 ("ilfaut cultiver notrejardin.")
62. See Amann, Harmonic Convergence, supra note 7, at 18 n.106 (discussing potential for
regional courts to "play a role in developing an international body of constitutional criminal procedure"); see
also Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 495:
In view of the political tensions that may arise over particular international cooperation cases,
especially when the discrimination clause is invoked with respect to an extradition request emanating from
a state with which the requested state has strong political ties, it may be better to have the case decided by
an international judicial body than by domestic judicial or administrative authorities.
63. Cf. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 23, at 4 (predicting that rules established
by the ICC "will have a significant impact on domestic criminal procedure... because it will be legally and
political difficult to justify a two-tiered system of rights, one for ICC and another for purely domestic
purposes.")
COLLECTIVE HARMS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE: A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON CLASS
ACTIONS'
Catharine A. MacKinnon*
A small but increasing number of class actions for mass human rights
violations are being brought under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Class actions are representative actions; the one stands for the many. The mass
accidents for which they are often used, such as large plane crashes, or slowly-
unfolding corporate catastrophes, such as illnesses from asbestos exposure,
involve discrete torts from a single physical cause in particular etiological
scenarios. The injuries are not group-based in the human rights sense. That is,
many people are injured because of where they were (on a plane) or what they
did (work with asbestos), but not because of who they are. Human rights
violations like genocide and crimes against humanity, by contrast, are not mass
accidents. They involve every imaginable tort to a human being and are done
because of who the victims are, based on their race, ethnicity, religion,
nationality, and sex. People are also politically tortured on the basis of their
politics and ethnicity, and war crimes are increasingly concerted acts against
groups. When war is an instrument of genocide, war crimes, too, can be group-
based acts in the political sense.
The question here is whether United States class action instruments under
Rule 23 are well suited to redressing international human rights injuries that
take a collective form. Focusing in particular on the Karadzic cases, and to
some extent the Marcos cases and the more recent Holocaust Victim Assets
cases, my concern here is with the fit between domestic class action techniques,
particularly the "limited fund class action" device, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(B). and international human rights goals for group-based injuries to
groups.
Class actions under Rule 23 are brought for injuries to large groups of
people when common questions of fact and law are raised in situations where
too many parties, plaintiffs or defendants, exist to make joining them all
1. Panel on the Alien Tort Claims Act, International Law Workshop. New York City, November
5, 1999.
* Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; long-term Visiting
Professor, University of Chicago Law School; counsel for plaintiffs in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). Particular thanks for our work together on these issues to
Natalie Nenadic, Asja Armanda, Aida Daidzic, Uza Velazquez, and Maria T. Vullo.
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practical. Some of the devices are mandatory; everyone who was hurt is
deemed included. Some permit people to opt out of the class to voluntarily
exclude themselves.
Class actions in the 60's and 70's, to speak very generally, could be called
the darlings of the Left. They made it possible to recognize and redress through
law collective injuries, including to groups, on a scale something as vast as the
injures were done. Many of these class actions produced civil rights initiatives
that resulted in social change, including prominently in education, employment,
housing, and prisons. The civil rights class action was assumed to be in the
interest of the whole class it represented. Without it, its members had nothing.
In this vision, dissenting class members were cast as greedy spoilers, self-
seeking outliers, troublemakers. Individuals who sought to opt out of these
actions, actions assumed to be in the interest of every member of the group as
a group including them, were considered self-seeking contrarians, free riders,
denying and obstructing the group's welfare. They were also a huge pain in the
neck for litigators, who imagined themselves on the way to the greatest good
for the group, doing justice.
In the 80's and 90's, to again draw a bit of a caricature, class action
devices became the darlings of the Right. Corporations, even whole industries,
found that class actions were made in heaven for controlling their legal
exposure to victims of the widespread harms they did. The utility of class
actions emerged as limiting the liability of mass tortfeasors. Some corpora-
tions, it was alleged, and some industry groups, or so'plaintiffs asserted, went
so far as to initiate their own collusive class actions against themselves,
bringing together a11 the possible victims in one case that they in effect
controlled, in order to settle low. With mandatory classes, the result was that
everyone's liability was limited to whatever those who represented the
plaintiffs-who could be real plaintiffs or not-settled for. The class
representatives were permitted to settle everyone's claims in a way that bound
class members whether they consented to be bound or not, then or later-with
res judicata effect. In massive and unpredictable cases like the asbestos
litigation (in some jurisdictions, around a fifth of all civil cases were asbestos
cases) mandatory class actions took place with the grateful acquiescence of the
courts in their ever-persistent pursuit of docket control.
The tension between these two images of the class action came to a head
of sorts last summer in the Ortiz case, producing a United States Supreme Court
decision2 that shows this shift from the earlier presumption that class plaintiffs
had the interest of the class at heart, to the later suspicion that something else
may be afoot. More specifically, it revealed the change from assuming that it
is best to get something as opposed to nothing for everyone to questioning
2. Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
MacKinnon
whether it is valid to bind all to a group resolution whether they wanted it or
not. One view sees some relief as opposed to none for a group of disenfran-
chised people whom no one will otherwise represent. The other sees an overly-
hasty presumptive, even overreaching, potentially collusive (whether in fact or
in intent) resolution of varied claims cutting off better possible relief later in a
form that is susceptible to being run by agendas that are very far removed from
full relief-far less justice-for the victims. These agendas can include, to
mention a few, politics, media attention and public speaking opportunities,
career and turf-building, development of expertise or its appearance,
credentialing and training, fundraising, and attorney's fees. When the interests
of hurt people are not entirely driving the litigation, class actions can become
more in the interest of perpetrators, and vehicles for the advancement of others,
than engines of vindication and reparations for the survivors.
The class action chameleon that was the particular concern in Ortiz was
the "limited fund class" arising under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(B). The classical limited fund class action arises, for instance, when
an insured ship sinks. The fund for everyone's recovery is limited because the
ship is only insured for so much. A fixed number of people has a stake in the
ship, and the policy limits total recovery, so the thought is that all claims should
be litigated together. Such classes are mandatory in the sense that no opting-out
is permitted except rarely by judicial discretion. No notice is required to
23(b)(1)(B) classes. People can be bound by the adjudication without ever
having heard that it happened. And the results bind all class members whether
they took part in the litigation or not or even knew about it.
The Court in Ortiz, which concerned a settlement class in asbestos
litigation, held that certification of a mandatory settlement class under b(1)(B)
required a showing that the fund is limited independent of the agreement of the
parties. You can notjust get the lawyers for the class together with the lawyers
for the companies, agree to stipulate that "this is all there is," and divide up the
pie. This invites abuse, such as exchanging avoidance of bankruptcy for the
companies for large attorney's fees to the class lawyers. So, the Court held, the
fund had to be shown to be limited in an external way, interclass conflicts had
to be addressed, and class members had to be equitably treated.
II
How do these concerns and safeguards map onto human rights concerns,
particularly with large victim and survivor classes with collective injuries such
as those increasingly occurring on the international stage? Given a plaintiff
class action, how do you know whether it is beneficial and progressive on the
one hand, or complicitous and exploitive on the other?
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Most Alien Tort cases have not been class cases. They have been brought
on behalf of harmed individuals whose human rights were violated, sometimes
on or implicating group grounds, sometimes not. In the spring of 1993, two
actions were brought against Radovan Karadzic, the leader of a group of
Bosnian Serb fascists who carried out a genocide through war to exterminate
and eliminate non-Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two Karadzic cases were
brought under the Alien Tort Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act for
genocide, torture and war crimes in the Southern District of New York by
Bosniac Muslim and Croat survivors, seeking relief for torts of ethnic cleansing
committed against them. One case, Kadic,3 emphasized claims for rape as
genocide, rape as torture, and rape as a war crime. We sought relief specifically
for injuries of genocidal sexual atrocities perpetrated as a result of Karadzic's
policy of ethnic cleansing in collaboration with Slobodan Milosovic's
administration in Belgrade, Serbia. Damages were sought for the named
individuals and groups, with an injunction that Karadzic order the genocide to
stop. This is a representative action in the sense that the injuries had a group
basis and the injunctive relief would have a group impact. If you stop a
genocide, you stop it for everyone-but the moving parties claimed to represent
only those who brought the case. The plaintiffs were one rather large survivor
group, a smaller group, and the named individuals. The second case, Doe,
seeking damages, was brought on behalf of two unnamed young girls claiming
to represent a class of "all people who suffered injury as a result of rape,
genocide, summary execution, arbitrary detention, disappearance, torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted by Bosnian-Serb Forces
under the command and control of defendant between April 1992 and the
present."4
By court practice, these two cases proceeded in tandem under a single
caption. Jurisdiction was established over Karadzic by beating back varieties
of immunity claims, some known, some previously unknown; a civil claim was
permitted under the Alien Tort Act for rape as an act of genocide.5 Then the
Doe lawyers moved to certify the class,6 which of course subsumed the Kadic
plaintiffs' case. After some months, this motion was amended to seek, in the
alternative, limited fund class certification because Karadzic's assets were
claimed to be limited. This claim was based on a letter Karadzic had sent to the
3. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
4. Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Doe counsel later clarified the claim
as covering persons injured from April 1992 to February, 1993.
5. Kadic, n. 3 supra.
6. All the other paneists worked on the Doe case, at one time or another. The class certification
motion was filed when Beth Stephens, original lead counsel, was no longer actively associated with the case,
and after Harold Hongju Koh, who contributed at a prior crucial period, had withdrawn to assume his position
with the State Department.
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judge contending, inter alia, that he did "not have the financial resources to
bring witnesses for my defense to the United States for either depositions, or
trial."7 The Kadic plaintiffs sought to opt out of the class, and the class
supported them. The judge, however, certified the class on the limited fund
theory and denied the Kadic motion to opt out-over not only the support of
the class but over the lack of opposition from the defendant as well. The Kadic
plaintiffs then moved to decertify the class. The issues under domestic law will
be resolved as procedural and due process matters under Ortiz and prior
precedents.
Two other recent cases have raised similar issues--or potentially so.
Marcos was a limited fund case for torture that received a verdict of $2 billion
at trial.9 The Holocaust Victim Assets cases were brought beginning during
1997 for claims under the Alien Tort Act for human rights violations, and
violations of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and other rights.
One claimed a class of all those persecuted and targeted for persecution by the
Nazis, divided into three subclasses, those deprived of their assets by banks,
subjected to slave labor, and forced to become refugees.'" The settlement
proposal would permit opting out, even though a fixed amount of total recovery
is agreed to between certain Swiss bank defendants and the plaintiffs.
III
This small cluster of critical cases raises two related issues for class
actions: adequacy of relief and adequacy of representation. The issue of
adequacy of relief is illustrated in both the Marcos and Karadzic cases. To us,
limiting the relief of all the survivors of the Bosnian genocide because Karadzic
says he cannot afford to come to New York seems both wrong and small. In the
Marcos case this last summer, a Philippine court disapproved a proposed
settlement that would reduce the $2 billion verdict to $1.5 million based on a
Marcos Swiss bank account, noting in particular that a quarter of this amount
was slated to go to the lawyers." That court also pointedly noted that it was
principally in the interest of the Marcos estate, not the victims, to reduce the
very large amount they had won to the much smaller amount of the settlement
7. Letter from Radovan Karadzic to the court 1 (1997), quoted in Doe v. Karadzk, 176 F.R.D. 458,
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
8. Doe, n. 4 supra.
9. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
10. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. 96 Civ. 4849 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
11. See, Philippines v. Marcos, Civil Case Nos. 0141 and 0185, slip op. at 17 (Republic of
Philippines, Sandiganbayan July 27, 1999) (Consolidated Resolution, Garchitorena, PJ). That court notes
that one lawyer, Robert Swift, who also participated as counsel in making the limited fund claims in the Doe
case, was claiming $34,585,000.00 of the $40 million sought by the lawyers in the Marcos settlement.
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proposal "consequences which are extremely beneficial to the Marcoses and of
minimal benefits for the human rights victims." 2
The Philippine court, noting that Philippine procedural law is heavily
based on United States law, citing United States authorities on class suits,
observed that the settlement it disapproved would likely preclude future
additional relief.
Whether [the plaintiffs] will initiate a new action against new
defendants over the same cause is open to question. Whether they
can even legally do so at this time is speculative... Whether human
rights victims for the period 1972 to 1986 can still initiate separate
suit against anyone else anywhere else is . . . doubtful (emphasis
added).3
The court also noted that the Hawaii decision in Marcos was "binding
under resjudicata principles upon all members of the class, whether or not they
were before the court."' 4 The resjudicata effect of discrimination class actions
have also precluded class members from suing subordinate tortfeasors for the
discrimination. 5 While this result should be resisted, it threatens to preclude
future relief, for example, for individuals who run into their individual rapists
on the streets of the United States, because Karadzic's liability to the class in
Doe is predicated on all the acts of all the people who carried out his orders and
policies. The complaint attributes all of it to him and the class definition seeks
relief for all of it from him. If relief from him is then limited by the limited
fund, but his responsibility for the genocide is total, a vast amount of injury was
just reduced, on the defendant's "say-so", to less than the price of a few tickets
to New York. And actual relief for the survivors' injuries, in this or any other
proceeding, is thus, if not undone, rendered speculative to nil.16
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 15-16
14. Id.
15. In adjudicating claim preclusion questions in claims brought by individual class members
following even unsuccessful class actions, several circuits have found that a vicarious liability or
principal/agent relationship provides enough privity to preclude their later claims. See, e.g., Pelletier v.
Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1502 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855 (1991); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon
Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1288 (5th Cir. 1988); Cahill v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 822 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1987);
Lambert v. Conrad, 536 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1976). While a subsequent suit by a survivor absent class
member against a lower-level perpetrator might not be precluded from seeking relief by a successful
resolution of Doe, it might-a successful case backed up by the limited fund theory having a potentially more
powerful preclusive effect.
16. The proceedings in the Holocaust Victims Asset litigation are multiple and on-going. Robert
Swift is also involved in them.
The issue of adequacy of representation raises the dangers of asserting a
class in human rights litigation when the members have, and can have, no real
contact with their purported representatives. The survivors are far away and
speak another language; they may number in the thousands or, as in the Bosnian
situation, in the hundreds of thousands. In on-going policy development, one
claims to represent huge numbers of people with whom one has no contact,
speaking for them in public or policy settings, taking positions on issues that
deeply and directly affect their lives, on which they have diverse and nuanced
opinions. The structure of the limited fund class claims in particular seems
actually to discourage contact, even discourages telling members of the class
that one is representing them. Their involvement would make things cumber-
some, complex, create cross-currents, become time-consuming, take resources.
Actually representing badly hurt people is a lot of work. As some of the
affiants in our motion supporting the de-certification motion noted, the Doe
class usurps many of the functions of elected representatives, which is
undemocratic. 7 It could even be termed colonizing.
Unsought and unwanted representation in a class raises the possibility that
some of the intangible and expressive gains from human rights litigation,
especially for group-based injuries like rape in genocide, may be undermined.
Human rights litigation offers people their humanity back. What is stolen from
them when they are violated can be partially or potentially returned to them
through a process that does not reduce them to the ciphers of group membership
the way their perpetrators did. It treats them as more than the sum of the
injuries done to them. It gives them back a voice in their fate, and the dignity
of a place at the table. For this to work, the process must be accountable,
personal, and responsive. Being forcibly lumped into a group-based class,
thereby deprived of direct or actual representation, being represented in name
(or no name) only, survivors of group-based atrocities can experience the
process as furthering the deprivation of humanity that human rights law
promises to restore.
POSTSCRIPT
On March 27, 2000, the Kadic plaintiffs won their motion to decertify the
Doe class under Ortiz. Judge Peter K. Leisure cited, among other grounds, the
Kadic plaintiff's insistence that the Doe plaintiff's "have been unresponsive to
their attempts to secure adequate representation" and "perhaps their most
serious accusation ... the Doe plaintiffs' willingness to accept defendant's
17. See, e.g., Exhibit H. Decl. of Haris Silajdzic, Co-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Exhibit E, Decl. of Mediha
Filipovic, Parliament Member of Bosnia-Herzegovina, id.
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'profession of poverty' in order to obtain mandatory class treatment. 8 On
August 10, 2000, a New York jury awarded the Kadic plaintiffs a total of $745
million in compensatory and punitive damages and a permanent injunction.
18. Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878 (PKL), 2000 WL 763851, at *8 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2000) (Memorandum Order).
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A man and a woman get married. After a number of years they have kids.
A few years later, they get a divorce. The divorce decree is issued in Israel,
where the wife resides, yet the ex-husband resides in Chicago.' The wife
obtains a claim for child support in Israel, and the husband, located in the
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I. These are the facts of Nardi v. Segal, 234 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. 1968).
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United States, defaults on his child support payments. Can Illinois enforce the
claim for arrears based on the Israeli divorce decree, through a reciprocal
agreement with Israel? Or for that matter, can Chicago deal directly with
Haifa? Will an agreement between Illinois and Israel (or Chicago and Haifa)
hamper the United States' foreign relations with Israel on other issues?
This case and these issues illustrate the existence of a wide gap between
the need by the states to enforce international cases of child support violations
and the federal government's desire to have continued comity amongst fellow
nations. This gap has resulted in a federal statute allowing individual states to
enter into agreements with foreign nations. Although critics have argued that
some areas of international law have been promoted by state legislation,2 the
International Child Support Enforcement' (ICSE) provision of the Social
Security Act is merely a band-aid to an increasingly pervasive problem. The
crevice in which international child support cases exist, between the precipice
of state's control over family law issues on one side and the federal govern-
ment's authority over foreign affairs on the other, has become wider as more
cases have fallen through the cracks and discussion has expanded on the issue."
In examining the issue of international child support enforcement, it is
necessary to notice the thin line between what is state and what is federal in
nature. Although enacted laws are presumed to be constitutional,' when the
democratic process produces a law, which goes against the Constitution, the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land must prevail.6
This paper examines the constitutionally of the recently promulgated
statutes7 addressing the issue of international child support enforcement. It
provides an analysis of the various questions raised by the application of the
provisions upon the.scope of the state or local government's ability to enter in
the realm of foreign affairs. Section (I) briefly examines the articulated
purposes of the ICSE provisions and demonstrates that they are not consistent
2. See Richard B. Bilder, The Rolde of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J. Int't L.
821, 826, 828-830 (1989) [hereinafter Bilder].
3. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998). Throughout this paper I will collectively
refer to these two separate statutes as the ICSE provisions.
4. See Adair Dyer, Internationalization of Family Law, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 641-645
(1997)[hereinafter Dyer]; Peter H. Pfund, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 3 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 665 (1997) [hereinafter Pfund]; Elizabeth Kolby, Moral Responsibility to Filipino
Amerasians: Potential Immigration and Child Support Alternatives, 2 ASIAN L. J. 61, 77-84 (1995)
[hereinafter Kolby]; Gloria F. DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and the Constitution: State and Federal
Initiatives in International Support Enforcement, 28 FAM. L. Q. 89 (1994)[hereinafter DeHart]; David F.
Cavers, International Enforcement of Family Support, 81 COLUM. L REv. 994 (1981)[hereinafter Cavers].
5. See Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,475 (1883); see infra discussion section II.
6. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2., "This Constitution .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
7. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998)(collectively referred to as the
International Child Support Enforcement provisions ICSE).
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with the actual language of the statute. Section (II) analyzes the constitu-
tionality of the ICSE provisions' grant of extra-constitutional' powers to the
states. It will consider those clauses in the constitution which may give
Congress the authority to pass the ICSE provisions. Section (III) analyzes
Congress' ability to regulate family law. Finally, this paper proposes two
things. First, if the statute is valid, then international child support enforce-
ment should be placed on a completely federal level without local interference
by the states into the federal government's foreign policy. Furthermore, if
Congress has Commerce Clause authority to regulate here, the provisions can
become constitutional without losing the desired effect by removing the
language directed toward the states from its content. Second, if Congress is
aggrandizing their power to regulate under the commerce clause then the life
span of the ICSE provisions is in serious jeopardy.
I. A STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE ICSE PROVISIONS
At common law, the only legal duty for a father to pay child support not
stipulated by contract, was a moral one.' In addition, if a minor child made a
contract with a third party, a father could not be held liable unless he explicitly
or implicitly consented to the contract.'0 Current state statutes" and judicial
8. Extra-constitutional powers, as referenced in this paper, means those powers which are not
specifically or residually granted to either the state or the federal government by the Constitution, i.e.
unconstitutional. The phrase extra-constitutional is amorphous in nature, equally being applied to mean
either non-constitutional, not stated in the constitution and thus political in nature, or unconstitutional, actions
which are against the expressed provisions in the Constitution. The phrase seemed appropriate in talking
about international child support enforcement, another amorphous area of the law.
9. See Shelton v. Springett, II C.B. 452, 454-55, 138 Eng. Rep. 549, 550 (1851); Bazeley v.
Forder, 3 Q.B. 559, 561 (1868)("here is no obligation on the part of the father to support his children at the
common law, the liability is only by force of the statutes as to poor law"). Id.
10. See Shelton, 11 C.B. at 454-455; see also id. at 456 (Maule, J. concurrence). "[Tihe mere moral
obligation on the father to maintain his child affords no inference of a legal promise to pay his debts." Id.
11. ANN. CAL. CIr. CODE § 4700 (Supp. 1980); Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act §§ 2,3,
9 U.L.A. 174, 177 (1979). Some states have extended the duty of support to stepparents. See, e.g., N.H.
STAT. ANN. §§ 546-A:1, 546-A:2 (1974); N.Y.-MCKINNEY'SSOC. SERV. L. § 101 (1983 & Supp. 1986); S.D.
COMP. L. §25-7-8 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. 1986, § 78-45-4.1 (Supp.); WEST'S REV. CODE WASH. ANN.
§ 26.16.205 (Supp. 1986).; See generally Logan v. Logan, 424 A.2d 403 (N.H. 1980). Note however, in the
absence of statutory imposed duty, in common law stepparents have no duty of support for their stepchildren
unless the stepparent assumes such a duty. See Chapin v. Superior Court In and For Kern County, 239 Cal.
App.2d 851 (1966); Ladd v. Welfare Commissioner, 217 A.2d 490 (1965); Fussell v. Douberly, 206 So.2d
231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Zeller v. Zeller, 407 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1965); In re Besondy, 20 N.W. 366
(Minn. 1884); Falzo v. Falzo, 202 A.2d 192 (N.J. Super 1964); In re Estate of Turer, 133 N.W.2d 765 (Wis.
1965); In re Fowler, 288 A.2d 463 (Vt. 1972).
Thus, a stepparent can relinquish their duty at any time without an imposition of liability. See Franklin
v. Franklin, 253 P.2d 337 (1953); Clevenger v. Clevenger 189 Cal. App.2d 658 (1961); Remliewicz v.
Remkiewicz, 429 A.2d 833 (Conn. 1980); Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396 (Md. 1980); Chestnut v. Chestnut,
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decisions 2 have placed a duty on both parents to be responsible for the support
of their children. 3
When this duty is breached, children and custodial guardians often look
to the courts for relief. Remedies which are available to children for the
enforcement of the duty of support include bringing a civil suit against the
offending parent,"' encouraging the state to bring a criminal suit, 5 or bringing
a suit in equity for the purchase of essential items for the child's maintenance.' 6
Judgment by the court is often times the awarding of specific performance of
child support payments. If it is determined that the parent intentionally refused
to pay, and payment was economically feasible, penalties for non-compliance
include civil contempt, 7 criminal sanctions, 8 and if the non-custodial parent
is a federal employee, the garnishment of wages.' 9
Child support enforcement has traditionally been the domain of the state
govemment. 20 However, when the problem of interstate enforcement of child
support orders became too pervasive to be ignored, National Conference of
Commission on Uniform Laws approved a series of uniform acts,2' Revised
147 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 1966). See generally Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship, 70 CORN. L REV. 38 (1984).
12. Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 At. 167,477 S.W.2d 845 (1972); Carter v. Carter, 397 N.Y.S.2d
88 (2nd Dept. 1977); Murredu v. Murredu, 236 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1977).
13. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1,
also requires both parents to share the responsibility of child support. See generally Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) holding that a statute authorizing alimony only to wives and not husbands violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
14. McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1960); Johnson v. Norman 421 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio
1981).
15. State v. Ducey, 266 N.E.2d 233 (Ohio 1970).
16. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953).
17. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment and
Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the Denver District Court, 57 DEN. L. 1.21, 44 (1979).
18. See Day v. State, 481 P.2d 807 (Okl. Crim. App. 1971) (non-support of child is a continuing
criminal offense); see generally THE MODEL PENALCODE § 207.14 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (misdemeanor
to fail to support a child, when defendant is capable of payment).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. §659. The use of garnishment are limited in scope. See Brockelman v.
Brockelman, 478 F. Supp. 141 (D.Kan. 1979) (spouse may not garnish amounts owed to the other spouse as
income tax refunds). See generally Maj. Alan Cook, The Armed Forces as a Model Employer in Child
Support Enforcement: A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on Military Members, 155 MIL. L. REV.
153, 161 (1998) (arguing that the military seems to be more effective enforcer of child support claims than
the local or state governments).
20. Kolby supra note 4. at 77. See also Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Support Over There, 9 FAM.
ADVOC. 34 (1987).
21. See Faye R. Goldberg, Child Support Enforcement; Balancing Increased Federal Involvement
with Procedural Due Process, 19 SuFrOLK U. L REV. 687 (1985) (presenting a history of the federal
government involvement in child support issues); see also Kolby supra note 4, at 78.
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Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)22 and the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 3 for the states to adopt, and which
currently have been enacted in some form in all states.24 Under these laws,
interstate child support enforcement decrees are treated like any other sister-
state court orders, thus making enforcement possible under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution.
2 5
22. 9 U.L.A. 381 §2(m)(1987). Avast majority ofstates have repealed the reciprocal enforcement
act in favoring instead to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 9. U.LA. 15 § 1(19)
(Supp. 1993).
23. 9 U.LA. 15 § 1(19) (Supp. 1993).
24. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996), replacing the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, has been adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. ALA. CODE §§ 30-3a-
101 to 30-3a-906 (1998); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.101 to 25.25.903 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-
621 to 25-661; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-17-101 to 9-17-902 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 490 to 4976;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-101 to 14-5-1007; 1997 CONN. ACMS 97-1 (2nd Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 601 to691 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-341.1 to 30-349.1 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
88.0011 to 88.9051 (West 1998); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 19-11-100 to 19-11-191 (Michie 1998); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 576B-101 to 576B-902 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1001 to 7-1059 (1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 22/100 to 22/999 (West 1998); IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 31-18-1-1 to 31-18-9-4 (West 1998); IOWACODE
ANN. §§ 252K.101 to 252K.904 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-9,301 to 23-9,903 (1998); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 407.5101 to 407.5902 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.1 to 1308.2 (West 1998);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 2801 to 3401; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 10-301 to 10-359 (1998);
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209D, §§ 1-101 to 9-902 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 552.1101
to 552.1901 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518C.101 to 518C.902 (West 1998); Miss. CODE. ANN. §§
93-25-1 to 93-25-117 (1998); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 454.850 to 454.997 (West 1998); MONT. CODE. ANN. §§
40-5-101 to 40-5-197 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-701 to 42-751 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 130.0902
to 130.802 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546-B:1 to 546-B:60 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-6A-101
to 40-6A-903 (Michie 1998); N.Y. FAm. Cr. Act. §§ 580-101 to 580-905 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§52C-1 -
100 to 52C-9-902 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-12.2-01 to 14-12.2-49 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 3115.01 to 3115.59 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 601-100 to 601-901 (1998); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 110.300 to 110.441 (1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101 to 7901 (West 1998); R.1. GEN.
LAWS §§ 15-23-I to 15-23-53 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-960 to 20-7-1166 (Law. Co-op. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-9B-101 to 25-9B-902 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 36-5-2001 to 36-5-2902
(1998); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001 to 159.902; (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45f-200 to 78-
45f-901 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15B, §§ 101 to 904 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.32 to 20-88.82
(Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 26.21.005 to26.21.916 (West 1998); W.VA. CODE §§ 48B-1 -101
to 48B-9-903 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 769.101 to 769.903 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-139
to 20-4-189 (Michie 1998).
A few states have enacted the UIFSA, but have not repealed their Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act statutes: Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11-40 to 19-11-81 (1998); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 252A. Ito 252A.25 (West 1998); and Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.151 to 780.183 (West
1998). Kentucky's adoption statute of the UIFSA, and repeal of the RURESA, would be deemed effective
when the United States Congress requires the UIFSA be adopted by the several states. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 407.5101 to 407.5902 (Michie 1998).
New Jersey is the only state which has not adopted the Uniform Family Support Act, but kept their
URESA statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-30.24 to 2A:4-30.64 (West 1998).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." All United States' states must give the same effect
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A problem arises when discussing the enforcement of foreign child support
decrees. Unlike in the interstate model of child support enforcement full faith
and credit does not apply to foreign judgments,26 states are not allowed to make
treaties with foreign nations,27 and enforcement of foreign court orders is by the
discretion of the state court28 or through a reciprocal arrangement between the
to a judgment of a court of a sister-state as if the judgment was rendered in the requesting state's court, as
long as the judgment was final and the court who entered the order had valid jurisdiction over the case.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not imply that the state
court must recognize decisions from foreign nations just sister-states of the United States.
In Nardi v. Segal, 234 N.E.2d 805 (111. 1968), an ex-wife brought a suit for arrearages of child support
against her ex-husband. ld at 806. The child support enforcement decree was based on an Israeli divorce
decree. Id. At the time the complaint was filed, the wife was living in Israel, the ex-husband in Chicago, and
the ex-husband had not paid nine months of child support. Id. The court stated that the doctrine of comity
did not require it to enforce a decree from a foreign country, nor did the Full-Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution require the court to recognize or enforce a decree from a foreign country. But see
Wolff v. Wolff, 389 A.2d 413, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held
that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act did not preclude the state court from
recognizing or enforcing an alimony decree obtained in England. Thus recognition of the foreign order by
the state court is not based on whether the court had jurisdiction but on the doctrine of comity.
Recognition of a foreign judgment does not imply enforcement of the judgment. The Uniform
Foreign-Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA) excludes judgments for "support in matrimonial or
family matters" from its definition of "foreign judgments." Uniform Foreign-Money Judgment Recognition
Act § 1(2); See also 100 A.L.R.3d 792 (explaining the construction and application of the Uniform Foreign-
Money Judgment Recognition Act).
By legislative promulgation, twenty-eight states, Washington, DC and the Virgin Islands have adopted
the UFMJRA. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100 to 09.30.180 (Michie 1998); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1713
to 1713.8 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-101 to 13-62-109 (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50a-30 to 50a-38 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4801 to 4808 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-381 to 15-388 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.601 to 55.607 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §§
9-12-110 to 9-12-117 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658C-1 to 685C-9 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 10-1401 to
10-1409 (1998); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-618 to 5/12-626 (West 1998); IOWACODEANN. §§ 626B. I
to 626B.8 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CS. & JUD. PROC §§ 10-701 to 10-709 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 691.1151 to 691.1159 (West 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 548.35 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770 to 511.787 (West 1998); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§§ 25-9-601 to 25-9-609 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:49A-16 to 2A:49A-24 (West 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39-4B-1 to 39-4B-9 (Michie 1998); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 5301 to5309 (McKinney 1998); N.C.GEN. STAT.
§§ 1C-1800 to IC-1808 (1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90 to 2394.94 (Anderson 1998); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 12, §§ 710 to 718 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 24.200 to 24.255 (1998); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 22001 to 22009 (1998); TEX. Cwv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001 to 36.008, 36.0041 to
36.0044 (West 1998); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-465.6 to 8.01-465.13 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. §§ 6.40.010 to 6.40.915 (West 1998); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 561 to 569 (1998).
By adopting the UFMJRA, state courts are precluded from recognizing and enforcing child support
decrees from foreign countries. See generally Nardi, 234 N.E.2d at 805; Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 360
N.E.2d 386 (111. 1977).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
28. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (stating that it is the state's courts discretion whether
to recognize a foreign nation's court judgment since under the principle of comity of nations the state court
was under no obligation).
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states and the foreign government." It is the validity of the last category wherethe main thrust of this paper will be focused.
A. The Statutory Language of the ICSE Provisions
Legislation is presumed constitutional, unless sufficient evidence is
presented to rebut the presumption.30 The Supreme Court has held that when
a statute contains patent inconsistencies against the expressed provisions of the
federal constitution, it is facially invalid.3 There is case law in which a facially
neutral statute, when applied, posed latent inconsistencies with federal law.32
Such statutes are also invalid.33 If a statute contains possible inconsistencies,
the legislature should ensure that the language of the statute clearly reflects a
valid legislative intent. If the statute is invalid when applied, the legislature
should repeal such an ineffective statute.
The International Child Support Enforcement (ICSE)35 provisions are
comprised of two statutory acts. The first one, under 42 U.S.C.A. §659a, is
entitled International Support Enforcement.36 The second provision, also
29. Pfund, at 674-75; Kolby, at 78; Cavers, at 1037 (stating that in absence of federal exercising
any power in enforcing international child support decrees, the states have in increasing number entered into
reciprocity arrangement with foreign nations).
Any future reference to foreign governments or foreign states means government of nation states and
not the government of the states of the United States.
30. See Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,475 (1883); Sloan v. Baker, 10 P.2d 362,364
(Or. 1932). This presumption is asserted to prevent the courts from rewriting the Constitution to adapt the
document to present life. Instead, the presumption gives force to newly enacted laws, at the same time not
disrupting the actual language of the Constitution. Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350, 410 (1920)(J.
Clarke, dissenting).
But see Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L REv. 457, 469 "It is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the ground upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Id.
31. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The
Supremacy Clause dictates that no other law shall be above the federal Constitution. "This Constitution...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. State laws and state constitutions can give
a broader interpretation of a constitutional right, but not a narrower one.
32. See E.E.O.C. v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 170-171 (1995).
33. See id.
34. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), prior to the Supreme Court deciding the
matter, Congress had adopted an amendment to the statute at issue in order, so that it may reflect a legislative
history which included an explanation on the connection between the impact of the regulation of gun
possession on school grounds and interstate commerce.
35. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998).
36. "(a) Authority for declarations
(1) Declarations
The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, is authorized to declare any foreign country (or a political subdivision
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incorporated under the federal Social Security Act, regulates state plans for
child and spousal support, under 42 U.S.C.A. §654.37
The current practice among state governments has been to enter into
agreements with foreign nations to address the issue of international child
support enforcement.3" The ICSE provisions39 of the federal Social Security
Act makes reference to the current arrangement between states and foreign
nations,' while simultaneously granting authority to the State Department and
thereof) to be a foreign reciprocating country if the foreign country has established, or
undertakes to establish, procedures for the establishment and enforcement of duties of
support owed to obligees who are residents of the United States, and such procedures
are substantially in conformity with the standards prescribed under section (b) of this
section.
(3) Form of declaration
A declaration under paragraph (1) may be made in the form of an international
agreement, in connection with an international agreement or corresponding foreign
declaration, or on a unilateral basis.
(b) Standards for foreign support enforcement procedures
(2) Additional elements
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the States, may establish such additional standards as may be
considered necessary to further the process of this section.
(d) , Effects on other states
States may enter into reciprocal arrangements for the establishment and enforcement
of support obligations with foreign countries that are not the subject of a declaration
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to the extent consistent with Federal law."
37. "A State plan for child and spousal support must-
32 (A) provide that any request for services under this part by a foreign reciprocating
country or a foreign country with which the States has an arrangement described in
section (42 U.S.C.S. §659a(d)] shall be treated as a request by a state;
(B) provide, at State option, notwithstanding ... any other provision of this
(act], for services under the plan for enforcement of a spousal support order not
described in paragraph (4)(B) entered by such a country (or subdivision); and
(C) provide that no application will be required from, and no costs will assessed
for such services against, the foreign reciprocating country or foreign obligee (but
costs may at State option be assessed against the obligor)."
38. See supra note 3.
39. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 654 132(A), 659a (d) (West 1998).
40. See id. The language in subsection (d), entitled "Effect on other laws" gives the states the
authority to enter into reciprocal enforcement agreements with foreign nations as long as the country is not
one already declared by the State Department to be a reciprocating nation under subsection (a) or inconsistent
with federal law. Id. at (d).
The current practice of international child support enforcement has been through Parallel Unilateral
Policy Declarations (PUPDs). Under the PUPDs, and the principle of comity, the state, through its courts
would agree to recognize foreign child support decrees if the foreign nation would reciprocate and afford the
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the Department of Health and Human Services to designate foreign nations as
reciprocating countries who will honor the United States child support decree.4
It also creates an imposition upon the state courts to recognize and treat foreign
judgments for child support as if it originated from a sister-state.42 In enacting
the ICSE provisions, Congress sought to federalize the issue of international
child support enforcement43 by encouraging the federal government to take a
more active role in enforcement." The ICSE provisions, in various
incarnations, were debated and dissected in Congress for over two years before
being signed into law.45
state citizens the same opportunity for enforcement of United States child support decrees. Some have argued
that with the passage of the ICSE provisions the federal government will be more inclined to begin
negotiations with foreign countries, both past participants in the PUPDs and other nations, regarding child
support enforcement. See DeHart, at 89.
41. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a (a) (West 1998).
42. See 42 U.S.C.A. at § 654. Section 654 entitled, "State plan for child and spousal support"
requires that any state plan for child support enforcement must treat international child support claims as if
there are interstate child support claims. See id at I 32(A).
Child support enforcement has traditionally been the domain of the state government. See Kolby, at
77. See also Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Support Over There, 9 F~m. ADVOC. 34 (1987). However, when the
problem of interstate enforcement of child support orders became too pervasive to be ignored, the National
Conference of Commission on Uniform Laws passed a series of uniform acts, Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), 9 U.L.A. 381 § 2(m) (1998), and the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA), 9 U.L.A. 15 § 1(19) (1998), for the states to adopt, and which currently have been
enacted in some form in 49 states and the District of Columbia. See discussion following note 24.
Under state laws interstate child support enforcement decrees are treated like any other sister-state
court decrees, thus enforcement is possible under the principles of Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." All United States' state courts must give the
same effect to a judgment of a court of a sister-state as if the judgment was rendered in the requesting state's
court, as long as the judgment was final and the court that entered the order had valid jurisdiction over the
case.
Under the principles of full faith and credit, and comity of nations, state courts are allowed to
recognize foreign court judgments at their discretion. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). However,
recognition does not imply that the judgment is considered conclusive evidence of an obligation to pay, just
prima facie evidence that a debt exists. Id.
43. See P.L. 104-193 § 39. "The U.S. and selected foreign nations maybe able to help each other
deal with the problem of parents and former spouses crossing boundaries to avoid support payments." Id.
. The United States is not a signatory to any of the United Nations treaties pertaining to international
child support enforcement. Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance Obligations, June 20, 1956,
268 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance
Obligations, Oct. 2, 1973, 1021 U.N.T.S. 209; see also 136 Cong. Rec. E2904 (daily ed. Sept. 19,
1990)(statement of Rep. Kennelly).
Prior to the passage of the ICSE provisions, no law existed on the issue of international child support
enforcement. 141 Cong. Rec. H12317, H15427 (daily ed. December 21, 1995); P.L. 104-193 § 39.
44. See P.L. 104-193 § 39 International Child Support Enforcement. The provisions were to "allow
and encourage the Secretary of State to pursue reciprocal support agreements with other nations." Id.
45. Representative Kennelly introduced legislation of January 4, 1995, designed to improve
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Congress expressed four specific reasons for passing the ICSE provisions:
(1) to provide a remedy to U.S. parents in the enforcement of child support
abroad,' (2) to address the fact that states do not have the power to enter into
treaties, (3) to encourage the Department of State to take a more active role in
pursuing agreements with foreign nations on this issue, and (4) to place on a
federal level the issue of international child support enforcement in order to
cultivate solutions to the problem via foreign policy. 7
Whether the statute provides an adequate remedy to U.S. parents trying to
enforce child support claims abroad remains a pressing issue- since its
enactment.48 The statute fails to provide any expressed jurisdictional predicate,
stating which forum or choice of law the parents will utilize.49 The statute does
declare that a request by a reciprocating foreign nation should be treated as if
it were a request by a sister state. 50 Yet, unlike international requests, interstate
requests have the protection of both state and federal law.
Each state has adopted into their laws provisions allowing for recognition
of outside state claims, thus ensuring interstate requests receive the same
treatment as intrastate requests for assistance. Additionally, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution precludes the courts of one state from
discriminating against and not recognizing judgments from another state.
Comparatively, international child support embodies two distinct principles of
interstate enforcement by urging Congress to ratify the U.N. treaties on international child support
enforcement and thus treat international support claims as if they were interstate support claims. See H.R.
95, 104th Cong. § 424 (1995). Senator Bradley introduced similar legislation on February 16, 1995. See S.
456, 104th Cong. §172 (1995); see also S. 442, 104th Cong. § 172 (1995)
Also on January 4, 1995, the clauses pertaining to state authority to enter into agreements with other
nations were introduced as part of the proposed Balance Budget Act, HR 2491, 104th Cong. § 12370 (1995),
and the proposed Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, HR 4, 104th Cong. §371
(1995). It was not until October 23, 1995, did the Senate propose similar legislation, but only pertaining to
the power of the State Department to designate foreign nations. S. 1357, 104th Cong. § 7371 (1995). The
legislation was re-introduced by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, in its entirety on June 5, 1996. See S. 1841,
104th Cong. § 271 (1996).
46. Currently, the United States is not a signatory to any major treaty or international convention
regarding international child support. The current reciprocal agreements by the states with foreign countries
were done pursuant to the model established in the URESA.
47. H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); P.L. 104-193, Title
111, §39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2), H12976 (1995).
48. See Pfund at 665, 675 (citing the ICSE provision, 42 U.S.C. §659a, as a new remedy for the
problem of international enforcement.); Dehart, at 93-4 (explaining the system between the state and foreign
governments in enforcing international orders under the URESA system); See also Cavers, at 997-1000
(addressing the issue of enforcing claims in the United States and abroad prior to the passage of the ICSE
provisions).
49. See Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe
to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1047,1049 (1995).
50. 42 U.S.C. §654 32 (A).
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law: family law and international affairs. Family law has traditionally been the
domain of state government and state courts."' Early on, the Supreme Court
found federal courts lack the necessary judicial expertise in domestic issues and
state courts were the best forum to handle such delicate matters.52 Additionally,
recognition of foreign court judgments are not automatic, but instead are based
solely on the discretion of the court to recognize the claim of an international
court judgment.5 3 Unlike Full Faith and Credit recognition, the recognition by
the court is not conclusive evidence that child support is due, but merely
evidence that a debt is owed to the complaining party.54 Therefore,
international claims can not be treated similar to interstate claims because of the
broad judicial discretion by the state courts to accept or deny recognition of a
foreign judgments."
The language of the statute is not directed towards state courts, but to state
governments. The statute expresses that "states may enter into reciprocal
arrangements for the establishment and enforcement of support obligations with
foreign countries."56 Identifying the constitutional basis for how a federal
statute may effect interstate commerce may aid in interpreting the legislative
intent if the law is on questionable grounds.57 A state court can hear a case
arising under federal law unless Congress says otherwise. 8 State courts have
inherent authority and are presumably competent to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States.59 This presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction can be rebutted by explicit statutory language or unmistakable
implication from legislative history or clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal interest.' Federal question jurisdiction in district
courts dictates that federal courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
51. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 590-92 (1858)(holding that matters dealing with domestic
relations are to be handled by the state courts, not the federal courts, since there exist no history of family law
on the federal level).
52. Id.
53. supra the discussion following note 46.
54. Id.
55. Although URESA was enacted to facilitate interstate child support enforcement, only about 41%
of state courts actually enforce claims from other states. 138 Cong. Rec. H7326 (statement by Rep. Hyde).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West 1998).
57. Id.
58. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380-81 (1990).
59. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-9 (1990).
60. Id. See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; id. at art. 11, §2; id. at amend. X. See generally Printz v.
U.S., 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995)(Kennedy's concurrence); N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992)(holding that Congress' efforts to
mandate state toxic waste clean up violated the Tenth Amendment); Missouri v. Holland, 40 S. Ct. 382
(1920); Condon v. Reno, 155 F. 3d 453 (1998).
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arising under the Constitution,6' federal laws or treaties of the United States.62
The ICSE provisions are silent as to the jurisdictional predicate to be employed
in bringing claims under this statute. Therefore, the statute does not explicitly
rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.
B. Legislative History of the ICSE Provisions
The legislative history of the ICSE provision gives jurisdiction by
implication to the federal court over the issue of international child support
enforcement. 63 By claiming to provide a remedy to United States parents in the
enforcement of child support abroad, the language in the ICSE provisions is
designed to allow the states to continue making arrangements with foreign
nations.' If the statute had vested jurisdiction in both state and federal courts,
the legislative history would not have mentioned that states can not enter into
treaties with foreign nations.65 In addition, allowing states to enter into these
agreements does not provide a direct remedy to parents who want to enforce
international claims for child support. Even if such agreements are legal, by not
providing a jurisdictional predicate within the statute itself, parents are not
afforded adequate remedies to enforce child support claims abroad.
The congressional record and debates indicate that the legislature
envisioned a more efficient enforcement of international child support claims.'
The legislative history of ICSE provisions acknowledges that states can not
make treaties.67 In addition, one purpose of the statute was to authorize and
motivate the federal government to take action in the area of child support since
the United States has not signed any treaties regarding this issue.68 Further-
61. See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1998). Original jurisdiction in this context means non-appellate
jurisdiction. See also 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(b) (1998) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have original but
not exlusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;... (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the
citizens of another States or against aliens").
62. 28 U.S.C. §1331 (1998).
63. See Pfund, at 674-675; See also DeHart, at 110 (calling for Federal government involvement
in international child support cases).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West 1998).
65. See infra the discussion regarding the prohibition on states forming treaties with foreign
nations.
66. See 136 Cong. Rec. E2904-01 (1990)(Rep. Kennelly calling for a ratification by the United
States of the international treaties dealing with child support enforcement); See also 141 Cong. Rec. H3581-
07, H3662 (1995) (proposing the adoption of the United Nations Convention of 1956, the so called "New
York" Convention, pertaining to international child support enforcement).
67. H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); P.L. 104-193, Title
111, §39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2), H12976 (1995).
68. P.L. 104-193, Title iIl, §39.
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more, the legislative history articulates that international child support
enforcement claims should be treated like inter-state claims.69
C. Statutory Analysis of the ICSE Provisions
Nothing in the statutory language or history intimates that the legislature
contemplated a non-custodial parent ever bringing a claim against the execution
of the order, under the provisions, as being unconstitutional or outside the scope
of the state's authority. 0 The specific language of the ICSE provisions, create
three functions. First, the provisions can be interpreted as an enabling statute,
giving the federal government the right to act on the states behalf.7 Second, it
is a supplementary statute, giving the states the right to make arrangements with
foreign nations in the absence of the federal government action.72 Finally, the
provisions act as a regulatory statute, requiring the states to give similar
treatment to international child support claims as they would to inter-state
claims.73 Allowing states to contract with foreign nations contradicts the grant
of jurisdiction to federal, rather than state courts.
The legislative history does not explicitly illustrate whether it was the
intention of the legislature to give both the federal and state governments
concurrentjurisdiction in the field of international child support enforcement.74
69. See supra the discussion following notes 44-48.
70. P.L. 104-193, Title ill §39; H.R. 3857, 104th Cong. §§ 41712,42424 (1996); H.R. 3832, 104th
Cong. § 3832 (1996); S. 1867, 104th Cong. § 371 (1996); H.R. 3612, 104th Cong. § 271 (1996); S. 1841,
104th Cong. § 271 (1996); H.R. 3453, 104th Cong. § 171 (1996); H.R. 3266, 104th Cong. § 371 (1996);
H.R. 2915, 104th Cong. § 971 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-725 at 41 (1996); H.R. 2491,104th Cong. § 12370
(1995); H.R. 2491,104th Cong. § 7371 (1995); H.R. 2530, 104th Cong. § 9472 (1995); S. 1357, 104th Cong.
§ 7371 (1995); H.R. 4, 104th Cong. § 971 (1995); S. 1117, 104th Cong. § 572 (1995); S. 840, 104th Cong.
§ 472 (1995); H.R. 1267, 104th Cong. § 472 (1995); H.R. 1250, 104th Cong. § 372 (1995); S. 442, 104th
Cong. § 172 (1995); S. 456, 104th Cong. § 172 (1995); H.R. 785, 104th Cong. §172 (1995); H.R. 95, 104th
Cong. § 424 (1995); H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 12370 (1995); H.R. 4, 10th Cong. § 371 (1995); H.R. Rep.
No. 104-430 at 371 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-430 at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350 at 12370 (1995);
H.R. Rep. No. 104-350 at 44 (1995); 142 Cong. Rec. H8829-02, H8925 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H7907-04,
H7947 (1996); 142 Cong. Rec. S8226-01, S8226(1996); 142 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15351 (1995); 141
Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H13379-01, H13589 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
H12509-01 (Pt. 1),H12720(1995); 141 Cong.Rec.S16159-01,S16284(1995); 141Cong.Rec.S15852-01,
S15945 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H10995-01,HI1312(1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S12428-02, S12501 (1995);
141 Cong. Rec. S12968-01, S13020 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S11894-01, S 11922 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
S11640-01, S11707 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H3742-04, H3759 (1995); 141 Cong. Rec. H3581-07, H3662
(1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S2823-02, S2886 (1995); 140 Cong. Rec. S14479-02, S14522 (1994).
71. See 42 U.S.C.A. §659a(a) (West 1998).
72. Id. at §659a(d).
73. Id. §654(32); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 104-350, at 44
(1995); P.L. 104-193, Title 111, §39; 141 Cong. Rec. H15317-01, H15427 (1995); 141 H12509-01 (Pt. 2),
H12976 (1995).
74. See supra discussion following notes 44-48.
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Yet, the statutory history, by implication, gives federal question jurisdiction
over international child support enforcement to the federal courts.75 Although
child support is best settled in state courts, the international nature of the statute
indicates that Congress envisioned the federal government and its courts
controlling the issue.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ICSE PROVISIONS
The structure of the Constitution creates a dual sovereignty, where by the
federal and state governments are both vested with and limited by certain
powers.7' The federal government is one of enumerated powers whose
authority is defined by the Constitution.77 All residual power, not expressly
denied by the Constitution, is vested in the state government and the people.
78
Analyzing the federal government's authority possesses within the Constitution
has been twofold, formalistic and functionalistic. A formalistic view of the
United States Constitution asserts that if the constitution does not expressly
grant the federal government the authority to act, it implicitly forbids.79 A
functionalistic view of the Constitution states that what the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit or limit, it implicitly permits.'o There are many articles
which suggest that international child support enforcement should be viewed
under a functionalistic test. 8' Although the court seems to apply both
approaches, 82 more recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated a trend to-
wards utilizing a formalistic analysis to federalism questions.83 Following the
modem trend of the court, the paper analyzes Congress' authority to enact the
ICSE provisions under a formalistic microscope.
Under the Constitution, full authority over foreign affairs is given to the
federal government.84 The Constitution expressly prohibits those activities by
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. et. seq.
77. Id. at art. I, et. seq.
78. Id. at amend. X.
79. Harold H. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, I 11HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1846-1848
(1998)[hereinafter Koh].
80. Id.
81. See DeHart, at 108-109; Pfund, at 765.
82. Cf. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1987); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 471 U.S. 1049 (1984) with Printz .v United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). See also Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453,461-63 (4th Cir. 1998)(following
the Printz decision, stating that the federal government can not single out states to implement federal policy).
83. Id.
84. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1840); See also Bilder, at 821-3 (presenting the
current trend of state and local governments entering in the arena of foreign policy from "sister-city"
programs to direct economic agreements to declarations of being nuclear-free zones). Bilder laments that
despite the apparent intrusion of states and local governments into foreign policy making ventures, neither
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state and local governments which invade the realm of expressed powers given
to the federal government,"5 including negotiating with foreign nations on
matters of foreign affairs.86 Congress may have the power to authorize state and
local governments to participate in activities which would ordinarily invade in
the realm of the federal government's control of foreign affairs,87 however a
grant of such power is inconsistent with the Constitution's delegation of
exclusive power of foreign policy to the President and Congress.88 Thus the
express language of the Constitution answers the question of what limits the
constitution places on the state government89 and who has the ultimate power
in matters of foreign affairs.' Therefore, "any judgments as to what constitutes
appropriate state or local involvement in foreign affairs ought to be made
primarily by the political branches, in which the federal foreign relations power
is lodged."'"
A. Treaty Making and State Treaty Prohibiting Clauses
Every word within the Constitution is significant and has meaning.9" The
Supreme Court has defined a treaty as "an instrument written and executed with
the formalities customary among nations."93  Under the Constitution, the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, holds the exclusive power
to make treaties.9 The Constitution neither grants a similar concurrent power
in the legislative,95 nor in the judicial branch of the federal government.96 In
addition, the Constitution explicitly prohibits the state governments from
Congress nor the Executive branch has hastened to react to the current situation. Id. See generally United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,331 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936).
85. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10 at art. II. § 2.
86. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
87. Bilder, at 826.
88. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, §2, cl. 2; id. at Art. 1, §8, cl. 2. See also Bilder, at 827-8.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10. et seq. (ci. 1: bars the state governments from making treaties with
foreign nations, clause three bars states, without Congressional consent, from entering into compacts with
foreign nations).
90. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2 et seq., id. at Art. 1, §8, cl. 2.; See also Bilder, at 829.
91. Bilder, at 830. This statement can be interpreted one of two ways. If states have any foreign
affairs power, such power must be granted by the political branches of the federal government. However, if
it can be legitimately argued, as presented infra through out this paper, that there exist an absolute exclusion
of state and local government in foreign affairs, a grant to the states of such power creates an interference by
the states into the federal government's ability to negotiate in foreign affairs.
92. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (1824); Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570-71.
93. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 571.
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
95. Id. at art. I et seq.
96. Id. at art. Il et seq.
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entering into agreements with foreign nations.9" Congress has no authority,
under the Constitution, to grant states treating making power.98 Furthermore,
there exist no implied authority by the federal government to allow states to
enter into agreements with foreign nations.99 Interpreting the text of Constitu-
tion, courts have held that the President, along with the executive branch, hold
exclusive power to make treaties and to conduct the foreign affairs of the
United States." Accordingly, the court's definition of a treaty, implies that
only sovereign nations, not sovereign states of nations, can enter into such
agreements.
The structure of the Constitution supports the contention that states do not
possess any powers within the realm of foreign affairs.'0 ' Although the
Constitution creates a dual sovereignty,' °2 the states have ceded their power to
the federal government in interstate"0 3 and international matters,"°4 so that the
country is able to act with a unified voice."0 5 Thus all powers to act in the area
of foreign relations is vested in the federal govemment.'0
Despite the explicit Constitutional language and the structure of the
Constitution, prohibiting treaties between states and foreign nations, early
Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of whether certain state actions
triggered the constitutional prohibitions. 0 7 In Holmes v. Jennison,1 the Court
addressed the issue whether the Governor of Vermont could assist Canada by
detaining and extraditing Holmes, a Canadian resident, who had committed a
97. Id. at art. 1, §10, cl. 1.
98. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10, cl. 1. See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 725,735
(1838).
99. Sloan v. Baker, 10 P.2d 362, 363 (Or. 1932). Although the Constitution provides that states,
with the consent of Congress, can enter into agreements with foreign nations, U.S. CONST, art. 1, §10, cl. 3,
the courts have narrowly interpreted the Compact Clause. The courts have frowned upon the states' ability
to maintain continuous relations with foreign nations because such agreements would interfere with the
supremacy of the federal government. See discussion infra regarding the courts' interpretation of the Compact
Clause.
100. See U.S. v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286,289 (9th Cir. 1979); see generally First National City Bank
v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 761 (1972).
101. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570.
102. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71,76 (1869); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991);
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: Commerce Clause.
104. U.S. CONsr. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (absolutely prohibiting the states to enter into treaties with foreign
nations); id. at art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (requiring states to obtain Congressional consent to enter into compacts with
foreign countries).
105. In re Hansen's Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 617,620-621 (N.Y. Sur. 1935); see also Zschemig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
106. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 570.
107. Id.; Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
108. 39 U.S. 540 (1840).
crime in Canada and had escaped to Vermont."°9 The Court found that by
extraditing Holmes from Vermont to Canada, the governor was neither
protecting his citizens nor exercising a valid police power."' The court stated
that Vermont, by assisting Canada under the principles of comity of nations,
intruded upon the domain of the federal government's foreign affairs powers."'
Thus, the Court held that the agreement between Vermont and Canada was
prohibited within the context of the federal government's control over foreign
affairs, and therefore unconstitutional." 2 Although this case was decided prior
to the enactment of any federal statutes or treaties relating to extradition, it
elucidates the premise that the authority to interact with foreign nations is
vested in the federal government, and not the states.
In Sloan v. Baker,"3 the Mayor of Portland visited Europe in order to
establish diplomatic contacts with European municipalities. The Supreme
Court of Oregon opined that cities do no possess any characteristics of a
sovereign and thus can not aggrandize themselves with authority not given to
them."14 The court, citing the federal Constitution's prohibition of state
governments in establishing relations with foreign nations," 5 declared that
neither an expressed nor an implied authority existed "on the part of a
municipality of a state to assume ambassadorial relations either with municipal-
ities of other states or with foreign governments."' ' 6 Therefore, states do not
possess any foreign affairs powers." 7
109. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 568.
110. Id. at 568, 569.
111. Id. at 569; Comity is not a discretion afforded the state courts, but one possessed by the nation-
states. Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589 (1839). Because comity is discretionary, it is not obligatory, and a
nation-state can choose not to exercise their discretion. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895).
112. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 568.
113. IOP.2d 362(1932). In Sloan v. Baker, the issue on appeal was whether the Mayor of Portland,
Oregon, was entitled to payment of his salary for the sixty days that we was in Europe, and not in Portland.
Id. at 363. Although this case is on the state court level, it exemplifies the doctrine of foreign relations
preemption, the doctrine that neither a city nor a state has a mandate to exercise authority in the field of
foreign affairs, a power directly vested in the federal government by the Constitution. See generally Koh,
at 1824. But see Bilder, at 821, which argues that although the foreign affairs power is vested in the federal
government, various states and municipalities have initiated relations with foreign nations and it is up to
"Congress and the President to decide whether to preempt it." Id. at 830.
114. Sloan, 10 P.2d at 364.
115. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10.
116. Sloan, 10 P.2d at 364.
117. In practice, the states prohibition into the realm of foreign affairs is not considered absolute.
In Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Supreme Court held that test was whether the intrusion by the
states had "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." Id. at 517. In Clark, the court declared
valid on its face a California probate reciprocity statute, which excluded non-resident alien legatees from
taking a decedent's property, by either testamentary disposition or intestate succession, unless, similar
procedures existed to afford United States citizens the same benefit in the foreign nation.
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The Supreme Court's stance on the Doctrine of Dormant Foreign Relations
Preemption is represented in Zschernig v. Miller. "' In Zschemig, the court held
that Oregon's "Iron Curtain" statute was "an intrusion by the state into the field
of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress."" 9  The statute at issue allowed for property, which would have
vested in German nationals by intestate succession, to escheat to the state
before vesting unless the foreign nationals could prove, inter alia, that there
existed a reciprocal right of inheritance in Germany. 20 Justice Douglas stated
that although states traditionally regulated intestate succession, if the state
legislature "impair[s] the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy"''
it must be invalidated. 22
In comparison, the ICSE provisions authorize states to enter agreements
with foreign nations. 123 Yet, the Constitution bars the states from enter into
treaties with foreign nations. 24 Furthermore, foreign relations power is directly
However, twenty years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)
again established that any intrusion, regardless how indirect or incidental, by the state government in foreign
affairs, have a direct effect on the federal government's ability to effectively administer their foreign relations
power. Id. at 436. Justice Douglas enunciated that although matters of property is a area of law traditionally
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment, international property law is a matter for the Federal
government, not the state probate courts to decide. Id. at 438. See also J. Stewart's concurrence stating the
same premise. Id. at 443.
118. 389 U.S. 249 (1968). See also Koh, at 1847; Bilder, at 824-25.
119. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
120. Id. at 431.
121. ld. at 440.
122. Id. Justice Stewart, in concurrence, articulated that allowing states to act in matters of foreign
affairs would be an invasion by the state where the Constitution only permitted the federal government to
trespass. Id. at 442.
In contrast, Justice Harlan, concurring for other reasons, id. at 681-82, asserted that Oregon's "Iron
Curtain" statute was not unconstitutional on its face and interprets the Court's decision as a call to find the
statute unconstitutional when applied. Id. at 459. Harlan oversimplifies the majority's opinion when he
stated that the opinion rests on the premise that the statute's requirement of reciprocity and the fact that a
foreign heir could inherit Oregon property would "involve the state courts in evaluation of foreign laws and
governmental policies, and that this is likely to result in offense to foreign government." Id. at 459-60. Prior
to any state court exercising their discretion, the statute's requirement of reciprocity frustrates the federal
government's ability to negotiate with another country, in this case Germany, on matters of recognition of
legatee rights.
Second, Harlan contends that the statute would not cause significant interference in foreign relations
since the Court did not mention, nor did the record show that "any instance in which such an occurrence has
been the occasion for a diplomatic protest, or, indeed, has had any foreign relations consequence whatsoever."
Id. at 460. Harlan cites the fact that the government did not contend that the Oregon statute would interfere
with the federal government's foreign relations. Id. Additionally, Harlan looks to the fact that the State
Department has stated that such a State statute would have a minute effect on foreign relations and foreign
policy. Id.
123. 42 U.S.C.A. §659a (d) (West. 1998).
124. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10.
given to the executive branch for general purposes,'25 and the legislative branch
for economic purposes.'26 Nor do state governments possess a right of passage
into foreign affairs within their residual constitutional grant of power.'27
Although states are sovereignties, similar to the decision in Sloan, states can not
aggrandize themselves with authority implicitly denied to them by the federal
Constitution. 128 In early cases, such as Holmes, and later cases, such as
Zschernig, the Supreme Court has articulated that the Framers did not intend
for the states to have a foreign affairs power.'29 Additionally, there exist no
aperture within the Constitution's state prohibition clauses to imply that states
even have a residual authority to enter into agreements with foreign nations. 130
Comparatively, the ICSE provisions creation of a grant of power to the state
government to negotiate child support agreements with foreign nations goes
against the Constitutional text and the framer's intent of what constituted
proper realms of state authority.
"No power under the [federal] government can make [any treaty entered
into by a state] valid or dispense with the constitutional prohibition.' 3 t  The
Court's interpretation of the constitutional limitations on state governments in
Holmes and Zschernig, in addition to the similar treatment by a state supreme
court in Sloan, illustrates that state governments can neither circumvent the
limitations nor initiate agreements which would create an interference into
United States foreign affairs. 32
B. Compact Clause
A second issue which arises from the enactment of the ICSE provisions is
whether the arrangements by the states with foreign nations goes so far beyond
the scope of the Constitution's Compact Clause as to actually interfere with the
nature of the federal structure of government. The current arrangements t33
125. Id. art. H et seq; id. at art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
126. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations").
127. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
128. States can provide, within state constitutions, more protection to its citizens than are given to
United States citizens within the federal constitution. Yet, states can not afford themselves more authority
which is not enumerated within the federal constitution.
129. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 569.; See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (explaining
that comity of nations can only exist between a federal government towards another nation's federal
government, and is not a state court between a foreign nation.) Id. at 163-66; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589
(1839) ("it is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation.").
130. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cls. 1, 3 with id. at amend. X.
131. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 724-725 (1838).
132. Id.
133. The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893), defines the terms
"compact" and "agreement." The term compact usually applies to formalistic contractual arrangements, while
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between states and foreign nations regarding international child support
enforcement are parallel unilateral policy declarations, for example, agree-
ments.' a4  The ICSE provisions represent congressional consent of these
agreements. Yet, the contention lies in nature of these agreements as being
beyond the framers' intent as permissible compacts, regardless of congressional
consent.
The form of an agreement does not dictate whether it is a compact. The
question rests on the impact of the arrangement on the federal government. 13 5
The general test regarding what constitutes a compact between two sovereign
entities 3 6 and whether it needs congressional consent was established at the
close of the nineteenth century in Virginia v. Tennessee,'37 which was
substantially modified in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commis-
sion."' The standard of review as to whether a compact falls under the
Compact Clause of the constitution is (1) whether the agreement has an impact
on the federal structure,'39 and (2) whether the agreement tends to increase the
political power of the state or interfere with areas of governance whose subject
matters are under the exclusive control of the federal government. "
The first inquiry is whether the agreement has an impact on the federal
structure.' 4' Not every agreement between two or more states is a "compact"
requiring congressional consent. 42 Agreements that are solely concerned with
intrastate affairs or the health and safety of the state citizens 141 would not pierce
the federal government's domain. Few cases address the issue of a state
entering into an agreement with a foreign nation.'" One early Supreme Court
case which interprets the Compact Clause's application to such arrangements
is Barron v. Baltimore. 45  In that case, Barron, the owner of a wharf in
agreements refer to all stipulations between the two affected parties. Id. In this paper, I use the terms
interchangeably, as the court has designated them to be used.
134. Gloria F. DeHart, Getting Over There, 9 FAM. ADVOC. 34 (1987) [hereinafter DeHart].
135. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363,369 (1976); Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at470-
71; see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981).
136. Sovereign entities can be either states or foreign nations.
137. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
138. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 452.
139. Id. at 471.
140. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518.
141. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 471.
142. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518. The Supreme Court lists illustrations of agreements between states
where congressional consent would not be required to validate the agreement. Id. In addition, the court opines
that "the terms 'compact' or 'agreement' in the Constitution do not apply to every possible compact or
agreement between one state and another." Id.
143. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518. (noting various intrastate concerns which do not interfere with the
federal structure).
144. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 569.
145. 32 U.S. at 243.
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Baltimore's eastern harbor sued the city of Baltimore for damages caused when
the city diverted waterways, which interfered with the operation of the docks. "
In dicta, Justice Marshall asserted that the Constitution expressly placed limits
on the state government in certain subject matters, as listed in Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution.147 He elucidated the issue regarding a state's ability to
compact with foreign countries by declaring that such arrangements interfere
with the exclusive power of the federal government to enter into treaties. 48
Yet, Marshal acknowledged that compacts amongst the several states do not
conflict with the framers' intent and purpose for the clause.1 49 The premise of
Marshall's stance lies in the fact that if a state government acted, on the local
level, in the making of arrangements with foreign nations, then such action
would interfere with the federal government's authority of coordinating efforts,
on a national level, for the common good of all citizens. 5' Since the limitation
are expressively stated in the Constitution, the court found there was no room
for interpretation as to any other meaning. Thus, the court stated that there
did not exist any convincing evidence to ignore the expressed limits the
Constitution has placed on the state legislature.'
Similarly, in Virginia v. Tennessee,'53 Virginia wanted the court to set
aside a compact entered into by Virginia and Tennessee to establish their
respective borders for lack of congressional consent. 54 The case dealt with
determining what types of compacts need congressional consent. 55 Justice
Field, citing Justice Story, 5 6 expressed that where treaties are political in
nature, compacts apply to subjects which "might be deemed mere private rights
of sovereignty."' 57 Furthermore, just as Congress can give consent to validate
a compact, Congress can also bar states from entering into compacts.' 58 Certain
146. See id. The issue centered around whether the actions of the municipality constituted a taking
under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although, The case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the court did address the issue of the application of the Compact Clause to state agreements with
foreign nations. Id. at 249, 251.
147. See id. at 249. The purpose of Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution was to"restrain state legislation
on subjects entrusted to the government of the union, in which the citizens of all the states are interested."
id.





153. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 503.
154. Id. at517.
155. See id. at518-519.
156. J. STORY, COMMENTARIESONTHECONSTITUTION OFTHE UNrIED STATES § 1403 (R. Rotunda
& J. Nowak eds. 1987).
157. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
158. Id. at519-520.
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subject matters belong to the federal government as a general right of federal
sovereignty. 5 9 In addition, these rights also belong to the state governments,
unless the right has been ceded to the federal government by the federal
constitution. 60
If the scope of the Compact Clause encompasses those agreements which
tend to increase the political power of the states, thus "encroach[ing] upon or
interfere[ing] with the just supremacy of the United States,"' 16' then agreements
regarding the enforcement of international child support would fall under the
clause. Even if the ICSE provisions operate as congressional consent, the
legislative history of the ICSE provisions acknowledges the fact that states do
not have the power to enter into treaties.' 62  Likewise, the United States
Constitution prohibits states from entering into any treaty, ,63 and requires states
to gain congressional consent to enter into any agreement or compact with
another state or foreign power.'"
The permissive language within the ICSE provision would imply that the
statute's intent is to consent to the agreements between states and foreign
nations regarding international child support enforcement.' 65  If the ICSE
provision constitutes congressional consent, the provision would make any
arrangements made by a state with a foreign nation a matter of federal law."6
Similarly, provisions of a treaty have equal footing with acts of Congress.'
67
When a federal law and a provision of the United States Constitution, in this
case the Compact Clause, are in conflict with one another, the Constitution, as
the supreme law of the land will always prevail.'68 Therefore, the ICSE
provision as federal law can not permit states to enter into agreements with
foreign nations. The courts in Barron and Virginia expressed that the framers'
159. Id. at 525.
160. Id.
161. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981); Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 485 (White,
J., dissenting); See also McHenry v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 544 (N.D. 1917).
162. H.R. REP. No. 104-430, at 44 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 104-350, at 44 (1995); Pub. L. No. 104-
193, § 39, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 141 CONG. REC. H 15317-01, H 15427 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. H! 2509-01
(Pt. 2), H12976 (1995); See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I (state treaty prohibiting clause).
164. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (compact clause).
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a(d) (West 1998). "States may enter into reciprocal arrangements for the
establishment and enforcement of support obligations with foreign countries that are not the subject of a
declaration [by the State Department], to the extent consistent with Federal law." Id.
166. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at439 n. 7. Under the "Law of the Union" Doctrine, if an interstate agreement
has congressional approval it becomes federal law. See also Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v.
Colburn, 310 U.S. 419,427-28 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13. How.)
518, 566 (1852).
167. Asakura v. City of Seattle, Washington, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); United States v. The Peggy,
5 U.S. 103 (1801).
168. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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intent did not allow for continuous on-going agreements between the states and
any foreign nations. Such agreements would interfere with the delicate nature
of the federal system of government. Thus, Congress' grant to the states of the
authority to negotiate agreements with foreign nations concerning child support
enforcement goes against the constitutional limitations placed upon and residual
powers vested in the government of the several states.
C. Foreign Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that "Congress
shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with Indian Tribes."' 69 Since 1937, when the
Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,170 the court has
broadened its recognition of Congress' plenary powers under the Commerce
Clause. NLRB marked the commencement of a period of extreme judicial
deference to the legislature.' 7' It was not until the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez,'72 that the judiciary began to reevaluate Congress'
assertions of authority under the Commerce Clause.
Although foreign affairs power is vested primarily in the executive branch,
only Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce.'73 In Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 174 the Supreme Court developed
a two-prong test in determining whether Congress has exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause. '5 To evaluate the constitutionality of Congress'
consent to states to enter into agreements with foreign nations, the Court would
first have to determine whether a rational basis exists to conclude that the
169. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
170. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In NLRB, the court upheld the
National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge. Id. at 36-8. In doing so, the court held
that Congress may regulate intrastate commerce activities which have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce as a prophylactic against burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 37.
171. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100(1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). In
Wickard, the application of the Commerce Clause was stretched to its limits. The court, by upholding the
act, permitted Congress to regulate local production and local consumption of wheat by a farmer because the
aggregate effects of taking the wheat out of commercial circulation would substantially effect interstate
commerce.
See also United States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D. R.I. 1996) (noting that "the Supreme
Court had not invalidated a federal statute as exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause for
over fifty years" until the Lopez decision).
172. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
173. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
174. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
175. See id. at 276.
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regulated activity substantially effects interstate or foreign commerce.' 176 If a
rational basis exist, the court would then look to see whether the specific
regulation is reasonably adapted to the goals permitted by the Constitution. 77
In Lopez, the Supreme Court established three broad categories of activity
which Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3)
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 178 Chief
Justice Rehnquist declared "that the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the regulated activity 'substantially effects' interstate commerce."' 179 The Lopez
decision has been used as the judicial standard in determining the outer limits
of the Commerce Clause.' Given the language in the ICSE provisions, test
two and test three seem to address the issue of whether the designation to the
state government of a right to enter into an agreement with a foreign nation is
with in Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Goods which enter into the stream of commerce are immune from state or
local taxation, so long as, the goods remain in the stream of commerce.''
Currently, the federal courts are spilt as to whether payment of child support
orders are considered "goods" and thus can be regulated by Congress under the
Commerce Clause.'82 The standard for regulation of commerce is whether the
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.'83 Any economic activity by
the states which substantially effects or places a direct burden on Congress'
enumerated power to regulate foreign commerce can be regulated by Congress
under the Commerce Clause.184
The economic or commercial impact of the activity on interstate commerce
dictates whether Congressional regulation is permissible, not the nature of the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
179. Id. at 1630.
180. See Unites States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1078-79 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act in ight of Lopez); Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1097-1100
(analyzing the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act using Lopez's categorical analysis).
181. See Eureka Pipe lne Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
182. Compare Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1096 (asserting that regulation by Congress of interstate child
support payments is a regulation of channels of interstate commerce) with United States v. Parker, 911 F.
Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), (arguing that Congress lacked the authority to regulate failure to pay child support
orders because unpaid money in such cases did not constitute a "good"). See also United States v.
Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that the Third Circuit, in United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3rd Cir. 1996), defines "commerce" under the Commerce Clause quite expansively).
183. See Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1082.
184. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 237 U.S. 34 (1927); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942); Cuban Steamship v. Fitzpatrick, 66 F. 63 (E.D. La. 1895).
activity.'85 The majority of the courts hold that regulation of child support
enforcement is a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. 86 Payment of child support constitutes commerce because the parent
who does not fulfill his or her obligation to pay receives an economic gain by
withholding such funds, at the same time there exist an economic loss to the
child who does not receive the needed money.'87 Under the analysis that
Congress has the authority to regulate all channels of interstate commerce,'88
payment of child support payments is an economic activity which has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus by analogy, international child
support payments would have an equivalent effect on foreign commerce.
Therefore, if payment of child support is considered a "good," then any
agreement by the states with a foreign nation could impair a "good" traveling
with in the stream of foreign commerce. Congress has plenary powers over
foreign commerce. Yet, the taxing harm caused by the state agreements with
foreign nations would be left entirely to the whim of state government and its
legiglature.
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a federal statute which regulated
the possession of a gun on school property.'89 After presenting a history of
judicial treatment of the Commerce Clause,"g Justice Rehnquist, writing the
opinion for the court, stated that possession of a hand gun on school property
did not constitute an economic activity that might substantially effect interstate
commerce.91 The court noted that the invalid statute lacked two things. First,
the statute failed to provide a jurisdictional element, connecting the regulated
activity with interstate commerce. Second, the statute lacked any mention, in
its text or legislative history, of its substantial impact on interstate commerce. 12
185. See Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. at 1082; United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 581 (3rd. Cir.
1996).
186. Currently nine district courts and the Second Circuit have upheld a federal statute which
criminalizes the non-payment of child support as constitutional. Only four district courts have found that the
statute is beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power.
187. See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84,90 (D. Conn. 1995); Lewis, 936 F. Supp. at 1099.
188. See United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Since payment often
occurs by mail, wire, or electronic transfer of funds, these instrumentalities are all included in Congress'
broad definition of interstate commerce. Id.
189. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. See discussion infra p. 1634 (providing a more detail analysis of
the case).
190. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-30.
191. See id. at.1634.
192. See id. If these two elements were included, the court could have found that the inclusion was
merely a pretext to validating the law under the Commerce Clause. Yet, the pretext argument is difficult to
prove.
The Lopez case merely adds to the pile of uncertainty regarding what Congress can regulate. Unlike
the historical test of direct or indirect effects on interstate commerce, the substantial effects test acknowledges
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Similar to the statute in Lopez, the ICSE provisions lack the necessary
legislative history to create a nexus between international child support
enforcement and foreign commerce.1 93 It can be asserted that Congress has the
authority to regulate payment of international child support orders t94 However,
what is being challenged is the statute's grant of authority to the state
governments to regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on foreign
commerce. Subsection (d) of the first ICSE provision 95 says that "states may
entered into reciprocal arrangements for the establishment and enforcement of
support obligations with foreign countries."'" Neither the statute nor the
legislative history indicates why granting the states government authority to
enter into such agreements has a diminishing effect on foreign commerce.' 97
The patent effect of subsection (d) is a grant by Congress to the state govern-
ment to do indirectly what Congress can not do directly, enter into treaties with
foreign nations. 98 The latent effect of subsection (d) is permission given to the
states to regulate foreign commerce. Enforcement of international child support
claims does substantially effect foreign commerce. The abdication of authority
by Congress to the states contradicts the plenary power of Congress to regulate
under the Commerce Clause. Congress can not regulate all aspects of human
life.1 99 Yet, in those areas of activity where Congress can regulate, Congress
should not be able to haphazardly relinquish its authority to the state govern-
ment if such an action would allow states to set foreign policy and regulate
foreign commerce.
It was not the intention of the framers to give any constitutional recogni-
tion to the state government as having a "reserved power" in the area of foreign
commerce. Congress' control over foreign commerce has a tremendous impact
on foreign policy. It can be inferred that any dissemination of this control to the
state government would permit the states and local governments to also
construct United States foreign policy. Congress has a right, under the foreign
Congress' plenary power under the Commerce Clause but at the same time eroding the limits on Congress'
inability to usurp areas of law which have traditionally been under the police power of the states.
193. See discussion following supra notes 44-48.
194. But see United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995), (arguing that Congress lacks
the authority to regulate failure to pay child support orders because unpaid money in such cases did not
constitute a "good").
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a(d) (West 1998).
196. See id.
197. If Congress regulates, they must show that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Conversely, if the state regulates, it must show that the effect on interstate commerce
was so minute enough to not require Congressional regulation of the activity. But see Wickard v. Filburn,
were the court upheld a federal regulatory statute because the aggregate effects of the regulated activity had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 111.
198. See discussion supra note 197.
199. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
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commerce clause, to regulate international child support enforcement.
However, the statute's appointment to state governments, of an equivalent right
to enter into agreements with foreign nations on the issue of international child
support enforcement, goes against the foreign commerce clause relations to the
state.
III. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ: IT'S EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DEBATE
One of the main purposes of this paper is to elevate the discussion in
whole or in part of the possible invalidity of the ICSE provisions. One way to
go about this mission is to not only present an argument that Congress has the
authority to act but also to assert that Congress lacks the authority to regulate
international child support enforcement. Before United States v. Lopez,
Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause was nearly omnipotent
for over fifty years. During that time period, Congress passed laws dealing with
problems on a national scope, which were morally based and Commerce Clause
authorized. 2' Since Lopez, the Supreme Court's deference to Congress has
waned, replaced instead with a demand that Congress justify its use of the
Commerce Clause to regulate state activity. Utilizing the analysis by the
Supreme Court in Lopez, it can be argued that Congress has no actual or
inherent authority to regulate international child support enforcement claims.
In Lopez, a 12th grader was arrested and charged under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,"' for possession of a gun while on school property.
The Supreme Court held that the statute exceeded Congress power under the
Commerce Clause. 2 The court, affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision, declared
the federal statute lacked two key components.2" 3 First, the statute failed to
state whether the regulated activity substantially effected interstate
commerce. 214 In the alternative, if the regulated activity had been an essential
part of a larger regulatory scheme where by without congressional regulation
the scheme would severely burden interstate commerce then the statute may
have been saved.20 5 However, the court concluded that this was not the case.2"6
The court found that the statute's regulation of gun possession on or near school
200. See Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241-53 (1964) (regulation of inns
and hotels which catered to tourists in order to promote racial integration). See also JILL E. HASDAY,
Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1310 (1998) (examining the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988).
202. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
203. See id. at 1630-1631.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 1631.
206. See id.
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grounds had nothing to do with commerce.2 7 Furthermore, the regulation had
no aggregate effect on interstate commerce.20 8
In Wickard v. Filburn,209 the court looked to what could be considered the
outer limits of Congress' ability to control interstate commerce to support its
finding. In Wickard, a farmer who had used his land togrow wheat for his
personal consumption was fined for violating the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938.210 The government argued that because the goal of the legislature was
to increase the market price of wheat, the aggregate effects of "home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. '21'
Even though Filburn's wheat was never sold on the grain market, the court
upheld the federal statute because by growing his own wheat, Filburn would
have no need to buy wheat.212 The aggregate effect of farmers similarly situated
as Filbum would cause demand for wheat to decrease, thus directly effecting
wheat prices.213
International child support claims have a substantial effect on foreign
commerce. Payment or failure to pay international claims effect foreign
commerce. If commerce is intercourse, 211 then an economic activity that effects
international borders is foreign commerce. When a foreign parent pays child
support, it allows for the child to purchase various sustainable items. In
contrast, when a parent does not pay child support, it creates an economic loss
to both the child and the effected economy. Yet, Justice Thomas, in his
concurrence, averred that "the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no
means.., empower the Federal government to regulate marriage... throughout
the 50 states." '215 Thus, what is still left undecided is whether Congress can
regulate international child support.216
Next, the court expressed that the statute should state a jurisdictional
element demarcating the nexus between interstate commerce and the regulated
207. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
208. See id. at 1631.
209. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
210. Id. at 128.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See id. If the farmer grows his own wheat, then he has no need to buy wheat, thus decreasing
the demand for wheat on the open market. When the farmer decides not to sell his wheat but use it for
personal consumption, it results in a decrease in supply of wheat in the open market.
214. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id.
215. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
216. But see id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that even
suggests that Congress could regulate such matters is in need of reexamination.").
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activity. In United States v. Bass, 17 such a connection was established. In
Bass, the court upheld a federal statute that criminalized the receiving,
possessing, or transporting of any firearm in commerce or affecting
commerce.2 1 8 "The Court interpreted the possession component of [the statute]
to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both because the statute
was ambiguous and because 'unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-balance. '219
Thus, to be successful, the defender of the statute must demonstrate not only
that the regulated activity occurred but also that there exist a nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. Such expressed jurisdictional
element might limit Congress' reach to a finite set of person or things that have
an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.220
Courts have looked to the expressed legislative history and committee
notes for clarification. Even though legislative findings are not necessary, 221
they enable the court to interpret the legislative intent of the statute.222 Yet, in
the case of the ICSE provisions such legislative findings are essential because,
similar to the statute in Lopez, the ICSE provisions addresses a never before
promulgated issue . 2' Thus, the "prior federal enactments or Congressional
findings [do not] speak to the subject matter... or its relationship to interstate
commerce." 224 However, the legislative history and the committee notes of the
ICSE provisions do not state the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. The
issue is whether Congress can regulate, with out more, international child
support enforcement.2 5 Under the Bass model, a clear congressional intent
must be shown.2" In the ICSE provisions it was not.
In Lopez, the court determined that if the government's argument was to
be accepted, it would hamper the court's ability to limit Congress' regulatory
authority of subjects traditionally under the state's police power.227 Federal
217. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
218. Id. at 337; see also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
219. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoted in Bass, 404 U.S. at 349).
220. See idt
221. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1997) ("Congress need not make particularized
findings in order to legislate."); Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
222. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
223. Pub. L No. 104-193, § 39, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (indicating that prior to the passage of the
ICSE provisions, no legislation existed on the issue of international child support enforcement).
224. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
225. See id. at1631.
226. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.
227. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 ("[lIt is difficult to perceive any limitations on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where states historically have been sovereign").
Justice Rehnquist, in his decision for the court, criticizes Justice's Breyer's dissent as lacking limits because
it would allow any activity to be economic in nature and thus under Congress' regulatory control.
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police power does not exist in the Constitution.2 8 "The Constitution mandates
this uncertainty [of which government controls which subject matters] by
withholding from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize
enactments of every type of legislation." '229 Since the ICSE provision deals with
family law, one of the areas under a state's police power, it can be averred that
Congress lacks the requisite power to regulate international child support
enforcement under the Commerce Clause.
IV. CAN THE ICSE PROVISIONS STAND AS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT?
All legislation is presumed constitutional. Yet, "[ilf [Congress] were to
make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be
considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are
to guard.. . They would declare it void."23
A. The ICSE Provisions Create Legal Quagmires
The Constitution absolutely prohibits states from entering into treaties
with foreign nations.23' The significance of such a limitation on state
government was to prevent local interference into foreign affairs. As
mentioned, traditionally the Supreme Court has held that any action by a state
with a foreign nation would invoke this constitutional prohibition.232 Yet,
recently the court had been of two differing positions. First, if the subject
matter has a high probability of becoming a subject of international dispute then
the federal government has paramount authority in and power over the subject
matter.233 In United States v. California,2" the conflict centered around whether
California could control oil reserves located within the boundary of the State's
three mile territorial waters.2 35  The court held that such authority over
petroleum commerce would severely affect the nation's ability to engage in
commerce with other nations and the stability of global peace.2 36 The court
228. See id. at 1633.
229. See id.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 553 (John Marshall); See also Lopez 115 S.Ct. at 1650 n. 9 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
232. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 540 (holding that New York had no right to capture and relinquish a
fugitive to Canada).
233. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
234. Id.




ruled that control of the oil reserves was the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government and not that of the California State government.237
On the other hand, the court has found the treaty prohibiting clause did not
prevent a state from regulating its citizens' fishing activity outside the state's
territorial waters.238 In Skiriotes v. Florida,2 39 the court held that if Florida's
action did not directly conflict with federal legislation, then Florida could
exercise its police power to regulate its citizens' behavior on the high seas.
Comparatively, the agreements by the states do have a potential for
international conflict. Early agreements between states and foreign nations
were not binding on both parties .2' Furthermore, it can be inferred from Gloria
DeHart's article241 that the arrangements between the states and the foreign
nations were wrought with problems because of lack of reciprocity on the part
of the state and the inability or unwillingness of foreign courts to enforce state
judgments. 42 Besides Canada, Great Britain no longer recognized an extended
definition of state to include individual states, thus requiring a nation to nation
reciprocity of recognizing of child support orders. 24 3 In West Germany, a semi-
private agency, and not the federal government,2' established an arrangement
with California regarding enforcement of child support orders. 45 Although the
individual states established a de facto reciprocity' 6 system with Germany and
the other nations, the ICSE provision would still require both the reciprocating
nation and the United States to establish reciprocity by governmental declara-
tion.247 The notion of de facto reciprocity presupposes that de jure reciprocity
would be an agreement established by treaty between the initiating country and
the responding country. Despite the fact that within several foreign countries
legislation has been passed to recognize agreements with individual states and
to establish reciprocity with the state, 48 with the United States such legislature,
237. See id. at 29.
238. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
239. Id.
240. See DeHart, supra note 134, at 94 n. 26 (exclaiming that although Canadian courts would enter
a finaljudgement on child support order originating from an American state, the Canadian court still required
from the state government some assurance of reciprocity to be attached to the original order).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 94-99.
243. Id. at 95 n. 29.
244. Id. at 96. According to DeHart, under German law the German government could not
participate officially. DeHart, supra note 134, at 96.
245. Id. at 97 (describing an agreement between France, New York, and California).
246. Id. at 102 (defining de facto reciprocity as recognition of a foreign other with out the formalities
of a treaty).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 659a(a).
248. See DeHart, supra note 134, at 98-99.
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as embodied in the ICSE provisions, may not be legally invalid against our
Constitution.
Similar to California, the individual arrangements by the state and the
foreign governments on international child support enforcement lay the
foundation for potential international disputes. Unlike Skiriotes, arrangements
between states and foreign nations do affect the sovereign authority of the
United States to negotiate with other nations on this subject matter. If the
United States had been a signatory to any of the United Nations treaties on the
subject of international child support enforcement, the. states participation and
the ICSE provisions would be considered "necessary and proper" implementa-
tion in the enforcement process.2' 9 However, the United States is neither a
signatory to or has never negotiated with any nation in the area of international
child support enforcement. The negotiation by the state governments and the
resultant de facto reciprocity between the state and foreign nations can infer a
treaty like relationship between the two parties.
How the courts have interpreted the Compact Clause creates a second
argument as to why agreements between state and foreign nations run afoul of
the Constitution. Aside from the necessity of Congressional consent, the
original inherent right of states to make compacts was not relinquished under
the Constitution.250 The formation of compacts by states 'was to be equivalent
to sovereign nations forming treaties.25" ' The significance of the distinction
between the treaty prohibiting clause and the compact clause was stated by the
Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison.
252
[T]he use of all of these terms, "treaty," "agreement," and "compact"
show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they
anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between
a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident
intention, unless we give to the word "agreement" its most extended
signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written
or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual
understanding of the parties. 253
249. Under the Federal Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONSr, art. 1, § 8, cl. 18,
federal statutes enacted in accordance with treaties or conventions the United States is signatory to are
considered "necessary and proper" toward the execution of the treaty.
250. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. 185, 209 (1837).
251. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938) ("'The Compact adapts to our Union of
sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations."); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U. S. at 725.
252. Poole, 39 U.S. at 540.
253. See id. at 570-572.
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Yet, the court later established the test for congressional consent as any
agreement that had a tendency to increase the political power of the state
government or to encroach upon the just supremacy of the United States." 4
Agreements between the states and the foreign nations may not necessarily
increase the political power of the state government, but it does interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States' ability to act in the international
affairs.255 Even if the ICSE provision constituted congressional consent, if
challenged, itis possible to argue that the authority granted to the states is of
such a nature that it would so severely hamper American foreign diplomacy as
to cause conflict of interest between the state government and the federal
government. This conflict of interest between the dual sovereigns, similar to
California, could eventually lead to conflict on an international level. It can be
inferred that agreements between the state and foreign nations should be within
the jurisdiction of the federal government in order to avoid any potential
problems in the international community. Comity is defined as:
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other person who are under the protection of its laws. 6
Comity is not a discretion afforded to state courts, but one possessed by nation-
states.25 7 Because comity is discretionary, it is not obligatory, and nation-states
can choose to exercise it at their discretion.2"' Since 1840, when Holmes was
decided, the more recent court decisions regarding comity have referred back
to the Holmes' definition of the nature of the doctrine.259 Comity is more likely
to be considered non-obligatory in nature on the federal court level as seen in
the Holmes2' and limited to the parties who are signatories of the compact, as
in Virginia v. Tennessee.26' Under the ICSE provisions, agreements between
the state government and foreign nations places a burden on states that are not
party to the agreement to assist in requests by foreign nations.262 The statute
254. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518; Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 452.
255. See Hooker, 607 F.2d at 289 (proclaiming that the state and federal governments have no
precedence of intergovernmental cooperation in international relations and states have no authority to conduct
the international affairs of the United States).
256. See DeHart, supra note 134, at 92; See also Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166. The duty that exists is
an international duty to respond, not a domestic duty.
257. Bank v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839).
258. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166.
259. See id.
260. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569.
261. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 654 32(A).
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specifically states that request "by a foreign reciprocating country... which the
States has an arrangement... shall be treated as a request by a state." '63 Such
a statement can be construed as use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
implement foreign support orders in non-party states.
From this analysis, the statute can be challenged as creating an obligatory
nature to the principle of comity by forcing the state executive branch to
implement federal policy.2" In addition, a non-custodial parent can contend
that the statutes require non-contracting states to be party to reciprocal
agreements whose terms they were not able to negotiate.26 Both the doctrine
of comity and recognition of foreign judgments by the courts are discretionary
in nature. If that is the case, then the statute's imposition of a duty on state
courts to accept international foreign judgments goes against the legal premise
of foreign judgments being merely prima facie evidence that a debt exists. The
legal effect of the statute would be to create a recognition and obligation to pay
in states who have adopted the UFMJRA,266 and thus making those states party
to another state's reciprocal agreement with a foreign nation. In total, the
statute creates a lack of accountability in the federal government267 by
impressing upon and creating in the states a duty of care they would not
naturally posses.2 68
B. The ICSE Provisions Delegation of Power to States Should be Chal-
lenged
Although an early court case may have stated an absolute concept that
"legislative power can not be delegated," 269 the court has on many occasions
sustained congressional delegation of power to federal agencies.?7 There exists
a de facto recognition by the court of Congress' ability to delegate its authority
in order to resolve specific problems. "Delegation by Congress has long been
263. See id.
264. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (finding that Congress has no
authority in forcing state officials to implement federal policy).
265. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. at 748 (stating that states should be made party to any
compact or agreement which effects their territory or citizens).
266. By adopting the UFMJRA, states are not allowed to recognize foreign judgments pertaining to
marital situations.
267. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382.
268. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) ("The State has no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident[s]").
269. See United States. v. Shreveoprt Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
270. See, e.g., New York Central Securities Co. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12,25 (1932) (Interstate
Commerce Commission); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933) (Federal Radio Commission); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(Federal Communication Commission); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (Sentencing
Commission).
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recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility. '27' The delicate balance of interpreting the Constitution
either through a functionalist versus formalist viewpoint has diffused the exact
boundary of Congress' ability to delegate authority to such an extent that the
Supreme Court, from early on, has been reluctant to decide on the matter
unnecessarily. 2 The court is more willing to sustain delegations whenever
Congress provided an "intelligible principle" to which the federal agency or
office could conform. 273 Therefore, the Supreme Court has been very
deferential to and recognizes the broad scope of Congress' ability in delegation
of authority to federal agencies.274 Yet, when it comes to foreign affairs and the
delegation of power to the states the court has had a more conservative
approach.275
Congress has promulgated statutes delegating state officials and agencies
to implement and execute federal laws. 276 Although the court expressed doubts
as to Congress' ability to delegate authority to the state governments, it has
been more consistent in ruling that Congress can give the state government the
option to enforce federal law.277 In Selective Draft Law Cases,278 the court
rejected the argument that a federal statute was invalid because it delegated
duties to state officers.279 Currently, the Court has reversed its position and has
held in numerous occasions that state officers, by virtue of not being appointed
by the President, are not federal officers possessed with the inherent power of
executing federal laws.28°
In Printz v. United States,28' local sheriffs sought to enjoin the enforcement
of provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevent Act (hereinafter "Brady
271. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); See also Minstretta,
488 U.S. at 372.
272. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42 (1825).
273. See JW Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (legislative standards
test). Since after the depression, the Supreme Court has never found a permissible Congressional delegation
of power to a federal agency.
274. See, e.g., SCHOENBORD, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985).
275. See United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp, 299 U.S. 304,312 (1936) (sustaining ajoint resolution
of Congress prohibiting the sale of weapons to selected countries, upon designation by the President);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918). The standard practice has been to interpret narrowly
the delegation so as to avoid constitutional problems. •
276. See WARREN, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1925).
277. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
278. Selective Draft Cases, 245 U.S. at 389.
279. See id.
280. In Printz, the Brady Gun Bill case, the court denied application of a section of the statute which
delegated to local sheriffs law enforcement branches, in the interim period prior to a federal system being
implemented, to enforce the federal law. 117 S.Ct. at 2383.
281. Id. at 2365.
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Act"). The court, reaffirming New York v. United States,282 found that Congress
could not compel states to "enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
283
Provisions in the Brady Act required, inter alia, the chief law enforcement
officer of a state conduct background checks in the interim period between the
inception of the statute and the time the federal government scheme became
operative.284 In finding the interim provisions unconstitutional, the court first
addressed the government's contention that early congressional enactment
supported the validity of the provisions. 285 The court stated that early federal
statutes did not impose an obligation to act on the state governments, instead
the state authorized its courts to consent to the statute, 6 or the states them-
selves consented to the statute.28 7 In addition, the court looked to the text of the
Constitution28 8 and concluded that "the early statutes imposing obligations on
state courts [did not] imply a power of Congress to impress the state executive
into its service. ' 289 The court eluded to the fact that the early statutes held no
evidence of an explicit or implicit grant to the federal government to "command
the states' executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional
authorization.290
Similarly, the ICSE provisions by requesting that state plans for child
support "must . . . provide that any request for services . . . by a foreign
reciprocating country or a foreign country with which the state has an
arrangement described in [the other ICSE provision] shall be treated as a
request by the state. 29 ' The Constitution in its text 292 and by its structure
creates a dual sovereignty, with enumerated powers vested in the federal
282. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1995).
283. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2383.
284. See id. at 2369.
285. See id. at 2370; See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,723-24 (1986) (explaining that
early congressional legislation provided "'contemporaneous and weighting evidence' of the Constitution's
meaning.").
286. Holgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 516-17 (1910) (refusing to address the isse of "whether
the states can be required to enforce [provisions of the Act of March 26, 1790] against the state's consent").
287. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2370; In Unites States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519-520 (1883), the court
asserted that a federal statute "could not be enforced against the consent of the state." Therefore, any
obligations to comply with the statute must be with the state's consent. Id.
288. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl.2 (Supremacy Clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ I (Full Faith and Credit).
289. Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2371.
290. See id. at 2372.
291. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 132(A) (West 1998).
292. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).
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government on the one hand,293 and imposed limitations upon29 and residual
power295 vested in the state government on the other.296
More recently, in Condon v. Reno,297 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act was unconstitu-
tional because it was a law which applied only to the states and not to private
parties, thus was not a law of general applicability.298
ICSE provisions give authority to the executive branch to enter into
reciprocal agreements with foreign nations,299 permits the states to enter into
reciprocal agreements with foreign nations, if the federal government has not,3°°
and requires the states to treat foreign judgments for child support as if they
originated in a sister-state. 30 1 Thus, the effect of the statute creates a delegation
to states the power to enter into agreements with foreign nations.
C. Suggested Remedies
The ICSE provisions can be saved by placing the issue of international
child support enforcement on a completely federal level without local
interference by the states in the federal government's foreign policy. By doing
this, a true demarcation of authority will be defined in such a way that both
sovereign powers, i.e. the state and federal governments, will not be in conflict
with each other. Furthermore, the ICSE provisions can be saved without losing
the desired effect by removing subsection (d) from §659a and 32 from §654.
These sections, which pertain to the role of the state governments in the
international child support arena, as argued, weaken the statute and provides
targets for non-custodial parents to challenge the statute on constitutional
grounds. By enforcing the provisions and allowing Congress to do indirectly
what it could not do directly, make treaties with foreign nations via the state
government, Congress should consider amending the statute to include clearer
legislative history illustrating what role was intended for both the federal and
state governments. Finally, it is for the judiciary to decide whether to follow
the Lopez precedence by finding a point to re-define that which is federal from
that which is local in order to preserve the balance of federalism. On the other
hand, the court may declare that those areas which are not strictly addressed by
293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
294. See id. at art. I, § 10.
295. See id. at amend. X.
296. Printz 117 S. Ct. at 2377; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
297. Cordon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998).
298. Id. at 456.
299. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659a (a) (West 1998).
300. Id.
301. Id. at § 654 32.
2000]
612 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 6:575
the Constitution, such as international child support enforcement, should be




As this analysis suggests, there exists sound constitutional grounds for a
non-custodial parent to challenge the international child support provisions.
Although federal legislature, by passing the ICSE provisions, has decided to
assume a more active role in this area, they did not proceed far enough to
safeguard against dismissal of claims purely on procedural grounds. If the court
is expected to interpret and defer to acts of legislation, those acts should
conform to the legislative intent while following the proper course of legal
precedence.
The ICSE provisions reflect the federal government's enterprise in
imposing extra-constitutional power upon the state governments; thus, creating
an incongruity between the articulated purposes of the law and the actual
content of the law itself. Furthermore, under various constitutional clauses,
Congress lacks the power to delegate to states a right to enter into agreements
with foreign nations. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez," 3
Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to regulate family law.
The content and statutory history of the ICSE provisions do not demonstrate
that regulation of international child support claims substantially effect foreign
commerce. Additionally, the provisions do not contain ajurisdictional element
linking regulation of international child support with foreign commerce.
By granting a right to the state government to enter into agreements with
foreign nations, the legislature has created a federalism problem, obscured the
delicate balance between the federal and state government, and introduced
ambiguity to the process of child support enforcement. By exercising control
over family law, the legislature obfuscated the Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez, avoiding to conservatively interpret the decision, which could have
eliminated any challenge presented by unwarranted congressional abrogation
of the Commerce Clause.
302. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, Justice, Legitimacy andAllegiance: The End ofDemocracy?, 44 LOY.
L. REv. 103, 105 (1998). Justice Scalia articulated this very premise in his concurrence in Webster v.
Reproduction Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,523-37 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring). Justice Scalia stated that
on the issue of abortion the federal government could be neither pro-life or pro-choice since abortion, like
many other things, is political in nature and not a constitutional issue. Id.
303. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
